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Congress has heavily intervened in U.S. mortgage markets ever since the
Great Depression, when federal housing credit policies were first deployed to
resuscitate housing and mortgage markets. Congress chartered federal agencies
and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to promote access to mortgage
credit by purchasing or guaranteeing mortgages. Since the onset of the Great
Recession the Federal Reserve has conducted its own form of housing credit
policy aimed at reducing the cost and increasing the availability of mortgage
credit: large-scale purchases of government agency mortgage-backed securities
(MBS). Whereas monetary policy targets a term structure of risk-free interest
rates, credit policies aim to alter the allocation of credit by absorbing or sub-
sidizing lending risks. Government purchases of mortgage debt might simply
displace private mortgage lending, or housing credit policies could channel re-
sources toward housing by subsidizing a reduction in mortgage risk premia.
Despite the federal government’s expansive use of housing credit policies,
evidence on the macroeconomic effects of government mortgage purchases has
been constrained by an identification problem. Regressing housing or mortgage
market activity on government agency mortgage purchases would capture re-
verse causality bias arising from policy endogeneity and profit motives; these
sources of reverse causality bias would similarly undermine common macroe-
conometric identification strategies. Studying the Fed’s MBS purchases during
the Great Recession faces related intrinsic challenges. My dissertation develops
a novel identification strategy to circumvent these challenges to inference re-
garding the macroeconomic effects of government agencies purchasing or sell-
ing mortgage debt. I construct instrumental variables from observable policy
interventions over 1967–2006 and use them to tease apart the intended versus
unintended causal effects of government purchases of mortgage debt.
The novel identification strategy underpinning my dissertation is a narrative
analysis of regulatory policy changes affecting government agency purchases of
mortgage debt. The narrative approach to time series identification exploits the
historical record for exogenous policy shocks, as opposed to backing out shocks
from latent variables with modeling assumptions or statistical techniques. I con-
tribute the first narrative analysis of U.S. housing credit policies, using primary
sources to identify and quantify regulatory shocks affecting the mortgage hold-
ings of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, the Federal Reserve, and the U.S.
Treasury Department. Regulatory policy changes that I classify as not cyclically
motivated are intended as instrumental variables for government agency mort-
gage purchases, circumventing concerns about reverse causality bias.
The first chapter of my dissertation exploits identifying variation from my
narrative analysis to document whether government mortgage purchases ad-
vance stated housing policy objectives and to study interactions with monetary
policy. We find that agency purchases boost total mortgage lending and lower
mortgage rates, indicating that policymakers are capable of directing credit to-
ward housing, as intended, as opposed to simply crowding out private mort-
gage lending. Agency purchases also advance periodic policy objectives of in-
creasing housing starts and homeownership rates. We identify similarities in
the transmission of monetary policy shocks and agency mortgage purchases,
and document significant interactions between monetary and housing credit
policies; Congress frequently used cyclically motivated credit policies to cush-
ion housing and mortgage markets from contractionary monetary shocks.
If housing credit policies expand targeted lending volumes by subsidizing or
absorbing private credit risks, they may inadvertently reduce other lending. My
second dissertation chapter empirically tests whether the mortgage purchases
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac unintentionally displace commercial lending
and related real activity by subsidizing an expansion in mortgage lending. I
use my narrative analysis for exogenous variation in the mortgage purchases of
Fannie and Freddie. Regulatory shocks to GSE mortgage purchases boost pri-
vate home mortgage lending yet unintentionally reduce commercial real estate
and business lending. U.S. housing credit policies similarly reallocate construc-
tion activity toward housing and away from commercial real estate, negating
any intended stimulus to aggregate construction spending or employment.
The third chapter of my dissertation is the narrative analysis underpinning
the identification strategies behind the first two chapters.
My findings are relevant to efforts in Congress to resolve the fate of Fan-
nie and Freddie, as well as to the ongoing reduction in the Fed’s MBS hold-
ings. Government agency mortgage purchases are capable of increasing mort-
gage borrowing, reducing mortgage rates, boosting housing investment, and
raising homeownership rates, as intended, through a subsidy channel. Sub-
sidizing mortgage borrowing, however, involves an unintended tradeoff with
respect to commercial lending and commercial real estate investment. Govern-
ment agency mortgage purchases appear ineffectual as a tool of stabilization
policy—as they have been employed on and off since the Great Depression.
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CHAPTER 1
THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT ASSET
PURCHASES: EVIDENCE FROM POSTWAR U.S. HOUSING CREDIT
POLICY*
Andrew J. Fieldhouse, Karel Mertens, and Morten O. Ravn
Abstract: We document the portfolio activity of federal housing agencies and
provide evidence on its impact on mortgage markets and the economy. Through
a narrative analysis, we identify historical policy changes leading to expansions
or contractions in agency mortgage holdings. Based on those regulatory events
that we classify as unrelated to short-run cyclical or credit market shocks, we
find that an increase in mortgage purchases by the agencies boosts mortgage
lending, in particular refinancing, and lowers mortgage rates. Agency pur-
chases also influence prices in other asset markets, stimulate residential invest-
ment, and expand homeownership. We compare these effects to those of con-
ventional monetary policy shocks, and we provide evidence on the interactions
between housing credit and monetary policies.
*For a final version of this paper, visit: https://academic.oup.com/qje/
article-pdf/133/3/1503/25112590/qjy002.pdf
Citation: Fieldhouse, Andrew J., Karel Mertens, and Morten O. Ravn. 2018.
“The Macroeconomic Effects of Government Asset Purchases: Evidence from
Postwar U.S. Housing Credit Policy,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133 (3):
1503-1560.
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1.1 Introduction
The residential mortgage market in the United States is one of the largest cap-
ital markets in the world and by far the dominant source of credit for Ameri-
can households. The mortgage market finances housing, which is a key com-
ponent of both household wealth and aggregate spending, see e.g. Leamer
(2007). Many accounts of the causes and propagating factors of the 2007/08 fi-
nancial crisis assign an important role to a boom and bust in the availability
of mortgage credit.1 The US mortgage market is also subject to heavy gov-
ernment involvement through various federal agencies, including the hous-
ing government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). In the decades preceding the
2007/08 crisis, the various agencies collectively accumulated a large share of
the total outstanding US mortgage debt on their balance sheets. In this paper,
we investigate whether agency portfolio purchases of mortgage assets influence
the availability and cost of housing credit, and whether there are spillovers to
other debt markets and economic activity more broadly.
While the history of agency activity offers a rich source of variation to study
the effects of government asset purchases, it also presents a number of chal-
lenges. The largest agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been privately
owned for much of their existence and therefore carry responsibilities to stock
owners as well as to their public missions of providing “stability” and “ongoing
assistance” in mortgage markets. Both profit and public objectives cause these
agencies to systematically and rapidly respond to market conditions, such that
changes in their mortgage purchasing activity reflect changes in housing credit
demand and many other influences. Some of the correlation between agency
1See e.g. Mian and Sufi (2009), Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2014), or Di Maggio
and Kermani (2016).
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balance sheets on the one hand and credit growth or mortgage rates on the other
is therefore likely to reflect reverse causality.
Our strategy to isolate changes in agency purchasing activity free of con-
founding influences is to focus on historical credit policy interventions affect-
ing agency mortgage holdings, in the spirit of the approaches in Romer and
Romer (1989, 2010) and Ramey (2011) to studying monetary and fiscal policy.
Based on a narrative analysis of the regulatory history of the housing agencies,
we identify and quantify significant policy events affecting agency purchases.
These include adjustments to capital requirements, portfolio caps, or statutory
borrowing authority, direct appropriations and capital injections by the Trea-
sury, or changes to the pool of mortgages eligible for agency purchase, such
as changes in conforming loan limits or authorizations to enter new mortgage
market segments.
Credit policy changes are often reactions to cyclical conditions in mortgage
and housing markets, the recent crisis being a prime example. However, many
interventions are motivated by other longer-run objectives such as increasing
homeownership. Based on an extensive analysis of historical sources, we clas-
sify each significant credit policy change as motivated by either cyclical consid-
erations or by other non-cyclical objectives.2 This results in a measure summa-
rizing the non-cyclically motivated policy events, which we use as an instru-
mental variable in regressions of a variety of outcome variables on measures
of agency purchasing activity. Similar to the approach in Ramey and Zubairy
(2017) to estimating government spending multipliers, we estimate the cumu-
lative effects of an increase in agency purchases on mortgage credit and origi-
2The full narrative analysis is in a companion background paper, Fieldhouse and Mertens
(2017), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w23165.
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nations, as well as impulse responses to news shocks about future agency pur-
chasing activity.
It is not clear ex ante that government purchases of mortgage assets have
meaningful effects on the cost and availability of housing credit. If financial
market frictions are relatively unimportant, an increase in agency purchases
may have little impact on the volume of mortgage credit, and simply lead to
crowding out of private holdings. If such frictions are instead pervasive, mort-
gage market policies may, on the other hand, be very important for the provi-
sion of credit to residential borrowers. Based on our methodology, we find that
agency purchases indeed lead to statistically significant expansions in mortgage
credit. Our estimates indicate that each additional dollar in agency mortgage
purchases leads to a 3 to 4 dollar cumulative increase in mortgage originations
over the course of three to four years, and a net expansion in the stock of mort-
gage debt of around one dollar. The rise in originations is largely driven by an
increase in refinancing activity, but is also followed by a greater volume of orig-
inations financing home purchases. The expansionary effects on housing credit
are accompanied by temporary reductions in mortgage interest rates, which fall
by 10 to 15 basis points for more than a year following an increase in agency
purchases of one percent of trend originations.
Agency purchases also affect prices in other asset markets. We estimate that
the 10-year Treasury rate and the 3-month T-bill rate both decline when the
agencies increase their purchases of mortgages. Key policy objectives behind
the housing credit policies first introduced in the 1930s included boosting the
availability of housing credit, increasing residential investment, and elevating
homeownership over the long run, all recurrent motivations for subsequent pol-
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icy interventions. We find evidence that supports these roles of the agencies in
that new housing starts and homeownership rates rise following an increase
in agency mortgage purchases. We also find some evidence that agency mort-
gage purchases increase house prices and stimulate private sector consumption.
There is no clear evidence of any significant impact on the unemployment rate
or personal income.
Perhaps our most surprising finding concerns the relationship between
housing credit and monetary policies. We show that the narratively identi-
fied housing credit policy shocks have forecasting power for the residual shock
component of the Romer and Romer (2004) decomposition of federal funds rate
target changes, while the reverse is not true. Instead, we find that cyclically mo-
tivated housing credit policy changes lean against the wind of contractionary
monetary disturbances. Housing credit policy shocks have larger effects on re-
financing originations than interest rate shocks, and influence homeownership
independent of short-term interest rates. The quantitative effects of housing
credit policy and conventional monetary shocks are very similar along many
other dimensions. These findings suggest that both may share similar trans-
mission channels, and that the interplay between monetary and credit policy
deserves more attention.
In the appendix, we also pursue an alternative identification strategy based
on instrumenting agency purchases with shocks to Fannie and Freddie excess
stock market returns. This approach is analogous to Fisher and Peters (2010),
who use excess return innovations in major US defense stocks as a measure of
news shocks to military spending. The results validate the findings obtained
from the narrative approach.
5
1.2 Mortgage Purchases as Credit Policy in the United States
The US government intervenes in the mortgage market in many ways. We fo-
cus attention on the federal involvement in purchasing residential mortgages.
The first significant use of this type of policy dates back to the Great Depres-
sion. The sharp and sustained downturn in credit markets motivated Congress
to create the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation in 1933. Financed by bonds,
the Corporation purchased delinquent mortgages from lenders and refinanced
these mortgages into fully amortizing fixed-rate loans with long maturities to
lower monthly payments for distressed mortgagors. In 1938, Congress created
Fannie Mae to support a secondary market for government-guaranteed mort-
gages. Fannie’s authority to acquire mortgage debt was increased greatly after
WWII to support the construction sector and promote homeownership among
veterans. The late 1960s saw the creation of Ginnie Mae to provide continued
support for the market for government-guaranteed mortgages. In 1970, Fan-
nie Mae obtained permission to enter the conventional market, i.e. the market
for loans not directly guaranteed or insured by the government, and the newly
created Freddie Mac joined Fannie Mae in developing a nationwide secondary
market for conventional mortgages.
Over time, the agencies have played an increasingly active role. The two
largest GSEs, Fannie and Freddie, acquire mortgages through advance commit-
ments to buy loans from mortgage lenders, which are delivered once the loans
are originated in the primary market 3 Until the late 1960s, the purchases by
Fannie were financed predominantly by borrowing from the Treasury. After-
3Another major housing GSE is the Federal Home Loan Bank System, chartered during the
Depression to provide wholesale liquidity to member mortgage lending institutions. We use
the term ‘GSE’ to refer to Fannie and Freddie.
6
wards, as quasi-private entities, Fannie and Freddie have financed these pur-
chases with a mix of private capital and debt issued in capital markets. A third
financing option is the issuance of mortgage pools, i.e. mortgage-backed secu-
rities (MBS). Securitization was brought to the conventional market by Freddie
Mac in the early 1970s, and took off in the 1980s when Fannie Mae entered the
business. Mortgage securitization has consistently been GSE-dominated, per-
haps with the brief exception of the 2004-2006 private-label securitization boom.
In the process of packaging whole mortgages into securities, the agencies also
assume the credit risk in return for guarantee fees. From the early 1990s on-
wards, the agencies increasingly retained their own and acquired each other’s
MBS, as opposed to selling them to private investors.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the evolution of agency involvement in the residential
mortgage market over time. The upper left panel shows the stock of total res-
idential mortgage debt both as a ratio of GDP and as ratio of total residential
wealth. The upper right panel shows the total annualized volume of residential
mortgage originations as a ratio of GDP and as a fraction of outstanding mort-
gage debt. The lower panels of Figure 1.1 provide measures of agency mar-
ket shares, constructed by consolidating data on holdings and net purchases
of whole loans and MBS as reported on the agencies’ balance sheet and activ-
ity statements. The left panel shows the fraction of mortgage debt owned by
Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie as well as all other federal agencies with mortgage
holdings, such as the Federal Home Loan Banks and the Federal Reserve.4 The
lower right panel show the flows of net mortgage purchases by the agencies as a
4Other agencies include the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, Treasury, Veterans Admin-
istration, Federal Housing Administration, Federal Farmers Home Administration, Resolution
Trust Corporation, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Public Housing Administra-
tion. We do not include mortgages in government pension funds. See the data appendix III for
sources.
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percentage of total originations. The blue line shows the net portfolio purchases.
To distinguish these portfolio purchases clearly from those for securitization, the
figure also shows in red the combined issuance of MBS by the agencies.5
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Figure 1.1: Mortgage Debt, Annualized Originations, and Agency Market
Shares
Notes: Residential mortgage debt and originations include home as well as multifamily mort-
gages. Agency holdings include holdings of both whole loans and pools. Agency purchases are
net purchases for portfolio investment, whereas pool issuance approximate purchases backing
new mortgage pools (mortgage-backed securities). The grey bars are NBER-dated recessions.
Sources: see data appendix.
The post-WWII period witnessed a marked expansion in mortgage debt, ris-
ing from around 10 percent of GDP at the end of WWII to more than 80 percent
by 2008, before steadily declining in the wake of the 2007/08 financial crisis.
Originations of new mortgages are volatile, procyclical, and average around 20
5Because purchases may include loans originated in prior periods, the market shares may
occasionally exceed 100 percent.
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percent of outstanding debt at an annualized rate.6 By any measure, the gov-
ernment agencies have over time become large players in the mortgage market.
Between 1980 and 2006, total purchases in the secondary market by Fannie and
Freddie alone average around 40 to 50 percent of originations. The majority of
these acquisitions were packaged in MBS and sold off to private investors. The
portfolio purchases, comprising whole loans retained for the portfolio as well as
net acquisitions of MBS, have averaged 7 percent of originations between 1967
and 1990, and about 15 percent between 1990 and 2006. At the peak in 2004, al-
most a quarter of all residential mortgage debt resided on the balance sheet of a
federal agency, with roughly 20 percent owned by Fannie and Freddie alone. In
early September 2008, Fannie and Freddie were taken into conservatorship and
were required to gradually wind-down their balance sheets by two-thirds. The
Federal Reserve subsequently pursued several rounds of large-scale purchases
of agency MBS under its quantitative easing (QE) programs, and its current
holdings amount to roughly 15 percent of total mortgage debt outstanding. For
readers wishing more information about the institutional history of the housing
agencies, appendix I provides more background.
The focus of this paper is on the portfolio purchases of the housing agen-
cies, shown in blue in the lower right panel in Figure 1.1. Prior to the Fed’s
QE programs, Fannie and Freddie accounted for the bulk of agency mortgage
acquisitions. Even as privately owned corporations, Fannie and Freddie have
been key agents of federal housing policy and differ from traditional financial
intermediaries in a number of important ways. First, they have always main-
tained authorization to borrow from the Treasury. While this authorization was
6Net additions to the stock of mortgage debt are considerably smaller than originations since
both existing home sales as well as refinancing transactions typically lead to minor net changes
in mortgage debt.
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limited and never formally exercised, it sufficed to create the widely held belief
that the US government would never allow a GSE to default. This perception,
eventually justified by the government takeover of Fannie and Freddie in 2008,
meant that interest rates on agency bonds have typically been close to Treasury
rates. Second, agency debt is eligible for open market operations by the Fed. In
the 1960s and 1970s the Fed made significant purchases of agency debt, see Hal-
tom and Sharp (2014), and again so under the QE programs. Third, the pruden-
tial supervision of the GSEs is separate from private banks and, prior to 2008,
resided within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).7
Regulatory oversight of the GSEs was traditionally light compared to that of
private banks, and the GSEs generally enjoyed much less stringent capital and
reporting requirements. For instance, despite being publicly listed companies,
Fannie and Freddie were exempt from filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission until the early 2000s. Finally, for much of their existence, the GSEs
have also benefitted from various preferential tax treatments.
In exchange for the privileges granted by federal law, the GSEs face a num-
ber of restrictions and obligations. Fannie and Freddie cannot originate loans
in the primary market and are not allowed to diversify portfolio holdings much
beyond mortgage assets. Their purchases are limited to conforming mortgages
that must meet certain underwriting standards, and the principal on the loans
cannot exceed a maximum amount, known as the conforming loan limit. The
authority for adjusting the limit and other loan characteristics that determine
what mortgages are conforming has generally lied with Congress and the HUD
Secretary. In 1980, the conforming loan limit became indexed to a house price
index maintained by Freddie Mac. Since then typically around 80 percent of
7Since 2008, the regulatory authority has lied with the Federal Housing Finance Agency, an
independent federal agency.
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mortgages have been conforming.8 Finally, the GSEs are expected to balance
stock owner interests with certain public policy objectives, including the stabi-
lization and enhancement of mortgage markets, as well as assistance with the
provision of credit to lower-income households.
1.3 Related Literature
There are relatively few attempts at identifying the dynamic effects of agency
purchases on mortgage credit, residential investment, or homeownership. An
early literature estimates reduced form models of credit and housing markets
to assess the impact of GSE activity in the 1970s, e.g. Arcelus and Meltzer
(1973), Meltzer (1974), Hendershott and Villani (1977, 1980), Jaffee and Rosen
(1978), and Kaufman (1985). Although no clear consensus emerges from this
early work, Smith, Rosen, and Fallis (1988) conclude that an additional dollar
in government lending increases mortgage debt by 25 to 35 cents after three to
four quarters. Arcelus and Meltzer (1973) and Meltzer (1974), however, argue
there is no effect on residential investment or home purchases, while Jaffee and
Rosen (1978) and Hendershott and Villani (1977, 1980) find a positive impact of
agency activity on home construction.
Starting with Hendershott and Shilling (1989), a number of studies docu-
ment significant interest rate spreads between conforming and jumbo loans,
which suggests that the GSEs affect the cost of mortgage credit. Hendershott
and Shilling (1989) attribute this result to a credit supply channel operating
8In response to the financial crisis, the limit was increased substantially for the financing
of homes in urban areas, which further expanded the pool of mortgage debt eligible for GSE
purchase.
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through agency securitization. A number of studies investigate the time series
relationship between GSE activity and credit costs. Naranjo and Toevs (2002),
for instance, find a negative long-run relationship between GSE purchases and
mortgage rates, while Gonza´lez-Rivera (2001) finds only a negative short-run
relationship.9 Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherlund (2008) study the impact of GSE
activities on primary and secondary market mortgage spreads using both gen-
eralized impulse response analysis and causal orderings in VAR models. Based
on monthly data from 1993 to 2005, these authors find little evidence that higher
GSE purchases impact mortgage spreads, which is consistent with the Meltzer
view that credit market interventions are neutral. In a May 2005 speech, Fed-
eral Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan conveyed a similar view of the role of
the GSEs’ portfolio activities, stating that “Fannie’s and Freddie’s purchases... with
their market-subsidized debt do not contribute usefully to mortgage market liquidity, to
the enhancement of capital markets in the United States, or to the lowering of mortgage
rates for homeowners” (Greenspan , 2005).
In this paper, we contribute new evidence against the Greenspan-Meltzer
view that agency mortgage purchase have little effect on the cost and avail-
ability of mortgage credit. Our approach is similar in spirit to Lehnert et al.
(2008), but adopts novel and arguably better identification strategies to control
for the endogeneity of agency purchases. We also study a much longer time
frame than any of the earlier papers, and we estimate the effects on both credit
aggregates and mortgage rates. Moreover, our analysis allows us to study the
9Naranjo and Toevs (2002), who use vector error-correction (VEC) and GARCH (general-
ized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic) models and study monthly time series data
from 1986 to 1998, find that both GSE purchases and securitization reduce conforming mort-
gage spreads and volatility, while documenting some spill over to reductions in non-conforming
loans, which they attribute to investor substitution effects. Gonza´lez-Rivera (2001), who uses
VEC models and monthly data from 1994 to 1999, finds a negative short-run relationship of GSE
purchases responding to widening secondary mortgage market spreads, and some evidence of
a pass through from secondary to primary mortgage rates from agency purchases.
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dynamic causal impact on many other variables of interest, including housing
starts, home prices, homeownership rates, cyclical indicators, and various other
interest rates and credit spreads.
Our paper is related to the many analyses of the large-scale MBS purchases
by the Federal Reserve under the QE programs. To isolate the effects of these
purchases, the literature typically restricts attention to high frequency financial
data, and most studies conclude that the MBS purchases lowered secondary
market mortgage yields on impact, see e.g. Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2011), Patrabansh, Doerner, and Asin (2014), and Han-
cock and Passmore (2011, 2015).10 Exploiting cross-sectional variation, a few
recent studies also uncover evidence that is suggestive of a positive impact
on mortgage lending. Di Maggio, Kermani, and Palmer (2016), for instance,
find that, after the first QE intervention, originations of mortgages qualifying
for inclusion in securities eligible for purchase by the Fed increased substan-
tially more than those of non-qualifying mortgages. No such differential effects
are evident after the second QE intervention, which did not include MBS pur-
chases. Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2018) find that banks with larger mort-
gage positions increased lending relative to banks with smaller positions, and
Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2017) show that banks with MBS ex-
posure increased their mortgage origination share relative to other banks. By
studying a longer history of housing credit policy interventions, we are able to
circumvent some key limitations of the event studies of the Fed’s large-scale
MBS purchases. Our approach permits an analysis beyond the very short-run
response of financial variables, and unlike the cross-sectional studies, provides
direct evidence on aggregate rather than relative effects.
10Stroebel and Taylor (2012) instead find no effects of the MBS purchases under QE1.
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Our study also fits in a broader empirical literature that aims to identify
credit supply shocks and estimate their aggregate effects. Peek, Rosengren, and
Tootell (2003), for instance, use bank health indicators as proxies for loan sup-
ply shocks and find substantial effects on inventory investment and other ag-
gregates. Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012) look at innovations in corporate bond
spreads after removing cyclical default premia, and demonstrate their strong
predictive content for macroeconomic fluctuations. Bassett, Chosak, Driscoll,
and Zakrajsek (2014) study residual variation in survey measures of bank lend-
ing standards and find an impact on economic activity. Mian, Sufi and Verner
(2017) use variation in the timing of bank branching deregulation in the 1980s to
construct differential state-level credit supply shocks, and find that these shocks
impact household borrowing and employment. Our narrative policy indicator
and the GSE excess return shocks discussed in the appendix can similarly be
viewed as proxies for credit supply shocks in the mortgage market.
Many existing theories of financial frictions can explain the non-neutrality
of agency mortgage purchases. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2011)
and Di Maggio et al. (2016), among others, discuss a variety of potential trans-
mission channels associated with the MBS purchases under the QE programs.
Many of these channels have similar implications for mortgage purchases by the
GSEs. Through the portfolio rebalancing channel, for instance, private investors
bid up the price of mortgages when rebalancing assets towards some desired
composition of mortgages and agency liabilities. GSE portfolio purchases are
not funded with reserves, but with debt instruments that closely substitute for
Treasuries in terms of liquidity and (perceived) safety.11 Depending on the level
of segmentation in financial markets, rebalancing effects may spill over to other
11This difference may be less important if the Federal Reserve simultaneously acquires agency
debt.
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asset markets, in which case yields on mortgage substitutes—particularly other
types of long-term debt—may fall as well.
Agency mortgage purchases also matter when private mortgage lenders face
capital constraints because of regulations or binding incentive constraints, for
instance as in the theoretical models of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) or Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2011). Because the GSEs are more highly leveraged than pri-
vate lenders, aggregate lending capacity increases with agency market share.
Agency purchases that drive up the price of mortgages may additionally im-
prove the net worth position of private mortgage lenders, while the exchange of
mortgages for agency debt lowers their risk-weighted leverage ratios. Increased
agency activity in the secondary mortgage market may also reduce liquidity
premia. Our findings support a role for credit supply channels in determining
household debt, homeownership, and residential investment, but it is beyond
the scope of this paper to isolate precisely which of these channels may be more
important.
1.4 Identifying Causal Effects of Agency Mortgage Purchases
1.4.1 Endogeneity Problems
To assess the impact of agency portfolio purchases, one might be tempted to
simply correlate measures of agency activity, such as those in Figure 1.1, with
credit and other macroeconomic aggregates. This would, however, ignore vari-
ous endogeneity problems. For one, the agencies respond to changes in market
conditions. To maintain market share, for instance, the GSEs vary purchases
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with the supply of mortgages into the secondary market, which in turn depends
on fluctuations in the housing market and the economy. The agency response to
varying growth in the mortgage market induces a positive relationship between
agency balance sheets and overall mortgage lending activity. Failure to correct
for this source of reverse causality is likely to lead to an overestimation of the
impact of agency activity on credit availability.
A different endogeneity concern operating in the opposite direction is that
agency purchases typically expand relative to the mortgage market when credit
is tight and/or conditions in the housing market are deteriorating. This was
evidently the case during the latest financial crisis through the actions of the
Fed and Treasury, but is also true of earlier episodes. To illustrate this, Figure
1.2 shows the average real levels of agency and private holdings of mortgage
debt over the course of business and credit cycles since the mid-1950s. The
left panel of Figure 1.2 shows the average real levels of agency and privately
held mortgage debt centered around NBER business cycle peaks. On average,
growth in agency holdings is high relative to growth in private holdings prior
to a business cycle peak. The growth in private mortgage holdings slows down
just prior to the peak and remains low for a prolonged period after the start of a
recession. The pace of growth of agency holdings, in contrast, remains roughly
unchanged for at least two years after the beginning of an economic downturn.
The right panel of Figure 1.2 shows the average real levels of mortgage hold-
ings centered around the peak of credit cycles, defined as the quarter preced-
ing the start of credit crisis episodes based on the datings in Eckstein and Sinai
(1986) and subsequent updates.12 Agency and private holdings grow at roughly
12The dating of pre-1986 credit crunches is from Eckstein and Sinai (1986). The dating of post-
1986 crunches is based on Owens and Schreft (1993) for the 1990 commercial real estate crunch,
Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherlund (2008) for the 1998 Russian default/LTCM crisis, and Bordo
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Figure 1.2: Real Mortgage Debt by Holder in Recessions and Credit Crunches
Notes: Mortgage debt is deflated by the core PCE price index. The left panel shows the aver-
age of 9 NBER recessions starting 1957Q2, 1960Q1, 1969Q4, 1973Q4, 1980Q1, 1981Q3, 1990Q3,
2001Q1, 2007Q4. The right panel shows the average of credit crunches beginning one quarter
after the following dates: 1955Q3, 1959Q1, 1965Q4, 1968Q4, 1972Q4, 1978Q1, 1980Q4, 1990Q1,
1998Q2, 2007Q2. See data appendix for sources.
similar rates prior to a credit crunch. Growth in private holdings of mortgage
debt slows markedly following the start of a credit crisis. In contrast, growth in
agency holdings accelerates at the onset of a credit crunch and remains elevated
for about ten quarters, before flattening toward the pre-crunch trend.
The evidence thus indicates that agencies tend to increase their share of the
market in cyclical downturns and credit crunches. These countercyclical pur-
chase dynamics are robust to omitting the 2007/08 crisis and the Federal Re-
serve’s interventions. There are a number of reasons why the agencies main-
tain or expand purchases during cyclical downturns. A public mission to pro-
vide stability to mortgage markets is mandated in the GSEs’ statutory charters.
Credit crises also offer particularly profitable opportunities for the GSEs because
their lending spreads widen relative to private intermediaries, due to counter-
cyclical mortgage spreads and the implicit guarantee provided by the US gov-
ernment. Finally, the federal government often undertakes deliberate regula-
and Haubrich (2010) for the 2007/08 financial crisis.
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tory or legislative actions to further enable agency expansions during down-
turns. The fact that agency purchases tend to accelerate when mortgage spreads
are elevated and/or credit is tight induces a negative relationship with mort-
gage credit aggregates. Failure to account for this negative association is likely
lead to an underestimation of the causal effects of agency mortgage purchases.
1.4.2 Narrative Analysis of Policy Changes Affecting Agency
Mortgage Holdings
Our strategy to control for reverse causality in the relationship between agency
mortgage purchases and credit conditions is to use a narrative identification ap-
proach involving major regulatory events impacting agency mortgage holdings.
By focusing on policy interventions by the federal government, we exclude vari-
ation in purchase activity resulting from the agencies’ regular response to mar-
ket developments. Because policymakers themselves often respond to condi-
tions in mortgage and housing markets, we exclude interventions with short-
run stabilization motives as the primary objective. The end result of our narra-
tive analysis is a record of housing credit policy events that we use as an instru-
ment for agency purchase activity. Here, we summarize the methodology of the
narrative analysis, and describe the resulting policy indicators. A companion
background paper, Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017), provides the full narrative
analysis of credit policy events, including explanations of relevant findings for
each policy event and extensive documentation that allows verification of our
analysis.
The development of the narrative instrumental variable follows five steps:
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identifying significant policy changes affecting agency portfolios; quantifying
their ex ante projected impact on agency holdings; pinpointing the timing of
when the policies became publicly known; classifying each policy change as
either cyclically or non-cyclically motivated; and restricting the sample for con-
sistent use as an instrument for agency purchasing activity. Next, we describe
the procedures used in each of these steps. Table 1.1 provides an overview of
the historical primary sources used in the narrative analysis.
Table 1.1: Sources for Narrative Analysis
Government Publications
Board of Governors Annual Report, Press releases, Federal ReserveBulletin
Congressional Budget
Office
The Housing Finance System and Federal Policy: Recent
Changes and Options for the Future (1983), Controlling
Risks of Government-Sponsored Enterprises (1991)
Congressional Quarterly Congressional Quarterly Almanac
Congressional Research
Service
A Chronology of Housing Legislation and Selected
Executive Actions, 1892-2003 (2004), The Conforming
Loan Limit (2008)
Council of Economic
Advisors Economic Report of the President
Department of Housing
and Urban Development
HUD news releases, The Secondary Market in
Residential Mortgages (1982), 1986 Report to Congress
on the Federal National Mortgage Association (1987),
The National Homeownership Strategy: Partners in the
American Dream (1995), Privatization of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac: Desirability and Feasibility (1996),
Profiles of GSE Mortgage Purchases in 2001-2004
(2008)
Department of the
Treasury
Press releases and statements, Report of the Secretary
of the Treasury on Government-Sponsored Enterprises
(1990), Government Sponsorship of the FNMA and the
FHLMC (1996)
Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp.
Press releases and statements, Annual Report,
Form 10-K
Federal Housing Finance
Administration
Press releases and statements, Mortgage Market
Notes
Federal National
Mortgage Association
Press releases and statements, Annual Report,
Form 10-K, Monthly Volume Summary, Information
Statement, MBSenger, Offering Circular, Background
and History of the Federal National Mortgage
Association (1969, 1973)
Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission
Final Report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(2011)
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Government
Accountability Office
The Federal National Mortgage Association in a
Changing Environment (1985), GSEs: A Framework for
Limiting the Government’s Exposure to Risk (1991),
Housing Enterprises: Potential Impacts of Severing
Government Sponsorship (1996), HUD’s Mission
Oversight Needs to be Strengthened (1998)
US Congress
Hearing transcripts and reports: Committees on
Appropriations, Committees on Banking and
Currency, Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, and Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs
Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight
Press releases and statements, Annual Report,
Mortgage Market Notes, Mortgage Markets and the
Enterprises, Evaluating the Capital Adequacy of Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae (1998), Special Examination
Reports (2003, 2004, 2006)
Office of the Federal
Register Federal Register
Office of Management
and Budget Budget of the United States Government
The President’s
Commission on Housing
The Report of The President’s Commission on Housing
(1982)
Press and Online
Sources
ABA Banking Journal, American Banker, The American
Presidency Project, The Bond Buyer, Dow Jones Capital
Market Reports, Dow Jones News Service, Dow Jones
Newswires, Financial Times, MarketWatch, National
Mortgage News, The New York Times, Reuters News,
The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post
Overview Books and Articles
Bartke Fannie Mae and the Secondary Mortgage Market(1971), Home Financing at a Crossroads: A Study of the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (1973)
Elliot, Feldberg, and
Lehnert
The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the
US (2013)
Greenspan The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World(2007)
Haar Federal Credit and Private Housing: The MassFinancing Dilemma (1960)
Hagerty The Fateful History of Fannie Mae: New Deal Birth toMortgage Crisis Fall (2012)
Hoffman and Cassell Mission Expansion in the Federal Home Loan BankSystem (2010)
Hunter The FNMA: Its Response to Critical FinancingRequirements of Housing (1971)
McLean Shaky Ground: The Strange Saga of the US MortgageGiants (2015)
Notes: For detailed bibliographical references, see Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017).
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1. Identifying Significant Policy Changes. Policy changes affecting agency
purchases and mortgages holdings have historically been directed by a range
of policymakers, notably Congress, the President and the Cabinet, particularly
the Secretaries of the Treasury and HUD, various regulatory agencies in the ex-
ecutive branch, and the Federal Reserve. The relevant regulatory institutions
were disbanded and reinvented several times over the decades, and as a result
there is no single consistent source tracking the history of housing credit policy.
Instead, a wide range of sources is required for identifying and analyzing policy
changes.
Policy actions generally originate from one of three sources: enacted leg-
islative changes, regulatory policy changes published in the Federal Register or
as other binding agreements with regulators, and macroeconomic stabilization
policies managed by the Federal Reserve or Treasury. We restrict attention to
significant policy actions, meaning actions that would either be expected to di-
rectly impact agencies’ permissible volume of net purchases and retained port-
folio holdings, or else considerably expand the pool of eligible mortgages an
agency was authorized or required to purchase. Interventions determined at
the legislative level include adjusting statutory leverage ratios, capital require-
ments, and conforming loan limits, provision of working capital, mandatory
retirements of public stock, and direct appropriations or borrowing authority
for purchases, among others. Regulatory policy actions include setting per-
missible debt-to-capital ratios, imposing capital surcharges in excess of statu-
tory capital requirements, capping portfolio size or growth, setting affordable
housing goals, and authorizing entrance to new segments of the mortgage mar-
ket. Macroeconomic stabilization actions include the Fannie and Freddie con-
servatorship agreements entered in September 2008, subsequent amendments
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to these agreements, and the large-scale MBS purchase programs conducted by
the Federal Reserve and Treasury since 2008.
We use the comprehensive Congressional Research Service report “A
Chronology of Housing Legislation and Selected Executive Actions, 1892-2003” (CRS
, 2004) as a starting point for identifying significant policy changes, particu-
larly pertinent public laws. This legislative history is cross-referenced with the
Congressional Quarterly Almanac’s Housing and Development tracker. We addi-
tionally search appendices of the Budget of the United States Government for infor-
mation about policy changes affecting Ginnie Mae during relevant years, cross-
referenced with HUD appropriations bills and related reports of the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees. After identifying public laws affecting the
agencies, we use the ProQuest Congressional Publications Database to collect
the legislative text of those enacted laws, related committee reports and Con-
gressional hearing transcripts, and any preceding House and Senate versions
of the final bill.13 We then analyze relevant sections of these primary sources
to confirm these laws’ material impact on mortgage holdings and better under-
stand the nature of the policy changes.
Legislative actions often set in motion the drafting of new regulatory rules.
Identified significant legislative events are the starting point for a directed
search of related regulatory changes in HeinOnline’s Federal Register Library.
We also obtain information from the GSEs’ annual reports about significant reg-
ulatory changes, as well as from 10-K filings in more recent years. We addition-
13The ProQuest Congressional Publications Database provides a comprehensive compilation
of all public laws, committee reports, and hearings. Public laws and related legislative actions
since 1973 are available from Congress.gov, a project of the Library of Congress, along with com-
mittee reports since 1995. Most older public laws are available through LegisWorks Statutes at
Large Project. Most hearing transcripts are digitally available since 1985 from the US Govern-
ment Publishing Office.
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ally use sections of the Economic Report of the President and Annual Report of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, as well as the various reports by regu-
lators to collect information about regulatory rulings. We use newspapers, fi-
nancial newswires, and mortgage industry newsletters to help direct the search
for information about the rulings in the Federal Register, particularly the Wall
Street Journal, American Banker, and National Mortgage News.14 Final rules pub-
lished in the Federal Register almost always include a detailed background and
overview of the initial proposed rule, public comments received, and any sub-
sequent modifications.
Using these procedures, we are confident that we have identified the over-
whelming majority of significant policy events. The main concern is developing
a policy indicator that is correlated with underlying regulatory shocks to agency
purchasing activity. The larger the number of significant policy events identi-
fied, the higher the relevance of the instrument.
2. Quantification. To be included, we require that primary sources either
explicitly cite projections of the policy change’s impact, or contain information
that can be used to quantify the impact on agency mortgage holdings. For each
policy change, we use contemporaneous sources to obtain an ex ante estimate of
the projected impact on the agencies’ capacity to purchase mortgages, measured
in annualized billions of dollars within the first year of taking effect. If a baseline
is needed for quantifying a policy change, say for Fannie’s regulatory capital
when its debt-to-capital ratio is increased, we use the most recent data publicly
available prior to the policy change. We use ex ante balance sheet data on reg-
14This is done by Factiva and LexisNexis Academic searches of key words related to the reg-
ulatory policy change, in search windows around the vicinity of the event. After roughly pin-
pointing the publication date of a rule, we search the Federal Register for the rule itself, and
then work backwards to initial rulings.
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ulatory capital, liabilities, and/or assets in conjunction with standing leverage
or capitalization requirements to estimate the impact of related changes, such
as increases in permissible leverage ratios. Similarly, public capital injections
are quantified as a multiple of one more than the prevailing leverage ratio, to
capture the potential increase in assets supported by related debt issues plus the
working capital itself. Direct appropriations are straightforward to quantify, at
most requiring a pro-rata annualization adjustment based on relevant imple-
mentation lags. To quantify potential impacts of discretionary conforming loan
limit changes, we rely on estimates from Congressional committee reports ac-
companying legislation. Such reports typically cite the extent to which a large
conforming loan limit increase would restore a GSE’s real purchase activity. We
quantify the impact of such adjustments as the difference between annualized
purchase volumes immediately preceding the policy change and the home price
index-adjusted purchase volume of the benchmark year being restored. For rel-
atively large, open-ended changes, such as leverage ratio increases, potential
effects on mortgage holdings are annualized using a two-year rule, which as-
sumes half of the full potential impact would be realized within the first year of
taking effect.
For other policies that are inherently harder to quantify, such as authoriza-
tions for program expansions into new mortgage market segments, we search
for ex ante estimates of projected impacts on purchasing activity from commit-
tee reports, market analysts, regulators, or agency executives. We do not include
policies that would not have been expected to impose or alleviate binding con-
straints on agency activity. For instance, when adjustments to leverage ratios or
affordable housing goals are viewed as non-binding by most accounts and this
appears consistent with the agencies’ balance sheet and purchase behavior, we
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do not consider the policy change significant. We also exclude any laws or reg-
ulations that merely extend prior authorizations, and for certain authorizations
affecting Ginnie Mae, we use a current policy baseline as opposed to a current
law baseline for scoring annual funding changes.
When estimating the quantitative aspects of the policies, we rely on informa-
tion released by the Congressional Budget Office, Government Accountability
Office, Treasury Department, and Congressional Research Service that contain
detailed analyses of policy changes, background information, and/or balance
sheet data for the agencies in question, see Table 1.1. We also use information
from the annual or periodic reports of the agencies and regulators, particularly
regarding balance sheet data, and from appropriations bills and budget appen-
dices for certain policies affecting Ginnie Mae. Committee report language oc-
casionally cites projected effects of a pending policy change, and we also use the
financial press and industry newsletters to search for projections of the impact
of policies that are difficult to quantify.
3. Timing. At the operational level, the agencies sell commitments to pur-
chase conforming mortgages from primary market lenders, which may then
be exercised by the mortgagee up to an expiration date. Consequently, actual
agency purchases tend to lag behind the issuance of commitments to purchase
mortgages from primary market originators. Together with the usual policy
implementation lags, the policy events are therefore best thought of as news
shocks about agency mortgage purchases. We date each policy intervention to
the month in which we estimate that it became publicly anticipated, rather than
the month in which it was formally announced or took effect.
The ProQuest Congressional Publications Database, HeinOnline’s Federal
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Register Library, the CQ Almanac, and financial press are the primary sources
used for documenting pertinent news surrounding policy changes and the im-
plementation dates. For regulatory changes, we use the month in which pro-
posed rules were first published in the Federal Register or reported in the press.
We date legislative changes to when the provision including the policy change
was agreed upon in the House, Senate, or conference version of a bill, rather
than upon subsequent enactment. For Fannie and Freddie, we additionally
check the timing by cross-referencing policy announcements with GSE stock
price movements and the financial press, as often policy news is priced into
GSE shares.
4. Classification by Motivation. The classification of the policy events distin-
guishes between interventions that are guided by prevailing business cycle and
financial conditions, and those that are plausibly free of such contemporaneous
influences. Our instrument for agency mortgage purchases only includes the
latter to avoid bias due to the systematic relaxation of policies during periods of
stress in mortgage or housing markets. The classification is based on identifying
the primary motivations underlying each of the policy interventions. To make
this classification, we parse historical documents, paying particular attention to
the rationales invoked by policymakers and the press, the nature of the legisla-
tive vehicles or regulatory processes, the relation to known periods of economic
and financial stress, and the time horizon of policy objectives.
The principal data sources for identifying policy motives include Congres-
sional committee reports and hearings, Presidential speeches and signing state-
ments, the Budget of the US Government, Economic Report of the President, Federal
Reserve Bulletin, Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, CQ
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Almanac, and the financial press (see Table 1.1). For legislated policies, the ac-
companying reports of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs and the House Financial Services Committee typically detail congres-
sional intent and any pertinent economic context. Major housing policy laws
are also usually accompanied by a Presidential signing statement explaining
the bill’s motivation, context, and intended impact. Budget appendices and/or
committee reports accompanying appropriations bills usually explain the impe-
tus for certain policy changes affecting Ginnie Mae. Final rules published in the
Federal Register also almost always include a detailed background and history,
shedding light on regulators’ motives.
Based on these sources, we classify the policy changes as either cyclically
motivated or non-cyclically motivated. Interventions classified as cyclically mo-
tivated tend to emphasize short-term outcomes, such as boosting housing starts
in a recession. Legislative vehicles for such policy actions tend to be quickly
drafted and enacted, with a relatively concise legislative history and narrow
focus. Policymakers are typically quite explicit about cyclical concerns and ob-
jectives, overwhelmingly so when policies are implemented in close proximity
to recessions or credit crunches. Language we search for in committee reports
and signing statements as strong evidence of cyclical motivations include “emer-
gency, crisis, recession, credit shortage, credit crunch, housing starts, employment,
construction, downturn, depressed, stimulus, boost”, etc. Policies enacted during
or near a recession or credit crunch are held to a particularly high bar for be-
ing classified as non-cyclical, but are not automatically classified as cyclically
motivated.
Interventions motivated by social policy, budgetary, or other more ideolog-
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ical objectives are classified as unrelated to the business or financial cycle, pro-
vided the various historical sources do not at the same time indicate signifi-
cant short-term economic or financial market concerns. Political rather than
economic context shapes the development of these interventions, such as an
administration’s emphasis on expanding affordable homeownership opportu-
nities to lower-income households, concerns regarding the structural budget
deficit, or ideological hostility toward the GSEs. It is often hard to establish a
single rationale for the non-cyclical actions, which can be motivated by a mix
of objectives. For our purposes, however, a more precise distinction between
these objectives is not essential. Language we search for as indicative of non-
cyclical motivations include “long-term, farsighted, comprehensive, low-income, af-
fordable housing, American Dream, homeownership, budget deficit, reduce borrowing,
off-budget, privatize,” etc. Legislative actions classified as non-cyclical empha-
size longer-term outcomes, such as increasing homeownership rates. Legisla-
tive vehicles for such interventions tend to be slower-moving bills, particularly
deliberate overhauls of housing policy with a lengthy legislative history; the
National Housing Acts, Housing and Urban Development Acts, and Housing
and Community Development Acts of various years tend to meet this descrip-
tion, being slowly crafted and negotiated between the House, Senate, and White
House, and focusing on broad, long-term objectives for housing policy, such as
urban revitalization or access to affordable housing for various constituencies.
New regulatory rules set in motion by such bills also tend to be classified as
non-cyclical, such as HUD setting new affordable housing goals for the GSEs.
Occasionally, interventions are prompted by specific events that we view as un-
related to the cycle, such as the regulatory actions taken in the aftermath of
accounting scandals at Fannie and Freddie in 2003-2004.
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5. Sample Restrictions. Occasionally a law or public rule sets in place changes
in purchase authorizations or balance sheet restrictions to take effect only multi-
ple years after announcement. To obtain a good indicator for news about pend-
ing purchase behavior, we exclude changes with very long implementation de-
lays and focus on interventions taking effect within nine months of their news
being made public.15 We also restrict attention to policy events after January
1967. This choice is made to select a period of relative institutional stability, as
it roughly coincides with the creation of Ginnie and Freddie, the emergence of
a nationwide secondary market for conventional mortgages, and the beginning
of the privatized GSE era. This starting point is also in part determined by the
availability of time series used in the empirical analysis. We focus exclusively
on the mortgage portfolio activity of Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie, ignoring less
significant government entities for which monthly data is not easily available.
We also include purchases by the Federal Reserve and Treasury in the recent
financial crisis, but in most of the analysis in Sections 1.5 and 1.6 the sample is
truncated at December 2006 to deliberately exclude the financial crisis and the
Fannie and Freddie conservatorship period. As shown in Figure 1.1, the three
housing agencies that we analyze account for the large majority of government
agency mortgage holdings between 1967 and 2006.
15Using a maximum lag of 12 months adds only one relatively minor event in 1968 with vir-
tually no effect on the results. Including all events yields an instrument that is considerably
weaker for purchases at shorter horizons. In practice, a larger maximum lag additionally in-
cludes only a couple of increases in affordable housing goals announced 18 months ahead of
taking effect.
29
1.4.3 The Narrative Measures of Policy Changes
Table 1.2 lists the policy events resulting from the narrative analysis. Each inter-
vention is described by the agencies affected, by its annualized projected impact
(in billions of US dollars), the timing (arrival of news and effective date), and
motivation. The monthly sample contains 45 months with interventions in the
post-1967 sample (there are 52 interventions in total but some occur within the
same month). Out of these, 28 are classified as cyclically motivated, leaving
19 distinct non-cyclically motivated policy events. In the sample that excludes
interventions after December 2006, there are 15 cyclically and 17 non-cyclically
motivated policy events after monthly aggregation.
Table 1.2: Narrative Measures of Policy Changes
Policy Description Agency Impact News Classification
HUDA 1968:
Increased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio
FNMA +$1.39 billion Oct. 1968 Non-Cyclical
Increased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio FNMA +$1.13 billion Dec. 1969 Cyclical
HUDA 1969: Special
Assistance GNMA +$0.75 billion Dec. 1969 Cyclical
Treasury-Guaranteed
Capitalization FNMA +$2.6 billion Apr. 1970 Cyclical
EHFA 1970: Special
Assistance GNMA +$0.38 billion July 1970 Cyclical
Conforming
Mortgage Program
Approval
FNMA +$0.4 billion Nov. 1971 Non-Cyclical
FHA/VA Tandem
Authorization GNMA +$1.5 billion Sep. 1973 Cyclical
FHA/VA Tandem
Authorization GNMA +$3.3 billion Jan. 1974 Cyclical
Subsidized Mortgage
Purchase Program FHLMC +$1.5 billion May 1974 Cyclical
FHA/VA Tandem
Authorization GNMA +$1.65 billion May 1974 Cyclical
HCDA 1974:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FNMA +$1.14 billion Aug. 1974 Non-Cyclical
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Policy Description Agency Impact News Classification
HCDA 1974:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FHLMC +$0.46 billion Aug. 1974 Non-Cyclical
EHPA 1974: Tandem
Program GNMA +$3.88 billion Oct. 1974 Cyclical
FY1976 Approps:
Tandem Program GNMA +$2.5 billion Oct. 1975 Cyclical
HCDA 1977:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FNMA +$4.82 billion Oct. 1977 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1977:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FHLMC +$0.21 billion Oct. 1977 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1977: Tandem
Program Expansion GNMA +$3.75 billion Oct. 1977 Non-Cyclical
FY1979 Approps:
Special Assistance GNMA +$1.0 billion Sep. 1978 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1978:
Mortgagee Expansion FHLMC +$2.0 billion Oct. 1978 Non-Cyclical
FY1980 Approps:
Special Assistance GNMA +$1.0 billion July 1979 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1979:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FHLMC +0.86 billion Dec. 1979 Cyclical
FY1981 Approps:
Special Assistance GNMA -$0.2 billion Sep. 1980 Cyclical
ARM Program
Approval FHLMC +$0.37 billion May 1981 Cyclical
ARM Program
Approval FNMA +$0.4 billion June 1981 Cyclical
Second Mortgage
Program Approval FNMA +$5.0 billion Sep. 1981 Cyclical
FY1982 Approps:
Special Assistance GNMA +$0.17 billion Dec. 1981 Cyclical
Increased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio FNMA +$6.25 billion Dec. 1982 Non-Cyclical
FY1983 Approps:
Special Assistance GNMA -$1.47 billion Dec. 1982 Cyclical
FY1984 Supp.
Approps: Tandem
Repeal
GNMA -$2.92 billion Nov. 1983 Non-Cyclical
Second Mortgage
Program Approval FHLMC +$1.0 billion Jan. 1986 Non-Cyclical
Decreased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio FNMA -$2.7 billion Apr. 1987 Non-Cyclical
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Policy Description Agency Impact News Classification
Public Listing: Stock
Split Capitalization FHLMC +$1.62 billion Nov. 1988 Non-Cyclical
FHEFSSA 1992:
Capital Requirements FNMA -$4.25 billion Mar. 1990 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 1995 FHLMC +$0.61 billion Dec. 1995 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 2004 FNMA +$7.6 billion Apr. 2004 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 2004 FHLMC +$7.6 billion Apr. 2004 Non-Cyclical
Accounting Scandal:
Capital Surcharge FNMA -$141.4 billion Sep. 2004 Non-Cyclical
Portfolio Growth
Limit Imposed FHLMC -$42.8 billion June 2006 Non-Cyclical
Portfolio Limit
Increase FNMA +$17.15 billion Sep. 2007 Cyclical
Portfolio Limit
Increase FHLMC +$2.14 billion Sep. 2007 Cyclical
ESA 2008: Jumbo
Loan Limit FNMA +$41.57 billion Feb. 2008 Cyclical
ESA 2008: Jumbo
Loan Limit FHLMC +$41.57 billion Feb. 2008 Cyclical
Removal of Portfolio
Limit FNMA +$9.28 billion Feb. 2008 Non-Cyclical
Removal of Portfolio
Limit FHLMC +$9.05 billion Feb. 2008 Non-Cyclical
Reduced Capital
Surcharge FNMA +$53.33 billion Mar. 2008 Cyclical
Reduced Capital
Surcharge FHLMC +$43.33 billion Mar. 2008 Cyclical
Reduced Capital
Surcharge FNMA +$17.75 billion May 2008 Cyclical
HERA 2008: Jumbo
Loan Limit FNMA -$13.34 billion July 2008 Cyclical
HERA 2008: Jumbo
Loan Limit FHLMC -$13.34 billion July 2008 Cyclical
Conservatorship:
Portfolio Limit
Increase
FNMA +$67.5 billion Sep. 2008 Cyclical
Conservatorship:
Portfolio Limit
Increase
FHLMC +$66.75 billion Sep. 2008 Cyclical
MBS Purchase
Program Launch Treasury +$80.0 billion Sep. 2008 Cyclical
QE1 Launch Fed +$250.0 billion Nov. 2008 Cyclical
32
Policy Description Agency Impact News Classification
ARRA 2009: Jumbo
Loan Limit FNMA +$13.34 billion Feb. 2009 Cyclical
ARRA 2009: Jumbo
Loan Limit FHLMC +$13.34 billion Feb. 2009 Cyclical
HASP: Portfolio Limit
Increase FNMA +$50.0 billion Feb. 2009 Cyclical
HASP: Portfolio Limit
Increase FHLMC +$50.0 billion Feb. 2009 Cyclical
QE1 Expansion Fed +$750.0 billion Mar. 2009 Cyclical
MBS Purchase
Program Sales Treasury -$120.0 billion Mar. 2011 Cyclical
Agency MBS
Reinvestment Fed +$262.0 billion Sep. 2011 Cyclical
Third SPSPA
Amendment FNMA -$22.16 billion Aug. 2012 Non-Cyclical
Third SPSPA
Amendment FHLMC -$22.16 billion Aug. 2012 Non-Cyclical
QE3 Launch Fed +$480.0 billion Sep. 2012 Cyclical
QE3 Taper Fed -$60.0 billion Dec. 2013 Cyclical
Notes: Acronyms (in chronological appearance): Housing and Urban Development Act
(HUDA); Emergency Home Finance Act (EHFA); Housing and Community Development
Act (HCDA); Emergency Home Purchase Act (EHPA); fiscal year (FY); adjustable-rate mort-
gage (ARM); Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act (FHEFSSA);
Economic Stimulus Act (ESA); Mortgage-backed securities (MBS); Housing and Economic
Recovery Act (HERA); quantitative easing (QE); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA); Home Affordability and Stability Plan (HASP); and Senior Preferred Stock Pur-
chase Agreements (SPSPA).
Figure 1.3 depicts the interventions as a percentage of the average annu-
alized level of originations in the preceding 12 months. The left (right) panel
shows the non-cyclical (cyclical) policy indicator. For reference, each figure also
shows credit crisis episodes in grey. The cyclically motivated interventions al-
most all occur during credit crunches or recessions, while those not motivated
by cyclical concerns appear unrelated to the cycle. The largest interventions
are those introduced since the start of the 2007/08 financial crisis, which are
mostly classified as cyclical.16 The only post-2006 events that we consider non-
16These include the Fed and Treasury MBS programs from late 2008 onwards, but also the
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cyclical are the removal of Fannie and Freddie portfolio caps in February 2008,
which was contingent on the timely filing of financial reports after the account-
ing scandals, and a 2012 Treasury decision to accelerate the mandated decline in
portfolio caps under the GSE conservatorship agreements. Relative to average
originations, the three largest non-cyclical changes are the October 1977 com-
bination of a conforming loan limit increase and the expansion of the Brooke-
Cranston Tandem program, an increase in Fannie’s debt-to-capital limit in De-
cember 1982, and the tightening of Fannie’s capital requirements in September
2004 in the wake of the accounting scandals. We refer to Fieldhouse and Mertens
(2017) for a detailed discussion of all policy events.
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Figure 1.3: Measures of Policy Events Affecting Agency Mortgage Holdings:
Jan 1967 to Dec 2014
Notes: The figure shows projected changes in the consolidated agency mortgage portfolio as a
percentage of average annualized mortgage originations over the prior twelve months. The left
panel shows changes classified as unrelated to the business or financial cycle. The right panel
shows changes classified as primarily motivated by cyclical considerations. For sources and
classification see Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017). Shaded areas are credit crunch periods, see
data appendix for the chronology.
loosening of capital requirements and portfolio caps for Fannie and Freddie and the introduc-
tion of ‘jumbo’ conforming loan limits in 2008.
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1.5 The Cumulative Effects of Agency Mortgage Purchases on
Mortgage Credit
To assess whether agency purchases influences mortgage lending activity, in
this section we present estimates of the cumulative impact on various mortgage
credit aggregates. We obtain these estimates by Jorda` (2005) local projections
estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS), similar to the methodology pro-
posed in Ramey and Zubairy (2017) to estimate cumulative government spend-
ing multipliers, using the non-cyclically motivated policy changes as an instru-
ment for agency purchasing activity. This approach yields easily interpretable
results in terms of dollar changes in credit variables, and is well-suited to handle
the news aspect of policy announcements.17
The first stage in the 2SLS procedure consists of regressions of cumulative
agency purchases on the narrative instrument. Recall that agencies typically
make advance commitments to buy loans from mortgage providers, and subse-
quently effectuate these as loans are delivered to the secondary market. Because
of potential time delays, we consider monthly data on both the advance net pur-
chase commitments made by the agencies as well as the effective net portfolio
purchases as indicators of agency purchasing activity. Specifically, we estimate
the following regressions for different horizons h:∑h
j=0 pt+ j
Xt
= α˜h + γ˜h
mt
Xt
+ ϕ˜h(L)Zt−1 + u˜t+h (1.1)
where pt is either the volume of net commitments or actual purchases by the
agencies in month t, expressed in constant dollars using the core PCE price in-
17Expressing the impact in terms of elasticities is not feasible since net purchases and net
purchase commitments take on negative values in the sample, and is also potentially misleading
given the differential growth trends in income, mortgage debt, and agency mortgage holdings.
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dex, and
∑h
j=0 pt+ j is the cumulative sum of purchases or commitments made
over the next h-month period. The variable mt on the right-hand side is the non-
cyclical narrative policy indicator from Table 1.2, expressed in constant dollars.
We express both as ratios of Xt, a deterministic trend in real personal income ob-
tained by fitting a third degree polynomial of time to the log of personal income
deflated by the core PCE price index.18 The first-stage regressions also include
lagged controls, Zt−1, which are defined below.
The cumulative impact on a credit aggregate yt over a given horizon h is
estimated by local projections of the form
yt+h − yt−1
Xt
= αh + γh
∑h
j=0 pt+ j
Xt
+ ϕh(L)Zt−1 + ut+h (1.2)
where yt is expressed in constant dollars using the core PCE price index, and
as a ratio of Xt. For stock variables, the dependent variable is the change in the
stock between t − 1 and period t + h, scaled by Xt. For credit flow measures, we
construct yt by cumulating the flows ft such that yt+h − yt−1 = ∑hj=0 ft+ j. The coef-
ficient γh in (1.2) measures the multiplier associated with an additional dollar in
commitments or purchases made between period t − 1 and t + h. This multiplier
is the total cumulative dollar change in yt over the same horizon. We estimate γh
by 2SLS, i.e. by replacing
∑h
j=0 pt+ j/Xt with predicted values from the first stage
in (2.1). The baseline estimates reported in the rest of this section use an effective
sample of 480 monthly observations, starting in January 1967.19 In appendix IV,
we present results for different sample periods.
18 The results do not differ meaningfully when we use polynomials of different order. In
appendix IV, we also show that the results are robust to using a trend in mortgage originations
instead of personal income.
19With local projections, every successive horizon h = 0, 1, 2... requires a separate regression
with h leads of observations beyond the end point of the sample, see Jorda` (2005) for a discus-
sion. For h > 0, we add the required observations beyond December 2006 such that the number
of observations remains constant at T = 480 for every h.
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Each of the regressions in (2.1) and (1.2) include a full year of monthly lags
of a number of control variables Zt, such that ϕh(L) is a lag polynomial of order
11. The controls include variables with predictive content for the dependent
variables, and always include lagged values of yt/Xt (or ft/Xt for flow variables),
as well as lags of agency net purchases and commitments as a ratio of Xt. In
addition, Zt contains lagged growth rates of the core PCE price index, a nomi-
nal house price index, and total mortgage debt, the log level of real mortgage
originations, housing starts, and lags of several interest rate variables: the 3-
month T-bill rate, the 10-year Treasury rate, the conventional mortgage interest
rate, and the BAA-AAA corporate bond spread. Finally, we add lags of two
cyclical indicators: the unemployment rate and the growth rate of real personal
income. All growth rates are quarter-over-quarter. The data appendix provides
full details on the sources and construction of the time series. In appendix IV,
we discuss results for a number of alternative control (sub)sets.
The central identifying restriction is exogeneity of the instrument, which re-
quires that the residuals in (1.2) and the narrative measure are uncorrelated. To
the extent that the lagged controls are informationally equivalent to all relevant
impulses to the dependent variables occurring prior to time t, the regression
residuals correspond to their horizon h forecast errors. The latter depend only
on unpredictable shocks occurring between period t and t + h. Our instrument
is based on the projected impact of policy events constructed from ex ante infor-
mation. These estimates should therefore be uncorrelated with shocks occurring
after time t. The identifying restriction then boils down to the assumption of
contemporaneous exogeneity, i.e. orthogonality between the instrument and all
shocks in month t other than the one associated with the policy event itself, see
Stock and Watson (2018). If the control set does not fully capture all impulses
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prior to date t, then the exogeneity requirement is stricter and the instrument
must be uncorrelated with the history of relevant impulses to the left hand side
variables. The omission of the cyclically motivated events aims at dropping
policy actions that may be correlated with all other time t shocks. Our narrative
classification retains the non-cyclically motivated events for which correlation
with contemporaneous shocks is unlikely, while the lagged controls provide
additional insurance that the confounding effects of any remaining correlations
with prior shocks are eliminated, see also Ramey (2016a) and Stock and Watson
(2018).
1.5.1 First-Stage Results
We first investigate whether the narrative policy changes indeed lead to sig-
nificant changes in agency purchasing activity by assessing the strength of our
narrative instrument. The left panel of Figure 1.4 shows the Newey and West
(1987) robust F-statistics on the excluded instrument in each of the first-stage re-
gressions (2.1) for horizons h = 0 to h = 60. The figure shows the F-statistics both
when we use cumulative commitments or purchases as the measure of agency
activity pt.
The results indicate that the narrative measure is a reasonably strong instru-
ment for agency purchasing activity for horizons between 4 to 48 months after
the policy events, with robust F-test statistics exceeding or close to 10. The F-
statistics are low for very short horizons. This is natural given the presence of
implementation lags and our timing of the policy changes according to the first
arrival of news about impending regulatory changes. Beyond horizons of 48
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Figure 1.4: First Stage Diagnostics
Notes: The left panel shows Newey and West (1987) robust F-statistics of the first-stage regres-
sions of cumulative agency commitments and purchases, respectively, on the narrative instru-
ment, see eq. (2.1). The right panel shows the estimated dollar increase in agency purchases per
dollar increase in commitments. Finer lines in the right panel are 95% Newey and West (1987)
confidence bands. Sample: Jan 1967 to Dec 2006.
months, the F-statistics fall to lower levels, which is also not surprising as other
influences on agency purchases accumulate with the forecast horizon. Given
these results we restrict attention to the 4-48 month horizon.
The left panel of Figure 1.4 shows that the F-statistics are very similar when
we instrument for either purchases or commitments. The right panel of Figure
1.4 depicts IV estimates of the dollar change in agency purchases for every dol-
lar of commitments issued over the various time horizons, based on the regres-
sions in (1.2) using cumulative agency purchases as the outcome variable and
cumulative commitments as the independent variable. The fine lines denote 95
percent Newey and West (1987) confidence intervals. Because of the time delays
associated with secondary market transactions, the pass-through from commit-
ments to purchases is high but smaller than unity for shorter horizons. After
about one year the relationship becomes one-for-one with very narrow confi-
dence intervals. The interpretation of the credit multiplier estimates presented
next therefore depends somewhat on the denominator used, but only for hori-
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zons of less than one year. At longer horizons, there is essentially no difference
between using commitments or purchases as the agency action measure.
1.5.2 Cumulative Credit Multipliers
According to the Meltzer-Greenspan view, the portfolio activities of the agencies
have no meaningful impact on housing or household debt. Without credit mar-
ket imperfections, the ownership of mortgage debt is irrelevant. Any change in
agency mortgage holdings has no impact on total mortgage debt, but leads in-
stead to perfect crowding out of private holdings. If, on the other hand, there are
frictions impeding on the private flow of credit to residential borrowers, agency
activity may not be neutral for the volume of mortgage lending. We now exam-
ine whether agency mortgage purchases indeed impact housing credit, and test
the neutrality hypothesis using the local projections in (1.2) and the narrative
policy instrument.
Figure 1.5 shows the impact of an increase in either agency commitments or
purchases on mortgage credit aggregates, together with the 95 percent Newey
and West (1987) confidence bands. There is a marked difference between the
short- and long-run effects. In the short run, the results are consistent with
neutrality: The upper left panel shows that a dollar purchased increases agency
mortgage holdings initially by almost a dollar. The short-run effect of a dollar
increase in commitments on agency holdings is lower at around 60 cents, which
is expected given the time delay between commitments and purchases. The
upper right panel shows that private holdings decline initially by roughly the
same amount as the increase in agency holdings, although the confidence bands
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are wide.20 The middle panels in Figure 1.5 show that as the dollar in mortgage
debt changes from private to agency ownership, there are initially no significant
changes in originations or mortgage debt.
Over longer horizons, however, there is clear evidence against the notion
that agency purchases are neutral for mortgage credit. The cumulative impact
on total mortgage originations increases with the horizon and becomes statisti-
cally significant after 6 months. Over the course of 3 years and beyond, there
is a cumulative increase in originations of 3 dollars or more for every dollar
purchased by the agencies. The estimated long-run multipliers for total origi-
nations are highly statistically significant and nearly identical for commitments
and purchases. The point estimates for the impact on the stock of mortgage debt
at shorter horizons are roughly in line with the range reported in Smith, Rosen,
and Fallis (1988). The increase in mortgage debt becomes statistically significant
after three to four years and in the longer run reaches a level of around one dol-
lar. As the time horizon grows, the increase in agency holdings slowly dissipates
toward levels expected before the expansion. Similarly, the negative impact on
the level of private mortgage holdings vanishes over time and eventually turns
into an increase, although not one that is statistically significant.
The results in the middle row of Figure 1.5 imply that agency portfolio ex-
pansions lead to a substantial rise in mortgage lending activity. Originations
take place when borrowers refinance, purchase an existing home, or purchase
a new home. Unless there are changes in house prices or homeownership, the
first two transactions typically lead only to small net changes in mortgage debt
20This almost surely reflects the fact that our measure of private holdings is partially based on
interpolation of quarterly data. Private holdings are measured by subtracting agency holdings
from total mortgage debt. Total mortgage debt is constructed using monthly data on origina-
tions and an interpolation of implied quarterly repayment rates. See the data appendix for more
detail.
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Figure 1.5: Estimated Balance Sheet Adjustments and Mortgage Credit Mul-
tipliers Associated with Agency Mortgage Purchases
Notes: The figure shows dollar changes in the variable listed per dollar increase in agency
net portfolio purchases or commitments to purchase cumulated over the reported horizon in
months. Estimates are from local projections-IV regressions, see eq. (1.2). Finer lines are 95%
Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample: Jan 1967 to Dec 2006. In the bottom row
panels, the sample excludes May 1985 to Dec 1986 because of missing data on refinance shares,
see data appendix.
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because a similar amount of mortgage debt is repaid. Since the increase in origi-
nations is a multiple of the net change in debt, it is likely driven mostly by a rise
in transactions of the first two types, with new home purchases playing a more
important role beyond horizons of two years. The bottom row of Figure 1.5
distinguishes between refinancing originations in the left panel, and home pur-
chase originations in the right.21 Refinancing originations indeed respond faster
and by a substantially larger amount than purchase originations. Refinancing
originations see a statistically significant increase beyond 6 months, and within
3 years are higher by roughly 3 dollars per dollar of agency purchases. Home
purchase originations rise more slowly and are statistically significantly higher
after 18 months, increasing by nearly one dollar within 4 years. The rise in pur-
chase originations occurs somewhat faster than the rise in total mortgage debt,
suggesting that existing home sales respond before new home sales. The longer-
run cumulative change in purchase originations is comparable to the increase in
mortgage debt, which suggests a positive impact on residential construction. In
the impulse response analysis below, we indeed find evidence for an increase in
housing starts. We also document positive effects on homeownership rates and,
although less clearly, on home prices, both of which also contribute to the rise
in mortgage debt. The bulk of the effect on originations is nevertheless due to
refinancing.22
A comparison of the 2SLS and OLS estimates of the credit multipliers is in-
formative about which of the sources of endogeneity bias discussed in Section
1.4.1 dominates in practice. A priori the direction of the bias in the OLS esti-
21Data prior to 1990 is approximated using the refinancing share of S&Ls, see data appendix.
Unfortunately, we were unable to find data distinguishing between originations for new and
existing home sales with a sufficient time span.
22This is consistent with Di Maggio et al. (2016), who document an increase in refinancing
activity by 170 percent during the Fed’s first QE program.
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mates is ambiguous. Systematic GSE expansions during times of high primary
market mortgage demand or high private sector credit supply are likely to bias
the OLS estimates upward relative to the true effects. The systematic stabilizing
actions of the agencies or their regulators, on the other hand, instead lead to
a downward bias. By using only the predicted variation in agency purchases
resulting from GSE regulatory changes, the 2SLS estimates aim to eliminate the
upward or downward biases resulting from any systematic patterns in regu-
lar GSE purchasing behavior. The restriction to non-cyclically motivated regu-
latory changes further eliminates the additional potential downward OLS bias
due systematic countercyclical actions by policymakers in response to economic
and financial conditions. Recall also that the inclusion of the lagged financial
and cyclical controls generally weakens the exogeneity requirement on the in-
strument, up to the point where the non-cyclical policy interventions need only
be contemporaneously uncorrelated with other determinants of the credit ag-
gregates, see Stock and Watson (2018).
Figure 1.6 compares the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the cumulative impact
on total mortgage originations. Given the strong procyclicality of originations,
the large and consistently positive OLS and 2SLS estimates make it unlikely that
either estimates are severely contaminated by the countercyclical actions of the
agencies over the sample. However, Figure 1.6 also shows that, regardless of
whether the baseline or full set of controls is included, the OLS estimates ex-
ceed the 2SLS estimates for horizons up to 2 years. Moreover, the OLS estimates
are roughly independent of the horizon, implying that the bulk of the increase in
originations occurs within a few months. The 2SLS estimates instead show a de-
layed and more gradual increase in originations. This pattern suggests that the
dominant source of bias in the OLS estimates is the systematic process of private
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lenders passing on loans to the agencies very shortly after origination. A GSE
policy of maintaining market share, for instance, would be consistent with orig-
inations rising before or roughly simultaneously with agency purchases, and
without a decline in private holdings. The delayed and more gradual effect
on originations that emerges after instrumentation, together with a short-run
decrease in private holdings, suggests that the 2SLS estimates are not picking
up increased supply of mortgages to the secondary market. Given the decision
lags and time delays associated with making new mortgage loans, the delayed
and gradual rise in originations after instrumenting seems instead much more
consistent with a causal interpretation.
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Figure 1.6: The Role of Instrumentation
Notes: The figure shows dollar changes per dollar increase in agency net portfolio purchases
cumulated over the reported horizon in months. The benchmark estimates are from local pro-
jections as in equation (1.2), comparing OLS and 2SLS estimates. The specification with baseline
controls excludes the interest rate and cyclical controls.
In appendix IV, we elaborate on the role of instrumenting, and we discuss
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additional results on agency securitization. We also verify robustness in several
dimensions, such as the choice of scaling variable Xt, the sample choice, the set
of controls, as well as the exclusion of specific policy events in the narrative
instrument. The expansionary effects of agency purchases on mortgage credit
are shown to be robust to many details of the analysis.
1.6 Impulse Response Analysis of News Shocks to Agency Pur-
chases
To evaluate the effects of agency purchases on residential investment and home-
ownership, as well as analyze the response of interest rates and other macro
aggregates, in this section we conduct an impulse response analysis of shocks
to agency mortgage purchases. Given the gradual and anticipated nature of
agency balance sheet expansions, our goal is to identify the response to shocks
to expectations of future agency purchasing activity. We adopt a local projec-
tions approach and use the narrative instrument for identification.
1.6.1 Empirical Specification
For a given monthly outcome variable yt, we estimate the response at horizon h
based on
yt+h − yt−1 = αh + δh
128 ×
∑7
j=0 pt+ j
X˜t
 + ϕh(L)Zt−1 + ut+h. (1.3)
The right hand side variable of interest measures annualized agency commit-
ments made over an 8 month period, expressed as a ratio of X˜t, a long-run trend
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in annualized originations. The latter is obtained by fitting a third degree poly-
nomial of time to the log of real originations obtained using the core PCE price
index as the deflator. The control variables Zt−1 are the same as in equation (1.2)
estimating dollar cumulative effects. The first-stage regression is the same as in
(2.1), but with (12/8)
∑7
j=0 pt+ j/X˜t as the dependent variable and mt/X˜t as regres-
sor. When an outcome variable is not included in the benchmark control set, we
always add 12 monthly lags of that variable as additional controls (in growth
rates for trending variables and in levels for other variables).
The regression in (1.3) estimates the month h ≥ 0 response to a time 0 news
shock to agency purchases. Expected agency purchases are proxied by agency
commitments made over the next 8 months. We choose an 8 month horizon
to measure expected future commitments because at this horizon the robust F-
statistic associated with the narrative instrument in the first-stage regression is
the largest, and equals 11.68. The results are very similar for somewhat shorter
or longer horizons. To address endogeneity, we use the indicator of non-cyclical
policy events, deflated by the core PCE price index and scaled by trend origi-
nations X˜t, as the instrument. The IV estimates of δh in (1.3) can be interpreted
as the response associated with a one percentage point increase in the agency
flow market share that becomes anticipated h periods before. For perspective,
the average market share in terms of portfolio purchases was approximately 7
percent between 1967 and 1990, and about 15 percent between 1990 and 2006,
see Figure 1.1.
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1.6.2 Effects on Mortgage Credit and Interest Rates
Figure 1.7 displays the responses of mortgage credit and interest rates to news
about higher future purchases. Each of the panels shows the point estimates
and 68 and 95 percent confidence bands for the first 24 months after an increase
in anticipated agency purchases by one percentage point of trend originations.
The first row in Figure 1.7 displays the responses of real originations and
mortgage debt to the agency purchase shock. Mortgage originations start rising
after a few months and reach peak increases of 4 percent to 5 percent between
12 and 18 months after the shock. With a slightly longer delay, the stock of
mortgage debt also gradually rises to levels that are about 0.3 percent higher
after two years. The expansions in both the stock and gross flow of mortgage
credit following a positive shock to agency purchases are statistically significant
for multiple periods. The results again indicate that agency purchases stimulate
mortgage lending significantly. Appendix IV shows that the impulse response
analysis also confirms that refinancing accounts for a large share of the increase
in originations.
The second row in Figure 1.7 shows the impact on interest rates on 30-year
fixed rate mortgages in the primary market. The left panel illustrates the interest
rate effect on newly originated conventional/conforming mortgages, whereas
the right pane contains the impact on interest rates of mortgages guaranteed
by the Federal Housing Administration. The mortgage rates in the primary
market are largely unaffected in the initial months after the increase in agency
mortgage purchase commitments. As the agencies’ purchasing activity picks
up, however, both mortgage rates gradually decline and are lower by around
10 basis points after 6 months. The declines in mortgages rates appear quite
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Figure 1.7: Impulse Responses to a Shock to Anticipated Agency Purchases
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from
local projections-IV regressions instrumented with the narrative policy indicator, see eq. (1.3).
Shaded areas are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample: Jan 1967 to
Dec 2006.
persistent, are statistically significant for multiple periods, and help explain the
increase in refinancing activity. A decrease in mortgage cost is consistent with
agency purchases affecting the aggregate supply of housing credit, for instance
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because of portfolio rebalancing effects or because private mortgage lenders are
capital constrained. Agency purchases also alleviate any constraints faced by
private intermediaries, for instance because the higher prices of mortgage as-
sets improve their net worth, or because the sale of mortgages in exchange for
agency debt lowers their risk-weighted leverage.
The issuance of agency debt to finance the mortgage purchases potentially
puts upward pressure on interest rates on other debt instruments. Such pressure
may be limited if significant amounts of agency debt are purchased by foreign
investors, as has been the case since the mid-1980s, or by the Federal Reserve,
as was the case in the early years of our sample. Depending on the level of
segmentation in financial markets, the rebalancing and other effects may also
spill over to other asset markets and cause the yields on substitutes to mort-
gages to fall. These include other high duration instruments such as long-term
Treasuries and corporate bonds. In addition, lower mortgage rates lead to more
prepayments, which do not carry any penalty in the United States. There is
considerable evidence that lower effective durations cause mortgage investors
to bid up the price of higher duration instruments, see for instance Boudoukh
et al. (1997), Perli and Sack (2003), Hanson (2014), and Malkhozov et al. (2016).
The broader impact on long-term yields is therefore ex ante not clear.
The left panel of the bottom row in Figure 1.7 shows the estimated response
of the 10-year Treasury rate. The results are very similar to those for the long-
term mortgage rates just discussed: The 10-year Treasury rate responds little
the first couple of months, but as the agency mortgage purchases commence,
it declines in a gradual and persistent manner by up to 5 to 10 basis points.
The drop is significant at the 95 percent level between 3 and 6 months after the
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shock. The right panel in the bottom row of Figure 1.7 reports the impact on the
3-month T-bill rate. The results are qualitatively similar to those for the long-
term rates discussed above. Quantitatively, we find some indication of a larger
drop in short-term rates than in the longer-term rates. With a delay of a few
months, the T-bill rate drops persistently by 15 to 20 basis points with a partial
reversion taking place at longer forecast horizons. The negative response of
short-term interest rates indicates that a potentially important explanation for
the expansion in mortgage lending and the decline in mortgage rates is a more
accommodative stance of monetary policy. In Section 1.7 below, we investigate
the role of monetary policy and its interactions with housing credit policy in
greater detail.
Figure 1.8 shows additional results on the effects on other interest rates and
credit spreads. The first two panels show the responses of the AAA-rated and
BAA-rated long-term corporate bond yields. Taken together, the results sug-
gest that agency purchases exert a downward pressure on corporate yields with
a timing that coincides with the actual purchasing of mortgage assets by the
agencies. The response of the corporate yields is qualitatively similar to those
of mortgage and Treasury rates, showing initially no effect, and subsequently a
gradual decline. The 95 percent confidence bands around the responses are rel-
atively wide, and the responses are only marginally significant. The declines in
corporate bond yields are also quantitatively smaller than mortgage and Trea-
sury rates. The third panel in the first row of Figure 1.8 shows statistically sig-
nificant short-run increases in the spread between AAA-rated corporate bonds
and 10-year Treasuries. Agency purchases appear therefore to induce the great-
est spill-overs on the demand for the relative liquidity and safety of Treasuries,
which do not have prepayment risk. The increases are, however, relatively
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short-lived, with the effects disappearing after 7 or 8 months. The next panel
shows evidence for a drop in the spread between BAA and AAA-rated corpo-
rate bonds after 7 or 8 months, suggesting also some positive spill-over effects
on the demand for riskier long-term bonds. The final two panels of Figure 1.8
show declines in the spreads of mortgage rates over the 10-year Treasure rates of
a few basis points after about 6 months. The declines are at best only marginally
significant, indicating that agency purchases have important positive spill-over
effects on the demand for long-term Treasuries.
Figure 1.8: Impulse Responses to a Shock to Anticipated Agency Purchases
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from
local projections-IV regressions instrumented with the narrative policy indicator, see eq. (1.3).
Shaded areas are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample: Jan 1967 to
Dec 2006.
The finding that increases in agency mortgage purchases produce a boom in
mortgage lending and declining interest rates is robust. Figure 1.9 shows the
response to a shock to anticipated agency purchases for the benchmark specifi-
cation together with those when we omit in turn each of the three largest pol-
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icy interventions from the narrative instrument: the October 1977 conforming
loan limit increase and expansion of the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program, the
December 1982 increase in Fannie Mae’s debt-to-capital limit, and the Septem-
ber 2004 tightening of capital requirements following the accounting scandals.
In each case we add the omitted event as a separate dummy variable, includ-
ing both the contemporaneous value and twelve lags to the control variables.
While there is some variation in the size of the responses, the results remain
qualitatively similar to the benchmark narrative estimates. In all cases, there are
increases in originations and mortgage debt, and declines in short- and long-
term interest rates. We also obtained very similar results for samples that omit
the Volcker years, or for the subsample starting in October 1982, the end of the
period of non-borrowed reserve targeting by the Federal Reserve.23 Thus, the
results are not driven by differences in Federal Reserve operating procedures in
the 1970s or by the inclusion of the Volcker period. There is narrative evidence
that political pressure to support the GSEs was exerted with some success in
the late 1960s and 1970s, leading for instance the Federal Reserve to purchase
significant amounts of agency debt, see Haltom and Sharp (2014). In the post-
1982 sample, however, it seems less likely that political pressure to support
government housing policies can explain an accommodative monetary policy
response.
Finally, in the appendix we report additional results based on using shocks
to GSE excess stock returns as an alternative instrument for agency purchasing
activity. This different approach is inspired by Fisher and Peters (2010), who use
innovations in defense stocks to identify the effects of news shocks to military
spending. The special GSE status is likely to account for the bulk of Fannie’s
23The results are available in the appendix.
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Figure 1.9: Impulse Responses when Omitting Largest Policy Events
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from
local projections-IV regressions instrumented with different subsets of the narrative policy in-
dicator, see eq. (1.3). Sample: Jan 1967 to Dec 2006.
and Freddie’s market value and portfolio size, see e.g. Passmore (2005). We
can therefore expect that idiosyncratic movements in GSE stock prices reflect
unanticipated changes in the value of their GSE status and expected purchasing
activity. Controlling for market-wide and real estate sector returns, as well as a
wide range of other macroeconomic and financial factors, we find that residual
variation in Fannie and Freddie excess stock returns predicts agency mortgage
purchases. This motivates us to use this residual variation as an alternative
instrumental variable to estimate the response of credit aggregates to shocks to
agency mortgage purchases. The resulting impulse response estimates, which
are discussed in the appendix, lead to very similar conclusions as those based
on the narrative instrument.
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1.6.3 Effects on Housing and Other Macro Aggregates
Next, we assess the evidence for the broader macroeconomic effects of govern-
ment asset purchases. Figure 1.10 shows the responses of a range of monthly
macro aggregates to an agency purchase shock. As in Figure 1.7, the responses
are to an anticipated increase in purchases by one percentage point of trend
originations, estimated by the regression in (1.3) and using the narrative instru-
ment. We consider the following additional outcome variables at the monthly
frequency: housing starts, real house prices, the homeownership rate, real per-
sonal consumption expenditures, real personal income, and the unemployment
rate.24
Figure 1.10: Impulse Responses to a Shock to Anticipated Agency Purchases
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from
local projections-IV regressions instrumented with the narrative policy indicator, see equation
(1.3). Shaded areas are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample: Jan
1967 to Dec 2006.
24All these variables, except the unemployment and the homeownership rate, are included
logs and all nominal variables are deflated by the core PCE price index. The homeownership
rate is only available at quarterly frequency, and the monthly series in this case simply consists
of the quarter values. See the data appendix for precise definitions and sources.
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The first panel in Figure 1.10 shows the effects on residential investment, as
measured by monthly housing starts. Based on the narrative instrument, the
number of new housing starts rises to levels that are roughly 1 to 2 percent
higher after about 6 months. Housing starts remain elevated for about a year
and drop off to prior levels afterwards. We thus find evidence that the expan-
sion in the stock of mortgage debt following a shock to agency purchases is
associated with higher levels of residential investment.25 The top middle panel
in Figure 1.10 plots the impact on real house prices, as measured by the Freddie
Mac house price index deflated by the core PCE price index. We find that real
house prices rise gradually but very persistently over time, with a point esti-
mate that becomes significantly positive at longer forecast horizons only. The
increase in house prices is quantitatively relatively small and imprecisely es-
timated. Thus, we have no clearcut evidence of any strong impact of agency
mortgage purchases on house prices. The size of the point estimates imply that
only some of the dollar increase in gross mortgage credit flows can be explained
by increases in house prices.
The top right panel in Figure 1.10 shows the response of the homeowner-
ship rate, as measured by the Census Bureau, which is often cited as one of
the primary motivations for housing credit policy. There is a sustained increase
in homeownership by around 5 basis points beyond a horizon of 10 months.
While there is considerable uncertainty in the estimates, the responses are sta-
tistically significant at the 95 percent level for multiple months, indicating that
agency activity indeed has an effect on homeownership. This also implies that
the expansion in the stock of mortgage debt is in part driven by an increase in
25The more immediate effects on residential construction are consistent with the more de-
layed impact on mortgage debt in Figure 1.7. This is because financing in the building phase
is typically through a short-term construction loan that is converted into a residential mortgage
loans only after the borrower takes up occupancy of the house.
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homeownership.
The remaining panels in Figure 1.10 show the responses of consumption ex-
penditures, personal income, and the unemployment rate. Using the narrative
instrument, we find that an increase in agency mortgage purchases stimulates
consumption very modestly and with a delay of more than a year. Personal
sector income and the unemployment rate are roughly unchanged over the en-
tire forecast horizon. The increase in consumption is imprecisely estimated and
none of the impulse responses are significantly different from zero at the 95 per-
cent level. There is an initial rise and a subsequent decline in the unemployment
rate around a year after the shock, but the magnitudes of these changes are small
and not statistically significant.
The alternative GSE excess returns identification strategy discussed in ap-
pendix II yields overall comparable results, including a statistically significant
rise in housing starts, as well as a significant and persistent rise in homeown-
ership.26 Our overall conclusion, therefore, is that there is evidence that agency
mortgage purchases stimulate residential investment and homeownership, and
some indication of a positive effect on personal consumption expenditures. The
confidence bands in Figure 1.10 are, however, relatively wide, and the power
of our instruments to detect a macroeconomic impact of agency mortgage pur-
chases beyond the housing sector is limited.
26The main exception is that the GSE excess returns instrument yields no evidence for any
significant rise in house prices.
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1.7 Housing Credit Policy vs. Conventional Monetary Policy
In the previous section, we found that increases in agency mortgage purchases
lead to an expansion in mortgage credit and to declines in short- and long-term
interest rates. A natural question to ask is to what extent these effects reflect
conventional monetary policy actions, and how monetary and credit policies
interact more broadly. The left panel in Figure 1.11 reports the estimated re-
sponse of the federal funds rate to an agency purchase shock obtained using the
methods of the previous section. Based on the narrative instrument, there is a
delayed and transitory decline in the funds rate by up to 30 basis points after 6
months. This decrease is statistically significant at conventional levels after 4 to
12 months.
Figure 1.11: Interactions Between Monetary and Credit Policies
Notes: The left and middle panels show responses to a one pp. increase in the expected fu-
ture agency market share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations.
Estimates are from local projections-IV regressions instrumented with the narrative policy in-
dicator, see equation (1.3). Shaded areas are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence
bands. The right panel shows responses to a monetary shock obtained by local projections-IV
regressions on the 3-month T-bill rate and instrumenting with the Romer and Romer (2004)
monetary policy shock measure. Finer lines and shaded areas in the right panel are 95% Newey
and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample: Jan 1967 to Dec 2006.
We obtain similar declines in short-term interest rates for the post-1982 sub-
sample, after excluding the non-borrowed reserves targeting period, or after
omitting larger policy events from the narrative instrument (see appendix IV.
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We therefore conclude that there is evidence that agency mortgage purchases
are accompanied by accommodative monetary policy. A possible alternative in-
terpretation is that our identification scheme erroneously picks up the influence
of recessionary shocks causing downward adjustments in the Federal Reserve’s
interest rate target. However, if this were the case, we would not expect to
find increases in strongly procyclical variables such as mortgage originations or
housing starts. To gain more insight into the nature of the funds rate response,
we make use of the decomposition by Romer and Romer (2004) of changes in
the intended funds rate at FOMC meetings into a systematic and a residual shock
component.27 The systematic component is measured by the explained vari-
ation in a regression of target changes on changes in Greenbook forecasts of
inflation, output growth, and unemployment. Monetary policy shocks are mea-
sured by the residuals in the regression, and capture the remaining variation in
target changes not explained by changes in the Greenbook forecasts.
The middle panel in Figure 1.11 depicts the estimated response of the cumu-
lative Romer and Romer (2004) shocks to an agency purchase shock using the
regressions in (1.3). With a few months delay, the narrative instrument yields
a significant and persistent decline by up to 10 basis points. The funds rate
decline is therefore not explained by inflation and output considerations alone,
and possibly also reflects an independent reaction to credit market conditions
and/or credit policies.
To investigate whether monetary policy affects housing credit policy, the
right panel in Figure 1.11 reports the response of the cumulated narrative mea-
sures of credit policy changes in Table 1.2, deflated by the core PCE price index
and expressed as a percentage of trend originations, to a monetary shock. The
27We use the updates by Wieland and Yang (2016) to extend the sample of the original series.
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response to a monetary shock is obtained by similar regressions as in equation
(1.3), but replacing the agency market share on the right-hand side with the con-
temporaneous level of the 3-month T-bill rate, and using the Romer and Romer
(2004) shock measure as an instrument.28 The results indicate there is no evi-
dence for monetary policy shocks impacting the non-cyclical measure of agency
purchase shocks, as our narratively identified housing credit policy instrument
is not itself predictable by the Romer and Romer (2004) residuals. This provides
assurance that our narrative instrument does not erroneously pick up the effects
of monetary policy shocks. Similarly, adding the current and lagged values of
the Romer and Romer (2004) shocks as additional control variables in (1.3) also
has very little effect on the results, see appendix IV. The cyclical housing policy
measure (in red), on the other hand, does show a statistically significant decline
following an expansionary monetary policy shock, which illustrates the impor-
tance of accounting for the endogeneity of credit policies. Consistent with an
objective of stabilizing credit flows, we thus find that housing credit policies on
average act to offset the effects of monetary policy disturbances.
To further judge the extent to which agency purchase shocks operate through
more conventional monetary transmission channels, Figure 1.12 compares the
impact of a traditional monetary policy shock (in red) with the response to
the agency purchase shock identified using the narrative instrument (in blue).
These responses are again obtained by local projections as in (1.3), but with the
contemporaneous 3-month T-bill rate as the right-hand side variable and the
Romer and Romer (2004) residuals as the instrument. In the figure, the impact
28Conditional on including an informationally sufficient set of lagged variables as controls,
valid identification under this approach requires only contemporaneous exogeneity of the
Romer and Romer (2004) shocks. The predictability of the Romer and Romer (2004) shocks
by agency purchase shock therefore does not necessarily invalidate the identification of the re-
sponse to monetary shocks.
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Figure 1.12: Responses to a Shock to Anticipated Agency Purchases Versus a
Monetary Policy Shock
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share as well as the response to a monetary policy shock. Estimates are from local projections-IV
regressions instrumenting agency commitments with the narrative policy indicator, see equa-
tion (1.3), and instrumenting the 3-month T-bill rate with the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary
policy shock measure. Finer lines and shaded areas are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence
bands. Sample: Jan 1967 to Dec 2006.
of the interest rate shock is scaled such that the maximum decline in the 3-month
T-bill rate is the same as for the agency purchase shock identified with the nar-
rative instrument. For easier comparison, the responses to the monetary policy
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shock in Figure 1.12 are shifted forward by 4 months such that the maximum
interest declines for each of the policy shocks coincide. The bands shown are
the 95 percent Newey and West (1987) confidence intervals.
Figure 1.12 reveals that conventional monetary policy shocks and credit pol-
icy shocks have qualitatively similar effects on many of the variables shown.
Although each of the policies involves purchases of different types of assets
with different sources of financing, both generate a decline in long-term inter-
est rates, a rise in originations and mortgage debt, and an increase in housing
starts. Consistent with most of the existing empirical literature, an expansion-
ary monetary shock leads to increases in consumption and income and a decline
in the unemployment rate.29 The monetary shock responses provide a familiar
reference point for judging the quantitative impact of agency purchase shocks.
After scaling the estimates to imply the same decline in the short-term interest
rate and accounting for the more immediate effects of a funds rate target shock
on short-term interest rates, many responses to each of the policy shocks are
similar in terms of magnitude and timing.
There are, however, also some notable differences between the responses in
Figure 1.12. The first is that agency purchases lead to a rise in originations that is
roughly twice as large as that of the interest rate shock. There is little indication
that a conventional monetary policy shock causes a significant rise in real house
prices, while the decline in long-term interest rates is slightly more pronounced
and persistent after an agency purchase shock. Both the rise in housing starts
and mortgage debt, on the other hand, are very similar for both policy shocks.
Taken together, the results indicate that agency purchases have a larger effect
29The response to both shocks also feature a similar ‘price puzzle’, i.e. a decline in the price
level as measured by the PCE price index. Results are available on request.
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on mortgage repayments than conventional interest rate policy. In appendix
IV, we compare the responses of refinance and purchase originations. Whereas
purchase originations respond very similarly to both shocks, refinancing origi-
nations react more strongly to the agency purchase shock, and account for the
entire difference in the effect on total originations.
Another notable difference between credit policy and traditional interest rate
shocks is the effect on the homeownership rate (right panel, third row in Figure
1.12). Unlike the response to an agency purchase shock, there is no indication
that a conventional interest rate shock has any positive effect on homeowner-
ship. In most months, the estimated effect on homeownership instead is nega-
tive, though small and generally not statistically significant. Apart from the dif-
ferent response of originations and homeownership, however, it does appear as
if credit policy operates through similar transmission channels as conventional
monetary policy.
In appendix IV, we compare agency activity and conventional monetary
shocks in terms of their contribution to fluctuations in credit aggregates and
interest rates. Because our local projections approach is not well suited for this
purpose, we assess the variance contributions in a proxy SVAR setting (Mertens
and Ravn, 2013) using the GSE excess returns identification strategy and the
Romer and Romer (2004) residuals as a proxy for monetary shocks. The main
finding is that GSE excess returns shocks explain up to 15 and 10 percent of
the medium-run forecast error variance of mortgage originations and housing
starts, respectively, which is roughly comparable to the contribution of mone-
tary policy shocks. In addition, while shocks to monetary policy are substan-
tially more important for the variance of interest rates in the short run, the role
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of GSE excess returns shocks for long-term interest rates exceeds the role of
monetary policy shocks at longer horizons. The SVAR-based analysis overall
indicates that the contribution of credit policy shocks to fluctuations in housing
and credit markets is non-negligible.
To explore the potential effects of agency mortgage purchases when conven-
tional interest rate policy does not respond, for instance because it is constrained
by the zero lower bound, Figure 1.13 reports the results from a counterfactual
experiment in which the short-term interest rate is assumed to remain constant.
As before, the responses are to an increase in anticipated agency purchases by
one percentage point of trend originations, as in (1.3). However, we now addi-
tionally assume the realization of a sequence of monetary shocks such that the
3-month T-bill rate remains unchanged at every horizon.30 An important caveat
with this experiment is that the short-term rate remains constant because of suc-
cessive monetary surprises rather than an anticipated policy response. As such,
the results are clearly subject to the Lucas critique. Figure 1.13 shows the coun-
terfactual responses in red and the earlier baseline estimates in blue, in both
cases with 95 percent Newey and West (1987) bands.
The results from the counterfactual experiment in Figure 1.13 suggests that
conventional monetary policy plays an important role in explaining the effects
of agency purchase shocks. The rise in originations is only about half as large
when short-term interest rates remain constant, and there is no longer any sign
of an increase in the stock of mortgage debt. The drop in long-term interest
rates is much reduced, and the positive effect on housing starts disappears en-
tirely. The combination of expansionary monetary and credit policy therefore
30The impact of monetary shocks on the outcome variables is obtained as in Figure 1.12, i.e. by
using the Romer and Romer (2004) shocks as an instrument in local projections on the 3-month
T-bill rate and the control variables.
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Figure 1.13: Shock to Anticipated Agency Purchases: Counterfactual with
Constant Short-Term Rate
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share as in the benchmark of eq. (1.3), as well as those augmented with a sequence of monetary
shocks such that the 3-month T-bill rate remains constant. Estimates are from local projections-
IV regressions instrumenting agency commitments with the narrative policy indicator, and the
3-month T-bill rate with the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shock measure, respec-
tively. Finer lines and shaded areas are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample:
Jan 1967 to Dec 2006.
seems particularly important for stimulating residential investment. Even with
constant interest rates, however, purchases of mortgage assets continue to have
statistically significant effects on mortgage lending. In addition, the path of
short-term interest rates appears largely irrelevant for the increase in the home-
ownership rate that follows an expansion in agency purchases. In the appendix,
we report results for the same counterfactual experiment when we use GSE ex-
cess returns shocks for identifying responses to anticipated agency purchases.
The results indicate a smaller role for conventional monetary policy in explain-
ing the drop in long-term interest rates or the positive effect on housing starts.
Otherwise, the findings are comparable to those obtained using the narrative
instrument in Figure 1.13.
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1.8 Concluding Remarks
The postwar period witnessed a remarkable expansion in residential mortgage
debt. During the same period, an increasing share has come to reside on what
is ultimately the balance sheet of the federal government. In this paper, we pro-
vide evidence that government mortgage purchases influence the volume and
cost of mortgage lending. In order to tackle reverse causality, we make use of a
number of policy changes that have impacted the ability of government agen-
cies to acquire mortgage debt. Using policy interventions that we classify as
non-cyclically motivated to construct an instrumental variable for (news about)
agency mortgage purchases, we find that an increase in these purchases stimu-
lates mortgage originations and debt, and temporarily lowers mortgage rates.
Consistent with the evidence in Di Maggio et al. (2016) regarding the effects of
the QE interventions, we find that agency purchases have particularly large ef-
fects on refinancing activity. We also find a positive impact on housing starts
and homeownership, and some indications of positive effects on house prices
and consumption expenditures. An alternative identification strategy discussed
in the appendix based on GSE excess returns innovations as an instrument for
purchasing activity yields overall very similar results.
One important aspect of our findings is the apparent similarity and interac-
tion between housing credit policies and conventional interest rate policy. We
find that greater agency mortgage purchases lead to broad declines in short-
and long-term interest rates. Our measure of non-cyclically motivated credit
policy changes predicts the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shock
measure, and expansionary credit policy appears to be accommodated by mon-
etary policy. In contrast, we find that credit policy adjusts in order to offset the
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effects of monetary disturbances. It may therefore be necessary to account for
credit policy to understand the effects of monetary policy. Agency purchase
shocks have relatively larger effects on mortgage originations and refinancing
activity than interest rate shocks, and influence homeownership regardless of
the path of short-term interest rates. The quantitative effects of credit and mon-
etary policy shocks on many other variables, including residential investment,
are otherwise remarkably similar.
There are several interesting avenues for future research: Unlike theoreti-
cal or multivariate statistical models, our approach does not easily allow an
assessment of the historical contribution of structural shocks without further
assumptions. Future work can verify whether credit policy shocks are impor-
tant causal factors in past housing or credit cycles, in particular during the most
recent housing boom and bust.31 Another interesting avenue for future research
is to verify whether the macroeconomic impact of agency mortgage purchases
has grown with the rise in the stock of mortgage debt, and whether it varies
importantly with the broader financial conditions. Our results can be used to
help evaluate the credit policy interventions in the recent financial crisis, the
possible impact of unwinding the Fed’s current mortgage holdings, or the var-
ious proposals for GSE reform. We have made no attempt at understanding
more precisely the nature or implications of the credit frictions and transmis-
sion channels through which housing credit policies operate. Future work may
apply similar cross-sectional identification strategies as Di Maggio et al. (2016),
Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2018), or Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay
(2017) to other housing credit policy events documented in our narrative anal-
31The expansion of the GSE’s market share from the early 1990s to mid-2004 was dramatic,
but came to a grinding halt when, following revelations of accounting fraud, regulators imposed
capital surcharges on Fannie and Freddie in the fall of 2004 and eventually portfolio caps in mid-
2006.
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ysis. Finally, it is possible to apply a similar analysis to assess the impact of
government mortgage guarantees and securitization.
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CHAPTER 2
CROWD-OUT EFFECTS OF U.S. HOUSING CREDIT POLICY
Andrew J. Fieldhouse
Abstract: Credit policies can expand targeted lending volumes by subsidizing
private credit risks, and an expansion in targeted lending may crowd out other
loans. I document that U.S. housing credit policies subsidizing an expansion
in residential mortgage lending unintentionally crowd out commercial lend-
ing and related real activity. I use a long history of regulatory changes for ex-
ogenous variation in the mortgage purchases of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
government-sponsored enterprises that subsidize mortgage borrowing. Regu-
latory shocks to subsidized mortgage purchases crowd in private home mort-
gage lending while unintentionally crowding out commercial mortgages and
loans. U.S. housing credit policies similarly reallocate construction activity to-
ward housing and away from commercial real estate, negating any intended
stimulus to aggregate construction or employment. I contribute evidence that
the transmission of such mortgage purchases operates through a mortgage orig-
ination channel and a safe asset supply channel, which induce significant real-
locations in bank lending. I explore implications for unwinding the Federal
Reserve’s mortgage holdings and eventual reforms to Fannie and Freddie.
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2.1 Introduction
Congress has heavily intervened in U.S. mortgage markets ever since the Great
Depression, when federal housing credit policies were first deployed to resus-
citate housing and mortgage markets. Congress chartered federal agencies and
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to promote access to mortgage credit
by purchasing or guaranteeing mortgages. Since the onset of the Great Reces-
sion the Federal Reserve has conducted its own form of housing credit policy
aimed at reducing the cost and increasing the availability of mortgage credit:
large-scale purchases of government agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
Whereas conventional monetary policy targets a term structure of risk-free in-
terest rates, credit policy aims to alter the allocation of credit by absorbing or
subsidizing lending risks. Housing credit policies can, in principle, allocate re-
sources toward housing by subsidizing a reduction in mortgage risk premia. By
subsidizing an expansion in mortgage borrowing, housing credit policies may
unintentionally crowd out lending to other sectors, potentially diminishing the
aggregate stimulus policymakers often intend from such credit policies.
I empirically test whether housing credit policies reallocate credit away from
other sectors, using a long history of regulatory shocks for exogenous variation
in GSE mortgage purchases. Primary sources and budget scorekeeping rules
suggest that congressional policymakers view housing credit policies as a free
lunch, ignoring possible tradeoffs predicted by the literature on credit policies.
If the supply of credit is imperfectly elastic, subsidizing an expansion in targeted
borrowing crowds out the supply of loanable funds available for intermediation
of other loans, as does issuing debt to finance credit policies. In theoretical mod-
els of federal credit policies the degree of crowd out hinges significantly on how
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the supply of credit is parameterized (Gale, 1991; Lucas, 2016). My empirical
strategy avoids taking a stance on the elasticity of credit supply or the precise
nature of credit frictions, and can easily speak to real-financial linkages. I find
that subsidizing an expansion in home mortgage lending crowds out commer-
cial real estate and business lending. Likewise, GSE purchases stimulate single-
family housing investment and crowd out commercial real estate construction,
providing no net stimulus to aggregate construction spending or employment.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to document that U.S. housing credit
policies inadvertently crowd out commercial lending and related real activity.
My empirical strategy exploits a long history of regulatory policy changes
affecting the mortgage holdings of government agencies as documented by
Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017), similar to the approaches of Friedman and
Schwartz (1963a), Romer and Romer (1989, 2010), and Ramey (2011) in parsing
historical records for policy variation. I instrument GSE mortgage purchases
with regulatory policy changes classified as unrelated to economic conditions—
essentially exogenous shocks to the supply of subsidized mortgage credit. The
identification strategy is similar to that employed by Fieldhouse, Mertens,
and Ravn (2018) to test whether mortgage purchases of government agencies
advance stated policy objectives or interact with conventional monetary pol-
icy. I estimate impulse responses of credit and construction flows to GSE
regulatory shocks in a local projection–instrumental variable (LP-IV) regres-
sion framework—a macroeconometric analog of microeconometric instrumen-
tal variable regressions, using a time series of documented and quantified GSE
regulatory policy shocks as the instrument.
More specifically, I document credit reallocations ensuing from the mortgage
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purchases of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Fed-
eral Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), the GSEs chartered by
Congress to support a secondary market for residential mortgages.1 The sec-
ondary mortgage market is intended to increase the availability and liquidity of
mortgages, and is periodically used to try to promote homeownership or stim-
ulate economic activity. Fannie and Freddie are barred from originating loans
themselves, and can only purchase mortgages originated in the primary market.
Purchased mortgages are either held as investments or pooled into guaranteed
MBS, much of which the GSEs also retain. In practice, the mortgage purchases
of Fannie and Freddie absorb credit, prepayment, and interest rate risk from the
private sector, and a mortgage subsidy arises from an implicit government guar-
antee on agency securities.2 The GSEs’ mortgage holdings came to comprise a
significant source of subsidized mortgage funding, with Fannie and Freddie
owning as much as 20% of residential mortgage debt in recent decades.
In the absence of subsidies and financial frictions, theory suggests govern-
ment mortgage purchases should affect neither mortgage lending nor other
credit markets: such purchases would be neutral in frictionless models of per-
fect competition, simply crowding out private mortgage holdings. By intro-
ducing subsidies, credit policies can expand targeted lending volumes in oth-
erwise perfectly competitive markets, as in the model of Lucas (2016). Field-
house, Mertens, and Ravn (2018) document that government agency mortgage
purchases advance a number of intended policy objectives, notably boosting
mortgage lending, housing starts, and homeownership rates. Agency pur-
1With an abuse of terminology, I use “GSE” to refer exclusively to Fannie and Freddie. The
Federal Home Loan Bank System is also a housing government-sponsored enterprise, instead
chartered to provide wholesale funding to mortgage lenders.
2Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005), Passmore (2005), and CBO (2012) estimate GSE
subsidies and funding advantages.
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chases both increase mortgage lending and reduce mortgage rates, consistent
with purchases subsidizing mortgage borrowing. The non-neutrality of agency
purchases for mortgage lending, however, sheds no light on whether purchases
might inadvertently crowd out other lending, which hinges on credit frictions
and credit supply elasticities as opposed to subsidies.
Secondary market demand for newly originated residential mortgages dis-
torts incentives in the primary market by generating risk-free fee income and
conferring an option on new mortgage originations. If primary market lenders
are constrained, the transmission of GSE purchases may operate through an
origination channel, in which diverting resources toward a profitable opportu-
nity to originate mortgages reduces other lending. There are extensive theo-
retical and empirical underpinnings for bank lending being constrained by in-
formation frictions in funding markets or regulatory requirements.3 Beyond
balance sheet constraints, banks may face origination capacity constraints: allo-
cating loan officers or other screening and underwriting resources to originate
residential mortgages may reduce other originations if such resources are fixed
in the short run.4 By issuing bonds or MBS to finance their purchases, the GSEs
may compete with banks for funding, raising banks’ external cost of funds and
tightening balance sheet constraints, thereby reducing lending. I test whether
subsidized GSE mortgage purchases induce a reallocation of credit away from
other sectors, as would be driven by funding or origination capacity constraints
in the primary mortgage market.
Expansionary housing credit policy shocks increase both GSE mortgage
3See, for instance, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1995, 2000), and
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
4Sharpe and Sherlund (2016) and Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2017, 2018) find
evidence of such a tradeoff.
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holdings and the supply of agency bonds and MBS, which are considered safe
assets that carry a premium for their money-like use as collateral (Gorton,
Lewellen, and Metrick, 2012). The safety premium on newly issued agency
securities can only directly subsidize residential mortgages, as the GSEs can-
not legally arbitrage across other asset classes. Increased GSE demand lowers
mortgage rates and induces primary market lenders to originate more residen-
tial mortgages; there is also a substitution away from nonresidential mortgage
originations, indicative of origination capacity constraints. In response to GSE
regulatory shocks, commercial banks substitute away from nonresidential loans
and toward holdings of safe government agency securities. Consistent with in-
termediaries being balance sheet constrained, there is no significant response
of commercial banks’ aggregate assets, only portfolio rebalancing effects across
assets. Beyond operating through a subsidy channel, lending responses to GSE
regulatory shocks suggest the transmission of housing credit policies operates
through a mortgage origination channel and a safe asset supply channel, induc-
ing significant reallocations in lending.
While GSE demand for mortgages stimulates lending and investment for
single-family housing, general equilibrium effects appear to negate any in-
tended aggregate stimulus. Private holdings of home mortgages see a signif-
icant rise of 25 to 50 cents in response to a one-dollar shock to GSE purchases
over two to four years. Secondary market purchase shocks additionally induce
a persistent, significant decline in private holdings of multifamily and commer-
cial mortgages of roughly 20 to 30 cents per dollar of GSE purchases, while
commercial and industrial (C&I) loan volumes persistently fall 15 to 25 cents.
GSE purchase shocks spur similarly divergent responses for real activity, in-
ducing a persistent rise in single-family home construction spending and an
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equivalent reduction in commercial real estate construction. There is no signif-
icant response of total construction spending, construction sector employment,
or total employment.
Lastly, I explore implications of the crowd-out effects of U.S. housing credit
policy for the shrinking federal role in financing mortgages, as well as eventual
reforms to Fannie and Freddie. Congress is still trying to resolve the fate of the
GSEs more than a decade after taking them into conservatorship. Federal reg-
ulators have significantly reduced the GSEs’ mortgage holdings, and the Fed
began unwinding its holdings of mortgages in 2017. Consequently the share
of residential mortgage debt funded by federal agencies is slated to fall from
over 25% to roughly 5%—a sizable shock to the supply of subsidized mortgage
credit. My findings are particularly relevant to the ongoing reduction of the
Fed’s mortgage holdings. The high-frequency and cross-sectional event study
designs used to analyze the Fed’s large-scale asset purchases cannot speak to
aggregate effects of reducing the Fed’s MBS holdings near the peak of the busi-
ness cycle. There are, however, significant similarities between the mortgage
purchases of the Fed and the GSEs; both purchase newly originated residential
mortgages in a forward contract market, similarly distorting origination incen-
tives. I find evidence of GSE purchases operating through a mortgage origi-
nation channel similar to that documented for the Fed’s MBS purchases.5 My
estimates of aggregate crowd out from exogenous GSE purchases bode well for
unwinding the Fed’s MBS holdings: a reallocation of credit and construction ac-
tivity toward commercial real estate may offset adverse effects for single-family
mortgage lending and housing investment.
5Fuster and Willen (2010); Di Maggio, Kermani, and Palmer (2016); Chakraborty, Goldstein,
and MacKinlay (2017); and Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2018) find evidence of the Fed’s MBS
purchases operating through a mortgage origination channel.
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2.2 U.S. Housing Credit Policy: Theory, Practice, and Evidence
The federal government effectively operates a sizable, largely off-balance sheet
national bank to try to advance numerous policy objectives. Credit policies refer
to the government absorbing risks associated with lending to the private sector,
typically through direct government lending, loan guarantees, or government-
sponsored secondary markets.6 Credit policies aim to expand a targeted form
of lending through subsidies. Relative to direct expenditures, the costs of credit
programs are more stochastic, less transparent, and broadly underestimated by
federal budget rules, contributing to the proliferation of credit policies.7 Federal
credit programs span mortgage credit, farm credit, student loans, and small
business loans. As of fiscal year 2010, the federal government had $2.3 trillion
in outstanding direct or guaranteed loans, and, including liabilities of Fannie
and Freddie, was exposed to credit risk on a total of $8 trillion in assets (Elliott,
2011); for scale, federal non-interest spending totaled $3.3 trillion and debt held
by the public totaled $9 trillion for the year.8
Congress heavily intervenes in mortgage markets via credit policies.
Government-sponsored secondary mortgage markets and the prominence of
long-term, fixed-rate mortgages in the U.S. are anomalies among advanced
economies, both being interrelated legacies of Depression-era policy inter-
ventions. Prior to the Depression, U.S. mortgages were structured as non-
amortizing loans with short maturities and balloon repayments. This financ-
ing system imploded amid the widespread bank failures and deflation of the
6Beyond housing, Congress sponsored secondary markets for agricultural loans (Farmer
Mac) and student loans (Sallie Mae).
7See Lucas (2016) for an overview of how federal budget rules underestimate credit subsi-
dies.
8Housing programs accounted for 55% of direct or guaranteed loans and 81% of total obli-
gations carrying federal credit risk.
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Depression. Against this backdrop, Congress launched a new class of long-
term, fixed-rate, self-amortizing mortgages, and government agencies began
guaranteeing loans for qualifying borrowers. Even absent credit risk, fixed-
rate mortgages pose dual interest rate risks, as lenders face shrinking loan
spreads if interest rates rise and refinancing prepayments if interest rates fall.
Liquidity risk arises from funding illiquid, long-term mortgages with volatile,
short-term deposits. Depository institutions were initially reluctant to hold
long-term, government-insured mortgages, prompting Congress to charter sec-
ondary markets to increase mortgage liquidity. Congress’s use of secondary
markets evolved, aiming to stabilize mortgage credit across the country and
business cycle, periodically boost residential construction, and promote home-
ownership rates—all while supporting an enduring policy preference for long-
term, fixed-rate mortgages.9
My overarching research question is whether U.S. housing credit policies
that subsidize residential mortgage borrowing inadvertently reallocate credit
away from other non-targeted lending. Figure 2.1 sketches out the rough struc-
ture of U.S. mortgage markets to elucidate how housing credit policies could
be displacing commercial lending. In chartering Fannie and Freddie to sup-
port a secondary market for residential mortgages conforming to certain un-
derwriting standards, or “conforming mortgages,” Congress barred the GSEs
from originating loans themselves or investing in non-mortgage assets.10 The
GSEs purchase conforming residential mortgages from primary market lenders
9See Appendix B for a more detailed history of the evolution of U.S. federal housing credit
policy.
10The GSEs can only purchase residential mortgages conforming to underwriting standards
set by their regulators, notably a loan limit and loan-to-value ratio. Mortgages above the con-
forming loan limit are “jumbo” mortgages, whereas Federal Housing Administration- or Veter-
ans Administration-guaranteed loans have lower loan limits and downpayment requirements.
Residential mortgages are for single-family and multifamily residences, excluding commercial
and farm mortgages.
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who originate and service loans—primarily commercial banks, thrift banks, and
mortgage companies. Broadly speaking, primary market lenders originate con-
forming mortgages they can sell to secondary market, and additionally origi-
nate a host of ineligible loans (depicted in blue), notably non-conforming res-
idential mortgages, commercial mortgages, commercial and industrial loans,
and consumer loans.11
Capital Markets
Agency Debt Guaranteed MBSGSE Retained Portfolios
Fannie Mae + Freddie Mac
Purchase Commitments Mortgage Purchases
Thrifts, Commercial Banks, Mortgage Companies...
Conforming Mortgages
Non-Conforming Mortgages
Commercial Mortgages
Commercial & Industrial Loans
Consumer Loans
Figure 2.1. Structure of the U.S. Primary and Secondary Mortgage Markets
Mortgages purchased by the GSEs are held as retained portfolio investments,
or are pooled into agency MBS that Fannie and Freddie guarantee in exchange
11Before the 1970s, Fannie only purchased Federal Housing Administration- and Veterans
Administration-guaranteed loans. In recent years, the GSEs have been allowed to purchase non-
conforming subprime and Alt-A mortgages if supplemented with private mortgage insurance.
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for fees.12 Fannie and Freddie hold agency MBS as investments and have a
sizable off-balance sheet guarantee book of their MBS held by third parties.
GSE mortgage purchases are financed by issuing agency bonds or MBS, both
considered safe assets because of an implicit government guarantee.13 Safe as-
sets carry a premium, as they play a money-like role in facilitating commerce
through their use as information-insensitive collateral (Gorton, Lewellen, and
Metrick, 2012). The safety premium on agency securities can only be passed on
to subsidize residential mortgages because the GSEs are prohibited from arbi-
traging across asset classes. In practice, the GSEs are able to intermediate funds
for residential mortgages at lower cost than private counter-parties because of
the safety premium on agency securities, or, framed differently, because credit
frictions raise banks’ external cost of funds above the risk-free rate afforded the
GSEs. Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005) estimate the GSEs’ funding ad-
vantage to be roughly 40 basis points over long-term AAA/AA financial cor-
porate debt, some of which is passed on to lower mortgage rates for borrowers.
Congressional Budget Office estimates similarly imply an annualized subsidy
rate of roughly 40 basis points for mortgages purchased by the GSEs (Lucas,
2016).
In the absence of subsidies or credit frictions, credit policies are neutral in
models of perfect competition, with government loans or purchases perfectly
crowding out private lending. Competitive banks will price mortgages at a pre-
mium over risk-free interest rates that compensates for expected default and in-
terest rate risk, generating a perfectly elastic supply of mortgage credit. The sec-
ondary mortgage market can, however, influence credit allocations by reducing
12“Agency MBS” refers to issues of Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie, with timely payment guar-
anteed by the issuing agency.
13Many institutional investors financing agency securities cannot purchase whole mortgages,
such as pension funds or the Fed.
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mortgage risk premia over risk-free interest rates. Directly funding mortgages
at a subsidized rate will expand the volume of mortgage borrowing, moving
households down along their demand curve. Reducing mortgage risk premia
by absorbing default risk on privately held loans is isomorphic to subsidized
direct lending, provided that government guarantees are underpriced, as is the
case in the United States (CBO, 2012; Lucas, 2016).14 If the supply of credit is un-
constrained, subsidizing a downward shift in the supply of mortgage credit will
have no effect on the markets for other loans, which will remain competitively
supplied at actuarily fair premia over risk-free interest rates.
If federal credit subsidies expand the volume of residential mortgage bor-
rowing, a tradeoff with respect to other lending may arise from a finite supply
of credit or frictions constraining bank lending. Gale (1991) demonstrates that
credit subsidies will increase targeted lending and crowd out non-targeted lend-
ing in a model of credit markets with information frictions, similar to Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981), but modified with a partially inelastic supply of funds. In-
ducing an expansion in targeted borrowing can crowd out the supply of sav-
ings available for intermediation of non-targeted loans, as does issuing govern-
ment debt to finance credit policies; see Gale (1991). Subsidizing mortgages
will similarly expand the volume of mortgage borrowing and reduce mortgage
spreads if credit supply is partially inelastic. But through the market clearing
condition for aggregate lending, the expansion in mortgage lending may ad-
ditionally cause a contraction in the supply of commercial loans, decreasing
borrowing and increasing spreads on commercial loans. In partial equilibrium
models of credit policies the degree of crowd out is highly sensitive to how the
supply of credit is parameterized. My identification strategy avoids imposing
14GSE MBS guarantees have carried a credit subsidy by underpricing both guarantee fees and
the cost of capital.
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such a stance: the degree of crowd out is empirically testable using exogenous
variation in the supply of subsidized mortgage credit.
Credit frictions could similarly generate a tradeoff between a subsidized ex-
pansion in residential mortgage lending and a contraction in other lending.
Banks are typically thought to operate a screening technology enabling them
to produce loans from deposits (or wholesale funding) and loan officers. There
is abundant theoretical and empirical support for this intermediation role be-
ing constrained by information or agency frictions, regulatory requirements, or
loan origination capacity constraints. Agency or contracting problems between
borrowers and lenders may give rise to endogenous balance sheet constraints,
limiting aggregate bank lending; see Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).15 The literature on the bank
lending channel of monetary policy is relatedly premised on banks being con-
strained by reserve requirements because they cannot frictionlessly raise unin-
sured funds.16 Such balance sheet constraints would necessitate a tradeoff be-
tween a subsidized expansion in mortgage lending and non-targeted lending
volumes. GSE purchase shocks distort primary market originations incentives
toward one class of loans by generating risk-free fee income, potentially crowd-
ing out other originations.17 By incentivizing new mortgages originations, GSE
15Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) develop a model of contracting frictions in which credit policies
can facilitate intermediation. With frictions in the retail or wholesale funding markets, banks
become balance sheet constrained and arbitrage breaks down. Credit policies expand total inter-
mediation when banks are constrained, but would otherwise perfectly displace private lending.
16See, for instance, Bernanke and Blinder (1988), and Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1995), and
Stein (1998). Beginning with Bernanke and Blinder (1992), a body of empirical work finds ev-
idence of monetary transmission shifting bank loan supply schedules, particularly for banks
with less liquid assets (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) and Black, Han-
cock, and Passmore (2010) find evidence of a bank lending channel of monetary policy operating
through mortgage lending.
17Non-interest fee income has become a sizable source of earnings for financial services insti-
tutions, often comparable to net interest earnings for large banks. In 2016 the five largest mort-
gage originators by volume were Quicken Loans, Wells Fargo Bank, JP Morgan Chase Bank,
Bank of America, and Freedom Mortgage Corporation (Bhutta, Laufer, and Ringo, 2018). Over
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purchases may divert loan officer effort or other underwriting resources away
from less profitable origination activity. Sharpe and Sherlund (2016) document
significant mortgage processing and origination capacity constraints binding
during refinancing booms, inducing a substitution away from more resource-
intensive underwriting activity. Loan officers are commissioned by origina-
tion volume, so their incentives are aligned with prioritizing low-effort, high-
volume originations.
Consistent with binding balance sheet or origination capacity constraints, a
smaller recent literature documents evidence of shocks to mortgage originations
crowding out non-mortgage lending. Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay
(2018) find cross-sectional evidence of regional home-price booms inducing an
expansion in home mortgage lending and reducing C&I lending, indicative of
constraints on bank intermediation. In a similar vein, Chakraborty, Goldstein,
and MacKinlay (2017) find cross-sectional evidence of the Fed’s MBS purchases
inducing a tradeoff in loan originations: banks with greater exposure to the
Fed’s MBS purchases see a relative increase in mortgage originations and a rel-
ative decrease in C&I loan growth during QE1 and QE3.18 The authors attribute
the unintended crowd out of non-targeted lending to a mortgage origination
channel.19 The crowd-out effects are larger for more financially constrained
banks, consistent with balance sheet constraints contributing to a reallocation
of credit when demand for mortgage originations increases. The transmission
2015–2017, mortgage banking income accounted for 20–20% of net income for Wells Fargo, 7–
10% of net income for JP Morgan Chase, and 1–15% of net income for Bank of America. Quicken
Loans and Freedom Mortgage Corporation are mortgage companies. Mortgage origination fees
and servicing fees or rights are the predominant sources of income for mortgage companies.
18No such effect was found when only Treasuries were purchases during QE2, suggesting a
key role for mortgage originations.
19Fuster and Willen (2010); Di Maggio, Kermani, and Palmer (2016); and Rodnyansky and
Darmouni (2018) find complimentary evidence of the Fed’s MBS purchases increasing conform-
ing mortgage originations and refinancing activity in particular.
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of GSE demand for newly originated mortgages should, in principle, operate
through a similar mortgage origination channel.
Rather than purchasing seasoned mortgages off of bank balance sheets, the
GSEs sell advanced commitments to purchase up to a set volume of newly orig-
inated loans at pre-specified prices. The market structure of the GSEs commit-
ting to purchase mortgages delivered at a later date, if exercised, confers an
option on new qualifying originations, altering adverse selection issues in mort-
gage lending. Banks may originate new loans in excess of anticipated sales to
the secondary market, knowing that they can learn about borrower characteris-
tics up to the option’s expiration and deliver lemons while cream-skimming
choice loans for their own holdings; such adverse selection issues are well
documented in mortgage delivery to secondary markets (Vickery and Wright,
2013). The Federal Reserve purchases pools of newly originated conforming
mortgages (i.e., agency MBS) through a similar forward contract market as the
GSEs, likewise distorting marginal origination incentives. Chakraborty, Gold-
stein, and MacKinlay (2017) argue that this market structure for the Fed’s MBS
purchases gives rise to a mortgage origination channel and crowd out of C&I
loans; again, the transmission of GSE demand for newly originated mortgages
should operate similarly.
Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018) use the Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017)
narrative history of regulatory policy shocks to test whether agency mortgage
purchases advance stated policy objectives. As intended by policymakers, pur-
chases induce statistically significant increases in mortgage lending, housing
starts, and the homeownership rate.20 The authors document that shocks to
20Bachasy, Kimz, and Yannelis (2018) find complementary empirical evidence that small busi-
ness lending is highly responsive to changes in subsidized Small Business Administration loan
guarantees, another form of U.S. credit policy.
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mortgage purchases yield a significant decline in mortgage rates, consistent
with purchases subsidizing borrowing. Non-neutrality of government agency
purchases for mortgage lending, however, does not inform whether purchases
would additionally reallocate credit from other lending, which depends on the
supply of credit and intermediation frictions. I employ a similar identification
strategy as Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018) to test whether GSE purchases
unintentionally reallocate credit away from other sectors by subsidizing an ex-
pansion of mortgage lending. Housing credit policies are often deployed to
try to boost construction activity or employment—as the Fed’s MBS purchases
intended—but crowd out of non-targeted lending could undermine their use
as a stabilization policy. More broadly, primary sources suggest congressional
policymakers neglect potential opportunity costs of housing credit subsidies,
notably inefficient distortions to lending and real activity, related fiscal costs,
and horizontal inequities. Related distortions to credit markets and real ac-
tivity would be an important consideration ahead of pending reforms to U.S.
secondary mortgage markets.
2.3 Identification Strategy and Main Regression Specifications
In estimating the response of economic activity to GSE purchases, the econo-
metrician must be concerned with two sources of reverse causation. First, GSE
purchases respond endogenously to mortgage market conditions, as mandated
by their public charters and reinforced by profit motives. For instance, the GSEs
may increase their purchases in response to rising mortgage spreads during
recessions. Second, policymakers respond endogenously to distress in hous-
ing and mortgage markets, often pushing housing credit agencies to expand
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purchases during recessions. Many common macroeconometric identification
strategies, such as imposing timing restrictions in structural vector autoregres-
sions (SVARs), cannot credibly deal with policy endogeneity and profit motives
related to quickly responding financial variables. An alternative empirical strat-
egy circumventing such pitfalls is the narrative approach to identification from
observed policy variation.
My empirical strategy exploits a long narrative history of observed regula-
tory changes affecting GSE mortgage holdings to test whether subsidized mort-
gage purchases crowd out commercial lending and non-residential construc-
tion. In exchange for upholding their public missions, Congress conferred fa-
vorable regulatory treatment upon the GSEs, with distinct (often weaker) over-
sight than for other financial institutions; ad hoc regulatory oversight, in turn,
generated a fair degree of policy variation affecting the mortgage holdings of
Fannie and Freddie. Instrumenting actual purchases with exogenous regula-
tory policy shocks circumvents the GSEs’ routine response to credit market con-
ditions. Restricting attention to regulatory policy shocks classified as not cycli-
cally motivated is intended to control for bias from policy endogeneity.
I test the responses of credit and construction flows to secondary market
purchase shocks in two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. In the first stage,
I use regulatory policy shocks that are classified as not cyclically motivated as
instrumental variables for actual GSE purchases, addressing measurement error
in the quantification of policy events. The benchmark regression specification is
a LP-IV framework, similar to how Ramey and Zubairy (2017) estimate govern-
ment spending multipliers and Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018) estimate
credit multipliers. The regression framework yields easily interpreted credit
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and construction multipliers, which represent the dollar response of lending or
construction volumes to a one-dollar increase in GSE mortgage purchases, both
cumulated over varying horizons. Dollar-denominated impulse responses are
particularly well suited for analyzing the absolute magnitude of credit or con-
struction reallocations.21 Moreover, the LP-IV framework is appealing because
it flexibly handles news shocks, policy implementation lags, and nonlinearities
in impulse response functions, which are less easily accommodated in SVAR-IV
frameworks; see Jorda` (2005), Ramey (2016a), and Stock and Watson (2018).22
2.3.1 Narrative Instruments for Subsidized Supply of Mort-
gage Credit
I use the Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) narrative record for exogenous vari-
ation in the mortgage purchases of Fannie and Freddie to test whether GSE
purchases unintentionally crowd out commercial lending and construction ac-
tivity.23 The narrative approach to causal inference is based on the preliminary
identification of observable shocks by parsing the historical record, as opposed
to backing out shocks from latent variables with statistical techniques or model-
ing assumptions. Narrative analyses generate a time series of events for which
the magnitude, pertinent timing, and exogeneity of the instruments are chron-
icled on an event-by-event basis. The narrative approach was pioneered by
Friedman and Schwartz (1963a) in their canonical study of U.S. monetary his-
tory. Beyond monetary shocks, narrative analyses have subsequently been used
21Impulse responses measured in percentage deviations for time series in varied levels would
preclude such comparisons.
22Nonlinearities may arise from lag times or asymmetric responses to contractionary versus
expansionary regulatory changes.
23The narrative analysis is available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w23165.
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to identify tax policy shocks, military spending shocks, and oil supply shocks.24
While narrative analyses can yield a source of as-if randomness for causal iden-
tification, they requires a depth of institutional knowledge, availability of rele-
vant primary sources, and sufficient historical identifying variation.
To identify exogenous variation in government purchases of mortgage debt,
Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) undertake a narrative analysis identifying and
quantifying regulatory changes affecting the mortgage holdings of Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, the Fed, and Treasury.25 Regulatory policy events
identified and classified as not cyclically motivated are intended as instrumen-
tal variables for government agency purchases of mortgage debt. The narra-
tive record is constructed from a close reading of primary source documents
produced by congressional committees, government agencies, and federal reg-
ulators to track the policy histories of agencies purchasing mortgage debt. It
proceeds in five steps: (1) identifying significant policy changes expected to af-
fect agency portfolios, (2) quantifying a projected dollar effect of each regulatory
change on the GSEs’ retained mortgage holdings, (3) pinpointing the timing of
each policy’s news first becoming anticipated, (4) using primary sources to clas-
sify each policy as either cyclically or not cyclically motivated, and (5) restricting
the sample for consistent use as instruments.
Policies for Fannie and Freddie are identified by chronologically tracing the
24Narrative analyses have documented monetary shocks (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963a,b;
Romer and Romer, 1989, 2004; Cloyne and Hu¨rtgen, 2016), tax shocks (Romer and Romer, 2010;
Mertens and Ravn, 2013; Cloyne, 2013), military spending shocks (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998;
Ramey, 2011, 2016b; Ramey and Zubairy, 2017), and oil shocks (Hamilton, 1983; Kilian, 2008).
25Ginnie Mae is a government-owned corporation, split from Fannie in 1968, that guarantees
pools of government-insured mortgages. Congress largely directed Ginnie to purchase difficult-
to-market classes of FHA/VA loans before ending its purchase program in the early 1980s. I
restrict attention to Fannie and Freddie, as results for the GSEs are more relevant to current
policy.
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legislative history of the GSEs and related regulatory rulings.26 Ex ante bal-
ance sheet data, estimates of regulators, or projections of financial analysts are
used to quantify a projected dollar change in the GSE mortgage holdings over
the first year of a policy taking effect. Policymakers tend to be quite explicit
about cyclical motivations, such as boosting construction employment during
a recession. The not cyclically motivated polices used for identification tend
to be driven by some combination of improving budgetary optics, clarifying
prior legislative intent, pushing the GSEs toward privatization, reacting to po-
litical scandals, or advancing social policy objectives. I restrict focus to policy
events over 1967–2006, capturing a period of relative institutional stability; the
start date roughly coincides with publicly listing Fannie and chartering Fred-
die, while the end date precedes the GSEs being taken into conservatorship. I
exclude any policy events with implementation lags exceeding 12 months; news
shocks with a wide range of implementation lags would weaken the first stage.
Implementation lags range between zero and nine months, with an average lag
of two months.
After monthly aggregation, there are 14 months with GSE regulatory inter-
ventions that are classified as not cyclically motivated over the 1967–2006 sam-
ple. Appendix B provides a brief description of each regulatory change that I use
for identifying variation, and Appendix Table B.1 lists the policy description,
projected effect on GSE holdings, news date, effective date, and classification
of each policy. Appendix Figure B.3 depicts the not cyclically motivated GSE
policy events used for identification (black), scaled to annualized GSE holdings
over the previous year (left panel) and annualized mortgage originations over
the previous year (right). For a sense of scale, GSE retained portfolio mortgage
26Regulatory rulings affecting the GSEs are typically published in the Federal Register.
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purchases—excluding purchases pooled as MBS for third parties—averaged
9.7% of residential mortgage originations over 1967–2006. Figure B.3 addition-
ally depicts the detrended growth in GSE mortgage holdings (blue). The expan-
sionary (contractionary) narrative events overwhelmingly line up with periods
of relative balance sheet growth (reductions). Instrument relevance is formally
discussed below.
2.3.2 Benchmark LP-IV Regression Specification
The Jorda` (2005) local projection method directly estimates impulse responses
for each dependent variable of interest, yt, with separate regressions for each
forecast horizon h ∈ {0, 1, ...,H}. The direct forecasting method is particularly
conducive to dealing with implementation lags following news about pending
regulatory changes to GSE balance sheet constraints. I iteratively estimate the
response of lending or construction activity to GSE purchases, rotating in vari-
ous volumes of mortgage loans, bank loans, agency securities, and construction
expenditures on the left-hand side. I separately estimate the cumulative change
of each left-hand-side variable, yt+h−yt−1, over each horizon h in response to reg-
ulatory shocks announced at date t. The LP-IV variant is similar to Jorda`’s local
projection method, but is estimated by 2SLS, with the first stage instrumenting
for the structural shock of interest; see Ramey (2016a) and Stock and Watson
(2018). Identification broadly rests on the assumption that the regulatory policy
events classified as not cyclically motivated are correlated with actual GSE pur-
chases but are uncorrelated with other structural shocks not spanned by a set
of lagged macroeconomic controls. Assumptions for LP-IV instrument validity
are discussed below.
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The first-stage regressions instrument actual GSE mortgage purchases with
the regulatory policy shocks. Quantifying a projected effect of each policy
change for GSE mortgage holdings strengthens narrative instruments, say rela-
tive to treating policy events as indicator variables, but the quantification inher-
ently involves a degree of measurement error. Measurement error, however, is
not overly problematic so long as the policy events are used as instruments and
are correlated with the unobserved structural shock of interest.27 The first-stage
regressions estimate the effect of the regulatory policy events on real GSE pur-
chases of mortgages for their retained portfolio investments, pt, cumulated over
each h-month horizon following policies’ announcements at time t:∑h
j=0 pt+ j
Xt
= α˜h + β˜h
mt
Xt
+ φ˜h(L)Zt−1 + u˜t+h for h = 0, 1, 2, ... , (2.1)
where mt are the not cyclically motivated GSE policy events, quantified as the
annualized projected effect on GSE mortgage holdings in real dollars. The re-
sponse of cumulated GSE net purchases are iteratively estimated for each hori-
zon h. Each regression additionally includes a vector of lagged mortgage mar-
ket, interest rate, and macroeconomic controls, Zt−1, which is detailed below.
Both cumulated GSE purchases and the GSE policy instruments are scaled rela-
tive to Xt, a trend of real personal income, akin to scaling time series by poten-
tial GDP but using a monthly series more related to housing.28 The first stage
amounts to estimating the effect of the regulatory policy events on near-term
GSE purchases not forecast by the lagged controls, notably lagged purchases
and mortgage market indicators.
27Greater measurement error will weaken the first stage but will not invalidate the instru-
ment, so long as measurement error of the narrative shock and measurement error of actual
GSE purchases are uncorrelated (Ramey and Zubairy, 2017).
28Trend real personal income is estimated by fitting a third-degree polynomial to monthly
log real personal income. The scale factor is used to induce stationarity. Results are broadly
robust to an alternative regression specification instead expressed in log first-differences; the
benchmark specification, however, is more easily interpreted.
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The second stage tests whether GSE purchase shocks crowd out commercial
lending and non-residential construction activity. The cumulative response of
each lending or construction volume, yt+h − yt−1, in response to GSE retained
mortgage purchases is separately estimated for each h-month horizon:
yt+h − yt−1
Xt
= αh + βh
∑h
j=0 pt+ j
Xt
+ φh(L)Zt−1 + ut+h for h = 0, 1, 2, ... , (2.2)
All dependent variables rotated in to regression (2.2) are deflated using the core
PCE price index. The coefficient of interest, βh, measures the cumulative dol-
lar response of each lending or construction volume, yt, associated with an ad-
ditional dollar in GSE mortgage purchases, both cumulated over the same h-
month horizon. The sequence of βh for horizon h ∈ {0, 1, ...,H} traces out dy-
namic impulse responses, interpreted as the credit or construction spending
multiplier per dollar in GSE purchases. Rather than estimating (2.2) using ac-
tual GSE purchases, βh is estimated by 2SLS, instrumenting mortgage purchases
with the GSE regulatory policy events in the first stage (2.1). In iteratively esti-
mating (2.2) for varying impulse response horizons h, the regression residuals
ût+h will be serially correlated for h > 0. Accordingly, all confidence intervals
are constructed with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors. Unless otherwise noted, all regressions are estimated over a monthly
sample from January 1967–December 2006.
The second stage amounts to estimating the effect of regulatory shocks to
GSE mortgage purchases on near-term lending or construction spending that
has been orthogonalized to a rich set of lagged controls. Each regression in-
cludes 12 lags of a vector of control variables Zt−1, where φh(L) is a polynomial
of the lag operator. The controls include variables with predictive content for
the dependent variables to reduce the sampling variance of the LP-IV estimator,
including lagged values of the dependent variable scaled to trend real personal
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income. Lagged values of GSE net purchases and purchase commitments, both
scaled to Xt, are always included for their predictive content for near-term GSE
purchases in the first-stage regressions. In addition, Zt−1 contains variables with
predictive content for mortgage and commercial lending, housing activity, risk-
free rates, and credit risk premia: the log level of real mortgage originations and
log level of housing starts; residential mortgage debt growth, real house price
index growth, and core PCE price index growth; the 3-month T-bill rate and 10-
year Treasury rate; and the conventional mortgage rate spread and BAA–AAA
corporate bond spread.29 I include lagged values of the unemployment rate
and real personal income growth as cyclical controls in the benchmark regres-
sion specification. The rich set of lagged controls additionally serves to reduce
the stringency of the identifying assumptions.
For the GSE regulatory policy shocks, mt, to be a valid instrument in this
LP-IV framework, they must satisfy conditions for relevance (A1), contempora-
neous exogeneity (A2), and lead/lag exogeneity (A3):
A1. E
[
u⊥1,tm
⊥′
t
]
, 0
A2. E
[
u⊥2:n,tm
⊥′
t
]
= 0
A3. E
[
u⊥t+ jm
⊥′
t
]
= 0 for j , 0,
where u⊥t+h = ut+h − Proj
(
ut+h | φh(L)Zt−1) are the regression residuals in (2.2) or-
thogonalized to the lagged controls, and u⊥1,t correspond to GSE purchases and
u⊥2:n,t to all other endogenous variables. Analogously to their microeconometric
IV counterparts, (A1) and (A2) amount to assuming that the not cyclically mo-
tivated GSE regulatory changes directly affect agency purchases, but are con-
temporaneously uncorrelated with other endogenous variables of interest. The
29Identical controls are used in the first-stage regressions (2.1). All growth rates are measured
on a quarter-over-quarter basis. See Appendix B for data sources and details.
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lead/lag exogeneity condition (A3) arises from the local projection dynamics,
as the left-hand side depends on the entire history of shocks up to t + h. The
lagged controls, however, reduce the stringency of the contemporaneous ex-
clusion restriction (A2) and lagged exclusion restriction (A3): GSE regulatory
shocks must be uncorrelated with other contemporaneous or lagged structural
shocks not spanned by the set of lagged macroeconomic controls. In estimating
(2.1), I exclude policy events classified as cyclically motivated in order to avoid
correlation of the narrative instrument with other contemporaneous or lagged
shocks. The narrative instruments are additionally dated to each policy’s news
first being made public to preclude correlation with past news shocks. Lead
exogeneity is less stringent, and will be satisfied so long as the narrative instru-
ment is constructed from variables realized at date t or earlier. The projected
effects of the regulatory changes are deliberately quantified using only ex ante
information available up to the date t policy announcements to satisfy the lead
exogeneity condition.
2.3.3 Diagnostics for Instrument Validity: Relevance and Lag
Exogeneity
Instrument relevance is testable using standard diagnostics. Figure 2.2 depicts
the robust F-statistics for the first-stage regressions of cumulated GSE mortgage
purchases on the not cyclically motivated GSE regulatory policies, estimated
over each horizon h as in equation (2.1). The left panel depicts the first-stage
robust F-statistics for 2SLS estimates of the response of GSE mortgage holdings
to GSE regulatory shocks, rotating in 12 lags of scaled GSE mortgage holdings
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as additional controls. The right panel depicts the first-stage robust F-statistics
for 2SLS estimates of the response of residential mortgage debt excluding GSE
mortgage holdings, with 12 lags similarly rotated in as controls. Instrument
strength varies somewhat by horizon as lagged controls are rotated in for each
left-hand-side variable of interest, but robust F-statistics are generally near or
well above a threshold of 10 for horizons of 6 and 48 months after news about
pending regulatory changes; results are accordingly reported for this impulse
response horizon, when the narrative instruments have significant predictive
power for actual GSE purchases. Treatment of the narrative instrument as
news shocks about pending changes, subsequent policy implementation lags,
and purchases lagging the exercise of advanced purchase commitments all con-
tribute to the lower F-statistics at shorter horizons.
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Figure 2.2. Instrument Relevance: Robust F-statistics
Notes: Newey and West (1987) robust F-statistics are calculated as in equation (2.1). Sources:
see the data appendix.
Appendix Figure B.4 depicts the corresponding second-stage response of
GSE mortgage holdings to a one-dollar increase in GSE mortgage purchases,
estimated over each horizon h using the GSE policy events as in equation (2.2).
Regulatory policies documented in the narrative analysis were expected to re-
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sult in significant changes in GSE mortgage holdings, and a significant response
of GSE mortgage holdings provides further evidence of instrument relevance:
GSE mortgage holdings see a significant rise shortly following news shocks
about pending regulatory changes, increasing roughly 80 cents per dollar of
cumulated purchases after six months. The expansion gradually declines there-
after, but remains statistically significant at conventional levels—evidence that
the regulatory shocks induce persistent GSE balance sheet responses.
With the narrative identification strategy, the econometrician might reason-
ably be concerned about misclassifying policies endogenously driven by re-
cent economic conditions as not cyclically motivated; such policy endogene-
ity would introduce spurious correlation between the instrument for structural
shocks to GSE purchases and other structural shocks.30 Reassuringly, the GSE
regulatory policies that I classify as not cyclically motivated are not predicted by
lagged values of cyclical economic indicators, notably the unemployment rate,
mortgage spreads, or growth in housing starts or real personal income. Given
the inclusion of the lagged macroeconomic and cyclical controls, this is a more
stringent test of lag exoegenity than actually required for instrument validity.
Appendix B documents that the headline results are broadly robust to dropping
individual policy events from the instrument, further easing concerns about er-
rant misclassification.
The precise lag exogeneity condition is formally testable: after condition-
ing on the lagged controls, other past shocks should not be correlated with the
narrative instrument. To test the lag exogeneity requirement, I estimate equa-
tion (2.2) as a single-stage LP-OLS regression to obtain fitted values of the error
30Conversely, non-systematic misclassification of truly not cyclically motivated policies as
cyclically motivated will merely reduce instrument strength.
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terms, û⊥t , that have been orthogonalized to the set of lagged controls. Appendix
Figure B.5 depicts the correlation of the narrative instrument (scaled to trend
real personal income) with lagged error terms û⊥t− j for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 12}, along
with 95% confidence intervals. Correlations with lagged error terms are cal-
culated for regressions measuring the response of GSE mortgage holdings (left
panel) and total residential mortgage debt (right panel) to actual GSE purchases.
In both cases, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the narrative instrument
is uncorrelated with lagged structural shocks after conditioning on the lagged
controls. Similarly, the narrative instrument is not predicted by lags of GSE
purchases orthogonalized to the control variables.
2.4 Lending Responses to Subsidized Mortgage Purchases
Partial equilibrium models of credit policies predict that subsidies will expand
targeted lending and may crowd out non-targeted borrowing; the degree of
crowd out, however, hinges significantly on how the supply of credit is mod-
eled.31 If total bank credit or the flow of originations are constrained by infor-
mation frictions, regulatory constraints, or underwriting capacity constraints,
subsidizing an expansion of mortgage lending will crowd out other lending to
some degree. In this section I test whether regulatory shocks to subsidized GSE
purchases crowd out commercial lending. My empirical strategy avoids hav-
ing to take a stance on the elasticity of credit supply or the nature and degree
of credit frictions. To shed light on the transmission mechanisms of housing
31Gale (1991) estimates that the introduction of federal credit policies reduces non-targeted
general borrowing between 1% and 4.6%, depending on an elasticity of credit supply ranging
from 0.5 to 5; see Gale (1991). Conversely, there is no credit crowd out in the model of Lucas
(2016) because the supply of credit is assumed to be perfectly elastic.
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credit policies, I additionally test for evidence of GSE purchase shocks operat-
ing through a mortgage origination channel and a safe asset supply channel.
2.4.1 Crowd-in, Crowd-out: Private Sector Mortgage Lending
Responses
I first estimate the responses of domestic private sector lending to GSE pur-
chase shocks, testing whether subsidizing an expansion in residential mortgage
borrowing involves a tradeoff with respect to commercial real estate lending.
For a cleaner link with the flow of primary market originations, I first ana-
lyze the level response of private holdings of mortgage loans to GSE purchase
shocks. I analyze flow mortgage origination responses in Section 2.4.2 and level
responses of securitized mortgage debt in Section 2.4.3.
Figure 2.3 depicts the response of private sector holdings of whole mort-
gages to a one-dollar increase in GSE retained portfolio mortgage purchases,
estimated by 2SLS as in equation (2.2) using the not cyclically motivated policy
events. Finer dashed lines are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence
intervals. In the top-left panel, private holdings of home mortgages see an early,
statistically significant spike at around six to eight months that dissipates af-
ter one year. The impulse response suggests that shocks to GSE demand spur
an initial burst of home mortgage originations and temporary warehousing of
loans that are subsequently passed on to the secondary market, as similarly
documented using flow originations data in Section 2.4.2. The initial transitory
increase in holdings of home mortgages is followed by a steady and statistically
significant rise at horizons above two years. Over longer horizons, private hold-
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ings of home mortgages increase by 25 to 50 cents in response to a one-dollar
increase in GSE purchases—evidence of housing credit policies crowding in pri-
vate home mortgage lending, as opposed to GSE ownership simply displacing
private lending. The expansion in private home mortgage lending beyond two
years is consistent with expansionary credit policies spurring new housing con-
struction and, at a lag, mortgage financing for new home sales; correspondingly,
Section 2.5.1 documents a gradual, persistent rise in construction spending for
single-family homes in response to GSE purchase shocks. The delayed expan-
sion in private holdings of home mortgages only occurs after a transitory reduc-
tion in mortgage spreads fades, thus increasing the attractiveness of mortgage
investments.32
If primary market lenders are constrained, being induced to originate or
hold more home mortgages could reduce other loan originations or holdings.
To the extent there is greater substitutability of loan officers across classes of
mortgages than between mortgage and non-mortgage originations, crowd-out
effects might be particularly acute for other types of mortgages. As depicted in
the top-right panel of Figure 2.3, private holdings of multifamily mortgages—
loans for buildings with five or more units, i.e. apartments or condominiums—
see a small but persistent decline of roughly five to eight cents in response to a
one-dollar increase in GSE mortgages purchases, which is broadly significant at
68% and 90% confidence levels. The bottom-left panel shows a larger decline in
private holdings of (non-residential) commercial mortgages, which fall roughly
15 to 25 cents in response to a one-dollar shock to GSE purchases. The decline is
persistent and significant at conventional levels for horizons beyond 10 months.
The bottom-right panel of Figure 2.3 depicts the response of private holdings of
32Section 2.6 documents that GSE purchase shocks reduce mortgage spreads over a horizon
of 8 to 18 months.
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Figure 2.3. Responses of Private Sector Mortgage Holdings to GSE Purchase
Shocks
Notes: Private sector direct holdings include those of commercial banks, savings banks, sav-
ings and loan associations, life insurance companies, mortgage companies, real estate invest-
ment trusts, state and local credit agencies, state and local retirement funds, noninsured pension
funds, credit unions, and finance companies. Direct mortgage debt holdings exclude holdings
of agency mortgage pools. Finer lines are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence
intervals. Sources: see the data appendix.
farm mortgages, which is generally insignificant. The negative responses of pri-
vate multifamily and commercial mortgage lending ensuing from GSE purchase
shocks is evidence of U.S. housing credit policies crowding out commercial real
estate lending, mirroring the GSEs’ footprint in mortgage markets; Fannie and
Freddie overwhelmingly transact in conventional mortgages for single-family
homes, although their charters were broadened in 1992 to promote multifamily
mortgage lending.33
33A 1992 reform bill revised the agencies’ statutory charters from providing stability in the
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Decomposing the aggregate response of private mortgage lending across
types of loans provides evidence of federal credit policies crowding in home
mortgage lending while simultaneously crowding out non-targeted lending. If
GSE purchase shocks induce such a reallocation of credit through a mortgage
origination channel, the effect should vary across financial sectors depending
on degrees of originations activity. Appendix B separately tests the response of
mortgage holdings for commercial banks and thrift banks, life insurance com-
panies, and other private entities (including mortgage companies and credit
unions). The mortgage lending responses of depository institutions and other
private entities to GSE purchase shocks are significant and qualitatively simi-
lar to the disparate responses depicted in Figure 2.3. Conversely, the responses
of life insurers’ home mortgage holdings are muted and only marginally sig-
nificant. Life insurance companies hold a broadly diversified asset portfolio,
including residential and commercial mortgages, but only play a marginal role
in originating mortgages. Portfolio rebalancing effects ensuing from GSE pur-
chase shocks are concentrated in sectors with a larger footprint in mortgage
originations—further evidence of the transmission of GSE purchases operating
in part through a mortgage origination channel.
“secondary market for home mortgages” to “secondary market for residential mortgages.”
Freddie Mac had recently exited the multifamily mortgage market entirely in 1989 after suf-
fering losses on its multifamily portfolio. The GSEs are barred from purchasing commercial and
farm mortgages.
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2.4.2 The Mortgage Origination Channel: Evidence from Mort-
gage Transaction Data
By subsidizing a surge in home mortgage originations, particularly for refi-
nancing activity, GSE purchases could crowd out commercial loan originations.
Sharpe and Sherlund (2016) document that surges in refinancing activity induce
binding origination capacity constraints and credit rationing, with primary mar-
ket lenders substituting away from more resource-intensive originations. To
more directly test whether the transmission of secondary market purchases op-
erates through a mortgage origination channel in the primary market, I estimate
the response of mortgage origination and transaction flows to GSE purchases
across primary mortgage market sectors. The underlying monthly mortgage
transaction flow data are from the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment’s discontinued Survey of Mortgage Lending Activity (SMLA), largely
acquired from the National Archives and Records Administration. Unlike the
Fed’s Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, the SMLA data cover loan
repayment flows and originations of nonresidential mortgages and construction
loans. If GSE purchases operate through a mortgage origination channel, stim-
ulating residential originations should crowd out nonresidential originations,
which the HMDA data cannot speak to.
The SMLA data, however, are only available for January 1970–December
1997. Accommodating 12 monthly lags for control variables and h monthly
leads for local projection impulse response horizons further reduce the effec-
tive sample for estimation.34 Unfortunately the narrative record of GSE policy
34Local projection regressions require h observations after the sample end point for estimating
t + h horizon responses. For the benchmark analysis, additional observations are added beyond
December 2006, which cannot be done with the SMLA data.
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events is an underpowered instrument for samples truncated to accommodate
the SMLA data.35 As such, the response of mortgage flows to actual GSE pur-
chases is instead estimated by single-stage LP-OLS regressions:∑h
j=0 ft+ j
Xt
= ah + bh
∑h
j=0 pt+ j
Xt
+ φh(L)Zt−1 + εt+h for h = 0, 1, 2, ... , (2.3)
where monthly mortgage origination flows, ft, and GSE purchases, pt, are both
cumulated over each horizon h. The forecast horizon is reduced from 48 to
24 months to extend the sample end point, while the unemployment rate and
personal income controls are dropped to conserve on parameter estimation in
the truncated sample. Lags of the left-hand-side mortgage flows, deflated and
scaled by trend real personal income, are rotated in for each regression, and all
other lagged controls are as described in Section 2.3.2. The LP-OLS estimator,
bh, measures the residual origination flows not forecast by lagged housing, loan
origination, and interest rate controls, estimated per dollar in cumulated GSE
purchases; LP-OLS regressions with robust controls are the local-projection di-
rect forecasting analog of factor-augmented vector autoregressions.
The top row of Figure 2.4 depicts the cumulated dollar flow of residential
mortgage originations, estimated across all primary market sectors (left col-
umn), for mortgage companies (middle), and for commercial banks (right). The
top-left panel depicts a significant increase in total residential mortgage orig-
inations, which rise by roughly $2.25 per dollar of increased GSE purchases.
Mortgage companies and commercial banks account for almost all of the in-
crease in residential originations.36 The top-middle panel shows a steady rise in
mortgage companies’ residential originations, increasing as much as $1.70 per
35There are only 10 months with not cyclically motivated narrative policy events for the Jan-
uary 1971–December 1995 sample.
36Savings and loan associations see a more muted, short-lived rise in residential mortgage
originations and sales (not depicted).
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dollar in GSE purchases. The top-right panel depicts commercial banks’ resi-
dential originations increasing by as much as 50 cents on the dollar. Residential
mortgage repayments also steadily rise, increasing roughly $1.75 per dollar in
cumulated GSE purchases, with repayments largely flowing to agency MBS (not
depicted). The coincident rise in residential originations and repayments is ev-
idence of increased refinancing activity in response to GSE purchases; the level
of residential mortgage lending would see a smaller increase than the flow vol-
ume of mortgage originations because of increased repayments of outstanding
mortgages. By subsidizing an expansion in refinancing activity, GSE purchases
could tighten mortgage origination capacity constraints.
The second row of Figure 2.4 depicts the response of primary market lenders’
net residential mortgage acquisitions being retained by the primary market (the
sum of new originations and purchases net of sales). Primary market lenders see
a significant rise in net residential acquisitions over four months that dissipates
within one year, indicative of temporarily warehousing new originations then
sold off to the secondary market; the short-lived increase in private holdings of
home mortgages depicted in Figure 2.3 is indicative of the same warehousing
dynamic. Mortgage companies sell off mortgages to the secondary market at
nearly the same rate as their flow of originations, consistent with an industry
reliant on secondary market funding. Mortgage companies’ short-term loan in-
ventory is financed by warehouse lending, typically large-scale revolving credit
lines with commercial banks; the expansion in originations of mortgage compa-
nies may thus tighten commercial bank funding constraints. Unlike mortgage
companies, depository institutions have the option of retaining newly origi-
nated mortgages. Commercial banks’ residential mortgage originations are in-
creasingly retained on balance sheet at horizons above eight months. Advanced
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Figure 2.4. Mortgage Origination Responses to GSE Purchases
Notes: Finer lines 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence intervals. Sources: U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development Survey of Mortgage Lending Activity; see the
data appendix.
GSE mortgage purchase commitments typically expire after 12 months, giving
banks a window to learn about borrower characteristics and retain more de-
sirable loans. GSE purchases appear to induce commercial banks to originate
more mortgages than they sell to the secondary market—consistent with GSE
purchases crowding in private residential mortgage holdings over longer hori-
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zons, as depicted in Figure 2.3.
If origination capacity constraints bind, GSE purchases inducing a signif-
icant expansion of residential originations may reduce originations of other
loans. The third and fourth rows of Figure 2.4 depict the response of non-
farm nonresidential mortgage originations and construction loan originations,
respectively, to GSE purchases. In response to one dollar of GSE purchases, to-
tal nonresidential mortgage originations decline by 45 to 55 cents at horizons
of one to two years. Commercial bank nonresidential originations see a grad-
ual, statistically significant decline, falling roughly 40 cents per dollar in GSE
purchases cumulated over two years. The bottom-left panel shows a sharp de-
cline in construction loans starting after one year, with lending activity falling
more than one dollar per dollar in GSE purchases. Much of the decline in to-
tal nonresidential mortgage lending and construction lending is attributable to
commercial banks’ loan activity. Commercial banks’ construction loan origina-
tions fall by more than 60 cents per dollar in GSE purchases as commercial bank
net residential acquisitions rise. The transaction flows for mortgage companies
reassuringly reflect an industry reliant on selling residential originations to the
secondary market and minimizing inventory.
The regression analysis of SMLA mortgage transaction data suggests that
GSE demand for mortgages induces a tradeoff between expanding residential
mortgage originations and decreasing originations of nonresidential mortgages
and construction loans. While the LP-OLS estimates of mortgage transaction
flows have less of a causal interpretation than the LP-IV estimates, they nonethe-
less support the transmission of housing credit policies operating through a
mortgage origination channel in the primary market.
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2.4.3 The Safe Asset Supply Channel: Evidence from GSE Se-
curities Issues
The transmission of housing credit policies may additionally operate through a
safe asset supply channel, both in subsidizing an expansion in mortgage lending
and tightening bank balance sheet constraints. An expansion of GSE mortgage
purchases will be funded with new issues of agency securities, which are clas-
sified as safe assets by Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick (2012). Safe assets are
understood to be information-insensitive, and to play a money-like role in facil-
itating commerce because of their efficient use as collateral. The safety premium
on agency securities, derived from an implicit government guarantee, is in part
passed on a subsidy to mortgage borrowers in the form of lower mortgage rates;
see Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005) and Passmore (2005). Regulatory
shocks to the supply of agency securities may additionally tightening bank bal-
ance sheet constraints by competing for wholesale funding, similar to the effect
of government debt issues in the models of Gale (1991) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010). The share of assets considered “safe” has been stable in the post-war era,
suggesting that (1) the demand for information-insensitive collateral has been
relatively constant relative to total assets and (2) government and agency debt
is a close substitute for privately supplies safe assets, notably bank debt (Gor-
ton, Lewellen, and Metrick, 2012).37 I estimate the responses of agency debt and
agency MBS outstanding to regulatory shocks affecting GSE purchases to test
for evidence of their transmission operating in part through a safe asset supply
channel.
37Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012) provide evidence on the safety and liquidity
premia of U.S. Treasuries, and find that highly rated commercial paper is a substitute for Trea-
suries.
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The top panel of Figure 2.5 shows the response of agency notes and bonds
outstanding to a one-dollar regulatory shock to GSE retained mortgage pur-
chases, estimated by 2SLS as in regression (2.2). The top-left panel depicts a
significant rise in Fannie’s debt outstanding shortly after news about pending
regulatory changes, increasing roughly one-for-one with purchases over the first
six months.38 The top-right panel depicts a significant, persistent response of all
housing GSE debt outstanding.39 The responses of agency debt closely resem-
ble the response of GSE mortgage holdings to a one-dollar shock to purchases,
as seen in Appendix Figure B.4, consistent with GSE mortgage holdings being
highly leveraged. As expected, the narrative regulatory shocks induce an in-
creased supply of safe agency bonds—with the potential to subsidize mortgage
borrowing and, in the presence of credit frictions, crowd out bank funding.
Agency MBS are another import conduit for housing credit policies subsidiz-
ing an expansion in mortgage borrowing, and regulatory shocks to GSE mort-
gage holdings likely affect the supply of agency MBS.40 The agency MBS issued
and guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie are highly liquid securities with (per-
ceived) implicit backing from the U.S. Treasury; these safety and liquidity fea-
tures serve to subsidize mortgage borrowing, as does an underpricing of MBS
guarantee fees. The mortgage purchase series used to estimate equations (2.1)
and (2.2) reflect purchases intended for the GSEs’ retained investment portfo-
38The response of Fannie Mae’s debt outstanding accounts for most of the increase in total
GSE debt, indicative that most of the identifying variation from the narrative analysis stems
from policy changes affecting Fannie’s mortgage holdings.
39The FHLBanks collectively issue bonds, known as consolidated obligations, to finance their
collateralized advances to members; the expansion of mortgage lending and housing market
stimulus ensuing from GSE purchases could have direct spillovers to the volume of advances
and related consolidated obligation issues. Consolidated obligations are also considered safe
assets.
40After mortgage securitization was popularized by Ginnie and Freddie in the early 1970s the
share of U.S. residential mortgage debt securitized as agency MBS steadily rose to roughly 45%
of that outstanding by the early 2000s, as depicted in Figure B.1.
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Figure 2.5. Response of Agency Debt and Agency MBS to GSE Purchase
Shocks
Notes: Housing GSE debt is the sum of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan
Bank System medium- and long-term notes and bonds outstanding. Data have been seasonally
adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program. Finer lines are 68% and 95% Newey and
West (1987) confidence intervals. Sources: See the data appendix for details.
lios, excluding purchases for pooling and issuing MBS; however, mortgages re-
cently purchased as investments can, to a degree, be subsequently securitized.
As with new issues of agency bonds, an increase in the supply of GSE MBS
could crowd out privately supplied safe assets and tighten banks’ balance sheet
constraints.
The bottom-left panel of Figure 2.5 depicts the response of MBS guaranteed
by Fannie and Freddie to the GSE regulatory shocks. GSE MBS outstanding
see a gradual increase of between 15 and 30 cents per dollar of purchases that
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is broadly significant at conventional levels for the 12- to 36-month horizon; as
with GSE bond issues, the expansion of GSE MBS increases the supply of safe
assets and subsidizes mortgage borrowing.41 Contrary to the gradual increase
in GSE MBS, the volume of Ginnie Mae’s guaranteed mortgage pools outstand-
ing sees a significant reduction, as shown in the bottom-right panel. Within six
months of the regulatory shocks Ginnie MBS fall by 20 cents per dollar in GSE
purchases, and see a persistent reduction of 10 to 15 cents at horizons above
12 months. The lagged response of GSE MBS outstanding to the regulatory
shocks is consistent with the GSEs first issuing purchase commitments and sub-
sequently purchasing and pooling mortgages themselves, whereas the faster re-
sponse of Ginnie MBS is consistent with a drop in originations of government-
backed mortgages being pooled as originated.42 More broadly, the responses
of agency MBS volumes to GSE regulatory shocks suggests a substitution of
originations toward GSE-eligible conforming mortgages and away from the
government-backed mortgages in Ginnie’s pools.
If the supply of domestic savings is relatively inelastic or if information and
contracting frictions constrain interbank funding, issuing agency securities and
competing for funding in capital markets will tighten balance sheet constraints,
crowding out bank lending. Conversely, a safe asset supply channel would
be dampened if foreign institutional investors absorb a significant share of the
newly issued agency securities. Agency securities and U.S. bank loans are likely
imperfect substitutes for foreign investors. Appendix B tests the response of for-
eign purchases of agency securities to the GSE regulatory shocks, using Treasury
41The data do not differentiate between agency MBS held by the GSEs versus third party
holdings.
42Ginnie’s pools are backed by mortgages partially guaranteed by other government agencies,
with Ginnie guaranteeing timely payment to the holder of the security. Unlike the GSEs, all of
Ginnie’s MBS are pooled by approved private lenders.
117
International Capital System flow data. Most of the increased supply of agency
securities and related U.S. residential mortgage lending is financed by domestic
private resources, with foreign capital accounting for at most 20% of the near-
term agency bond issues or longer-run expansion in U.S. residential mortgage
debt.
2.4.4 Portfolio Rebalancing Effects: Balance Sheet Responses
of Commercial Banks
If the transmission of GSE purchases operates through a mortgage origina-
tion channel, commercial banks’ balance sheets should be significantly affected,
in addition to their origination activity. Section 2.4.2 presents evidence that
commercial banks significantly expand residential mortgage originations in re-
sponse to GSE purchases, and retain a significant volume of their new resi-
dential originations while concurrently reducing originations of nonresidential
loans. Beyond having a large footprint in mortgage originations, commercial
banks’ relatively diversified asset holdings and utilization of interbank loan
markets could additionally result in credit rationing through a safe asset sup-
ply channel of housing credit policy.
Figure 2.6 depicts aggregate balance sheet responses of domestic commer-
cial bank lending activity to a one-dollar increase in GSE purchases, estimated
by 2SLS as in regression (2.2). In the top-left panel, commercial banks’ total
loans and leases see a fairly persistent decline of around 30 to 50 cents per dol-
lar of GSE purchases, which is significant at 68% or 90% confidence levels after
one year. The top-right panel depicts the response of commercial banks’ hold-
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Figure 2.6. Commercial Bank Balance Sheet Responses to GSE Purchase
Shocks
Notes: Real estate loans include home mortgages, revolving home equity loans, and commercial
real estate loans. Consumer loans include credit cards, auto loans, student loans, personal loans,
and other forms of revolving credit. Treasury and agency securities include all liabilities of the
U.S. Treasury Department, other U.S. government agencies, and U.S. GSEs. Finer lines are 68%
and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence intervals. Sources: Federal Reserve Board Table
H.8; see the data appendix.
ings of Treasuries, agency bonds, and agency MBS, which see something of a
mirror image of the response of loans and leases. Government agency securi-
ties holdings rise roughly 10 to 15 cents in response to one dollar in GSE pur-
chases, an increase that is broadly significant at horizons above two years. The
rise in holdings of government agency securities drives a persistent, significant
increase in commercial banks’ holdings of total securities (not depicted). Com-
mercial banks appear to substitute away from loans and toward securities as the
supply of agency securities concurrently expands in response to GSE regulatory
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shocks, as depicted in Figure 2.5.
The bottom-left panel depicts a persistent decline in C&I lending activity in
response to GSE purchases, which accounts for much of the reduction in com-
mercial banks’ total loans (depicted above). A one-dollar shock to GSE pur-
chases induces a statistically significant 15- to 25-cent decrease in C&I loans
at horizons beyond nine months. The initial reduction in C&I lending in re-
sponse to GSE purchase shocks coincides with commercial banks’ expansion
of residential mortgage originations and contraction in nonresidential origina-
tions over shorter horizon, as depicted in Figure 2.4. If an increase in residential
originations, particularly for refinancing, tightens underwriting capacity con-
straints, a substitution away from relatively costly originations may be concen-
trated in business loans; Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2017, 2018)
find corroborating evidence of a tradeoff between increased mortgage origina-
tions and decreased C&I loan growth. The bottom-right panel shows the re-
sponse of commercial banks’ combined real estate loans, including residential
mortgages, home equity loans, and commercial real estate loans. Commercial
banks’ real estate loan volumes do not significantly respond for several years
after GSE purchase shocks, but eventually rise roughly 20 cents on the dollar.
The response of real estate loans over shorter horizons, however, masks a rise
in the flow of both residential originations and sales to the secondary market,
as depicted in Figure 2.4.
The aggregate balance sheet responses of commercial banks suggest that
GSE purchase shocks induce a significant degree of portfolio rebalancing, con-
sistent with credit rationing arising from credit frictions and a partially inelastic
supply of credit. The balance sheet responses—particularly the substitution to-
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ward agency securities—are consistent with intermediation constraints being
tightened by an increase in the supply of safe agency securities, which would
both subsidize an expansion of home mortgage originations and crowd out in-
terbank funding. The evidence of C&I credit crowd out from the transmission
of GSE purchases echoes similar results of Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKin-
lay (2017) for the Fed’s MBS purchases; the authors find that banks with more
exposure to the Fed’s MBS purchases increase mortgage originations and de-
crease C&I lending relative to banks with less exposure, which they attribute to
a mortgage origination channel.
2.5 Real Responses to Subsidized Mortgage Purchases
Section 2.4 presents evidence of credit rationing arising from the subsidized
government intermediation of mortgage lending, as would be predicted by the
model of Gale (1991) if credit supply was partially inelastic. The intended effect
of GSE purchases expanding home mortgage borrowing and unintended effects
of crowding out commercial lending may additionally translate to a realloca-
tion of real economic activity. Congressional policymakers often cite stimulat-
ing construction activity or employment as an intended effect of expansionary
housing credit policies. Moreover, understanding the real effects of mortgage
subsidies is relevant to the ongoing sharp reduction in the share of U.S. mort-
gage debt being subsidized by Fannie, Freddie, and the Fed. The small literature
on the economic effects of federal credit policies has not directly mapped subsi-
dies and credit reallocations to real economic activity; see Gale (1991) and Lucas
(2016). My identification strategy based on exogenous regulatory variation in
GSE purchases can speak to real-financial linkages. I directly test whether the
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divergent credit responses to GSE purchase shocks map to a similar reallocation
of real economic activity, particularly for construction activity and employment.
2.5.1 Crowd-in, Crowd-out: Construction Sector Responses to
GSE Purchases
I constructed an extended time series for construction expenditure flows from
historical reports of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Value of Construction Put in Place
survey.43 Figure 2.7 depicts the cumulated flow value of new real construction
spending in response to a one-dollar increase in GSE purchases, estimated by
2SLS as in regression (2.2). The top-left panel shows a gradual but persistent
rise in private construction spending for new single-family homes. The increase
is statistically significant at conventional levels for horizons beyond three years,
with single-family home construction spending rising 10 to 20 cents per dollar in
GSE purchases. The gradual rise in construction expenditures for single-family
homes in response to GSE purchase shocks complements a finding of Field-
house, Mertens, and Ravn (2018), who document a significant rise in housing
starts roughly 6 to 18 months after news about regulatory changes to agency
mortgage purchases. Moreover, increased single-family home construction is
consistent with the medium-term expansion of home mortgage debt depicted
in Figure 2.3, as new purchase mortgages are originated when newly completed
homes are sold.
The top-right panel of Figure 2.7 depicts the response of private construc-
43The survey has been conducted since 1960, but historical time series are only available from
the Census Bureau dating back to 1993. For this analysis, the more recent seasonally adjusted
data have been spliced together with older time series manually constructed (and seasonally
adjusted) from the historical survey reports; see the data appendix for details.
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tion spending for new multifamily buildings. The point estimates depict a per-
sistent decline at horizons above 18 months. Multifamily construction sees a
decline of four to six cents for horizons above three years that is significant
at the 68% confidence level. Nonresidential construction spending also sees
a decline that is significant at the 68% confidence level (not depicted). The
bottom-left panel shows a persistent, negative response of all private construc-
tion spending excluding single-family home building that is always significant
at the 68% confidence level; at horizons approaching four years the gradual de-
cline reaches roughly 20 cents per dollar in GSE purchases, which is significant
at the 90% confidence level. The gradual rise in new single-family home con-
struction spending mirrors the steady decrease in all other private construction
spending, suggesting that housing credit subsidies reallocate real activity across
sectors.
The bottom-right panel of Figure 2.7 shows no significant effect of GSE pur-
chase shocks on total construction spending. Similarly, there is no statistically
significant effect on public sector construction spending (not depicted), which
is reassuring, as private credit reallocations should not affect construction fi-
nanced with tax revenues or referendum-driven municipal bond issues. The
construction responses to GSE purchase shocks are broadly consistent with U.S.
housing credit policy reallocating both credit flows and related real activity
across markets without boosting aggregate construction. Regarding fixed in-
vestment, Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018) only document a significant
response of housing starts to government agency mortgage purchases, which
might misleadingly suggest that housing credit policies could be an effective
tool for demand stabilization. Moreover, the positive response of total hous-
ing starts masks a reallocation of investment toward single-family housing and
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away from multifamily housing; see Appendix B for more details.
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Figure 2.7. Flow Value of New Construction in Response to GSE Purchase
Shocks
Notes: Finer lines are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence intervals. Sources: U.S.
Census Bureau Value of Construction Put in Place Survey; see the data appendix.
2.5.2 Labor Market Neutrality: Employment Responses
I modify regression (2.2) to accommodate measures of economic activity that
are not dollar denominated. I estimate the response of nonfarm payroll employ-
ment, et in log point changes over each h-month horizon in response to date t
news shocks about GSE regulatory changes. To better capture news about pend-
ing balance sheet changes, I use advanced purchase commitments, ct, as the
right-hand-side measure of GSE retained portfolio activity; advanced purchase
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commitments are issued ahead of purchasing loans from the primary market,
and thus respond faster to regulatory shocks than purchases. I use the regu-
latory policy news shocks as an instrumental variable for annualized purchase
commitments made in the eight months following policy announcements.44 The
shock to annualized purchase commitments are scaled to trend mortgage origi-
nations, X¯t, for easier interpretation than scaling by trend real personal income.
The sequence of βh for horizon h ∈ {0, 1, ...,H} traces out impulse responses cap-
turing the percentage change in employment to a one-percentage-point shock
to anticipated GSE purchases as a share of residential mortgage originations:
log(et+h) − log(et−1) = αh + βh
(12
8
×
∑7
k=0 ct+k
X¯t
)
+ φh(L)Zt−1 + ut+h for h = 0, 1, 2, ...
(2.4)
Equation (2.4) is estimated by 2SLS, instrumenting annualized GSE purchase
commitments with the narrative regulatory policy shocks, mt, in the first stage.
The set of lagged controls, Zt−1, is identical to those for the credit and construc-
tion multipliers estimated as in (2.2). Twelves lags of the left-hand-side variables
are similarly rotated into the control set, expressed in log first differences.
Figure 2.8 depicts impulse responses for employment following news about
pending GSE balance sheet expansions, estimated as in equation (2.4). Despite
the expansion in construction for single-family homes, construction sector em-
ployment never sees a response that is significant at conventional levels (top-
left), consistent with the offsetting decline in other private construction activity
depicted in Figure 2.7. Similarly, there is no significant response of manufac-
turing sector employment (top-right) or total employment (bottom-left) follow-
ing regulatory shocks to GSE purchases. Subsidizing an expansion in home
44The eight-month horizon maximizes the first-stage robust F-statistics, but point estimates
are similar for varying horizons.
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Figure 2.8. Employment Responses to GSE Purchase Shocks
Notes: Finer lines are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence intervals. Sources: see
the data appendix.
mortgage lending in an attempt to boost employment, as Congress has often
intended, appears entirely ineffectual.
The bottom-right panel, however, depicts a significant rise in financial ser-
vices employment, consistent with binding origination constraints arising from
loan officers. Sharpe and Sherlund (2016) document significant mortgage pro-
cessing constraints arising from refinancing booms, and find evidence of credit
rationing away from more resource-intensive underwriting activity. The au-
thors document that mortgage industry labor capacity is unresponsive to booms
in refinancing applications, which are unpredictable and transitory, but does
respond to changes in demand for purchase originations; consistent with a
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more gradual increase in hiring loan officers, Appendix B documents a gradual,
significant rise in new single-family homes sales, lagging behind increases in
building permits and housing starts. The positive response of financial services
employment is further evidence suggesting GSE purchases operate through a
mortgage originations channel.
2.6 Robustness Checks and Extensions
The patterns of GSE purchases expanding home mortgage lending and single-
family home construction while crowding out commercial real estate lending
and construction activity is robust to many details of the analysis, discussed at
length in Appendix B. Headline results are broadly robust to analyzing alterna-
tive dependent variables, controlling for interactions with other areas of federal
policy, excluding individual regulatory events from the instrument, and adjust-
ments to the set of lagged macroeconomic controls.
The effect of GSE purchases stimulating single-family housing investment
and crowding out real activity in the commercial real estate market is robust
to analyzing alternative dependent variables. Appendix Figure B.8 depicts sig-
nificant responses of building permits, housing starts, and new home sales for
single-family homes being stimulated in response to GSE purchase shocks; con-
versely, there is evidence of a short-term contraction in multifamily housing
starts. The impulse responses are in line with the divergent construction mul-
tipliers depicted in Figure 2.7. Moreover, the staggered lags in the responses
for single-family housing activity lends further credibility to the causal inter-
pretation of impulse responses to the regulatory policy shocks: the response of
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building permits leads that of housing starts, which in turn leads that of new
home sales, as real estate development actually transpires.
An overarching question is the degree to which shocks to the supply of mort-
gage credit is driving reallocations across sectors, as opposed to unobserved
shocks to loan demand or construction sector supply constraints. An expan-
sionary shock to the supply of subsidized mortgage credit might predict an
increase in mortgage lending, a decrease in mortgage spreads, a decrease in
commercial lending, and an increase in commercial loan rate spreads. In line
with two of these predictions, Section 2.4 documents that home mortgage lend-
ing increases and commercial mortgage lending decreases in response to GSE
mortgage purchase shocks. Figure 2.9 presents complimentary evidence that
GSE purchase shocks induce a transitory decrease in mortgage spreads but a
short-term increase in business loan spreads. The response of mortgage spreads
and business loan spreads to news shocks about GSE balance sheet expansions
are estimated as in equation (2.4), but measuring the percentage point change in
loan rate spreads as the dependent variable.45 Mortgage spreads are calculated
relative to the 10-year Treasury yield and business loan spreads are calculated
relative to the federal funds rate, as is common practice.46
Mortgage spreads see a decline over 8 to 18 months that is significant at the
68% confidence level (top panel). Business loan rate spreads see an increase over
the first 8 months that is significant at the 68% confidence level (bottom panel).
Mortgage rates see an even larger decrease due to a decline in 10-year Trea-
45Twelves lags of any left-hand-side variables not included in the benchmark controls are
rotated into the controls.
46Both classes of loans are benchmarked to risk-free interest rates closer to their respective
average maturities. The most prevalent U.S. mortgage contracts are 30-year and 15-year fixed-
rate mortgages, whereas the weighted-average maturity for commercial and industrial loans
has averaged less than 2 years in recent decades.
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Figure 2.9. Responses of Mortgage and Business Loan Spreads to GSE Pur-
chase Shocks
Notes: Finer lines are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence intervals. Sources: see
the data appendix.
sury yields (not depicted). The expansion in home mortgage lending coupled
with a decrease in mortgage spreads is consistent with GSE purchases operat-
ing through a subsidy channel, with the safe asset premium on issues of agency
securities being passed on in part to homeowners. The short-term increase in
business loan spreads in response to GSE purchase shocks suggests that the re-
duction in commercial mortgage lending and C&I loan volumes is being driven
by a decrease in loan supply as opposed to demand. At minimum, the evidence
on borrowing costs suggest that credit reallocations are not being driven by an
expansionary shock to mortgage demand or a contractionary shock to business
loan demand.
129
A related question is whether the contraction in commercial real estate in-
vestment is driven by construction sector supply constraints as opposed to re-
duced commercial lending resulting from housing credit policies. If construc-
tion materials or labor supply are rather inelastic in the short run, subsidizing
an increase in single-family housing demand might decrease the supply of other
construction activity. If the construction sector were supply constrained, how-
ever, one would expect increased demand for new single-family homes to put
upward pressure on the price of construction materials or construction sector
wages. Regulatory shocks to GSE purchases have no significant effect on real
average hourly earnings for construction workers or producer prices for con-
struction materials (not depicted). Public sector construction spending is also
unaffected by GSE purchase shocks, further evidence against supply-side con-
straints in construction.
Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3 shed light on the role of instrumentation with
the regulatory events and the set of benchmark lagged controls for the main
results. The role of instrumentation is particularly pronounced for the short-
run for responses of variables related to GSE purchases and profitability, no-
tably agency debt outstanding, GSE mortgage holdings, and private holdings
of home mortgages. There is less of a divergence between 2SLS and OLS es-
timates for the response of commercial lending activity to GSE purchases. Re-
verse causality would be expected to arise from the GSEs and policymakers
endogenously responding to housing and mortgage market conditions, not to
conditions in commercial loan markets. Over longer horizons, similarities be-
tween the 2SLS and OLS estimates hinge on using an identical set of rich control
variables; as the set of lagged controls is pared back, the OLS estimates increas-
ingly diverge from the 2SLS estimates.
130
Appendix Tables B.4 and B.5 document that the benchmark results are ro-
bust to including alternative controls for interactions with other areas of federal
policy potentially influencing mortgage lending: controls for the timing of inter-
state and intra-state banking deregulation, the home mortgage interest tax de-
duction, average marginal federal income tax rates, and conventional monetary
policy innovations. Appendix Tables B.6 and B.7 document that the benchmark
results are broadly robust to iteratively omitting particularly large GSE regula-
tory policy events from the first-stage estimates or including alternative controls
related to secondary market activity, such as growth in the real conforming loan
limit or GSE mortgage holdings.
Section 2.4 documents market-segmented lending responses to subsidized
GSE purchase shocks. The narrative identification strategy can alternatively
be interpreted as identifying housing-specific credit supply shocks from the
secondary market, tying this paper to a larger literature on macroeconomic
responses to credit supply shocks.47 As another robustness check, I contrast
the disparate lending responses to the housing-specific credit supply shocks
with responses to a broader measure of credit shocks from that literature: the
Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012) excess bond premium. Impulse responses to con-
tractionary excess bond premium shocks in recursively identified SVARs show
a similar decrease in commercial lending and rise in home mortgage lending, as
documented in Appendix B. Broad credit supply shocks induce an endogenous
expansion in GSE purchase and securitization activity, which coincide with in-
creased home mortgage lending and single-family housing starts. Lending and
construction for multifamily dwellings, conversely, see no significant response.
The SVAR impulse response analysis provides complementary evidence of di-
47See for instance Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (2003); Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012); Bassett,
Chosak, Driscoll, and Zakrajsek (2014); and Mian, Sufi and Verner (2017).
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vergent lending responses between housing and commercial sectors resulting
from credit shocks, as well as significant real-financial linkages across housing,
commercial real estate, and industrial activity.
2.7 Policy Implications
The United States is on the cusp of a sizable policy experiment that is neither
well understood nor widely recognized: sharply reversing a longstanding pol-
icy stance of trying to direct credit toward residential mortgages. Figure 2.10
depicts government holdings of residential mortgage debt and its projected tra-
jectory based on current policies for Fannie, Freddie, and the Fed. Total agency
holdings are depicted as a share of residential mortgage debt (solid black), with
breakouts for the portion held only by Fannie and Freddie (solid blue) as well
as their portion plus the Fed’s (dashed blue). Federal regulators used the con-
servatorship agreements to wind down the GSEs’ retained mortgage holdings
by roughly 70%. The Fed began unwinding its holdings of agency MBS as part
of its balance sheet normalization policies in October 2017. The share of U.S.
residential mortgage debt effectively residing on the federal balance sheet is
slated to drop from over 26% in 2010 to just over 5%, the lowest share since the
late 1960s. The sharp reversal of subsidized government funding of residential
mortgages could pose a sizable credit supply shock for housing and mortgage
markets.
While government ownership of mortgage debt is slated to contract, it
would be premature to assume subsidized housing credit policies will soon be
a relic of ages past. Congress has demonstrated a proclivity for ad hoc credit
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policy interventions when mortgage rates rise and construction slows, or for
repurposing secondary mortgage markets to advance new social policy objec-
tives. GSE reform might simply shift subsidies from agency mortgage holdings
toward explicit government guarantees on MBS; conversely, the administration
has proposed ending conservatorship and re-privatizing the GSEs. The Fed’s
recent foray into housing credit policy is being wound down, but similarly may
be revisited. The Federal Open Market Committee’s latest policy normalization
principles noted the central bank was prepared to increase purchases of agency
MBS and “use its full range of tools, including altering the size and composition
of its balance sheet” if the federal funds rate again proved an inadequate tool of
stabilization policy.48
Using historical regulatory changes to infer possible effects of unwinding
U.S. housing credit policies or inform GSE reform is clearly subject to the Lu-
cas critique. That said, the conduct of U.S. housing credit policies has been far
more ad hoc and less salient than other areas of federal policy likely altering
household expectations and the structure of econometric models, say house-
holds adapting to systematic changes in conventional monetary policy. More-
over, it is not obvious that the anticipation of opaque mortgage subsidies (or
their removal) should affect deep parameters of agents’ behavior in a structural
model, whereas offered mortgage rates will clearly affect household behavior.
The Lucas critique notwithstanding, evidence on the historical effects of shocks
to subsidized GSE mortgage purchases offers some guidance, taken with a grain
of salt, to possible effects of the Fed unwinding its mortgage holdings. Similarly,
48See FOMC Press Release, Addendum to the Policy Normalization Principles and Plans,
June 14, 2017. Barring new legislation, the Fed’s open market operations will remain restricted
to transacting in either Treasuries or agency securities. The Interest Rate Adjustment Act of
1966 authorized the Fed to conduct open market operations in any direct or fully guaranteed
obligation “of any agency of the United States,” which was made permanent in 1968; see Haltom
and Sharp (2014).
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Figure 2.10. Actual and Projected Mortgage Holdings of Government Agen-
cies
Notes: Gray bars correspond with NBER recession dates. Vertical dotted line corresponds to be-
ginning of forecasts for agency mortgage holdings and residential mortgage debt. Residential
mortgage debt growth is forecast using an estimated VAR system and the Congressional Budget
Office’s Economic Outlook forecast. Other agencies funding mortgages include the FHLBanks,
Ginnie Mae, Federal Housing Administration, Veterans Administration, Farmers Home Ad-
ministration, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Federal Land Banks. Sources: see the
data appendix.
macroeconometric evidence can inform what set of historical tradeoffs policy-
makers might want to consider when overhauling secondary mortgage markets
and the degree to which the federal government subsidizes mortgage borrow-
ing.
2.7.1 Policy Implications: Balance Sheet Normalization
Evidence on the transmission of GSE mortgage purchases is relevant to the Fed’s
large-scale purchases of agency MBS. The Fed’s MBS purchases are an uncon-
ventional form of housing credit policy, not merely unconventional monetary
policy. Whereas the Fed’s purchases of long-term Treasuries directly target the
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term structure of risk-free interest rates, the stated objective behind the Fed’s
MBS purchases was to “reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit
for the purchase of houses.”49 The Federal Open Market Committee was pub-
licly rebuked for inappropriately foraying into the realm of credit policy by sev-
eral regional Fed presidents; for instance, Charles Plosser, then President of the
Philadelphia Fed, argued
“when the Fed engages in targeted credit programs that seek to al-
ter the allocation of credit across markets, I believe it is engaging in
fiscal policy and has breached the traditional boundaries established
between the fiscal authorities and the central bank” (Plosser, 2012).50
While the Fed’s MBS purchases were seen as a departure from past mone-
tary policy, Congress has engaged in large-scale purchases of mortgage debt on
and off since the Great Depression. Evidence on the aggregate effects and per-
sistence of responses to exogenous GSE purchase shocks can help inform likely
effects of unwinding the Fed’s sizable holdings of mortgage debt, circumvent-
ing intrinsic limitations in study designs used to analyze the high-frequency
or relative effects of the Fed’s purchases during the crisis.51 There are consid-
49See FOMC Press Release, November 25, 2008.
50Jeffrey Lacker, then President of the Richmond Fed, similarly warned “Buying MBS in large
quantities is intended to reduce borrowing rates for conforming home mortgages, and thereby
provide support to that recovering market. However, it necessarily does so only by reducing
rates for borrowers in other markets by less than would be the case if purchases were confined to
U.S. Treasury securities. Therefore, by purchasing MBS, the Fed is attempting to tilt the flow of
credit toward one particular economic sector... the Fed’s actions risk distorting credit allocation
and depriving some sectors of the credit they deserve” (Lacker, 2012).
51Quantifying the macroeconomic effects of the Fed’s MBS purchase program faces numer-
ous intrinsic complications: there were relatively few policy interventions or related announce-
ments, purchases were endogenously motivated by economic distress, and policy announce-
ments about MBS purchases were often coupled with news about purchases of Treasuries or for-
ward guidance regarding short-term rates. Consequently, the literature has largely focused on
high-frequency event studies around policy announcements or event studies exploiting cross-
sectional variation across bank balance sheets or mortgage contracts. High-frequency regres-
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erable similarities between the Fed’s MBS purchases and the GSEs’ mortgage
purchases. As with the GSEs’ purchases, the Fed’s purchases of mortgage debt
pull credit, prepayment, and interest rate risk from the private sector. The Fed’s
MBS purchases similarly subsidize mortgage credit, either relative to only pur-
chasing Treasuries or in terms of a funding advantage over banks. Funding
mortgage purchases with the issuance of either reserves or agency bonds in-
volves the creation of safe assets. There are significant similarities between the
market structures for the Fed’s MBS purchases in the to-be-announced (TBA)
forward market and the GSEs’ purchases: both market structures are geared to-
ward newly originated conforming mortgages meeting recently set parameters
and afford an option on new mortgage originations.52
Moreover, there is a growing body of empirical evidence that the Fed’s MBS
purchases and GSEs’ purchases operate through a similar mortgage origina-
tion channel. Fuster and Willen (2010); Di Maggio, Kermani, and Palmer (2016);
Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2017); and Rodnyansky and Darmouni
(2018) find cross-sectional evidence of the Fed’s MBS purchases increasing con-
forming mortgage originations and refinancing activity, attributed to lowered
sion discontinuities are naturally confined to studying the intraday or interday movement of
financial variables, and cannot readily speak to aggregate effects or persistence. This literature
predominantly finds evidence of announcements regarding MBS purchases decreasing long-
term bond yields and MBS spreads. See, for instance, Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2011), and Hancock and Passmore (2011, 2015). Cumulating responses
over a larger sample of Fed events, Greenlaw et al. (2018) contend that initial rate responses
to such policy announcements were not persistent. Cross-sectional difference-in-differences re-
gressions can speak to relative effects for a broader range of dependent variables, but similarly
cannot speak to aggregate effects or persistence. High-frequency and cross-sectional evidence
from the crisis is also ill-suited to informing likely effects of the Fed arresting its MBS purchases
near the peak of the business cycle.
52The Fed’s purchases have been heavily concentrated in newly issued 30-year fixed-rate
agency MBS acquired through the TBA market (Gagnon et al., 2011). In this market, param-
eters for maturity, coupon, price, par volume, issuer, and settlement date for the traded security
are agreed upon in advance, but the pool of mortgages delivered to the purchaser is only re-
vealed near settlement, typically one to three months after the trade date (Vickery and Wright,
2013).
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mortgage rates, increased market liquidity, and removal of lending risks from
the private sector. Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018) similarly find large
mortgage origination responses ensuing from agency mortgage purchases, par-
ticularly for refinancing. Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2017) find
evidence of banks with greater exposure to the Fed’s MBS purchases both in-
creasing mortgage originations and decreasing C&I lending relative to banks
with less exposure. I document analogous crowd-out effects for aggregate C&I
lending in response to GSE purchase shocks, as well as crowd out of private
multifamily mortgage and commercial mortgage lending.
After the Fed terminated its QE3 MBS purchases in 2014, the system’s hold-
ings of mortgage debt hovered around $1.75 trillion for the next three years,
resulting from a policy of reinvesting principal payments back into new agency
MBS, as seen in the left panel of Appendix Figure B.2. The Fed’s MBS reinvest-
ment purchases amounted to buying 15–17% of the flow of residential mortgage
originations in recent years. The Fed ceased agency MBS reinvestments in Octo-
ber 2018. While the Fed’s balance sheet normalization program was anticipated,
the transmission of purchases affecting lending through a mortgage origination
channel will not have simply been priced in already.53 Fieldhouse, Mertens, and
Ravn (2018) find that a one percentage point increase in agency purchases as a
share of mortgage originations reduces mortgage spreads by 2 to 3 basis points
roughly one year after policy announcements, while housing starts increase 1%
to 2%. If those responses were to scale linearly to phasing out the Fed’s reinvest-
ments, they would imply a gradual 30 to 45 basis point rise in mortgage spreads
and a 15 to 30% reduction in housing investment. The sharp 15 percentage point
53High-frequency studies may underestimate the effects of the Fed’s purchases by focusing
solely on news effects. Hancock and Passmore (2015) find the initiation of the Fed’s MBS pur-
chases produced further improvements in market functioning.
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reduction in the share of originations purchased by the Fed might thus be ex-
pected to significantly drag on housing and mortgage markets, and perhaps the
economy more broadly.54
If, however, reduced Fed demand for newly originated mortgages induces
a reallocation of credit through bank lending channels, the macroeconomic ef-
fects of balance sheet normalization may be muted and largely redistributive.
The credit and construction multipliers estimated in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 sug-
gest that balance sheet normalization will drag on single-family housing and
mortgage markets, but likely exert positive spillovers for commercial lending
and leave employment unaffected. The results of Chakraborty, Goldstein, and
MacKinlay (2017) would similarly predict a relative increase in commercial loan
growth for banks with more exposure to the Fed’s purchases. There is no sat-
isfactory way of benchmarking my estimates of aggregate C&I loan crowd-out
from GSE purchases to the relative C&I loan crowd-out from the Fed’s MBS
purchases documented by Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2017). As
an alternative crosswalk, Appendix B estimates the response of C&I lending to
the Fed’s MBS purchases in a LP-OLS regression framework; the point estimates
show a 10- to 25-cent reduction in C&I lending per dollar of the Fed’s MBS pur-
chases, in line with my LP-IV estimates of C&I loan crowd-out per dollar of
GSE purchases. This again suggests that phasing out the Fed’s MBS holdings
will largely reallocate credit and real activity across sectors, likely inducing a
substitution toward commercial real estate lending and related construction.
Recent economic data seems consistent with housing credit policies predom-
inantly reallocating activity toward housing without stimulating aggregate ac-
54Leamer (2007); Leamer (2015) argues that the U.S. business cycle is predominantly a con-
sumer cycle governed by housing investment; 9 of 11 post-war recessions have been led by
deteriorations in housing, and all but two housing slumps have preceded recessions.
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tivity. The residential housing market softened as the Fed phased out its subsi-
dized purchases of agency MBS over October 2017 to October 2018. Mortgage
spreads rose 22 basis points over October 2017–October 2018. Housing starts hit
inflection point in January 2018 and have since fallen 10%. New home sales and
existing home sales peaked in November 2017, and the latter have similarly
dropped 10%. The Fed’s latest Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey reported
strengthening demand for C&I loans but weakening demand for residential real
estate and construction loans.55 The Fed’s rate tightening cycle is also surely
contributing to the weakening housing market but not to the rise in mortgage
spreads, and other leading economic indicators remain strong. Annual growth
in construction sector employment has accelerated, reaching a two-year high in
October 2018. Weakening housing market activity notwithstanding, my find-
ings on crowd-out effects from housing credit policies bode well for the Fed’s
ongoing reduction in its mortgage holdings, particularly for total construction
spending and employment.
2.7.2 Policy Implications: GSE Reform and Future Research
Congress, to its own chagrin, has yet to resolve the fate of Fannie and Freddie
more than a decade after they were taken into federal conservatorship. The last
major bipartisan push at GSE reform fizzled in 2014, but neither Congress nor
the administration is fond of the status quo. The pre-crisis GSE model of priva-
tized upside gains with catastrophic losses borne by taxpayers remains widely
maligned a decade after catastrophic losses erupted. A new bipartisan GSE re-
form bill was introduced in the House Financial Services Committee in Septem-
55Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, July 2018.
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ber 2018. While the GSEs’ retained portfolios have been shrunk significantly,
their MBS guarantee books have been allowed to grow without limit, and they
remain behemoths of U.S. mortgage finance; the GSEs own or guarantee over
42% of U.S. residential mortgage debt.56 Some form of government-sponsored
secondary market will surely persist so long as Congress remains wedded to 30-
year fixed-rate mortgages with a prepayment option. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to weigh the wisdom of that entrenched preference, but it will surely
shape reforms to the GSE model and U.S. housing credit policies.57
One leading contender on Capital Hill is replacing the GSEs with a system of
bank-issued MBS explicitly guaranteed by the Treasury, but with private capital
absorbing the first 10% of losses.58 The proposal would reinstate a version of
privatized gains with risks backstopped by the Treasury. The other leading con-
tender in Congress is replacing the GSEs with an expanded role for government-
owned Ginnie Mae: Ginnie would additionally guarantee pools of privately
insured conventional mortgages in exchange for fees, with the Treasury absorb-
ing net earnings and backstopping credit risk.59 Conversely, Congress could
rescind conservatorship and recharter the GSEs as private entities notionally
severed from an implicit government guarantee, as the administration recently
proposed (OMB, 2018). If legislative reforms continue to stall, administrative
reforms might instead be used to shrink the GSEs’ market footprint by reducing
the conforming loan limit, tightening underwriting standards, and raising MBS
56Looking at flows, roughly 70% of mortgages originated in 2017 were backed by Fannie,
Freddie, or Ginnie (OMB, 2018).
57For instance, in outlining priorities for housing credit policy reform in 2013, President
Barack Obama emphasized that any legislation “should preserve access to safe and simple mortgage
products like the 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage” (Obama, 2013).
58Such a proposal drafted by Senator Mark Crapo and Senator Tim Johnson passed the Senate
Banking Committee in 2014.
59A bipartisan bill sponsored by Representative Jeb Hensarling and Representative John De-
laney proposed such a model in September 2018, and Senator Bob Corker and Senator Mark
Warner recently proposed a similar Ginnie model of GSE reform.
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guarantee fees (Parrott and Zandi, 2018).
While Congress has fixated on market structure and downside losses, the
elephant in the room remains the extent to which mortgage debt will be sub-
sidized in the next iteration of secondary markets. GSE reform might curtail
the subsidization of mortgages via implicitly guaranteed agency bonds only to
increase subsidization by underpricing risk on explicitly guaranteed MBS. Dy-
namic responses to GSE purchase shocks suggest that housing policy objectives
can be advanced through a subsidy channel, while the subsidized expansion
of mortgage lending unintentionally crowds out commercial lending through
credit supply and bank lending channels. Underpriced guarantees can likely
advance Congress’s various housing policy objectives through a subsidy chan-
nel, but may induce a varying degree of credit crowd out. Guarantees leave in-
terest rate risk borne by the private sector, potentially driving a smaller wedge
in marginal origination incentives and weakening the mortgage origination
channel of housing credit policies. Prepayment risk may render agency MBS a
weaker substitute to bank debt than noncallable agency bonds, altering portfo-
lio rebalancing effects through the safe asset supply channel. A complementary
empirical analysis of the macroeconomic effects of government mortgage guar-
antees is left for future research. Regardless, policymakers should weigh the op-
portunity costs of subsidizing mortgage debt, notably fiscal costs to taxpayers,
horizontal inequities between homeowners and renters, and crowd-out of non-
targeted lending and real activity; overhauling budget scorekeeping rules that
understate the net present value of credit subsidies would help (Lucas, 2016).
Another lingering policy question is the extent to which countercyclical GSE
activity has served as an automatic stabilizer for housing across the business cy-
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cle. Fannie and Freddie have been a countercyclical source of funding for mort-
gage intermediation, and entirely replacing their mortgage holdings with guar-
antees may have significant implications for mortgage and housing markets
during credit crunches. The SVAR impulse response analysis in Appendix B
provides evidence of an endogenous expansion of secondary mortgage market
activity in response to broad-based credit supply shocks, and mortgage lend-
ing and housing starts see a similar countercyclical response. A comprehensive
analysis of the historical contribution of GSE purchase and securitization activ-
ity in stabilizing mortgage flows and housing activity across the business cycle
is a related work in progress (Fieldhouse, 2018).
2.8 Concluding Remarks
As a matter of theory, credit policies can expand targeted lending volumes
through subsidies and guarantees. In the presence of credit frictions or an in-
elastic supply of savings, however, credit policies stimulating a targeted form
of lending may inadvertently ration credit away from other uses. While the
potential for credit policies to crowd out lending has broad, long-standing the-
oretical backing, quantifying such credit reallocations in calibrated models is
highly sensitive to assumptions about the supply of credit (Gale, 1991; Lucas,
2016). Exploiting exogenous variation in the mortgage holdings of Fannie and
Freddie, I document evidence of U.S. housing credit policies reallocating credit
away from commercial lending. My identification strategy can speak to real-
financial linkages of housing credit policies, unlike related partial equilibrium
models of the effects of federal credit policies. I find that the reallocation of
credit ensuing from regulatory shocks to GSE purchases maps to a related real-
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location of construction activity across sectors.
Federal policymakers have shown a proclivity for ad hoc uses of credit poli-
cies, particularly during periods of financial distress. With their past conduct
of housing credit policies via secondary markets, policymakers appear capable
of increasing home mortgage lending and stimulating single-family housing in-
vestment, as intended, through a subsidy channel. These partial equilibrium
effects, however, are effectively offset in general equilibrium by unintended re-
allocations arising from an imperfectly elastic supply of bank loans. Housing
credit policies appear broadly neutral for total construction spending and em-
ployment, casting doubt on the efficacy of their use as stabilization policies, as
was common up through the 1980s and again during the Great Recession. Ev-
idence of a zero sum nature of U.S. housing credit policies should serve as a
cautionary tale to policymakers for their use of credit policy and housing subsi-
dies more broadly. If subsidizing an expansion in mortgage borrowing crowds
out commercial lending because of a partially inelastic supply of bank loans, the
home mortgage interest deduction may induce similar credit crowd out.
While my empirical strategy is well suited to quantifying credit and real
reallocations, a drawback is the inability to speak to welfare. Credit policies
are often justified in terms of correcting market failures (Elliott, 2011), and in-
crease welfare in some adverse selection models of credit rationing (Smith, 1983;
Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Lucas, 2016). Yet credit policies are distortionary
and, under different assumptions about contracting frictions and the function-
ing of capital markets, are found to decrease welfare, particularly when account-
ing for fiscal costs (Gale, 1991; Williamson, 1994). Fiscal costs aside, the theory
of the second best seems a reasonable framework for thinking about credit poli-
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cies. Would market failures under-allocate credit to housing without federal
credit policy interventions? Perhaps at times, say when housing credit policies
were first launched during the 1930s, or when the Fed launched QE1 in 2008.
That seems far less likely during 1990s and early 2000s, when Fannie and Fred-
die were allowed to rapidly expand, likely contributing to the housing bubble
through a subsidy channel. Subsidizing mortgages may reap political rewards,
but is by no means necessary for supporting mortgage liquidity via secondary
markets. While reversing the longstanding stance of subsidized housing credit
policies might increase welfare, it surely would not be a Pareto improvement:
housing credit policies create winners and losers, as would unwinding them.
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CHAPTER 3
A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF MORTGAGE ASSET PURCHASES BY
FEDERAL AGENCIES*
Andrew J. Fieldhouse and Karel Mertens
Abstract: This paper provides a narrative analysis of regulatory policy changes
affecting the purchases and holdings of mortgages and related securities of five
US government entities over the 1968–2014 period. We focus on federal govern-
ment policies that aim to influence the allocation and/or supply of residential
mortgage credit. We use contemporary primary sources and various institu-
tional histories to identify significant policy interventions, to document their
economic and regulatory context, surrounding motives, and pertinent timing,
as well as to quantify projected impacts on agencies’ mortgage holdings. Fi-
nally, we classify each significant policy change as either ‘cyclically motivated’
or ‘non-cyclically motivated.’ The results of the narrative analysis of federal
housing credit policy changes yield a record of events that can be used as an
instrumental variable for agency purchase activity.
*For a final version of this paper, visit: https://www.nber.org/papers/
w23165
Citation: Fieldhouse, Andrew J. and Karel Mertens. 2017. “A Narrative Anal-
ysis of Mortgage Asset Purchases by Federal Agencies,” NBER Working Paper
No. 23165.
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3.1 Introduction
This paper provides a narrative analysis of regulatory policy changes affect-
ing the purchases and holdings of mortgages and related securities of five US
government entities. We focus on federal government policies that aim to influ-
ence the allocation and/or supply of residential mortgage credit. We use con-
temporary primary sources and various legislative and institutional histories to
identify significant policy changes expected to affect government agencies’ per-
missible volumes of commitments to purchase mortgages, net purchases, and
retained mortgage portfolios. We quantify the projected impact of each policy
change on agencies’ ability to purchase mortgage assets using ex ante balance
sheet data and estimates of congressional staff, market analysts, regulators, and
agency executives. We use an array of primary sources to document the eco-
nomic and regulatory context of each major policy change, including the timing
of policy events being announced and taking effect, as well as purported and
discerned motives. Each significant policy change affecting agencies’ retained
mortgage portfolios is then classified as either ‘cyclically motivated’ or ‘non-
cyclically motivated’ for those policies deemed unrelated to contemporaneous
changes in the business cycle and housing credit conditions.
The documentation, quantification, dating, and classification of federal
housing credit policy interventions is intended to yield an input for studying
their use and impact. In a companion paper, Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn
(2017), we use the policy changes and narrative classification to analyze the
impact of government mortgage purchases on mortgage lending, interest rates,
residential investment, home prices, homeownership, the stance of monetary
policy, and other financial indicators and macroeconomic aggregates.
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We focus on five government agencies that have actively participated in
mortgage asset markets: the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA,
or Fannie Mae), Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC, or Fred-
die Mac), Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA, or Ginnie Mae),
Federal Reserve, and US Treasury Department. We restrict our focus of interest
for significant policy changes to 1968–2014, a period of relative institutional sta-
bility in secondary mortgage markets. A historical overview of US federal hous-
ing credit policy provides background and context for these individual policy
changes, and the history of Fannie Mae is traced back to its Great Depression
origins in an accompanying online appendix for broader context regarding its
charter, public mission, and the evolution of housing credit policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a
historical overview of US federal housing credit policy institutions and trends.
Section 3.3 outlines the methodologies and principal data sources used in com-
piling the narrative histories of the relevant agencies and policy changes. Sec-
tion 3.4 offers a chronological narrative analysis relating to the purchases of
mortgage assets for each of the five agencies. Section 3.5 presents the end result
of the narrative analysis, which consists of a time series of significant federal
housing credit policy innovations, along with our projected annualized impact
on each agency’s mortgage holdings (in nominal dollars), determination of the
policy change’s pertinent timing as a news shock about pending purchases, and
classification of the policy as either cyclically or non-cyclically motivated.
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3.2 Historical Overview of US Federal Housing Credit Policy
To provide broader context for the discussion of each agency’s significant pol-
icy changes, we first overview the origins and evolution of US federal housing
credit policy and the housing agencies of interest. As a reference, Table 3.1 lists
the major housing credit policy institutions and their years active, and Table 3.2
provides a glossary of all acronyms used in this paper.
Table 3.1: Principal Institutions of US Housing Credit Policy
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 1933-
FHA Federal Housing Administration 1934-
FHFA Federal Housing Finance Agency 2008-
FHFB Federal Housing Finance Board 1989-2008
FHLBB Federal Home Loan Bank Board 1932-1989
FHLBS Federal Home Loan Bank System 1932-
FHLMC Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 1970-
FNMA Federal National Mortgage Association 1938-
FSLIC Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 1934-1989
GNMA Government National Mortgage Association 1968 -
HOLC Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 1933-1954
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development 1965-
OFHEO Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 1992-2008
PHA Public Housing Administration 1937-1965
RFC Reconstruction Finance Corporation 1932-1957
RFCMC RFC Mortgage Company 1935-1948
RTC Resolution Trust Corporation 1989-1995
VA Veterans Administration/Department of Veterans Affairs 1944-
The origins of present day US federal housing credit policy stem from policy
responses intended to ameliorate the collapse of mortgage credit and resuscitate
the housing market during the Great Depression. The Depression was led by a
sharp and sustained downturn in housing starts, which plunged from a peak of
over 900,000 in 1925 to 500,000 by 1929 and a low of under 100,000 in 1933, hav-
ing dropped 90% (Leamer (2007), Eichengreen (2015)). The stock market crash
of 1929 had been preceded by a speculative residential real estate development
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boom and bust in Florida, sparking a slew of regional bank failures, the fallout
of which “soured bankers and homebuyers on the residential real estate market” across
the country (Eichengreen (2015)). During the Great Depression, banking pan-
ics and failures, falling incomes and rising unemployment, and the prevailing
terms of mortgage contracts all contributed to a severe mortgage credit crunch
and unprecedented foreclosure crisis. At the time, almost all mortgages were
short-term loans of only up to 5-6 years, required large down payments, with
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) not exceeding 60%, and were structured as balloon
mortgages as opposed to self-amortizing loans; borrowers would take out a new
mortgage to repay the principal of their previous maturing mortgage, but this fi-
nancing system imploded when panicked or failing banks stopped making new
loans.
The first major federal intervention in residential mortgage markets was the
creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS) by the Hoover ad-
ministration in 1932, which was intended to provide a liquidity backstop for
mortgage lenders. The FHLBS was modeled after the Federal Reserve System,
organized as a governing Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), twelve re-
gional Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks), and private mortgage lenders
as members. The FHLBanks were chartered to facilitate and stabilize mortgage
lending by providing liquidity via wholesale loans to member institutions, se-
cured by members’ mortgages. Membership was mandatory for federally char-
tered savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and voluntary for other institutions
making long-term home mortgage loans.
The scope of housing credit policy interventions expanded considerably un-
der the Roosevelt administration’s New Deal legislation. In response to the
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foreclosure crisis, Congress established and capitalized the Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation (HOLC) in 1933 to purchase mortgages in default from lenders and
refinance delinquent mortgages on enticing terms. One year later, the water-
shed National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Administra-
tion (FHA) to stimulate the construction sector and improve housing standards.
Qualifying borrowers could obtain an attractive FHA-insured loan from a pri-
vate mortgagee, while lenders could file mortgage insurance claims with the
FHA if a borrower defaulted, thereby transferring credit risk to the federal gov-
ernment. The Act also created the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo-
ration (FSLIC) to extend deposit insurance to the thrift industry and stabilize
mortgage market funding. Through the statutory terms for HOLC and FHA-
insured mortgages, Congress transformed the norm for mortgage contracts to
closely resemble the long-term fixed-rate self-amortizing mortgages prevalent
today.1 In 1935, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) incorporated
and capitalized the RFC Mortgage Company, principally to serve as a secondary
market supporting FHA-insured mortgages.
In 1938, the Federal National Mortgage Association was established and au-
thorized to support a more liquid secondary market for FHA-insured mort-
gages. Congress had repeatedly tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to induce the in-
corporation of legally privileged private national mortgage associations, which
had been authorized by the National Housing Act of 1934; after several years of
private sector inaction, FNMA was chartered as a wholly owned subsidiary of
the RFC, which also provided Fannie’s initial capitalization.
1HOLC loans allowed higher LTVs of up to 80%, were self-amortizing over a longer 15 year
maturity (later revised to 25 years), and bore fixed interest rates capped at 5%. Loan limits
were set at $14,000, a relatively modest size at the time. FHA-insured loans initially imposed
maximum LTVs of 80%, maturities of 20 years, interest rates of 5%, and loan limits of $16,000.
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The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (or ‘GI Bill’) established the Vet-
erans Administration (VA) mortgage guarantee program, which allowed vet-
erans to obtain mortgages with very low down payments.2 The program was
intended as a cheap alternative reward to cash bonuses for veterans, as well as
to reinvigorate housing construction, which had cratered again during the war.
The RFC Mortgage Company initially expanded secondary market operations
to support VA mortgages. After the RFC Mortgage Company was dissolved in
1948, Fannie was rechartered and authorized to support a secondary market in
VA mortgages later that year. The Korean GI Bill extended the VA home loan
benefit to Korean War vets, setting precedent that eligibility would be extended
following every major subsequent conflict or deployment.
The National Housing Act of 1954 rechartered a nearly bankrupted Fannie
Mae, turning it into a mixed-ownership corporation by requiring that mort-
gagee counterparties purchase common stock, and authorized Fannie to issue
debt, subject to leverage constraints.3 The bill envisaged an eventual full pri-
vatization, but set no mechanism or timeline for such a transition; the Act also
introduced a standby line of credit with the Department for Fannie’s secondary
market operations, intended as a liquidity backstop to reassure private lenders.
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 split FNMA into a quasi-
private Fannie Mae and a government-owned Government National Mortgage
Association—a move largely intended to remove Fannie Mae’s balance sheet
and debt issues from the federal budget ledger. The new shareholder-owned
Fannie Mae assumed secondary market operations, but retained the ability to
2Subject to eligibility requirements, veterans enjoyed a limited guarantee on loans used for
the purchase or construction of residential property, or home repairs and improvement; the
VA would pay the private lender a portion of losses in the event that a veteran defaulted on a
guaranteed loan.
3Preferred stock ownership remained with the federal government.
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borrow from the Treasury, widely perceived as an implicit government guaran-
tee. Ginnie Mae assumed the other functions, which largely entailed cyclically
motivated interventions or purchases supporting difficult-to-market FHA/VA
mortgages. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), estab-
lished as a Cabinet-level agency in 1965, fully administered Ginnie and retained
considerable regulatory authority over Fannie. Ginnie was actively used to in-
tervene in mortgage markets until its purchase programs were wound down in
the early 1980s.
The 1970s ushered in the ascendence of government-sponsored secondary
mortgage markets. Following the 1969 credit crunch, the Emergency Home Fi-
nance Act of 1970 authorized Fannie to expand its activities from dealing solely
in FHA/VA mortgages to the much larger conventional mortgage market.4 That
Act also chartered the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as a compan-
ion government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) to support a secondary market for
conventional mortgages for the S&Ls.5 Like Fannie, Freddie was chartered with
preferential tax and regulatory treatment, but ownership and regulation of Fred-
die was placed with the FHLBS. Freddie was authorized to issue debt securities
and sell mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued against pools of mortgages.
In February 1970, GNMA issued the first publicly traded pass-through secu-
rities, backed with interests in pools of FHA/VA mortgages, with timely pay-
ment explicitly backed by a government guarantee. In 1971, Freddie started
a program of pass-through securities, or ‘participation certificates,’ backed by
conventional mortgages, with default risk guaranteed by Freddie.
4Conventional mortgages are loans that are not directly guaranteed by the federal govern-
ment.
5The FHLBS is also a housing GSE, while the government-retained Ginnie Mae is not a GSE.
With an abuse of notation, we use the term ‘GSEs’ or ‘Enterprises’ to refer simply to Fannie and
Freddie, the only housing GSEs of focus in this paper.
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Freddie’s MBS were largely sold to third parties, so its retained portfolio—
primarily used for MBS pooling inventory—remained small relative to that of
Fannie through the 1980s. Fannie’s greater retained portfolio and interest rate
risk exposure led to large losses in the early 1980s. The Reagan administration’s
plans to fully privatize both GSEs were delayed while Fannie’s balance sheet
was recovering, aided by accommodating tax and regulatory policies. A dereg-
ulatory regime tried to help both the thrift industry and Fannie grow their way
back to health without taxpayer bailouts or recapitalizations, exacerbating the
subsequent S&L crisis, which again delayed any attempt at privatization.
Amidst the S&L crisis and public resolution of failed thrifts, the Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 expanded the
GSEs’ secondary mortgage market objectives to include promoting housing for
low- and moderate-income borrowers. The Act also converted Freddie into a
publicly traded shareholder-owned corporation, transferring regulatory author-
ity to HUD. Freddie was also extended the same $2.25 billion standby credit
line with the Treasury as afforded Fannie, bolstering the perception of an im-
plicit government guarantee of agency debt securities. Congress also diverted
FHLBank earnings to affordable housing goals and repaying thrift resolutions;
this action had the unintended consequence of pressuring the FHLBS to increase
earnings, prompting a leveraged balance sheet expansion into MBS. The Federal
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 established
minimal capital requirements for the GSEs and mandated that HUD set afford-
able housing goals.
The 1990s and early 2000s saw considerable balance sheet growth of Fan-
nie and Freddie largely unrelated to deliberate federal policy changes. After
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publicly listing, earnings pressure drove Freddie to exploit the profitability of
balance sheet expansion, and its retained portfolio began catching up with Fan-
nie (Greenspan (2005)). The GSEs’ automated underwriting systems became
widely used by originators, guaranteeing that their mortgages could easily be
sold to secondary markets, helping the GSEs gain market share. An era of low
interest rates triggered a massive mortgage refinancing wave, which Fannie and
Freddie capitalized on. And Fannie and Freddie successfully courted and ex-
panded debt issuance to foreign institutional investors, aided by a falling sup-
ply of Treasuries. New FHLBank programs were also authorized for portfolio
purchases of whole loans from members, creating an alternative secondary mar-
ket for their members.
Accounting scandals that surfaced in the early 2000s, however, prompted
greater regulatory oversight of the GSEs, capital surcharges, and portfolio caps,
contributing to declining agency shares of mortgage holdings and guaranteed
mortgage debt in the mid-2000s. The GSEs’ purchase and securitization activity
also slowed with the end of the refinancing boom in 2003. The explosion of
subprime and alt-A mortgage lending and private-label MBS issuance was also
an important factor behind the agencies’ falling market shares.
Government agencies rapidly regained and then surpassed their previous
market share highs as the housing market and private mortgage lending col-
lapsed ahead of and during the Great Recession. Fannie and Freddie were
heavy-handedly reminded of their public missions and pushed to expand pur-
chases in a tanking market; their portfolio limits were relaxed in September
2007 and again in February 2009, while capital surcharges were removed in
March 2008. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 vastly increased conform-
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ing loan limits to expand the reach of GSE purchases and securitization.6 The
FHLBanks also effectively served as an alternative discount window (on more
favorable terms than the Fed), and saw lending activity and mortgage holdings
rise sharply.
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 authorized the Treasury
Department to purchase securities issued by Fannie and Freddie and dissolved
several regulatory agencies, consolidating authority into the newly created Fed-
eral Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). In September 2008, Fannie and Fred-
die were placed under the conservatorship of the FHFA and Treasury, and
were ordered to first increase, then gradually reduce their mortgage portfo-
lios. The Treasury concurrently announced an agency MBS purchase program
that resulted in nearly $200 billion worth of purchases through the end of 2009.
The Federal Reserve launched its first round of quantitative easing (QE) asset
purchases in November 2008, initially committing to purchase $500 billion in
agency MBS and $100 billion in agency debt.7 The March 2009 expansion of QE1
committed to purchasing an additional $750 billion in agency MBS and another
$100 billion in agency debt. Operation Twist, announced in September 2011,
shifted reinvestment of principal repayments from agency MBS and agency
debt holdings back into agency MBS, instead of Treasuries. When launched
in September 2012, QE3 committed to purchasing $40 billion in agency MBS
a month, tapered to $35 billion in December 2013, and terminated in October
2014. For a period during these active mortgage market interventions, agency
net portfolio purchases and pool issues effectively accounted for all US mort-
6Conforming loans are mortgages that meet the GSEs’ guidelines for eligible purchases, no-
tably a loan limit and LTV limit.
7The Interest Rate Adjustment Act of 1966 temporarily amended the Federal Reserve Act to
make any security of any government agency eligible for the conduct of open market operations,
authority made permanent in 1968 (Haltom and Sharp (2014)).
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Table 3.2: Glossary of Acronyms Used
AHPs affordable housing programs
ARMs adjustable-rate mortgages
ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
CBO Congressional Budget Office
CMOs collateralized mortgage obligations
CRS Congressional Research Service
ESA Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FHA Federal Housing Administration
FHEFSSA Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992
FHFA Federal Housing Finance Agency
FHFB Federal Housing Finance Board
FHLBanks Federal Home Loan Banks
FHLBB Federal Home Loan Bank Board
FHLBS Federal Home Loan Bank System
FHLMC Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
FIRREA Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
FNMA Federal National Mortgage Association
FOMC Federal Open Market Committee
FSLIC Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
FY fiscal year
GAAP generally accepted accounting principles
GAO Government Accountability Office
GNMA Government National Mortgage Association
GPMs graduated payment mortgages
GSE government-sponsored enterprise
HERA Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
HARP Home Affordable Refinance Program
HMDA Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
HOLC Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development
HUDA Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968
JCT Joint Committee on Taxation
LTV loan-to-value ratio
MBS mortgage-backed securities
NCUA National Credit Union Administration
NHA National Housing Act of 1934
NYSE New York Stock Exchange
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OFHEO Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PCs Mortgage Participation Certificates
QE quantitative easing
REMICs real estate mortgage investment conduit
RFC Reconstruction Finance Corporation
RRMs renegotiable-rate mortgages
RTC Resolution Trust Corporation
S&Ls savings and loan associations
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SPSPA Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program
UPB unpaid principal balance
VA Veterans Administration/Department of Veterans Affairs
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gage originations. As of this writing, the Fed’s balance sheet held $1.77 trillion
worth of securitized US residential mortgage debt, more than 15% of that out-
standing.8 Fannie’s and Freddie’s portfolios continue to be shrunk while they
remain in government conservatorship, but their eventual fate remains unclear.
3.3 Overview of Methodology
The principal purpose of this narrative analysis of federal housing credit policy
changes is developing a record of events that can be used as a valid instrumen-
tal variable for agency purchases of mortgage assets. The narrative develop-
ment of policy instruments follows five steps. We start by restricting the sample
and focus of housing credit interventions for consistent use as news shocks. We
then identify binding, significant policy changes expected to affect agency’s pur-
chases and retained portfolio activity. We quantify these significant policies’ ex
ante projected impact on agency mortgage holdings. We also pinpoint our best
determination of when news of each policy change was made public. Lastly, we
classify each significant policy as either ‘cyclically motivated’ or ‘non-cyclically
motivated.’ Here we provide an overview of the procedures and data sources
used in each of these steps. The companion paper, Fieldhouse, Mertens, and
Ravn (2017), also provides a similar but substantially abbreviated overview of
this methodology.
8The Fed’s balance sheet included $1.77 trillion worth of FNMA, FHLMC, and GNMA MBS
as of June 28, 2017, or 15.3% of the $11.54 trillion in total mortgage debt outstanding for one-
to four-family residences and multifamily residences as of 2017Q1, the most recently available
quarter (Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1 and Mortgage Debt Outstanding (1.54).
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3.3.1 Sample Restriction
The starting point for the narrative analysis is the landmark Housing and Ur-
ban Development Act of 1968, a choice made to select a period of relative in-
stitutional stability. That Act split off FNMA’s secondary mortgage market op-
erations into a quasi-privatized shareholder-owned Fannie Mae, while creating
a HUD-retained Ginnie Mae to assume FNMA’s remaining operations. This
choice also roughly coincides with the creation of Freddie Mac in 1970, Fannie
Mae’s authorization to enter the conventional market in 1970, the emergence of
a nationwide secondary market for both FHA/VA and conventional mortgages,
the beginning of mortgage securitization and its rapid growth, and the ascen-
dancy of the quasi-privatized GSE era. We largely focus on the mortgage portfo-
lio activity of Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie, ignoring less significant government
entities for which monthly portfolio data is not easily available.9 Fannie has
historically accounted for the largest share of post-war mortgage holdings, al-
though Freddie grew rapidly and began catching up after being privatized in
1989. Ginnie also accounted for a significant share of mortgage holdings be-
fore its purchase programs were wound down in the early 1980s.10 As shown in
Figure 3.1, these three housing agencies of focus have accounted for the vast ma-
jority of government agency mortgage holdings prior to the financial crisis. We
also include as significant policy changes the agency MBS purchase programs
of the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department during the Great Recession,
9The FHLBS has also played a large role in US federal housing credit policy, albeit principally
by providing wholesale liquidity to member mortgage lenders. The FHLBS did start purchasing
and holding MBS in the early 1990s and several FHLBanks created quasi-secondary markets for
whole loans starting in the late 1990s, but we ignore these purchases due to data limitations for
purchases and holdings at a monthly frequency.
10Guaranteeing timely payment of MBS has comprised of nearly all of Ginnie’s subsequent
activity in mortgage markets, but unlike the housing GSEs, Ginnie does not directly hold a
pooling inventory or retain MBS on portfolio.
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Figure 3.1. Agency Market Share of Mortgage Debt Outstanding
Notes: Residential mortgage debt and originations include home as well as multifamily mort-
gages. Agency holdings include holdings of both whole loans and pools. The grey bars are
NBER-dated recessions. Sources: see data appendix of Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2017).
although all of these policies were clearly cyclically motivated.
3.3.2 Identifying Significant Policy Changes
We restrict our attention to ‘significant’ policy events that would either be ex-
pected to impact agencies’ permissible volume of net purchases and retained
portfolio holdings or considerably expand the pool of eligible mortgages an
agency was authorized or required to purchase. Policies influencing retained
portfolio volumes include leverage ratios, portfolio caps, and direct appropria-
tions or provision of working capital, whereas policies considerably expanding
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the pool of eligible mortgages include changes to conforming loan limits, af-
fordable housing goals, or classes of mortgages eligible for purchase, such as
conventional, adjustable-rate, or second mortgages.
We use a wide range of sources for identifying legislative and regulatory
changes affecting agency purchases, using primary sources, whenever possible,
both in searching for and analyzing policy changes. We also cross-reference
identified policy changes with multiple sources whenever possible. As a refer-
ence, Table 3.3 lists all primary sources used in compiling the narrative analysis.
Policy changes affecting agency mortgage purchases have been directed by a
range of policymakers, notably Congress, the President, Treasury Secretary, and
HUD Secretary, various regulatory agencies in the executive branch, and the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The relevant regulatory institutions
setting policy have varied over the decades, particularly as regulatory bodies
were disbanded and reinvented in the aftermath of various crises or perceived
regulatory failures, further necessitating the use of a wide range of sources.
Principal sources used in identifying and analyzing significant policy changes
include the legislative text of public laws, the Federal Register, the Budget of
the United States Government, the Economic Report of the President, and periodical
reports of the agencies and their regulators, notably the annual reports of the
Enterprises, HUD, FHFA, and Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO).
Significant policy changes affecting government agencies’ mortgage hold-
ings generally originate from enacted legislative changes, regulatory policy
changes published in the Federal Register or as other binding agreements, or
macroeconomic stabilization policies managed by the Federal Reserve or Trea-
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sury. Significant policy changes determined legislatively include adjustments
to statutory leverage ratios, capital requirements, and conforming loan limits,
provisions of working capital, mandatory retirements of public stock, direct
appropriations or borrowing authority for purchases, and authorizations for
agencies to enter new segments of the mortgage market, among others. Sig-
nificant regulatory policy changes include setting permissible debt-to-capital
ratios, imposing capital surcharges in excess of statutory capital requirements,
capping portfolio size or growth, setting affordable housing goals, and autho-
rizing agencies to enter new segments of the mortgage market. Macroeconomic
stabilization actions include the Treasury Department and FHFA taking Fannie
and Freddie into conservatorship in September 2008, subsequent amendments
to the conservatorship agreements, and large-scale asset purchases of agency
MBS conducted by the Federal Reserve and Treasury since 2008.
We use the comprehensive Congressional Research Service (CRS) report A
Chronology of Housing Legislation and Selected Executive Actions, 1892-2003 (CRS
(2004)) as a starting point for identifying significant policy changes, particu-
larly pertinent public laws. This legislative history is cross-referenced with the
Congressional Quarterly Almanac’s Housing and Development and/or Appropri-
ations trackers. Appendices of the Budget of the United States Government are ad-
ditionally searched for information about policy changes affecting Ginnie Mae
during relevant years, cross-referenced with HUD appropriations bills and re-
lated reports of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. After iden-
tifying public laws affecting Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie, we use the ProQuest
Congressional Publications Database’s Legislative & Executive Publications to
collect the legislative text of those enacted laws, related committee reports, re-
lated Congressional hearing transcripts, and the preceding House and Senate
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versions of the final bill, if applicable. We then analyze relevant sections of these
primary sources to confirm these laws’ material impact on mortgage holdings
and better understand the nature and timing of the policy changes at hand.
Transcripts of all public laws, committee reports, and hearings were contempo-
raneously made publicly available, and are easily accessible online for recent
decades.11
Legislative actions are often also the impetus for drafting new regulatory
rules, and identified significant legislative events are the starting point for a di-
rected search of related, significant regulatory changes using HeinOnline’s Fed-
eral Register Library. We obtain information from the Annual Report of the Federal
National Mortgage Association and Annual Report of the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation about significant regulatory changes for the GSEs, and from
their 10-K filings for events after 2003, when Fannie and Freddie ‘voluntarily’
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and began filing
audited financial reports. Sections of the Economic Report of the President and An-
nual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve related to housing are
also scanned for information about regulatory changes, as are various reports
of regulators. After identifying regulatory policy events, we use newspapers, fi-
nancial newswires, and mortgage industry newsletters to help direct the search
for information about the rulings and their publication in the Federal Regis-
ter, particularly the Wall Street Journal, American Banker, and National Mortgage
11The ProQuest Congressional Publications Database’s Legislative & Execu-
tive Publications provides a comprehensive compilation of all such documents
(http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional, subscription required). Pub-
lic laws and related legislative actions since 1973 are available from Congress.gov,
a project of the Library of Congress, along with committee reports since 1995.
Most older public laws are available through LegisWorks Statutes at Large Project
(http://legisworks.org/sal/), created and maintained by Joe Carmel. Most hearing
transcripts are digitally available since 1985 from the US Government Publishing Office
(https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CHRG).
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News. This is principally accomplished by Factiva, LexisNexis Academic, and
ProQuest Historical Newspapers searches of key words related to the regula-
tory policy change, in search windows around the vicinity of the event. After
roughly pinpointing the publication date of a rule, we search HeinOnline’s Fed-
eral Register Library for the rule itself, and then work backwards to initial rul-
ings, if applicable. Final rules published in the Federal Register almost always
include a detailed background and overview of the initial proposed rule, public
comments received, and any subsequent modification of the rule.
All significant policy changes identified and documented below in this nar-
rative analysis begin with a table summarizing the regulatory policy change,
the affected agency, the policy’s projected annualized impact on that agency’s
retained purchases (in nominal billions), our determination of its news being
made public, the timing of the policy becoming effective, and our classification
of the policy as motivated by either cyclical or non-cyclical concerns. These
policy specific tables are then compiled chronologically in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.3: Sources for Narrative Analysis
Government Publications
Board of Governors Annual Report, Press releases, Federal Reserve Bulletin
Congressional Budget Office The Housing Finance System and Federal Policy: RecentChanges and Options for the Future (1983), Controlling Risks
of Government-Sponsored Enterprises (1991)
Congressional Quarterly Congressional Quarterly Almanac
Congressional Research Service A Chronology of Housing Legislation and Selected Executive
Actions, 1892-2003 (2004), The Conforming Loan Limit (2008)
Council of Economic Advisors Economic Report of the President
Department of Housing and
Urban Development
HUD news releases, The Secondary Market in Residential
Mortgages (1983), 1986 Report to Congress on the Federal
National Mortgage Association (1987), The National
Homeownership Strategy: Partners in the American Dream
(1995), Privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
Desirability and Feasibility (1996), Profiles of GSE Mortgage
Purchases in 2001-2004 (2008)
Department of the Treasury Press releases and statements, Report of the Secretary of theTreasury on Government-Sponsored Enterprises (1990),
Government Sponsorship of the FNMA and the FHLMC
(1996)
Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation Press releases and statements, Annual Report, Form 10-K
Federal Housing Finance
Administration Press releases and statements, Mortgage Market Notes
Federal National Mortgage
Association
Press releases and statements, Annual Report, Form 10-K,
Monthly Volume Summary, Information Statement,
MBSenger, Offering Circular, Background and History of the
Federal National Mortgage Association (1969, 1973)
Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission Final Report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011)
Government Accountability
Office
The Federal National Mortgage Association in a Changing
Environment (1985), GSEs: A Framework for Limiting the
Government’s Exposure to Risk (1991), Housing Enterprises:
Potential Impacts of Severing Government Sponsorship (1996),
HUD’s Mission Oversight Needs to be Strengthened (1998)
US Congress
Hearing transcripts and reports: Committees on
Appropriations, Committees on Banking and Currency,
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3.3.3 Quantification
Significant policy changes must be sufficiently material that primary sources
either explicitly cite projections of their pending impact or can be used to quan-
tify likely short-run impacts back-of-the-envelope. For each policy, we use in-
formation available in contemporaneous sources to obtain an ex ante estimate
of the projected impact on the agencies’ capacity to purchase mortgages, mea-
sured in annualized billions of nominal dollars. For relatively large, open-ended
changes, such as leverage ratio increases or permanent funding authorizations,
potential effects on mortgage holdings are annualized using a ‘two-year rule,’
which assumes that only half of the full potential impact would be realized
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within the first year of taking effect. The two-year rule is meant to accommo-
date the likelihood that, driven by profit incentives and/or regulatory pressure,
balance sheet policy changes would have an impact within a year without nec-
essarily becoming a tightly binding constraint.
We use ex ante balance sheet data on regulatory capital, liabilities, and/or
assets in conjunction with standing leverage or capitalization requirements to
estimate the impact of related changes. If a baseline is needed for quantifying a
policy change, say for regulatory capital when a permissible debt-to-capital ra-
tio is increased, we use the most recent data publicly available prior to the policy
change’s news being made public. For example, the HUD Secretary increased
Fannie’s permissible debt-to-capital ratio from 25-to-1 to 30-to-1 in December
1982. We use regulatory capital from the end of calendar year 1981—the most
recent publicly available baseline we could find prior to the announcement—of
$2.5 billion (Department of the Treasury (1990), p. A-82), implying maximum
growth in mortgage assets of $12.5 billion ($2.5 billion × (30 - 25) = $12.5 billion).
Using the two-year rule, we assign a $6.25 billion annualized increase in Fan-
nie’s permissible purchase activity. All such back-of-the-envelope calculations
are explicitly spelled out in Section 3.4 below.
Public capital injections are quantified as a multiple of one more than the
prevailing leverage ratio, to capture the potential increase in assets supported
by related debt issues plus the working capital itself. Direct appropriations are
the most straightforward policies to quantify, at most requiring a pro-rata annu-
alization adjustment based on relevant implementation lags.
To quantify potential impacts of discretionary conforming loan limit
changes, we rely, whenever possible, on estimates from accompanying Con-
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gressional committee reports, which typically cite projections of the extent to
which a large conforming loan limit increase would restore a GSE’s real pur-
chase activity; we quantify the impact of such adjustments as the difference be-
tween annualized purchase volumes immediately preceding the policy change
and the home price index-adjusted purchase volume of the benchmark year
being restored. For example, the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974 raised the conforming loan limit for conventional mortgages eligible
for purchase by Fannie and Freddie from $33,000 to $55,000. The accompany-
ing House committee report stated that raising FNMA’s loan limit to $55,0000
“would permit FNMA to serve much the same housing market in terms of constant
dollars as it was authorized to serve when the Emergency Home Finance Act was en-
acted [in July 1970]” (House Committee on Banking and Currency (1974), p.
29). Pursuant to House and Senate committee report language, we assume that
the change would restore FNMA’s real purchasing power relative to purchase
volumes around enactment of the Emergency Home Finance Act in July 1970
and the last FHA Section 203(b) loan limit increase in December 1969.12 The
$5.93 billion average net purchase volume over 1969Q4 through 1970Q3 would
have translated to $7.91 billion at the end of June 1974, adjusted for the 33.3%
increase in OFHEO’s seasonally adjusted Constant-Quality House Price Index
for new homes sold over 1970Q3 and 1974Q2. We use four-quarter rolling aver-
ages to smooth out any residual seasonality and other idiosyncratic sources of
volatility. Relative to the $6.77 billion average net purchase volume over 1973Q3
and 1974Q2, the year before enactment of the Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act of 1974, this represents an increase of $1.14 billion, which we assign
as the projected impact of the policy change on Fannie’s purchase capacity for
12The standing $33,000 limit was based on the Section 203(b) loan limit for FHA-insured mort-
gages.
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the year starting August 1974.
For other policies that are inherently harder to quantify, such as authoriza-
tions for program expansions into new mortgage market segments, we search
for ex ante estimates of projected impacts on purchasing activity from commit-
tee reports, market analysts, regulators, or agency executives. The impacts of
such policies largely depend on the size of the relevant market segment being
entered and, in many cases, how secondary market access might expand pri-
mary market issuance, rendering these policies much more difficult to quantify
back-of-the-envelope. For instance, Fannie Mae announced that it would begin
purchasing second mortgages beginning in late November 1981, shortly after
the HUD Secretary temporarily approved FNMA to purchase second lien mort-
gages and revised HUD’s regulatory definition ‘mortgage loan’ to enable such
purchases (The American Banker (11/20/1981)). While trying to secure ap-
proval, Fannie had recently estimated it could finance up to $5 billion worth
of second mortgage loans a year, or roughly one-quarter of originations (The
Washington Post (8/8/1981)), an estimate we use as the basis of our quantifica-
tion.
In trying to capture regulatory shocks to agency purchases, we do not con-
sider as significant any laws or regulations that merely extend prior authoriza-
tions or rules. For example, when Fannie was authorized to purchase second
mortgages and create a secondary market for subordinate liens in September
1981, this authority was set to expire in March 1983. In practice, this autho-
rization was renewed several times before being made permanent in 1987. We
only count the first temporary authorization as a significant policy change. Sim-
ilarly, we use a current policy baseline as opposed to a current law baseline for
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scoring annual funding changes, if applicable, for certain authorizations, par-
ticularly those affecting Ginnie. For example, after the GSEs’ conforming loan
limit was indexed to annual growth in a home price index in 1980, we do not
consider any related changes from indexation to be significant, as such adjust-
ments were both a continuation of current policy and easily anticipated based
on public information about the growth of home prices.
We do not treat as significant policies that would not have been expected
to impose or alleviate binding constraints on agency retained portfolio activity.
More specifically, when adjustments to leverage ratios or affordable housing
goals are viewed as non-binding by most accounts and this appears consistent
with the agencies’ balance sheet and purchase behavior, we do not consider the
policy change significant. For instance, the statutory capital requirements im-
posed on both Fannie and Freddie in 1992 had no expected impact on the bal-
ance sheet behavior of Freddie Mac, which had a much stronger capital position
than Fannie and did not appear to be the focus of regulators’ concerns; indeed
no effort to increase capitalization could be discerned for Freddie ex post, while
the opposite was true for Fannie. Authorization extensions or other policies that
may have had only an incidental impact on purchases are, however, often doc-
umented to shed light on the motivation of related significant policy changes
and to present a more comprehensive narrative of the pertinent evolution of US
federal housing credit policy. Similarly, we take note of regulatory changes for
which we could not obtain credible estimates of the impact on holdings, but
exclude these from our instrument.
When estimating the quantitative aspects of policies, we rely on information
released by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Government Accountabil-
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ity Office (GAO), Treasury Department, and CRS that contain detailed analyses
of policy changes, background information, and/or balance sheet data for the
agencies in question.13 We also use information from the annual or periodic
reports of the government agencies and regulators, particularly regarding bal-
ance sheet data. We use information from appropriations bills and budget ap-
pendices for certain policies affecting Ginnie Mae. For legislative housing policy
authorizations, the accompanying reports of the US Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the US House Financial Services Commit-
tee (or their preceding committees of jurisdiction) typically include CBO cost
estimates and/or staff estimates of a bill’s impact, if applicable.14 Newspapers,
financial newswires, and mortgage industry newsletters are also used to search
for projections of policies that are difficult to quantify.
3.3.4 Timing
At the operational level, housing agencies generally sell commitments to pur-
chase mortgages from primary market lenders at a predetermined price, which
may then be exercised by the mortgagee up to an expiration date, often up to one
year. Consequently, actual agency purchases lag somewhat behind the issuance
of commitments to purchase mortgages from primary market mortgagees. The
quantified policy events are thus best thought of as news shocks about pend-
ing agency purchases and balance sheet expansions or contractions. As such,
we date each policy intervention to the month in which we determine that it
13The Government Accounting Office was renamed the Government Accountability Office in
2004.
14The House Committee on Banking and Currency and then the House Committee on Bank-
ing, Finance, and Urban Affairs preceded the House Financial Services Committee. The Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency preceded the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs.
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became publicly anticipated, rather than the month in which it was formally
announced or took effect.
Disagreements over provisions in House and Senate versions of a bill,
wholesale amendments in the conference process, and uncertainty about bills
stalling out entirely makes it harder to characterize expectations about pending
legislative policy changes than regulatory changes.15 A policy proposal aris-
ing from a single chamber does not seem likely enough to be enacted to be
actionable news, and relevant housing credit policy provisions are often mate-
rially changed in conference committee. As such, legislative changes are dated
to the provision containing the policy change of interest being agreed upon by
both the House and Senate—often a conference committee’s negotiation of a
compromise bill—rather than upon first proposal by one chamber or the bill’s
subsequent enactment. Enactment usually follows within a week or so of both
chambers agreeing to a conference report, if necessary.
For regulatory changes, we typically use the month in which final rules were
first reported in the press or published in the Federal Register, as opposed to the
date of the final rule’s effect. But regulations are often backdated to a proposed
rule first being published in Federal Register, if materially similar to the final
rule. When new legislation serves as the impetus for a discretionary regulatory
change, say by the HUD Secretary, as opposed to directly changing policy itself,
we date the timing of the policy change to the first announcement of the per-
tinent regulatory change. If applicable, policies are dated when leaked to the
press ahead of formal announcement, or when agencies are found to be demon-
15If the House and Senate are in disagreement about legislation, one chamber can reject the
other chamber’s amended legislation and request forming a conference committee to negotiate
a bill acceptable to both chambers. Conference committees are usually comprised of senior
committee members from the bill’s committees of jurisdiction.
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strably getting ahead of the curve of pending policy changes they view as both
anticipated and actionable.
For Fannie and Freddie, we also cross-reference announcements about pol-
icy events with excess stock returns, measured relative to daily changes in the
S&P 500, when available, as well as financial newspapers and newswires to help
verify the timing of policy changes, specifically whether news about the policy
was being priced in to shares. The underlying idea is that portfolio purchases,
for a variety of reasons including implicit government guarantees as well as tax
and regulatory advantages, are profitable for Fannie and Freddie, and thus loos-
ening regulatory balance sheet restrictions should influence their stock returns
relative to the market at large (see Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2017)).
The ProQuest Congressional Publications Database, HeinOnline’s Federal
Register Library, CQ Almanac, and newspapers and newsletters are the primary
sources used for documenting pertinent news surrounding policy changes, as
well as subsequent implementation dates. Factiva, LexisNexis Academic, Pro-
Quest Historical Newspapers, and Gale Business Insights: Essentials are the
principal sources used in searching for pertinent information from newspapers
and newswires, particularly from The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times,
The Washington Post, Financial Times, American Banker, National Mortgage News,
Dow Jones Newswires, and The Bond Buyer. These sources are also often used for
classifying policy’s underlying motivations, discussed below.
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3.3.5 Classification by Motivation
The aim behind classifying the policy changes is to distinguish between regu-
latory actions that were prompted by concerns about the prevailing business
cycle, credit cycle, or the housing and mortgage markets in particular, versus
those motivated by unrelated concerns. As an instrumental variable for agency
purchase activity, the intent is to restrict usage to policy events deemed orthogo-
nal to cyclical concerns, omitting those displaying some degree of endogenous,
economically driven policy response. There is a systematic, counter-cyclical re-
sponse of US federal housing credit policy to economic downturns and credit
crunches, as extensively documented in Section 3.4, so such an exclusion is im-
portant for addressing reverse causality between credit aggregates and agency
purchases. Our classification is primarily based on identifying stated or per-
ceived motivations underlying each policy intervention, but as discussed below,
the related political process and economic circumstances are often also quite in-
formative. In classifying policies’ overarching motivations, we parse historical
documents, paying particular attention to the rationales invoked by policymak-
ers and the press, the nature of the legislative vehicles or regulatory processes,
the relation to known periods of economic and financial stress, and the time
horizon of policy objectives.
The principal data sources used in identifying policy motives include Con-
gressional committee reports and hearings, Presidential speeches, the Budget
of the United States Government, Economic Report of the President, Federal Reserve
Bulletin, Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, CQ Al-
manac, and newspapers, financial newswires, and mortgage industry newslet-
ters. For legislative housing policy authorizations, the accompanying reports
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of the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and US
House Financial Services Committee (or their preceding committees of jurisdic-
tion) typically detail the committees’ motivations and any pertinent economic
context. These reports also often include additional views or dissenting opin-
ions by Committee members, providing a range of perspectives. Major housing
policy laws are also usually accompanied by a Presidential signing statement
explaining the bill’s motivation, context, and intended impact.16 State of the
Union addresses and other Presidential speeches, the Budget of the United States
Government, and the Economic Report of the President often shed insight on the
motivation behind housing policies newly proposed by the White House. Bud-
get appendices and/or committee reports accompanying appropriations bills
usually explain the impetus for certain policy changes affecting Ginnie Mae.
Final rules published in the Federal Register almost always include a detailed
background and history of the rule, shedding light on regulators’ motives for
policy changes.
Policies classified as principally cyclically motivated tend to emphasize
short-term outcomes, such as boosting housing starts in a recession. Legisla-
tive vehicles for such policy changes also tend to be quickly drafted and en-
acted, with a relatively concise legislative history and narrow focus. Policy-
makers are typically quite explicit about cyclical concerns and objectives, over-
whelmingly so when policies are implemented in close proximity to recessions
or credit crunches. Policies enacted during or near a recession or credit crunch
are extensively scrutinized and held to a particularly high bar for being clas-
sified as unrelated to the business cycle, but are not categorically classified as
16Presidential speeches and signing statements are publicly available online from The Ameri-
can Presidency Project (www.presidency.ucsb.edu), a collaboration of John T. Woolley and Ger-
hard Peters.
184
cyclically motivated, and on the rare occasion are instead classified as non-
cyclically motivated. When analyzing committee reports, signing statements,
and the like, examples of language we tend to interpret as strongly indicative of
cyclical concerns include, but are in no way limited to, “emergency, crisis, reces-
sion, credit shortage, credit crunch, housing starts, employment, construction, down-
turn, depressed, stimulus, boost,” although such terms must be evaluated within
the context of surrounding phrases. When inferring motives from policymak-
ers’ quotes or other primary sources in Section 3.4, such particularly informa-
tive language is typically emphasized in boldface, within broader quotations,
for transparency about our interpretation and relevant context.
Conversely, policies principally motivated by social policy, budgetary, or
other more ideological political objectives are classified as unrelated to the busi-
ness or financial cycle—provided the narrative record is not also suggestive of
significant short-term economic or financial concerns. Political rather than eco-
nomic context shapes the development of these non-cyclically motivated policy
changes, such as an administration’s emphasis on expanding affordable home-
ownership opportunities to lower-income households, concerns regarding the
structural budget deficit, or ideological hostility toward the GSEs motivating
moves toward full privatization. Legislative policies classified as non-cyclically
motivated emphasize longer-term outcomes, such as boosting homeownership
rates. Legislative vehicles for such policy changes tend to be slower-moving
bills, particularly deliberate overhauls of housing policy with a lengthy legisla-
tive history; the National Housing Acts, Housing and Urban Development Acts,
and Housing and Community Development Acts of various years tend to meet
this description, being slowly crafted and negotiated between the House, Sen-
ate, and White House, and focusing on broad, long-term objectives for housing
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policy, such as urban revitalization or access to affordable housing for various
constituencies. The drafting of new regulatory rules set in motion by such bills
also tend to be classified as unrelated to cyclical concerns, such as HUD set-
ting new affordable housing goals for the GSEs. More broadly, interventions
classified as non-cyclically motivated tend to be actions shaped by prior law
or prompted by events fundamentally unrelated to the business or credit cy-
cle, such as the accounting scandals that surfaced at Freddie and then Fannie
in 2003–2004. Examples of language we generally take as indicative of such
non-cyclical motives include “long-term, farsighted, comprehensive, low-income, af-
fordable housing, American Dream, homeownership, budget deficit, reduce borrowing,
off-budget, privatize,” again with the caveat regarding the importance of context.
Based on our reading of the historical record, we simply classify all signifi-
cant policy changes as either cyclically motivated or non-cyclically motivated,
as this binary classification is relatively straightforward and a more precise dis-
tinction between non-cyclical objectives is not particularly relevant. The non-
cyclical classification spans policy changes with social policy concerns, struc-
tural budgetary motives, and more ideological political pursuits; it is often
harder to establish a single precise rationale for these non-cyclical actions, in
part because these policy changes unrelated to the business cycle tend to be en-
acted in deliberate and comprehensive bills frequently characterized by much
deliberation and compromise between the House and Senate or Congress and
the White House, often to the effect of promoting multiple non-cyclical objec-
tives. For instance, the quasi-privatization of Fannie by the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968 was largely motivated by structural budget concerns
of the Johnson administration. But while the particular timing of Fannie’s pri-
vatization was driven by budgetary concerns, privatization also fulfilled long-
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standing Congressional intent dating back to Fannie’s 1954 Charter Act. More
broadly, the Act’s stated purpose was “[t]o assist in the provision of housing for
low and moderate income families, and to extend and amend laws relating to housing
and urban development,” and the expansive bill did much to advance an array
of social policy objectives and redistributional concerns. Similarly, beyond pro-
moting access to affordable housing for minorities and lower-income families,
it has been suggested that the Bush administration pushed HUD to increase the
Enterprises’ affordable housing goals in 2004 in part “to make sure Fannie and
Freddie understood who was the boss in the relationship” as part of a broader effort
to rein in the GSEs being coordinated with the Federal Reserve (McLean (2015),
p. 88).
3.3.6 Examples of Methodological Application and Classifica-
tion
For a better sense of our application of the methodology overviewed above,
particularly with respect to classification, below we provide concise examples
of classifying one policy of each of the four broad categories of motivations out-
lined above.
Example 1: Business or Financial Cycle Motives. Policies motivated by eco-
nomic or financial cycle concerns include those aimed at boosting housing starts
or construction employment, and smoothing mortgage credit or lowering bor-
rowing costs for would be homeowners. A clear example of a policy change mo-
tivated by both cyclical economic and financial concerns was a congressional au-
thorization for up to $7.5 billion in “emergency special assistance authority” fund-
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ing for Ginnie Mae to make subsidized purchases of conventional mortgages,
one prong of the Emergency Home Purchase Assistance Act of 1974 (Pub. L.
93-449). The Act authorized the HUD Secretary to instruct GNMA to make
emergency mortgage commitments and purchases “whenever the Secretary finds
inflationary conditions and related governmental actions are having a severely
disproportionate effect on the housing industry and the resulting reduction in the
volume of home construction or acquisition threatens seriously to affect the
economy and to delay the orderly achievement of the national housing goals...” (Sec.
3(a)). The bill was drafted and passed in a remarkably short time frame dur-
ing the recession lasting from November 1973 through March 1975, moving
from introduction in Senate committee on September 10, 1974 to being enacted
on October 18; President Ford explicitly thanked “Congress for responding so
quickly” in order to “provide a shot in the arm for the housing industry” (Ford
(1974a)) when signing the bill into law. The bill was clearly enacted in response
to depressed housing market conditions, with the accompanying Senate Com-
mittee report stating that the bill “responds to a mortgage credit crisis which has
crippled the residential real estate industry in the United States. Housing activity in
the Nation is severely depressed” (Senate Committee on Banking (1974a), p. 1).
We classify news of Ginnie’s new conventional mortgage purchases under this
Brooke-Cranston Tandem program authorization as having been made public
in October 1974, when the bill cleared both chambers, and when the HUD Sec-
retary released the funds immediately upon its enactment.
Example 2: Structural Budget Deficit Motives. Policies motivated by fed-
eral budget concerns are those intended to reduce public debt or those made
for improved budgetary optics, such as moving programs ‘off-budget’ to de-
crease the unified budget deficit. For instance, the privatization of Fannie’s sec-
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ondary market operations under the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968 (Pub. L. 90-448) was widely viewed as being largely motivated by the John-
son administration’s desire to reduce federal debt (FCIC (2011), p. 38). While
Congress had originally intended Fannie Mae to be chartered as a private entity,
and intended to eventually privatize Fannie when it was rechartered in 1954, the
timing of Fannie’s eventual privatization was largely driven by budgetary con-
cerns influencing the deliberative process of drafting the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968. A budgetary reform commission established in 1967
had recommended moving Fannie’s secondary market operations onto the Fed-
eral Budget as a matter of sound budgeting, but doing so would have increased
the deficit by $2.5 billion at the time, which was considered ‘untenable.’ Histori-
cal background materials accompanying hearings before the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs explained that “spinning off Fannie’s
Secondary Market Operations into a separate corporation was proposed as a means of
accomplishing the transition to private ownership, keeping Fannie Mae from show-
ing up on the Federal Budget, and retiring the outstanding preferred shares owned
by the US Treasury,” which would further reduce the deficit (Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1976a), pp. 104–105). The conversion
of secondary market operations to private ownership was estimated to reduce
US public debt by $6 billion in 1969 (The Budget for Fiscal Year 1970 Special
Analyses, p. 27), concurrent with the escalation of the Vietnam War and asso-
ciated increases in defense spending and public borrowing. Federal expendi-
tures had risen to 19.8% of GDP and the federal budget deficit had expanded
to 2.8% of GDP in fiscal year (FY) 1968, or the year ending June 30, 1968, their
highest levels since the Korean War and demobilization from World War II, re-
spectively (OMB Historical Table 1-2). In his remarks upon signing the Act,
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President Johnson hailed the bill as “the most farsighted, the most comprehen-
sive, the most massive housing program in all American history” (Johnson (1968));
his remarks made no mention of countercyclical motivations. We classify the
increase in FNMA’s debt-to-capital ratio prompted by the Act’s privatization of
Fannie as unrelated to the business or financial cycle, as privatization was moti-
vated by long-standing Congressional intent and budgetary concerns unrelated
to the business cycle, underscored by the Act being the result of a deliberative
legislative process, oriented toward long-term housing objectives, and crafted
and enacted during neither a recession nor a credit crunch.
Example 3: Social Policy Objectives. Regulatory changes intended to meet
social policy objectives include those deliberately aimed at increasing home-
ownership rates, or targeting homeownership assistance to particular demo-
graphics, such as veterans or low- and moderate-income households. For in-
stance, when HUD’s affordable housing goals for Fannie and Freddie came up
for renewal in 2004 for the first time under the George W. Bush administra-
tion, aggressive new goals were set to rise every year between 2005 and 2008.
HUD projected that to meet the new housing goals, Fannie and Freddie together
would have to purchase an additional 400,000 goal-qualifying home loans dur-
ing 2005–2008, above what they would purchase without the increase in the
housing goals, or about $61 billion of additional mortgage debt based on the
average balance of goal qualifying mortgages purchased in 2003 (HUD (2004)).
This policy change fell under a broader policy umbrella of the administration
prioritizing expanding affordable home ownership, particularly for minorities.
The President had emphasized using the GSEs to promote minority homeown-
ership in a June 2002 speech: “Too many American families, too many minorities do
not own a home. There is a home ownership gap in America. The difference between
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Anglo America and African American and Hispanic home ownership is too big... Fan-
nie May and Freddie Mac, as well as the federal home loan banks, will increase their
commitment to minority markets by more than $440 billion... This means they will
purchase more loans made by banks after Americans, Hispanics and other minorities,
which will encourage homeownership” (Bush (2002)). Similarly, in signing into law
the American Dream Downpayment Act of 2003, President Bush emphasized
that “This administration will constantly strive to promote an ownership society in
America. We want more people owning their own home. It is in our national inter-
est that more people own their own home. After all, if you own your own home, you
have a vital stake in the future of our country” (Bush (2003)). The increased goals
were clearly motivated by the administration’s broader social policy objective
of expanding affordable housing and minority homeownership. McLean (2015)
also suggested that the Bush administration pushed HUD to increase the Enter-
prises’ affordable housing goals in 2004 in part “to make sure Fannie and Freddie
understood who was the boss in the relationship” as part of a broader effort to rein
in the GSEs being coordinated with the Federal Reserve (McLean (2015), p. 88).
We classify this increase in the GSEs’ affordable housing goals as non-cyclically
motivated.
Example 4: Ideological Political Preferences. Policies that are predominantly
politically motivated for reasons unrelated to social policy include efforts to
shrink and eventually privatize the GSEs—periodically prioritized by Republi-
can administrations—or regulatory backlashes to public scandals or crises. For
instance, in the political backlash to Fannie Mae’s accounting scandals in the
early 2000s, regulators capped Fannie’s portfolio and forced it to achieve a 30%
capital surplus above statuary minimum capital requirements after ruling that
Fannie had misapplied accounting rules; in conjunction with a restatement of
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earnings, OFEHO’s regulatory reprisal required that Fannie Mae abruptly close
a $12.5 billion hole in its capital base, which would require a significant reduc-
tion in Fannie’s retained portfolio. The George W. Bush administration, which,
along with the Greenspan Fed, wanted the GSEs downsized and eventually pri-
vatized, was perceived as exploiting the scandal to rein in Fannie, and later
Freddie as well (McLean (2015), pp. 85–86, Greenspan (2007), p. 242). Senator
Chuck Schumer, for instance, claimed that “there are a whole lot of people who want
to take advantage of the auditing problems that Fannie and Freddie have done to take the
whole thing down” (Dow Jones Capital Markets Report (5/23/2006)). Ex post,
the accounting scandal and regulatory backlash appear somewhat overblown
and perhaps politically exploited to an even greeter degree. The eventual re-
statement of Fannie’s results for 2002–2004 actually resulted in an increase of
shareholder’s equity of $4.1 billion, the SEC and Justice Departments both even-
tually dropped their investigations into Fannie’s accounting practices, and a
civil suit against ousted Fannie CEO Raines was dismissed (McLean (2015),
pp. 90–91). We classify the regulatory changes arising from FNMA’s account-
ing scandal capital shortfalls as regulatory backlash to an unforeseen event and
being motivated by longstanding political preferences, but certainly unrelated
to cyclical or financial concerns.
3.4 Narrative Analysis of Government Mortgage Purchases
This section contains the discussion of individual housing credit policy changes,
which are presented chronologically, in turn for each of the following agencies:
the Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration, Government National Mortgage Association, Federal Reserve, and US
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Treasury Department. We focus on policy changes since the Housing and Ur-
ban Development Act of 1968. The online appendix traces the history of FNMA
back to its Great Depression origins to provide broader context regarding its
charter, public mission, and the evolution and systematic nature of US federal
housing credit policy. Following Freddie Mac’s privatization in 1989, HUD was
tasked with regulatory authority over both Fannie and Freddie, and numerous
policy changes applied to both Enterprises. In these cases, the pertinent context
and details regarding quantification, timing, and classification are covered thor-
oughly in the policy’s first listing under Fannie, with minimal repetitiveness in
its listing under Freddie.
3.4.1 Federal National Mortgage Association
The Federal National Mortgage Association, established by Congress in 1938,
was authorized to buy FHA-insured mortgages with the objective of supporting
a secondary market. To that end, Congress had intended the National Housing
Act of 1934 to induce the incorporation of legally privileged private national
mortgage associations, first authorized by that bill. Congress’s repeated failure
to induce private incorporation of such associations led to the National Housing
Act Amendments of 1938, which ordered the creation of the Federal National
Mortgage Association as a wholly owned subsidiary of the RFC. FNMA was
transferred to the Federal Loan Agency in 1939, to the Department of Commerce
in 1942, and back to the Federal Loan Agency in 1945. The Housing Act of 1948
granted an explicit statutory basis for Fannie, which was also newly authorized
to deal in and support a secondary market for the new class of VA-guaranteed
mortgages. In 1950, FNMA became part of the Housing and Home Finance
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Agency.
Title II of the National Housing Act of 1954, titled the FNMA Charter Act,
rechartered a nearly bankrupted Fannie Mae into a three part corporation, sep-
arating a special assistance function, management and liquidations function,
and secondary mortgage market operations. The special assistance function
amounted to a direct government lending program for certain FHA loans that
were not generally acceptable to investors, primarily because of their low in-
terest rates. The management and liquidations function was created to dispose
of Fannie Mae’s previously amassed mortgage portfolio in an orderly fashion,
although it also continued mortgage purchases for many months because of
outstanding precommitments to purchase mortgages. Secondary market opera-
tions were to continue supporting the market for FHA/VA mortgages. The 1954
Act turned Fannie Mae into a mixed-ownership corporation by requiring au-
thorized mortgagees to purchase common stock while the federal government
retained Fannie’s preferred stock, transferred from the RFC to Treasury. The Act
also allowed Fannie to issue debt in capital markets, subject to statutory lever-
age constraints. To facilitate such issuance, the secondary market facility was
granted standby powers to borrow up to $1 billion from the Treasury Depart-
ment, which would come to be perceived as an implicit government guarantee
of Fannie’s debt. The 1954 Act envisaged an eventual full privatization of Fan-
nie Mae, but provided no timeline or mechanism for such a transition.
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 split off the secondary
market operations into a privatized Fannie Mae, while transferring the spe-
cial assistance and management and liquidations functions to a newly created
and government-retained Government National Mortgage Association (see Sec.
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3.4.3). The 1968 Act gave HUD considerable regulatory authority over Fannie
Mae, including the authority to require that it devote a reasonable portion of its
mortgage purchases to support low- and moderate-income housing. The Act
also preserved Fannie’s ability to borrow from the Treasury, which reduced the
perceived riskiness of its debt. Following the 1969 credit crunch, the Emergency
Home Finance Act 1970 allowed Fannie Mae to expand its activities to the con-
ventional mortgage market, subject to loan limits comparable to those applying
to FHA mortgages and conditional on the approval of the HUD Secretary. The
same Act also established the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company (see Sec.
3.4.2), intended as a counterpart to Fannie, but supporting a secondary mort-
gage market for conventional mortgages originated by the thrift industry.
In the aftermath of the S&L crisis, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) expanded the objectives of Fannie’s
secondary mortgage market operations to promote homeownership for low-
and moderate-income borrowers. The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial
Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (FHEFSSA) created OFHEO, a new regula-
tory agency within HUD charged with the safety and soundness supervision
of Fannie and Freddie. FHEFSSA also established statutory minimal capital re-
quirements, instructed OFHEO to develop additional risk-based capital require-
ments, and mandated that HUD set and enforce affordable housing goals. Ac-
counting scandals in the early 2000s prompted greater oversight, as well as the
imposition of capital surcharges and portfolio caps. The Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 abolished the OFHEO along with the Federal Housing
Finance Board (FHFB), the regulator of the FHLBanks at the time, and consoli-
dated regulatory authority in the newly formed FHFA. The Act also authorized
Treasury to purchase securities issued by Fannie or Freddie. In September 2008,
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both Enterprises were placed under the conservatorship of the FHFA and Trea-
sury, and were ordered to first increase then gradually reduce their retained
mortgage portfolios. Shortly thereafter, the Treasury Department and Federal
Reserve began large-scale asset purchases of agency MBS and agency debt.
In this section we discuss significant policy events affecting Fannie Mae and
related context, starting with the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.
In the accompanying online appendix, we discuss Fannie’s early evolution and
important preceding policy events, starting with the National Housing Act of
1934.
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (Pub. L. 90-448)
Enacted: August 1, 1968
Policy Change: Increased Debt-to-Capital Ratio
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$1.39 billion
News: Oct. 1968
Effective: Oct. 1968
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The Act split FNMA into the Government National Mortgage Association and
a quasi-private Fannie Mae, and ushered in a new era of secondary mort-
gage market purchases and mortgage securitization by government agencies
and government-sponsored enterprises. Retained as a government corporation
fully under HUD administration, Ginnie Mae assumed FNMA’s management
and liquidations and special assistance functions. Fannie Mae, a government-
sponsored private corporation, retained the secondary market operations and
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was given permission to issue MBS, which could be structured as other debt
obligations or trust certificates. The purpose of the new MBS authorization was
“[t]o provide a greater degree of liquidity to the mortgage investment market and an
additional means of financing its operations” (Sec. 803(a)). The Act also authorized
GNMA to guarantee timely payments of MBS issued by Fannie or other autho-
rized issuers, and Ginnie issued the first mortgage-backed bond in 1970 (see
GNMA, Sec. 3.4.3).
The Act required the retirement of all the Treasury’s preferred FNMA stock
and authorized issues of subordinated debt, to be included in regulatory capital,
up to twice the sum of equity capital, surplus, and retained earnings. Private
stockholders received two-thirds representation on Fannie’s board of directors,
with the remaining third to be appointed by the President, who could also re-
move any member of the board for good cause. The association was allowed
to operate nationwide in the secondary market while being exempt from SEC
disclosures and securities fees, as well as exempt from state and local income
taxes. Most significantly, the newly charted Fannie also retained standby bor-
rowing authority of up to $2.25 billion from the Treasury, and FNMA securities
joined Treasuries in privileged exemption from depository institutions’ portfo-
lio limitations (Hagerty (2012), p. 40).17
In exchange for these privileges, the HUD Secretary received general regu-
latory powers over Fannie to ensure that the purposes of the newly amended
FNMA Charter Act continued to be served. These powers included the abil-
ity to restrict dividends paid to stockholders and to increase Fannie’s permis-
sible debt-to-capital ratio beyond the statutory limit of 15 times its capital and
17The Housing Act of 1957 (Pub. L. 85-104) had increased FNMA’s standby authority to $2.25
billion (see online appendix).
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retained surplus. The HUD Secretary’s prior approval was to be required for
issuances of securities and debt obligations as well as for any changes in min-
imum stock retention requirements. The Act also gave the HUD Secretary the
authority to require that a reasonable portion of Fannie’s mortgage purchases
advanced the national policy objective of providing adequate housing for low-
and moderate-income families, provided these provide purchases provided “a
reasonable economic return” to FNMA’s stockholders. Through these various reg-
ulatory powers, Congress intended that “the Secretary would participate in the de-
cision making process as to the level of mortgage purchases at various time” (Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency (1968), p. 82). At the same time, the Act
explicitly limited HUD’s involvement in Fannie’s activities; regulatory powers
were not to extend to Fannie’s internal affairs, such as staffing, salaries, and
other usual corporate matters, unless to protect the financial interests of the fed-
eral government.
On September 30, 1968, a total of $250 million in subordinated debentures
were sold to the public to retire the Treasury’s preferred stock and share of re-
tained earnings. This issuance exceeded the amount required for retirement by
$33 million, which was added to FNMA’s capital stock (Bartke (1971), p 43).
Fannie had obtained a letter from the Treasury Secretary guaranteeing that, if
necessary, the Treasury would make loans to Fannie to ensure the timely pay-
ments of principal and interest on its debt (Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs (1976a)). Because the Treasury’s guarantee letter was a
deliberate, discretionary policy action that was not compelled by the Act, we
view this as a distinct and significant policy change. The subordinated deben-
tures were included in regulatory capital for Fannie’s debt-to-capital restriction.
On October 1, 1968, one day after the Treasury stock was retired and Fannie
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became a private corporation, the HUD Secretary increased Fannie’s debt-to-
capital limitation on secondary market facility borrowing leverage from 15 to
20 times Fannie’s regulatory capital (33 FR 14779). Based on regulatory capital
of $452.1 million at the end of calendar year 1968 (FNMA Annual Report 1969,
p. 19) and taking into account the $33.0 million capital stock addition aided by
the Treasury yields an estimated potential portfolio expansion of up to $2.79 bil-
lion ($452.1 × (20+1) - ($452.1 million - $33.0 million) × (15+1) = $2.79 billion).18
Using the two-year rule, we assign one half of that amount as an annualized
increase in Fannie’s portfolio capacity of $1.39 billion starting October 1968.
The Act amended Fannie’s statutory purpose under Section 301 of the
FNMA Charter Act to read as follows (revisions underlined):
“SEC. 301. The Congress hereby declares that the purposes of this title are to es-
tablish secondary market facilities for home mortgages, to provide that the operations
thereof shall be financed by private capital to the maximum extent feasible, and to au-
thorize such facilities to (a) provide supplementary assistance to the secondary market
for home mortgages by providing a degree of liquidity for mortgage investments, thereby
improving the distribution of investment capital available for home mortgage financing;
(b) provide special assistance (when, and to the extent that, the President has deter-
mined that it is in the public interest) for the financing of (1) selected types of home
mortgages (pending the establishment of their marketability) originated under special
housing programs designed to provide housing of acceptable standards at full economic
costs for segments of the national population which are unable to obtain adequate hous-
ing under established home financing programs, and (2) home mortgages generally as a
18It is not possible to use ex ante balance sheet data in this one particular case, as the balance
sheet of the Federal National Mortgage Association prior to enactment of the Housing and Ur-
ban Development Act of 1968 was split between Ginnie and Fannie, rendering December 1968
the earliest baseline available for the newly privatized Fannie’s regulatory capital.
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means of retarding or stopping a decline in mortgage lending and home building activ-
ities which threatens materially the stability of a high level national economy; and (c)
manage and liquidate federally owned mortgage portfolios in an orderly manner, with
a minimum of adverse effect upon the home mortgage market and minimum loss to the
Federal Government.”
Of note, the revisions to Fannie’s statutory purpose underscore Congressional
intent to sponsor multiple secondary markets and to manage multiple feder-
ally owned mortgages portfolios, as opposed the narrower scope of “the existing
mortgage portfolio of the Federal National Mortgage Association” as set by the Na-
tional Housing Act of 1954.
The privatization of Fannie’s secondary market operations is widely viewed
as being largely motivated by the administration’s desire to reduce federal debt
(FCIC (2011), p. 38). A budgetary reform commission established in 1967 had
recommended moving Fannie’s secondary market operations onto the Federal
Budget as a matter of sound budgeting, but doing so would have increased the
deficit by $2.5 billion at the time, which was viewed as ‘untenable.’ Histori-
cal background materials accompanying hearings before the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs explained that “spinning off Fannie’s
Secondary Market Operations into a separate corporation was proposed as a means of
accomplishing the transition to private ownership, keeping Fannie Mae from show-
ing up on the Federal Budget, and retiring the outstanding preferred shares owned
by the US Treasury,” which would instead reduce the deficit (Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1976a), pp. 104–105). The conversion
to complete private ownership reduced Federal debt by about $6 billion (The
Budget for Fiscal Year 1970 Special Analyses, p. 27). The escalation of the Viet-
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nam War, in conjunction with the Great Society expansions of social insurance,
were adding to concerns about the budgetary outlook. The HUD Secretary also
underscored that the transfer of FNMA’s secondary market operations to en-
tirely private ownership fulfilled the intent of Congress when it had rechartered
FNMA in 1954 (Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (1968)), but the
timing of the transition appears to be explained by budgetary motives.19
The accompanying committee report also underscored that the Act was the
result of a multi-year deliberative process seeking to address longer-term home-
ownership goals unrelated to stabilization. The report framed the bill as in-
tended to meet the President’s proposed “program of Federal assistance for the con-
struction and rehabilitation of 6 million housing units over a 10-year period for the
low and moderate income families of this country,” which had been requested
in his State of the Union Address to Congress, delivered January 17, 1968. With
the Act, Congress established an even more aggressive new national goal of
creating 26 million new dwelling units over the next decade (Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1976a), p. 66). In his remarks
upon signing the Act, President Johnson hailed the bill as “the most farsighted,
the most comprehensive, the most massive housing program in all American history,”
framing the bill as the capstone to more than three decades of housing policy
that began with “President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s conviction that a compassionate
and farsighted government cannot ignore the plight of the ill-housed or the ill-fed or the
ill-clothed” (Johnson (1968)). His remarks made no mention of countercyclical
motivations or other short-term policy objectives.
19Federal expenditures had risen to 19.8% of GDP and the federal budget deficit had ex-
panded to 2.8% of GDP in fiscal year (FY) 1968, or the year ending June 30, 1968, their highest
levels since the Korean War and demobilization from World War II, respectively (OMB Histori-
cal Table 1-2).
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The Federal Reserve Bulletin’s October 1968 overview of construction and
mortgage markets highlighted record construction volumes and strong levels of
housing starts, with demand buoyed by a two-year backlog of under-building.
The Fed further noted that disintermediation fears had eased considerably since
June (Federal Reserve Bulletin October 1968, p. 787). The Fed characterized the
Act as “extremely comprehensive” but noted that implementation of much of the
Act “will be delayed because of funding requirements and time needed to develop and
adjust to new regulations. Consequently, although the long-run implications are very
substantial, only a limited net stimulus to residential and other construction in partic-
ular to real estate markets in general may be realized from this legislation during the
current fiscal year” (Federal Reserve Bulletin October 1968, p. 789).
We classify the increase in FNMA’s debt-to-capital ratio prompted by the
Act’s privatization of Fannie as unrelated to the business or financial cycle, as
privatization was motivated by long-standing Congressional intent and bud-
getary concerns unrelated to the business cycle, underscored by the Act being
the result of a deliberative legislative process, oriented toward long-term hous-
ing objectives, and crafted and enacted during neither a recession nor a credit
crunch.20
HUD Increase of Debt-to-Capital Ratio (34 FR 19656)
Announced: December 4, 1969
20The dating of pre-1986 credit crunches is from Eckstein and Sinai (1986). The dating of post-
1986 crunches is based on Owens and Schreft (1993) for the 1990 commercial real estate crunch,
Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherlund (2008) for the 1998 Russian default/LTCM crisis, and Bordo
and Haubrich (2010) for the 2007/08 financial crisis. As Eckstein and Sinai (1986) note, reces-
sions are often led by such periods of credit shortages. Recession dates are from the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
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Policy Change: Increased Debt-to-Capital Ratio
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$1.13 billion
News: Dec. 1969
Effective: Dec. 1969
Classification: Cyclical
Policy Change: Treasury-Guaranteed Capitalization
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$2.6 billion
News: Apr. 1970
Effective: Apr. 1970
Classification: Cyclical
On December 4, 1969, HUD Secretary George Romney, recently appointed
by the incoming Nixon administration, again increased Fannie’s permissible
debt-to-capital ratio for secondary market operations from 20 to 25 times its
regulatory capital, effective December 8, 1969 (34 FR 19656). Using regulatory
capital of $452.1 million at the end of calendar year 1968 (FNMA Annual Re-
port 1969, p. 19) yields an estimated portfolio expansion of up to $2.26 billion
($452.1 million × (25 - 20) = $2.26 billion). Using the two-year rule, we assign
an annualized increase in FNMA’s purchase capacity of $1.13 billion starting in
December 1969, when the leverage change was first announced.
The move took place as the Nixon administration sought to ‘get control’ of
Fannie during its transition to private ownership by sacking and eventually
ousting Fannie’s President, Raymond Lapin—a Democrat and Johnson admin-
istration appointee supposedly uncooperative with Romney and the Republi-
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can White House. Lapin publicly fought and legally challenged his removal
without cause, but eventually conceded (Hagerty (2012)), pp. 43–45). This par-
tisan power struggle during Fannie’s transition suggested that FNMA was not
as independent as the 1968 Act had intended, and presaged that FNMA would
remain a political football in the coming decades.
On April 1, 1970, Fannie sold another $200 million in subordinated deben-
tures with an accompanying Treasury letter—again guaranteeing timely repay-
ment with a Treasury backstop—allowing a further portfolio expansion of up to
$5.2 billion ($200 million × (25+1) = $5.2 billion). Because the Treasury’s guaran-
tee letter was a deliberate, discretionary policy action and unrelated to the HUD
Act of 1968, we view this as a distinct and significant policy change. Moreover,
Fannie was still in the midst of transitioning between a publicly owned and
shareholder owned enterprise. Using the two-year rule, we assign an annual-
ized increase in FNMA’s purchase capacity of $2.6 billion starting in April 1970.
The transitional period towards private ownership officially ended on May
21, 1970, when the HUD Secretary signed a proclamation converting Fannie
from a government agency to a private corporation. On August 31, FNMA
stock was traded for the first time on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
As a result of “the increasing market acceptance for FNMA’s subordinated debt,” no
Treasury letter was requested for subsequent issues, and no explicit government
guarantee was volunteered (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs (1976a), p. 232).
The economic environment had shifted markedly between the HUD Sec-
retaries’ first and second increase of Fannie’s debt-to-capital ratio during the
transition period. Hearing transcripts from the Senate Committee on Bank-
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ing, Housing, and Urban Development explicitly cited that the second lever-
age increase was the consequence of Fannie’s portfolio growth “during a period
of tight money” (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
(1976a), p. 110). The Federal Reserve Bulletin’s July 1969 overview of mortgage,
construction, and real estate markets cited that residential construction activity
had been declining since January, also noting “a growing dissatisfaction among
financial investors with mortgages—as with all types of fixed-income investments”
in the prevailing inflationary environment (Federal Reserve Bulletin July 1969,
p. 565). HUD’s second debt-to-capital ratio increase during Fannie’s transition
period was granted during what would later be classified as the credit crunch
persisting from 1969Q1 through 1970Q1, as dated by Eckstein and Sinai (1986).
In December 1969, the economy entered a recession lasting through November
1970. The Federal Reserve Bulletin’s March 1971 overview of mortgage, construc-
tion, and real estate markets noted that housing starts bottomed out in early
1970, after monetary policy had transitioned to accommodation, and housing
construction bottomed out in July (Federal Reserve Bulletin March 1971, p.
167). Consequently, we classify both these transition-support policy changes
as cyclically motivated.
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969 (Pub. L. 91-152)
Enacted: December 24, 1969
The Act extended various authorizations from the Housing and Urban De-
velopment Act of 1968 by one- to- two-years. Most pressingly, authorization of
the FHA’s mortgage insurance program had been set to expire on October 1,
1969, and a temporary extension had to be authorized while work on the Act
was completed (Pub. L. 91-78, enacted September 30, 1969). The Act increased
205
FHA mortgage insurance loan limits by 10%, raising the limit on Section 203(b)
mortgages—and hence FNMA’s loan limit for secondary market purchases—
from $30,000 to $33,000.21 The Senate version of the bill would have increased
the FHA loan limits by $2,500 while also indexing loan limits to the annual
change in the average sales price of new homes, but the conference committee
adopted the House’s approach of a one-off percentage increase. In conjunction
with the bill’s enactment, the Federal Housing Commissioner issued a rule on
December 24 increasing the FHA loan limit, along with other adjustments to
FHA programs (35 FR 284).
Insufficient references and documented estimates could be found in the his-
torical record to reliably quantify a projected impact of this loan limit increase,
so this policy change is not considered significant. If it could be quantified, how-
ever, it would be classified as cyclically motivated. Cyclical concerns had been
flagged as Congress began working on the bill in July 1969, and the final bill
was enacted in the midst of the 1969 credit crunch. When pressed by members
of the House Committee on Banking and Currency Subcommittee on Housing
about falling housing starts, Secretary Romney had warned in July 1969 testi-
mony that “We are experiencing a credit crunch that certainly in terms of interest
rates and tightness of money exceeds that of 1966” (House Committee on Banking
and Currency (1969a), p. 7). The Annual Report of the Federal Reserve for 1969
noted that liquidity pressures had markedly intensified for thrifts in the latter
half of the year, and that FNMA and the FHLBB were trying to “channel a large
volume of funds into housing finance” (Annual Report of the Federal Reserve for
1969, p. 6).
21On February 3, 1967, Fannie had established that it would purchase mortgage loans of up
to the FHA’s Section 203(b) loan limit, reversing an earlier policy intended to conserve cash. See
the online appendix.
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Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-351)
Enacted: July 24, 1970
Policy Change: Conforming Mortgage Program Approval
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$0.4 billion
News: Nov. 1971
Effective: Oct. 1968
Classification: Feb. 1972
Unprecedented volumes of housing subsidies for low-income families pro-
vided by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, as well as Fannie’s
rapidly expanding support of the FHA/VA market in 1968 and 1969, gave rise
to concerns that middle income families were being neglected by federal hous-
ing policy (HUD (1987), pp. 29–30). According to a Treasury Department re-
port, Congress was also seeking to more efficiently resolve chronic regional mis-
matches between savings deposits and the demand for mortgage credit (Trea-
sury (1990), p. B-1). Among other concerns motivating calls for renewed hous-
ing finance reform, Bartke (1972) cited the declining share of national resources
invested in housing, the fact that the housing sector had consistently borne the
brunt of tight money policies, and views that the burdens of monetary policies
should be shared more equitably.
Legislation was introduced in Congress in September 1969 that would,
among other things, permit Fannie to expand into the conventional mortgage
market, conditional on the HUD Secretary’s approval. The bill additionally
proposed establishing a new GSE to provide secondary market support for the
S&L industry. The Federal Reserve expressed strong reservations to Congress
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expanding secondary mortgage market operations, but the Emergency Home
Finance Act of 1970 was nonetheless enacted on July 24, 1970, its passage aided
by robust support from segments of the housing and mortgage industries. The
enacted bill created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation to support a
secondary market for conventional loans originated by the S&Ls (see FHLMC,
Sec. 3.4.2), and also extended Fannie’s purchase authority to include the con-
ventional market, again subject to the HUD Secretary’s approval. The Act also
authorized HUD to make certain interest-subsidy payments to Fannie for mort-
gages purchases during periods of high mortgage rates, and provided Ginnie
with increased special assistance purchase authority (see GNMA, Sec. 3.4.3).
Fannie’s purchases of conventional loans would initially be statutorily lim-
ited to mortgages ‘conforming’ to a number of underwriting standards. LTVs
were not to exceed 75% unless the seller (1) retained a 10% participation, (2)
agreed to repurchase the loan in case of default within three years, or (3) the
amount of the loan in excess of 75% was privately guaranteed or insured. Con-
forming mortgage amounts could not exceed limits under the FHA Section
203(b) program, currently set at $33,000 as of December 24, 1969 (see above).
The conforming loan limits were intended to avoid diversion of scarce credit
from housing production for low- and moderate-income households.22
The stated purpose of the conventional mortgage program was not only to
pump a modest amount of additional funds into housing, but also to eventually
popularize a more standardized and marketable conventional mortgage instru-
ment. An accompanying committee report stressed that expansion into the con-
ventional mortgage market was not intended to compromise Fannie’s primary
22Conventional mortgages with loan values exceeding the conforming loan limit are termed
‘jumbo’ mortgages.
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role supporting a secondary mortgage market for FHA/VA mortgages, noting
“the committee has been assured that FNMA will take whatever action is appropriate
to prevent its expansion into the conventional field from jeopardizing the soundness of
its credit or from adversely affecting its traditional role in buying and selling FHA and
VA mortgages. The committee wants to remind FNMA that it was set up primarily for
FHA and VA mortgages and that conventional mortgage purchasing should in no way
diminish its support of the FHA and VA market” (Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency (1970), p. 7). Contrary to Congressional intent, Fannie’s purchases of
conventional mortgages would quickly surpass those of FHA/VA mortgages in
1976 (HUD (1983)).
On December 3, 1970, Fannie announced tentative details of its pending new
conventional program, stating that it aimed to purchase between $300 and $500
million of conventional loans in 1971 (The Wall Street Journal (12/3/70)). Con-
ventional mortgages for single-family owner-occupied houses were to be pur-
chased via a free market system auction, similar to its purchases of FHA/VA
mortgages. Noting that its tentative plan was already being postponed one
month because of a rights issue, Fannie stated that it hoped to enter the mar-
ket by February 1971, conditional on approval from the HUD Secretary, which
the agency hoped to secure by January 1, 1971. Preliminary program approval
to buy conventional mortgages was granted in a letter from the HUD Secretary
to Fannie’s president on January 25, 1971. The final authorization and imple-
mentation of the program was, however, significantly delayed because of the
difficulties involved with drafting uniform mortgage contracts and other instru-
ments needed for packaging loans from across the United States, and there was
considerable uncertainty about when the program would launch. Fannie and
Freddie had struggled for months to negotiate uniform contracts, and eventu-
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ally failed to reach compromise over prepayment options; Fannie’s proposed
contracts, published in November, would have allowed prepayment without
penalty and allowed the buyer of an existing home to assume the previous
owner’s mortgage; on the insistence of the thrifts, Freddie’s contracts included
prepayment penalties and non-assumption provisions (The Wall Street Journal
(12/16/71)). Consumer and civil rights groups—strongly favoring penalty free
prepayment options—had also slowed the development of contracts, and un-
der pressure, Fannie revised its conventional mortgage guidelines in late 1971.
On November 15, 1971, it was announced that HUD Secretary Romney had
approved Fannie’s standardized mortgage forms, clearing the final major reg-
ulatory hurdle ahead of launching conventional secondary market operations
(The Wall Street Journal (11/15/71)).
In a news conference on December 15, 1971, Fannie announced the first auc-
tion involving conventional mortgages on single-family homes, to take place
in February 1972 (The Wall Street Journal (12/16/71)). The first conventional
single-family mortgage purchase was made on February 15, 1972. In May 1971,
Fannie Mae President Oakley Hunter had projected that conventional mortgage
purchases would initially not exceed $400 million per year (Hunter (1971) p.
834), which was consistent with the prior target range of $300 million to $500
million for the first year of operation. We assign that estimate of an annualized
$400 million for the year starting November 1971, upon Secretary Romney’s
approval of the consequential standardized mortgage contracts, as the initial
impact upon Fannie’s portfolio from program expansion into the conventional
market. In practice, Fannie purchased conventional mortgages totaling $55 mil-
lion in 1972, $939 million in 1973 and $1.129 billion in 1974 (FNMA Annual
Report 1975, p. 14).
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The Act opening the doors for Fannie to enter the conventional market
was passed in the midst of the recession lasting from December 1969 through
November 1970, but unlike certain other provisions, Fannie’s new authorization
was not representative of the Act’s title. The accompanying Senate committee
report characterized the Act as “designed to encourage and expedite the construction
and financing of a substantial number of new and existing homes. Primary empha-
sis is placed on the expansion of existing mortgage credit facilities and the creation of
new secondary market facilities to broaden the availability of mortgage credit”
(Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (1970), p. 2). That report’s gen-
eral statement opened with economic concerns and countercyclical motivations:
“It is obvious to the committee that economic conditions in this Nation are approaching
a critical level, and that immediate action is necessary if we are to avoid a further
drop in the economy and possibly a serious recession by the end of the year... Unfor-
tunately, the policies currently being used by the administration to fight inflation are
having an extremely disastrous effect on housing” (Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency (1970), p. 1). The subsequent House committee report accompa-
nying that chamber’s bill, on the other hand, acknowledged varying short-run
cyclical concerns and longer-run policy objectives behind the expansions of sec-
ondary mortgage market operations: “The home buying public, the mortgage lend-
ing institutions, and the homebuilding industry are confronted with the highest interest
rates in a century and an extreme scarcity of mortgage credit.... While this bill is an at-
tempt to alleviate the immediate crisis, the committee will continue to work toward a
solution to provide serious and long-term changes to provide new sources of funds
for mortgage credit” (House Committee on Banking and Currency (1970), pp.
4–5).23
23The House report included the following estimate of the disproportionate impact of mone-
tary tightening on housing: “One member of the Federal Reserve Board has calculated that, whereas the
home construction industry accounts for approximately 3 percent of the gross national product, 70 per-
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Contrary to these nods to near-term stabilization, House Committee on
Banking and Currency Chairman Wright Patman lambasted that the only pro-
vision to improve the near-term housing outlook was the appropriation of $250
million to the FHLBanks for a mortgage interest rate subsidy, stating that the
bill “may contain some useful sections, but it nevertheless completely fails to provide
a meaningful response to the Nation’s housing crisis... The bill, in its present form,
does not add one dollar to the country’s pool of mortgage funds and because of this it is
an Emergency Home Finance Act in name only. The real effect of the bill in its
present form is to appropriate more money to subsidize high interest rates on
loans made from a pool of mortgage funds that is now and will continue to be entirely
inadequate to meet the Nation’s housing needs” (House Committee on Banking and
Currency (1970), p. 16).
In his statement upon enacting the law, President Nixon emphasized the
legislation as intended to “alleviate the Nation’s critical housing shortage,” both to
meet “growing demand for housing but also to make up the large housing deficit which
has accumulated over the past 4 years, and to permit people to move from the many sub-
standard housing units which are now in existence” (Nixon (1970)). The statement
noted that “housing production is still substantially below desirable levels,” but the
emphasis was on permanently increasing the housing stock to meet demand,
not increasing home production to stabilize the economy.
Moreover, the House report explicitly characterized the authorization for
FNMA to enter conventional mortgage secondary market operations as fore-
word looking, acknowledging that it would take too long to implement to al-
leviate the current credit crunch and hasty action would be imprudent: “If,
cent of the impact of a tight-money policy falls on the home construction industry” (House Committee
on Banking and Currency (1970), pp. 11–12).
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as seems likely, the current money market situation should continue for some time,
FNMA should not implement this authority immediately. A great deal of spade-
work should be done in the way of establishing an appraisal system, drafting uniform
mortgage documents and making other preparations before FNMA could engage in the
buying and selling of conventional mortgages to any significant degree. The time to
begin these undertakings is now, so that FNMA will be ready to begin encouraging
and supplementing a market for conventional mortgages when the pressure on
the FHA and VA market has eased” (House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency (1970), p. 7). The Senate report contained nearly identical language (Sen-
ate Committee on Banking and Currency (1970), p. 7). And as noted above,
Fannie’s final authorization by the HUD Secretary and subsequent first conven-
tional mortgage purchases both took place more than a year after the recession
of December 1969 to November 1970 had ended, following a long, deliberative
process of drafting mortgage contracts.
While short-term provisions for targeted mortgage purchases by Ginnie Mae
and interest rate subsidies through the FHLBanks were intended to take effect
during the recession and were clearly cyclically motivated, we take exception in
classifying FNMA’s conventional market program approval and subsequent ex-
pansion into that market as unrelated to the business and financial cycle, given
its stated longer-term objective and intended delay in implementation (see also
listings under FHLMC, Sec. 3.4.2, and GNMA, Sec. 3.4.3). The Act’s overhaul
of US secondary market operations was principally intended to improve the ef-
ficiency of mortgage markets by spreading credit from regions with excess sav-
ings to markets with high credit demand, and to improve the efficiency of sec-
ondary mortgage markets by standardizing contracts across the countries, nei-
ther of which was understood to be capable of ameliorating the housing credit
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shortage prevailing at the time of the bill’s enactment.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-383)
Enacted: August 22, 1974
Policy Change: Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$1.14 billion
News: Aug. 1974
Effective: Aug. 1974
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The Act decoupled the limit on the outstanding balance of a conventional
mortgage eligible for purchase by Fannie and Freddie from the FHA Section
203(b) mortgage insurance limit, and instead tied it to the Section 5(c) limit for
mortgages originated by insured S&L associations. Prior to the bill’s enactment,
the Section 5(c) limit was set at $45,000, above the $33,000 Section 203(b) limit
currently limiting Fannie’s purchases. The reason for the change had more to
do with Freddie than with Fannie (HUD (1987)). As the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs report explained, it was “not realistic
to permit savings and loans to originate $45,000 mortgages and to restrict [Freddie]
to the purchase of mortgages with a maximum principal mortgage tied to a varying
FHA limit” (Senate Committee on Banking (1974b), p. 85). The change for
Fannie apparently followed in order to roughly maintain parity between both
GSEs (HUD (1987), p. 35). Adopted from the House bill, the Act also raised
the FHA 203(b) limit to $45,000 and the S&Ls Section 5(c) limit to $55,000, with
up to an additional 50% for dwellings in Alaska, Guam, and Hawaii. Hence
the Act raised the conforming loan limit for conventional mortgages by 66.67%,
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from $33,000 to $55,000. The conforming loan limit changes were effective upon
enactment.
The House committee report stated that raising FNMA’s loan limit from
$33,000 to $55,0000 “would permit FNMA to serve much the same housing market
in terms of constant dollars as it was authorized to serve when the Emergency Home
Finance Act was enacted [in July 1970]” (House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency (1974), p. 29). The increase in the 5(c) limit was intended to “help adjust the
limit in line with the substantial increases that have occurred in recent years in the cost
and value of single-family homes, particularly in the nation’s high-cost areas” (House
Committee on Banking and Currency (1974), p. 43). The Senate committee re-
port noted that “single-family housing costs have increased between 20 and 25 percent
since late 1969 when the FHA section 203 (b) limit was last set” (Senate Committee
on Banking (1974b), p. 86). That report also noted that “of the new homes built
for sale today, 35% are now priced at $35,000 or over; 22% are priced at $40,000 or
over. A recent study indicates that 25% of the sales of existing single-family homes in
the second quarter of 1973 were over $40,000; 46.6% were over $30,000.”
The Act also increased the limit on the Enterprises’ holdings of conventional
mortgages originated more than one year prior to purchase, from 10% to 20% of
their aggregate portfolio. Other eligibility restrictions were relaxed and the LTV
restriction for conventional mortgage purchases was lifted from 75% to 80% of
the value of the property securing the mortgage, unless the seller (1) retained a
participation of at least 20% (up from 10%), (2) the seller agreed to repurchase
the mortgage on demand, or (3) the excess over 80% was privately guaranteed
or insured. The portfolio and LTV relaxations were deemed necessary in light
of housing cost increases since the 1960s.
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To quantify the impact of the increase in FNMA’s conforming loan limit, we
assume, pursuant to the House and Senate committee report language, that the
change would have restored FNMA’s real purchasing power relative to pur-
chase volumes surrounding the December 1969 Section 203(b) increase and July
1970 enactment of the Emergency Home Finance Act. The $5.93 billion net pur-
chase volume over 1969Q4 through 1970Q3 would have translated to $7.9 bil-
lion at the end of June 1974, adjusted for the 33.3% increase in OFHEO’s sea-
sonally adjusted Constant-Quality House Price Index for new homes sold over
1970Q3 and 1974Q2.24 Relative to the $6.77 billion net purchase volume over
1973Q3 through 1974Q2, the year before enactment of the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974, this represents an increase of $1.14 billion,
which we assign to the year starting August 1974, when the conference commit-
tee resolved policy disagreements on the conforming loan limit.25 In practice,
Fannie’s retained portfolio increased $2.41 billion in the year starting in 1974Q3,
with its net purchase volume decelerating slightly to $5.09 billion for the year,
down slightly from $6.77 billion in the preceding year.
While these policy changes were enacted in the midst of the recession last-
ing from November 1973 through March 1975, there is exhaustive evidence that
the bill’s origins considerably preceded the recession, and that the timing of the
bill’s enactment predominantly reflected the breaking of a longstanding politi-
cal impasse unrelated to the business or financial cycle. The purpose of the bill
stated in its preamble was “[t]o establish a program of community development block
grants, to amend and extend laws relating to housing and urban development, and for
24We use annual volumes to smooth out seasonality and other idiosyncratic sources of volatil-
ity.
25The House bill containing the eventually enacted provisions was finalized in June 1974, but
the pertinent differences with the Senate bill’s smaller increase in the conforming loan limit was
not resolved until the August 1974 conference committee bill.
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other purposes.” The accompanying Senate committee report asserted that “the
main thrust of the proposed legislation is to consolidate and simplifying existing [hous-
ing and community development] programs,” and noted that the origins of the bill
stemmed from the administration’s proposal for program consolidation in 1970,
and subsequent failure of the House to act on a Senate-passed bill during the
92nd Congress (Senate Committee on Banking (1974b), pp. 1–3).26 Similarly,
the supplemental views of Senators Tower, Packwood, and Brock in the accom-
panying committee report emphasized that “The bill reflects the fact that major
housing and urban development legislation has been delayed many years, with
the last comprehensive bill enacted in 1968. It is a long and complex measure...”
(House Committee on Banking and Currency (1974), p. 165).
The drive to resolve the multi-year congressional political impasse and pass
a comprehensive housing bill had been amplified when the Nixon administra-
tion halted several HUD programs in January 1973, well ahead of the recession,
based on ideological opposition to the recent Great Society housing legislation;
one month later, the administration proposed entirely defunding community
development programs in its FY1974 budget request.27 While the Senate and
26The House rules committee killed the 1972 bill by refusing to grant a rule for floor consid-
eration. Underscoring the same point, the introduction and background of the bill in the House
committee report explained: “The committee bill is the product of an extensive period of hearings and
studies brought about by two acts of critical importance to Federal housing and urban development ef-
forts: first, the rejection by the House Rules Committee in late 1972 of an omnibus housing bill which
would have, in part, continued and expanded highly controversial housing subsidy programs; and second,
the suspension of these pro- grams by the President in January 1973.” There is no mention of busi-
ness or financial cycle concerns motivating the bill, but overwhelming concern with an “effort
to break the deadlock over HUD’s housing and community development programs so that the Nation can
resume its activities in these areas with broad political support” (House Committee on Banking and
Currency (1974), pp. 1–2).
27CQ Almanac offered the following summary: “On Jan. 8, 1973, the Nixon administration an-
nounced a moratorium on all new commitments for major subsidized housing and urban programs in
order to review what former HUD Secretary George Romney called ‘the entire Rube Goldberg structure’
of housing and urban development laws. The moratorium also included a temporary suspension of inter-
est subsidy programs for home ownership (section 235) and for rental and cooperative housing (section
236) under the National Housing Act. In addition, the administration’s fiscal 1974 budget request did
not include funds for community development programs, scheduled to be phased out and replaced in fiscal
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companion House bills were introduced in February 1974 and June 1974, re-
spectively, the Act was related to a myriad of stalled housing bills, as there had
been no comprehensive housing policy authorization since the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1969.28 According to CQ Almanac, the Senate ver-
sion of the bill largely resuscitated the bill killed by the rules committee in 1972,
while making additional concessions to the Nixon administration (CQ (1975a)).
Despite the Senate’s compromises, the HUD Secretary had threatened that Pres-
ident Nixon would veto the Senate draft, and the bill was only eventually en-
acted in the first month of the Ford administration, following President Nixon’s
resignation on August 9, 1974. This additional political risk and uncertainty
surrounding a veto threat further substantiate the determination that news of
the policy change was only materially made public in August 1974, concurrent
with the conference agreement, and that the timing of enactment was unrelated
to the recession.
In his statement on signing the Act, President Ford touted the legislation
as “far-reaching and perhaps historic significance, for it not only helps to boost the
long-range prospects for the housing market but also marks a complete and wel-
come reversal in the way that America tries to solve the problems of our urban com-
munities...No one expects this bill to bring substantial immediate relief to the
housing market, but over the long haul it should provide the foundations for better
housing for all Americans” (Ford (1974b)).
1975 by the President’s proposed urban community development revenue-sharing plan” (CQ (1975a)).
28Prominent related bills include the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 (91 H.R.
16643); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1971 (92 H.R. 9688); Middle and Low Income
Housing Act of 1971 (92 H.R. 1574); Community Development Assistance Act of 1971 (S. 2333);
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1972 (92 S. 3248); Community Development Assistance
Act of 1973 (S. 1744); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1973 (93 H.R. 10036); and the
Housing Act of 1973 (93 S. 2507). ProQuest Legislative Insight cites more than 80 related bills
introduced between 1969 and 1974.
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Given the bill’s multi-year, stalled development, long-term, comprehensive
focus on overhauling housing policy, and timing reflective of breaking of a long-
standing political impasse unrelated to the business cycle, we classify the bill
and conforming loan limit increase as unrelated to the business cycle.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 (Pub. L. 95-128)
Enacted: October 12, 1977
Policy Change: Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$4.82 billion
News: Oct. 1977
Effective: Oct. 1977
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The Act raised the FHA 203(b) single-family limit from $45,000 to $60,000 and
the S&Ls Section 5(c) single-family limit from $55,000 to $60,000. The Act also
increased the conforming loan limits for conventional mortgages to 125% of the
5(c) loan limit, thereby increasing Fannie’s loan limit for purchases from $55,000
to $75,000 on net. The conforming loan limit changes were again effective upon
enactment.
The committee report accompanying the House bill, which more closely re-
sembled the enacted law, explained that high rates of inflation compelled the
loan limit increases, particularly to the FHA 203(b) limit: “The most recent in-
crease to $45,000 for the section 203(b) basic homeownership program (authorized by
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974) has not been adequate to re-
store the maximum [mortgage amount] to the same relationship to the price of new
homes as prevailed in the mid-1960’s when the FHA insured 15.3 percent of the new
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home market. In fact, the current limits have resulted in the widest gap between the
maximum mortgage amounts and new home prices that has ever existed. To eliminate
the gap, the committee bill establishes a new maximum insurable amount of $60,000
for the section 203(b) program. The new limit is designed both to reflect increases in
the prices of homes and mortgage amounts since 1974 and to anticipate likely increases
for at least the near future” (House Committee on Banking (1977a), p. 16). That
report explained that increasing the 5(c) loan limit from $55,000 to $60,000, as
adopted in the enacted conference report, was viewed as consistent with in-
creasing the 203(b) loan limit from $45,000 to $60,000, and that the 25% higher
conforming loan limit for Fannie and Freddie was “necessary to adjust the limit
to the increased cost and value of single-family homes, particularly in high-cost areas”
(House Committee on Banking (1977a), pp. 21, 25).
The Senate Committee report, based on a bill that would have increased the
5(c) limit from $55,000 to $65,000 without further increasing the Enterprises’
loan limits, similarly stated that proposal was taken “in response to the substan-
tial increases in housing costs which have occurred since the ceilings were raised in
1974” (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1977), p.
32). Unlike their House counterparts, the Senate committee had deliberately re-
jected a proposal to do more for high-cost areas. The conference committee also
rejected a proposal to further increase the loan limits in high-cost areas, opting
instead “to adjust the maximum loan limit to keep pace with inflation, while preserving
these limits as meaningful ceilings” (House Committee on Banking (1977b)), but
adopted the 25% higher purchase limit for the Enterprises from the House bill.
To quantify the impact of the increase in FNMA’s conforming loan limit, we
assume, pursuant to the House and Senate committee report language, that the
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change would restore FNMA’s real purchasing power relative to purchase vol-
umes around the enactment of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974 (see above). The $7.43 billion net purchase volume over 1973Q4 through
1974Q3 would have translated to $9.98 billion at the end of September 1977, ad-
justed for the 34.3% increase in OFHEO’s seasonally adjusted Constant-Quality
House Price Index for new homes sold over 1974Q3 and 1977Q3. Relative to
the $5.16 billion net purchase volume over 1976Q4 and 1977Q3, the year be-
fore enactment of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, this
would have represented an increase of $4.82 billion, which we assign to the year
starting October 1977.29 To the extent that the enacted provisions were meant to
anticipate further near-term inflation, we view this as a conservative estimate.
In practice, Fannie’s net purchase volume more than doubled to $10.44 billion
in the year starting in 1977Q4, up $5.28 billion from the preceding year.
In his remarks upon signing the Act, President Jimmy Carter noted that
“There’s no immediate solution that can be offered” to the housing needs of older
and more distressed communities, and emphasized that the Act’s cornerstone
funding for the Community Development Block Grant would span the next
three years (Carter (1977)). There was no mention of housing starts or con-
temporaneous economic conditions, or immediate stimulus to the housing mar-
ket. Similarly, the accompanying report of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs made no mention of near-term economic or other
countercyclical motives (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs (1977)). Given the bill’s long-term and comprehensive focus on overhaul-
ing housing policy, coupled with the lack of any discernible cyclical motive, we
29As a major policy difference regarding the Enterprises’ purchase limit was resolved in con-
ference, our determination of the news of the policy change being made public is based on the
conference agreement. The Senate agreed to the conference report on October 1, 1977 and the
House agreed to the conference bill on October 4, 1977.
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classify the conforming loan limit increase as unrelated to the business cycle.
Expansion to Conventional Multifamily Mortgages
Effective: February 1, 1978
On January 20, 1978, Fannie announced that conventional mortgages on
two-to-four family houses would become eligible for purchase on February 1,
1978. Fannie Mae’s Chairman Oakley Hunter explained that “We expect that
this broadening of our conventional program should be especially helpful in urban ar-
eas, many of which have a large existing stock of two-to-four-family structures” (The
Washington Post (1/21/1978)). Because Fannie’s entry into multifamily con-
ventional mortgages does not appear to have required regulatory approval, it is
not considered a significant policy change.
1978 HUD Regulations (43 FR 36200)
Issued: August 15, 1978
At the start of the Carter administration, HUD officials and some key mem-
bers of Congress voiced concerns that Fannie had been putting too much em-
phasis on profit margins for its stockholders and was not fulfilling its public
mission of advancing national housing goals. In hearings before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on June 7, 1977, newly
appointed HUD Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris rebuked FNMA, stating that
mortgage bankers were reluctant to make urban mortgage loans because they
believed “Fannie Mae won’t buy them” (The Washington Post (6/8/1977)). She
also criticized her own department during its previous tenure under Republi-
can administrations for failing to exercise statutory authority over Fannie’s op-
erations (The Washington Post (6/8/1977)). Ire was also growing on Capital
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Hill. At a February 1978 hearing of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, Chairman William Proxmire lambasted that “FNMA’s char-
ter is entirely clear that it has public responsibilities including the support of low- and
moderate-Income housing... It is the Committee’s impression that, in the case of FNMA,
this public oversight function has been neglected by HUD, leaving this massive corpora-
tion to conduct its affairs in any manner it sees fit” (43 FR 36200). Beyond neglecting
distributional concerns, Fannie was also criticized for ignoring its role in stabi-
lizing mortgage credit across the financial cycle; since Fannie’s privatization in
1968, its portfolio had only rapidly expanded, without any significant volume
of mortgage sales despite the 1970s real estate boom-bust cycle.
On several occasions in early 1978, HUD delayed approvals of Fannie’s bor-
rowing authority—previously a routine matter—until the last moment.30 In
March 1978, HUD proposed new rules expanding regulatory powers and im-
posing tighter restrictions on Fannie, including a much more stringent approval
process for individual debt issuance and a ceiling on short-term discount notes.
After strong pushback from Fannie and the mortgage and real estate indus-
tries, HUD issued a weaker final regulation without short-term debt limits, but
nonetheless exerting greater approval authority over Fannie’s issues of obliga-
tions and securities (43 FR 36200).31 The maximum debt-to-capital ratio of 25-to-
1 was also written into the regulations. HUD established housing goals for low-
and moderate-income housing and for housing located in central cities, with
each goal set at 30% of FNMA’s total mortgage purchases (coined the ‘30/30’
goals).32 Statutory authority for such targets had been set by the Housing and
30For example, see The Washington Post (2/11/1978).
31The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-440) substantially
curtailed HUD’s approval authority over Fannie as codified by this ruling (see below).
32The new regulations also required Fannie to file an annual Business Activities Report, in
large part based on the annual reporting requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, but Fannie remained exempt from SEC filings.
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Urban Development Act of 1968, but had not previously been exercised. Fannie
objected to the mandatory credit allocations on several grounds, notably that
they ignored the FNMA Charter Act’s statutory requirement to promote a “rea-
sonable economic return” for the association. According to various reports, the
30/30 goals were never consistently monitored or enforced prior to Congress
establishing affordable housing goals in 1992, and HUD collected insufficient
mortgage data to monitor compliance with the goals (GAO (1996), p. 82). HUD
established a Fannie oversight unit after the issuance of these regulations, but it
was disbanded shortly thereafter by the incoming Reagan administration. Be-
cause the 1978 HUD regulations do not appear to have materially influenced
Fannie’s purchase activity, we do not consider them a significant policy change.
Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-153)
Enacted: December 21, 1979
The Act increased the S&L Section 5(c) mortgage loan limits from $60,000 to
$75,000. On January 3, 1980, Fannie and Freddie announced a new conform-
ing limit of 125% of this amount, or $93,750, up from $75,000 on single unit
mortgages (The Washington Post (1/4/1980)). The Act also increased the FHA
Section 203(b) loan limit for single-family homes from $60,000 to $67,750. In
explaining the increase in the FHA 203(b) limit, the committee report accompa-
nying the Senate bill noted that the median sales price of homes had jumped
roughly 30% since the loan limits had last been increased by the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1977 (see above), and that the FHA’s market
share had dropped from roughly 15% to 5% because loan limits had not kept
up with inflation or the market (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs (1979), p. 14). Regarding the 5(c) limit, the report similarly ex-
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plained that “[b]ecause home prices have escalated 20 to 25 percent in the past 2 year,
the committee believes that the $60,000 limit has become obsolete and is severely re-
stricting the ability of thrifts to meet the borrowing amounts requested by today’s home
buying public” and that increasing that limit to $75,000 was an adjustment to
“reflect inflation in home prices (and increase in mortgage size) since last amended in
1977” (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1979), p.
20).
Committee reports, however, did not cite a benchmark year for which pur-
chasing power would be restored. Assuming the Act would restore purchasing
power when limits were last adjusted in 1977 and applying the same methodol-
ogy as in quantifying the impacts of the Housing and Community Development
Acts of 1974 and 1977 (see above) implies no increase in net purchasing capacity
from the increase in loan limits.33 Hence we do not consider this a binding, sig-
nificant policy change for Fannie Mae. The Act’s loan limit increase, however,
represented a smaller relative increase for Fannie and Freddie than the prior
two increases, and the legislation did not carve out additional increases for the
Enterprises, unlike the prior legislative increase in loan limits.34
Housing and Community Development Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-399)
Enacted: October 8, 1980
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-221, enacted March 31, 1980)
eliminated the S&L Section 5(c) loan limit. Because conforming loan limits for
FNMA and FHLMC were set at 125% of the 5(c) limit, that Act also inadver-
tently eliminated loan limits for the GSEs. The Housing and Community Devel-
33Applying a comparable methodology to Fannie’s retained portfolio as opposed to purchases
also suggests the policy change was not alleviating a binding constraint.
34The Act increased conforming loan limits by 25%, versus 66.7% and 36.4%, respectively, in
the prior two increases.
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opment Act of 1980 quickly restored conforming loan limits and established a
formula for automatic annual adjustments. The limit for a mortgage on a single-
family unit was reinstated at $93,750 for 1980, unchanged from the lapsed value
based on the 5(c) loan limit, while higher limits were introduced for multifamily
units. Beginning in 1981, annual upward adjustments were to be made, effec-
tive January 1, equal to the year-to-October percentage change in the national
average single-family home price for new and existing units from the FHLBB’s
survey of major lenders. The legislative history does not identify any rationale
for the formula, which was not subject to much scrutiny before enactment; there
was no public discussion in the House or Senate committees of jurisdiction re-
garding the new limits or adjustment formula (HUD (1987) p. 37).
On December 23, 1980, Fannie and Freddie announced that, based on the
new adjustment formula, the single-family loan limit would be increased to
$98,500 on January 1, 1981. According to Dow Jones Newswire, “Fannie Mae said
it was adjusting loan amounts upwards to keep pace with rising home prices” (Dow
Jones News Service (12/23/1980)). FNMA also announced that the higher
loan limit would be applied to all conventional mortgages with at least a 5%
downpayment, whereas low downpayment loans were previously subject to a
lower $75,000 ceiling (The American Banker (12/29/1980)). The reinstatement
of the $93,750 loan limit was a continuation of current policy, and we do not
consider subsequent changes based on the home price indexation formula to be
significant policy changes, because they would have been both a continuation
of current policy and easily anticipated. As the latter action was taken adminis-
tratively by Fannie, we do not consider it a policy change.
Of particularly lasting consequence, the Act set in motion the creation of
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Fannie’s MBS program by mandating that if Fannie submitted a MBS program
for approval to the HUD Secretary or Treasury Secretary, their agency would
have to either approve said program within 90 days or transmit to Congress
a report explaining why it was rejected (CBO (1983)). Through fees for issu-
ing commitments and guaranteeing timely payment, a program packaging and
selling MBS to third parties was seen as a way to generate revenue while reduc-
ing the association’s interest rate risk—a considerable prevailing concern given
the Fed’s policy stance. As off-balance sheet obligations, MBS were also ex-
cluded from capital requirements, making them an attractive source of revenue
growth. In July 1981, Fannie announced that it would soon be launching an
MBS program, with the first securities to be on the market by year’s end. Fannie
CEO Maxwell believed the program had “the potential to attract billions of dollars
from pension funds and other investors,” and explained that the program would
behave similarly to Ginnie’s MBS program, but for the conventional market,
which was four-fold the FHA/VA market being served by GNMA (The Bond
Buyer (7/29/1981)).35
Authorization for Fannie Mae to issue MBS was approved by HUD on
September 23, 1981 (HUD (1996), p. 52). The first Fannie-guaranteed MBS
were issued in December 1981, in the amount of roughly $700 million, and the
program expanded rapidly thereafter. By the end of 1981, Fannie had com-
mitted to issue $3.3 billion in MBS (FNMA Annual Report 1981, p. 2) and in
35In an October publication in The American Banker, Maxwell elaborated on these themes: “We
predict the FNMA-guaranteed mortgage-backed security will do for conventional home lending what
Ginnie Maes have done for government-backed loans. Ginnie Maes have achieved a volume of $120
billion, yet the FHA market they serve is a fraction of the size of the conventional market to be served by
the FNMA security. The potential for housing is enormous, and so is the potential flow of fee income to
FNMA. Because of their FNMA guarantee, their attractive yields, and their simplicity, our new securities
will appeal strongly to both mortgage lenders and investors. We believe they will attract new funds into
housing. To that end, we have worked closely with managers of major pension funds in designing our
security. We will issue our first securities in November” (The American Banker (10/26/1981)).
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1982, the program’s first full year of operation, issuance jumped to $13.8 billion
(HUD (1987), p. 78–79). Whereas mortgage sales were limited between 1968
and 1981, Fannie’s new leadership decided to sell larger quantities of higher
yielding mortgage assets through the new MBS program. Around $2.9 billion
of the $13.8 MBS issuance in 1982 resulted from sales of its own portfolio, leav-
ing roughly 79% of the total issuance securitized from new purchases. We were
unable to quantify or find ex ante projections of Fannie’s associated purchase or
securitization volume in the first year or two of operations, so we do not treat
Fannie’s entrance into mortgage securitization as a significant policy change af-
fecting portfolio size. While the new MBS program hoped to attract billions of
dollars into conventional mortgage financing, the appetite of investors to hold
conventional MBS seemed somewhat uncertain relative to the thriving Ginnie
Mae secondary market. If it could be quantified, however, it would have been
classified as cyclically motivated.36
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1980 additionally autho-
rized Fannie to deal in loans secured by manufactured housing, subject to HUD
approval. The last regulatory hurdle was cleared by a FHLBB ruling on July 28,
1981 clarifying that, regardless of ambiguities in state laws, mortgages on man-
ufactured housing were considered real estate loans. In August 1981, Fannie
announced that it would launch a nationwide program buying mortgages on
manufactured housing (The Washington Post (8/15/1981)). We were unable to
quantify or find an estimate of Fannie Mae’s likely purchases of manufactured
home mortgages, so we do not consider this a significant policy change.
Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Program
36The request for MBS program approval was made in an environment of heightened interest
rate risk and depressed earnings due to monetary tightening, and HUD’s approval was granted
early during the recession from July 1981 through November 1982.
228
Announced: June 25, 1981
Policy Change: ARM Program Approval
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$0.4 billion
News: June 1981
Effective: Aug. 1981
Classification: Cyclical
On June 25, 1981, Fannie announced it would initiate a purchase program
for eight types of variable-rate mortgages, with purchases to start on August 7,
1981 (The Washington Post (6/26/1981)). A Fannie spokesperson announced
that commitments would first be made in late July, and that FNMA was un-
likely to set any upward limit for August purchases (The American Banker
(6/26/1981)). Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) had first been authorized in
primary markets earlier in 1981, as the FHLBB, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) ap-
proved various programs and lifted interest rate restrictions imposed on feder-
ally chartered banks and thrifts (45 FR 1425, 45 FR 79494, 46 FR 18932).37 FHLBB
approval of thrifts issuing adjustable-rate loan issuance on April 23, 1981 also
paved the way for Freddie to purchase ARMs from FHLBank members (46 FR
24148, see also FHLMC, Sec. 3.4.2). Without established secondary market sup-
port, however, mortgagees were initially hesitant to issue ARMs, and there was
little issuance until Fannie and Freddie unveiled their guidelines for adjustable-
rate secondary market purchase programs. Because secondary market entry
into ARMs was de facto set in motion immediately following deregulation of
37The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ruling allowed an annual rate adjustment
of up to 2 percentage points, and the FHLBB rules removed interest rate caps on variable-rate
mortgages (HUD (1987), p. 135).
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the primary mortgage market and was necessary for mortgagees to issue ARMs,
we consider entry into ARMs by Fannie and Freddie as driven by US federal
housing credit policy regulatory changes.
Upon Fannie’s announcement, The American Banker reported that its pro-
gram would be “substantially broader than the purchase plan recently put together
by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp” (The American Banker (6/26/1981)).
Four of Fannie’s announced ARM products were negative amortization mort-
gages, which Freddie’s program had not included at the time. Furthermore,
industry analysts “had said at the time the FHLMC plan was announced in late May
that many lenders would likely postpone plans to sell ARMs until FNMA’s program
was disclosed” (The American Banker (6/26/1981)). No estimate could be found
for the volume of FNMA’s pending ARM purchase program and independently
quantifying such an impact is constrained by uncertainty and related regulatory
changes for the primary market, but there were public projections of Freddie’s
pending ARM purchase program, unveiled just one month earlier. Given the
expectation of a larger ARM program for Fannie, we adopt the high-end esti-
mate of FHLMC’s ARM program, for an annualized impact of $400 million in
the program’s first year of operations.38
After Freddie and Fannie announced their ARM programs in May and June,
respectively, thrifts rapidly began originating ARMs in the summer of 1981, but
initially tended to prefer holding them in portfolio—to reduce their own interest
rate risk exposure—rather than selling to the secondary market (HUD (1987),
pp. 135–136). But by the end of 1981, Fannie had made commitments to buy
more the $1 billion in ARMs (FNMA Annual Report 1981, p. 2). During the
38FHLMC President Brinkerhoff had projected that Freddie would purchase $500 to $600 mil-
lion worth of ARMs in the first 18 months of program operations, or up to $400 million on an
annualized basis (see ARM Program under FHLMC, Sec. 3.4.2)
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first full year of the program in 1982, Fannie’s purchases totaled $3.2 billion
(HUD (1987), p. 71), and FNMA’s purchase volume of ARMs subsequently
rose steadily. In 1984 and 1985, ARMs constituted over one-third of its retained
portfolio purchases, reaching $7.1 billion in 1985, and about 20% of its MBS
issuance. The share of ARMs in Fannie’s retained portfolio increased from 5%
in 1982 to about 18% in 1985 (HUD (1987), p. 71, Treasury (1990), p. A-32).39
On June 23, FNMA’s chief economist leaked that Fannie would unveil its
program on June 25, and additionally confirmed that multiple loan types would
be purchased—including negative amortization loans. Market analysts re-
ported that the program would be more expansive and flexible than FHLMC’s
ARM program (The American Banker (6/24/1981)). Breaking from a streak of
falling prices and predominantly negative excess stock returns, Fannie’s share
price rose 2.5% on the June 23, a gain of 1.4 percentage points over the S&P 500
for the day. Shares flatlined on June 25 when the program was formally an-
nounced, slightly behind a 0.1% gain for the S&P 500. No earlier concrete news
of a pending ARM program could be found being priced into shares. Conse-
quently, we date the news of Fannie’s pending ARM program being made pub-
lic to June 23, 1981.
The program expansion into ARMs was made in an environment of height-
ened interest rate risk and depressed earnings resulting from monetary tight-
ening, and the program took effect early in the recession lasting from July 1981
through November 1982 and in the midst of the credit crunch persisting from
1978Q2 through 1981Q4. Primary market deregulation was explicitly driven by
economic conditions; for instance, the introduction of the FHLBB’s proposed
39Because of declining interest rates, ARM purchases dropped sharply to 4% of total pur-
chases in 1986.
231
rule for allowing renegotiable-rate mortgage instruments cited that the Board
was “monitoring the money market situation” and that “recent credit tightening
policies of the Federal Reserve have resulted in extremely volatile interest rates,
causing growing reluctance of discretionary mortgage lenders to make long-term loan
commitments, and a resulting scarcity of home mortgage funds” (45 FR 1425).
Moreover, the ARM program was explicitly intended to help revitalize Fannie’s
balance sheet by reducing interest rate risk and increasing revenue in light of
Fannie’s ongoing financial difficulties; HUD estimated that Fannie had a nega-
tive net worth of $7 billion in 1980 and $10 billion in 1981, and FNMA’s program
was intended to enhance profits (HUD (1987), p. 100). Consequently we clas-
sify the ARM program’s approval and launch as cyclically motivated.
Second Mortgage Purchase Program
Announced: September 10, 1981
Policy Change: Second Mortgage Program Approval
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$5.0 billion
News: Sep. 1981
Effective: Nov. 1981
Classification: Cyclical
In June 1981, Fannie appealed to HUD for approval of a second mortgage
purchase program aimed at increasing the yield on its portfolio as well as low-
ering second mortgage costs. Because of high prevailing interest rates, many
homebuyers were increasingly relying on second mortgages for home pur-
chases, and Fannie argued it could help provide liquidity for this financing in-
strument. In 1980, between $15 billion and $20 billion worth of home equity
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loans were made nationwide, up from $3 billion to $4 billion in the mid-1970s
(The Washington Post (8/8/1981)). Second mortgages, or home equity loans,
have shorter maturities, and were thus also intended to improve Fannie’s ma-
turity match between assets and liabilities.
On July 9, 1981, the HUD Secretary submitted an interim rule, effective Au-
gust 3, 1981, redefining ‘mortgage loan’ to allow FNMA to request approval for
a second mortgage purchase program (46 FR 39434). The interim rule found
that the FNMA Charter Act was consistent with Fannie dealing in secondary
mortgages, but that standing HUD regulations defining mortgage loans were
a barrier, and needed modification to keep up with the evolving structure of
the housing market. The interim rule was atypically accelerated, bypassing the
customary initial notice of proposed rule making, subsequent comment period,
and 30-day delay in taking effect, as a delay “could cause unnecessary hardships to
homebuyers and sellers who would benefit from the development of a secondary market
in second mortgages, and to FNMA in forgoing profitable business transactions.” The
HUD Secretary later issued the interim rule for adoption without amendment
on January 20, 1982, to take effect March 18 (47 FR 5410).
Even before final adoption of the interim rule, HUD Secretary Pierce sent
a letter on September 10, 1981 approving Fannie’s request to purchase second
mortgages, citing the need for liquidity as a key motivation. But against Fan-
nie’s wishes, HUD only granted explicitly temporary approval, set to expire on
March 31, 1983. HUD viewed the program appropriate given the importance
of second mortgages for housing finance in the high interest rate environment.
But upon an anticipated return to more normal interest rates, HUD regarded the
role of second mortgages allowing homeowners to access their home equity for
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non-housing purposes as outside of Fannie’s statutory purpose (HUD (1987),
p. 171). In practice, however, this approval was extended several times and
was later made permanent by the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1987 (Pub. L. 100-242).40
On November 19, 1981, Fannie officially announced that it would begin pur-
chasing second mortgages beginning on November 30 (The American Banker
(11/20/1981)). Fannie had recently estimated it could finance up to $5 bil-
lion worth of second mortgage loans a year (The Washington Post (8/8/1981)).
Based on that projection, we assign a $5 billion annualized increase in Fannie’s
potential retained portfolio in the year starting September 1981, on the first pub-
lic news of the program’s approval by the HUD Secretary. In practice, second
mortgage purchases totaled $176 million in 1981, $1.55 billion in 1982, $1.41 bil-
lion in 1983, and $0.94 billion in 1984. There is no direct evidence explaining
the reversal in purchase volumes (HUD (1987) p. 71), but the decline in interest
rates may have reduced demand for home equity loans, both from homeowners
and Fannie.
Shares of Fannie rose 5.4% on July 10, 1981, 5.4 percentage points above the
daily return on the S&P 500, when the HUD Secretary’s interim rule redefined
‘mortgage loan’ to accommodate a second mortgage program. Upon approval
of Fannie’s request on September 10, shares jumped another 5.4%, closing 3.9
percentage points above the S&P 500. No alternative explanations for these
excess stock returns could be identified through newspapers or other periodical
finance sources.
40A June 27, 1983 letter extended authorization through September 30, 1984, and the Sec-
ondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-440) provided temporary statu-
tory authorization, subject to further restrictions on the program (see below).
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FNMA’s request was made in an environment of heightened interest rate risk
and depressed earnings resulting from contractionary monetary policy, and the
regulatory ruling was made in the midst of the recession lasting from July 1981
through November 1982. The interim HUD rule was explicitly made “[i]n view
of recent inflation in both costs and interest rates, and given recent demand for sec-
ond mortgage financing” (46 FR 39435). That rule also explained that program
approval was in part intended to increase Fannie’s profitability and improve its
balance sheet: “[s]ince second mortgages usually bear a higher interest rate than first
mortgages, dealing in them could prove attractive to FNMA as a method of increasing
its portfolio yield on investments” (46 FR 39435). The regulatory approval process
was also unusually fast-tracked, further suggesting that immediate economic
concerns were paramount. We thus classify the second mortgage program’s
approval and launch as cyclically motivated.
HUD Increases Debt-to-Capital Ratio to 30-to-1 (47 FR 58044)
Announced: December 22, 1982
Policy Change: Increased Debt-to-Capital Ratio
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$6.25 billion
News: Dec. 1982
Effective: Dec. 1982
Classification: Non-Cyclical
A rule proposed by HUD on May 17, 1982 (47 FR 21093) and published una-
mended on July 22 (47 FR 31866), to take effect September 10, newly permitted
the HUD Secretary to increase FNMA’s debt-to-capital ratio by expedited means
of simply publishing a notice in the federal register, subject to an adequately
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justified request by Fannie. The rule had been proposed “due to the [HUD] Secre-
tary’s determination that the interests of neither the public nor FNMA or the purposes
of the Charter Act require resort to rulemaking procedures upon FNMA requests for
increase in its maximum debt-to-capital ratio, and in order to permit the Secretary to
respond to requests for increases in a manner more directly focused on FNMA’s immedi-
ately foreseeable requirements than would be practicable in rulemaking proceedings” (47
FR 21094). Fannie’s debt-to-capital ratio had risen sharply in 1981, and the asso-
ciation had projected its debt-to-capital ratio would reach the standing 25-to-1
limit by the end of 1982.41 FNMA had initially appealed to HUD to markedly
increase its leverage limit to 35-to-1, “based in major part upon the length of time
inevitably consumed by rulemaking proceedings and a desire to avoid such repetitive
proceedings” (47 FR 21094), a borrowing cushion and implementation lag that
HUD’s new rule sought to obviate. Following the rule’s implementation, Fan-
nie modified its request to 30-to-1 and the HUD Secretary granted the modified
request on December 22, 1982, effective immediately, thereby increasing Fan-
nie’s cap on secondary market facility borrowing from 25 to 30 times Fannie’s
capital, surpluses, reserves, and undistributed earnings (47 FR 58044).
Using 1981 year end regulatory capital of $2.5 billion (Department of the
Treasury (1990), p. A-82), the HUD Secretary’s approval would have implied
maximum growth in mortgage assets of $12.5 billion ($2.5 × (30 - 25) = $12.5).
Using the two-year rule, we assign a $6.25 billion annualized increase in the
year starting December 1982, dated to the HUD Secretary’s approval. Shares of
Fannie rose 3.6% on December 22, 1982, when the HUD Secretary’s rule mod-
ification was announced, closing 3.4 percentage points above the daily return
41HUD noted that “[i]ncreases in the [debt-to-capital] ratio during 1981 resulted more from contrac-
tion of stockholders’ equity (caused by losses due to the negative spread on FNMA’s portfolio) than from
large increases in total borrowings,” and this dynamic was expected to continue in 1982 (47 FR
21094).
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on the S&P 500. No alternative explanation for this daily excess stock return
could be identified through newspapers or other periodical finance sources. In
practice, Fannie’s debt-to-capital ratio rose from 23.2 in 1981 to 25.9 in 1982 and
27.3 in 1983, suggesting that the policy change indeed alleviated an otherwise
binding regulatory constraint.42
The HUD Secretary’s approval stressed that the maximum limit could affect
FNMA’s borrowing ability, or the “attractiveness of its securities,” and that the in-
crease was intended to keep Fannie advancing its public mission: “As FNMA’s
actual debt-to-capital ratio approaches the limit set by the Secretary, indicating the pos-
sibility of an urgent need for an increase in the near future, uncertainty and consequent
adverse market reaction could result. The Secretary believes, therefore, that it is both
prudent and in the interest of facilitating FNMA’s continued ability to meet its
statutory purposes that the maximum ratio be maintained at a level which will per-
mit continuation of projected activities without artificial hindrance for the proxi-
mately foreseeable future” (47 FR 58045). That published rule made no mention
of cyclical concerns.
Both the request and HUD’s eventual approval were, however, a response
to Fannie’s lingering balance sheet woes following the interest rate increases of
1979–1981 (HUD (1987), p. 95). After posting profits for its first 12 years of
operations as a shareholder owned company, Fannie sustained losses of $190
million in 1981 and $105 million in 1982, stemming from a negative interest rate
margin and amplified by Fannie’s inability to diversify its portfolio away from
mortgage assets. By year’s end 1982, Fannie’s net worth had fallen to $953 mil-
lion, down 27% over two years, against an asset portfolio of $73.0 billion (De-
42Ratios are calculated at year’s end based on balance sheet data reported by Treasury (Trea-
sury (1990), pp. A-11, A-82).
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partment of the Treasury (1990), p. A-11). Loosening Fannie’s debt-to-capital
ratio fit into a larger deregulatory effort to help both Fannie and the S&Ls re-
cover, or ‘grow their way back to health,’ without a direct injection of public
capital (Elliot (2013), p. 34). Fannie and its regulators turned their attention
to increased fee income, diversification into ARMs and second mortgages (see
above), and leveraged purchases of newly originated mortgages bearing higher
interest rates (GAO (1985)).43 Agency status in particular was seen as key to
enabling Fannie to grow its way out of its financial difficulties; by increasing its
debt-to-capital ratio, HUD allowed Fannie to finance new activity with debt in-
stead of equity, permitting Fannie to increase borrowing at relatively favorable
interest rates.
By 1982, increasing Fannie’s profitability was also seen as a key intermediate
step to fully privatizing the GSEs. The 1982 Report of the President’s Commis-
sion on Housing concluded that Fannie and Freddie “should play important roles
in the development of markets for conventional mortgage passthrough securities. Fed-
eral policy should encourage the operation of FNMA and FHLMC as private corpora-
tions that retain limited benefits arising from Congressionally mandated commitments
to housing... Eventually, both FNMA and FHLMC should become privately owned
corporations with common responsibilities and advantages” (The President’s Com-
mission on Housing (1982), pp. 167–168). The report concluded, however, that
a transition period was first needed to address “FNMA’s profit problem” putting
43A number of legislative actions around this time underscore this deregulatory approach.
The Mortgage Purchase Amendments of 1981 (Pub. L. 97-110, enacted December 26, 1981)
amended the FNMA Charter Act and the FHLMC Act to remove the portfolio limitations on
the GSEs’ holdings of conventional mortgages over one year old, which were previously lim-
ited to 20% of investments. The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Pub. L.
97-320, enacted October 15, 1982) largely served to loosen regulations on the S&Ls in an effort
to improve their beleaguered balance sheets. To facilitate recapitalization, that Act additionally
permitted Fannie to issue preferred stock and made such stock freely transferable. And the Mis-
cellaneous Revenue Act of 1982 (Pub. Law 97-362, enacted October 25, 1982) changed Fannie’s
net operating loss carryback and carryforward tax rules to improve its balance sheet.
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it at a serious competitive disadvantage relative to the recently recapitalized
FHLMC, which had significantly less interest rate risk exposure heading into
the 1980 and 1981–1982 recessions. The administration wanted to help Fannie
return to a “positive profit position” before phasing out “FNMA’s Treasury back-
stop borrowing authority and agency status for its obligations” (The President’s
Commission on Housing (1982), p. 168).
FNMA’s request was made during the recession lasting from July 1981
through November 1982, and HUD’s approval was granted shortly after the
recession’s end. But following monetary easing in the second half of 1981 and
a drop in mortgage rates that fall, the housing market had begun recovering
in late 1981, and interest rate risk had considerably abetted by late 1982 (Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin February 1983). Final approval was also made more than
seven months after the enabling rule for expedited policy changes was first pro-
posed, in stark contrast to the rapid and explicitly fast-tracked regulatory ap-
proval process for Fannie’s second mortgage program in 1981 (see above). The
request and its approval seemed principally motivated by supporting Fannie’s
core statutory mission, repairing the cumulative balance sheet damage from
1981–1982, helping to advance the administration’s longer-term objective of pri-
vatization, and avoiding the possibility of a public capital infusion. Moreover,
the HUD Secretary’s published rule approving the increase made no mention of
cyclical concerns. Consequently, we classify the regulatory ruling as contempo-
raneously unrelated to the business or credit cycle.
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-440)
Enacted: October 3, 1984
The Act aimed to remove barriers to the issuance of private-label (i.e., non-
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GSE) MBS. The goal was to greatly expand the private sector’s role in the grow-
ing market for MBS, which was dominated by regulation-favored Fannie and
Freddie. The Act, for instance, newly allowed state-regulated pension funds
and insurance companies to invest in private-label MBS and removed state and
federal limitations on thrift and bank holdings of private-label MBS. The Act
additionally introduced several amendments to the FNMA Charter Act, and
modified several of HUD’s regulatory powers over Fannie (HUD (1987)). The
Act eliminated HUD’s approval authority over Fannie’s issuance of obligations,
securities, participations or other instruments, effective October 1, 1985, but
maintained HUD’s approval authority over stock issues and debt obligations
convertible into stock (HUD (1987)).44 It also required HUD to approve or dis-
allow additional programs within 45 days (60 if it required additional informa-
tion from Fannie). The Act also statutorily extended FNMA’s second mortgage
purchase authority, but with a sunset of October 1, 1987. Subordinate mort-
gages were also limited to 50% of the conforming loan limit and the sum of all
liens on a property had to cumulatively adhere to LTV ratios.45 These changes
were perceived as reducing regulatory delays and increasing Fannie’s flexibil-
ity to respond to market conditions (GAO (1985), p. 104). Finally, the Act
forced HUD to meets its requirement to submit an annual report on Fannie to
Congress, which did not happen until 1987 (HUD (1987)).
HUD Decreases Debt-to-Capital Ratio to 25-to-1
Announced: April 21, 1987
44This short-lived approval authority had been established in HUD’s 1978 regulatory rulings
(see above).
45Second mortgage limits were previously the same as first mortgage limits.
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Policy Change: Decreased Debt-to-Capital Ratio
Agency: FNMA
Impact: -$2.7 billion
News: Apr. 1987
Effective: Dec. 1987
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-514, enacted October 22, 1986) intro-
duced real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs), a new tax-preferred
vehicle for structuring pass-through mortgage securities. Congress intended
REMICs to provide another source of mortgage funds and expand the volume
of mortgage credit. Because of their favorable tax treatment, market analysts
predicted that REMICs would eventually become the dominant securitization
instrument in secondary mortgage markets.
Fannie quickly announced its intentions to enter the REMIC market, which
drew strong opposition from private mortgage lenders concerned that agency
status gave FNMA an unfair competitive advantage that could be used to cor-
ner the market. HUD approval was not required for Fannie to structure REMICs
backed by FHA/VA loans, but was required for REMICs backed by conven-
tional mortgages. On November 17, 1986, HUD issued a complaint to Fannie for
its failure to request approval for its proposed REMIC program, most of which
would be backed by conventional mortgages. On December 17, Fannie issued
its first REMICs, a $500 million sale backed with only FHA/VA mortgages.
On January 21, 1987, Fannie requested HUD’s approval for REMICs backed
by conventional mortgages (HUD (1987), pp. 175–176). HUD approved lim-
ited REMIC issuance backed by conventional mortgages of up to $15 billion
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on April 21, with authorization expiring June 30, 1988 (The American Banker
(4/23/1987)).46 HUD’s ruling also included a requirement that Fannie Mae
work with HUD to develop legislation for fully privatizing the association. The
rule also immediately and unexpectedly lowered Fannie Mae’s debt-to-capital-
ratio from 30-to-1 to 25-to-1, which the HUD Secretary stated would be further
reduced to 20-to-1 by December 31, 1988. The financial press interpreted the
scheduled December reduction as a definitive constraint, with The Bond Buyer
characterizing the HUD Secretary as having “directed Fannie Mae to boost its
capital or shrink its balance sheet” and elaborating that “[t]he agency will be
required to lower its debt-to capital ratio to 25-to-1 from 30-to-1 immediately and to
reduce it to 20-to-1 by the end of 1988” (The Bond Buyer (4/22/1987)).47
In an April 21 letter to Fannie’s chairman, the HUD Secretary explained that
he was concerned Fannie would dominate the REMIC market and was acting
in accordance with “the desire of the administration to move Fannie Mae toward
privatization” (The Wall Street Journal (4/22/1987)). The Wall Street Journal
similarly framed HUD’s policy announcements as intended to rein in Fannie,
consistent with the administration’s objective of privatization: “[t]he Reagan
administration has long sought to shrink the federally sponsored corporations
that operate the secondary mortgage market and to leave as much of the business as
46HUD later eased several of these restrictions on Fannie’s REMIC issues on April 20, 1988,
allowing issuances of up to $20 billion of REMICs through September 30, 1989. Citing contin-
ued fears by thrifts and investment banks that Fannie would unfairly dominate the new REMIC
market, HUD refused to give the secondary mortgage market operator the permanent, unlim-
ited issuance authority its officials had sought. Fannie had issued about $4 billion of REMICs
at the time, and its executives said the additional $16 billion in authority would be adequate
for expected market demand (The Wall Street Journal (4/21/1988)). On October 13, 1988, HUD
granted Fannie permanent and unlimited authority to issue REMICs. This unexpected regula-
tory reversal came as Congress was preparing to circumvent HUD and statutorily grant Fannie
such authority. A Fannie official explained that “[n]o federal agency wants to see its authority up-
staged by Congress” (The Wall Street Journal (10/14/1988)).
47National Mortgage News similarly characterized the regulatory moves as follows: “the HUD
official ordered an immediate reduction in Fannie Mae’s leverage to a debt/equity ratio of 25-to-1 and a
further cut to 20-to-1 before the end of 1988” (National Mortgage News (4/27/1987)).
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possible for the private sector” (The Wall Street Journal (4/22/1987)). Fannie
CEO David Maxwell suggested that the capital reductions would require bal-
ance sheet adjustments, but the agency was willing to comply without a fight
in exchange for securing REMIC market entry, stating “FNMA readily accepts the
reductions in debt-to-capital ratio. They are in line with our objective of lowering the
company’s leverage” (National Mortgage News (4/27/1987)).
At year’s end 1986, the regulatory ratio of unsecured debt-to-capital was 27.7
and regulatory capital was $3.3 billion, the same level as in 1984 and 1985 (Trea-
sury (1990), p. A-82). The decrease in the debt-to-capital ratio therefore suggests
an eventual capital shortfall of $1.3 billion ($3.3 ×(27.720 − 1) = $1.3). Taking into
account a $375 million common stock issue in February 1987 and conservatively
assuming that 75% of the remaining shortfall would be eliminated by increasing
retained earnings or loan loss reserves suggests a reduction in Fannie’s $94.17
billion asset portfolio of roughly $4.73 billion ($94.17 ×(3.3+0.375+0.75×(1.3−0.375)3.3+1.3 −1) =
-$4.73) by the end of 1988. Applying a pro rata annualization, we assign a $2.7
billion decrease in Fannie’s portfolio capacity from the reduced debt-to-capital
limit, dated to HUD’s announcement in April 1987 (-$4.73 ×1221 = -$2.7).48
The development of the REMIC market following the Tax Reform Act of
1986 and HUD’s subsequent decision to allow REMIC issues by Fannie did not
directly affect the supply of MBS, because the GSEs mostly re-securitized out-
standing agency MBSs. Instead, the issuance of tax-preferred REMICs backed
by Fannie MBS created greater overall demand for MBS (FNMA Information
48Corroborating this scoring, The American Banker reported that “A Fannie Mae spokesman
said the agency’s current debt-to-capital-ratio there is 21.7-to-1” (The American Banker
(4/23/1987)) following Fannie’s common stock issue. Meeting the remaining debt-to-capital
shortfall through portfolio reductions alone would require asset sales of $7.38 billion between
April and December 1987 (94.167 × ( 21.720 − 1) = −7.38), relative to assets at year’s end 1986.
Our estimated portfolio reduction of $2.7 billion is consistent with this score, making further
allowances for capital growth through retained earnings.
243
Statement March 30, 1992, p. 32). As such, we do not attribute any change in
Fannie’s purchases resulting from HUD’s approval of conventional mortgage
REMIC issues.
Both lowering Fannie’s debt-to-capital ratio and the coincident, reluctant ap-
proval of limited conventional mortgage REMIC issues clearly reflected the Rea-
gan administration’s anti-GSE sentiments. Various other concurrent actions of
the Reagan administration further underscored their efforts to pressure Fannie
and Freddie toward privatization. For instance, the administration had started
threatening legislation to permanently limit the GSEs mortgage purchase au-
thority in early 1987. The administration’s FY1988 Budget touted that “[t]he ad-
ministration is studying ways of privatizing [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac]... The ad-
ministration also plans to propose legislation that will limit permanently the maximum
amount of a mortgage these Government-sponsored enterprises can purchase. This will
limit their continued encroachment on the market served by private firms for as long as
these entities enjoy the advantages conferred by their association with the Federal Gov-
ernment” (The Budget for Fiscal Year 1988, p. 2-48). The Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) also proposed that the GSEs’ loan limits be frozen at “the
lesser of the new $153,000 ceiling or the 75th percentile of home sales prices for each
standard metropolitan statistical area” (National Mortgage News (1/12/1987)).49
The administration had also proposed imposing user fees for programs run by
Fannie and Freddie.
While the charters of Fannie and Freddie were consistent with issuing
REMICs and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was explicitly supportive of their is-
suance of REMICs, authority to enter the conventional market was by no means
49The conforming loan limit freeze was never implemented, and the limit was subsequently
raised to $168,700, a 10.2% increase, based on the adjustment rule introduced by the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1980 (see above).
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guaranteed, particularly given the Reagan administration’s hostility (GAO
(1988), pp. 40–41). Both the decision—including the accompanying decrease
in the debt-to-capital ratio—and its timing appear somewhat unanticipated; on
the news of REMIC authorization, Fannie’s share price jumped 4.0% on April 21,
1987, for an excess return of 1.5 percentage points above the S&P 500. Newspa-
per accounts underscore that perceived profitability from Fannie’s entry to the
conventional REMIC market clearly exceeded downsides from a lower debt-to-
capital ratio.
The conventional mortgage REMIC authorization and decrease in the debt-
to-capital ratio were made when the economy was neither in recession nor expe-
riencing a credit crunch. Because shrinking Fannie’s leverage ratio was explic-
itly intended to rein in Fannie and advance the Reagan administration’s objec-
tive of GSE privatization, we classify the policy change as politically motivated
and unrelated to the business cycle.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 (Pub. L. 100-242)
Enacted: February 5, 1988
The Act made permanent the authorization for Fannie and Freddie to pur-
chase second mortgages on single-family properties. It also banned impos-
ing any user fees for programs run by Fannie and Freddie, which the Rea-
gan administration had recently proposed as a step towards full privatization
(see above). The bill was enacted despite the administration’s objections, and
thwarted many of its recent efforts to reduce the federal role in housing mar-
kets, effectively killing momentum toward GSE privatization for well over a
decade. A Treasury official explained that “[w]e had too many other other problems
and we didn’t have enough political capital to take on Fannie and Freddie...” (Hagerty
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(2012), p. 73). The administration’s focus had pivoted to the collapsing S&L
industry and fallout from the Latin American debt crisis. Beyond the GSEs’ ef-
fective lobbying efforts on Capital Hill, Wall Street and the Mortgage Bankers
Association were not keen on the GSEs and primary mortgage markets, respec-
tively, loosing access to cheap funding (Hagerty (2012), pp. 72–73).
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(Pub. L. 101-73)
Enacted: August 9, 1989
FIRREA primarily served as a major regulatory overhaul of the thrift indus-
try and FHLBS in response to the S&L crisis. It established the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC) to wind down insolvent thrifts, abolished the FSLIC and
transferred S&L deposit insurance to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and moved regulatory oversight of Freddie to HUD from the FHLBB,
which was also dissolved. The Act additionally contained several provisions
affecting Fannie, most notably by amending its statutory purpose to read as
follows:
“SEC. 301. The Congress hereby declares that the purposes of this title are to es-
tablish secondary market facilities for home mortgages, to provide that the operations
thereof shall be financed by private capital to the maximum extent feasible, and to au-
thorize such facilities to (1) provide stability in the secondary market for home mort-
gages; (2) respond appropriately to the private capital market; (3) provide ongoing
assistance to the secondary market for home mortgages (including mortgages securing
housing for low- and moderate-income families involving a reasonable economic
return) by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the distri-
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bution of investment capital available for home mortgage financing; and (4) manage
and liquidate federally owned mortgage portfolios in an orderly manner, with
a minimum of adverse effect upon the home mortgage market and minimum
loss to the Federal Government.”
Of particular note, FIRREA modified Fannie’s statutory purpose from providing
‘supplemental’ assistance to the mortgage market with directions to providing
‘stability’ and ‘ongoing assistance’ to the secondary mortgage market. These
charter revisions charged Fannie with maintaining a continuous presence in the
secondary market (Department of the Treasury (1990), p. A-5). The revised
statement of purpose also newly expanded Fannie’s responsibility to support
mortgages for low- and moderate-income families involving a ‘reasonable’ eco-
nomic return. Prior language set by the 1954 FNMA Charter Act had more
narrowly only promoted “providing a degree of liquidity,” supporting special as-
sistance programs for certain mortgages, and intervening “as a means of retarding
or stopping a decline in mortgage lending and home building activities which threatens
materially the stability of a high level national economy” (see online appendix).
Freddie Mac, which had previously operated without a statutory statement
of purpose, was also rechartered with an identical statutory purpose. An accom-
panying House committee report elaborated upon the revised role Congress en-
visioned for Fannie and Freddie: “A primary purpose is to provide stability in
the secondary market for home mortgages including mortgages securing hous-
ing for low and moderate income families. This can be accomplished through
both portfolio purchasing and selling activities, as well as through the securitiza-
tion of home mortgages. The continuous presence of the FHLMC and FNMA in the
secondary market in bad as well as good economic times provides assurances of a
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dependable and substantial funding source for home mortgages. FHLMC and FNMA
are also required to respond appropriately to the private capital market. They must take
a leading role in developing and marketing new and innovative finance and mortgage
products and assure that their products are responsive to the changing demands
of the capital market. Lastly, FHLMC and FMNA are responsible for providing
ongoing support to the secondary mortgage market. They should increase the liquid-
ity of mortgage investments by refining and improving their securitization and credit
enhancement products, as well as developing new products that add to the liquidity
of mortgage investments. They should improve the distribution of investment capital
available for home mortgage financing by seeking to attract new, in addition to tra-
ditional, sources of mortgage investment” (House Committee on Banking (1989),
p. 2). Put differently, FIRREA did not so much as usher in mission creep for
Fannie and Freddie, but rather mandated a considerably expanded role for the
Enterprises in US mortgage finance.
FIRREA established tougher risk-based capital standards for thrifts, but not
for Fannie or Freddie. The Act, however, had the effect of increasing thrifts’
demand for agency MBS, since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities received
a lower risk weighting than whole loans, encouraging thrifts to swap mortgage
holdings for agency MBS (HUD (1996), p. 57). Similarly, the Act increased
the FHLBanks’ demand for agency MBS, as the FHLBS came under pressure to
meet the Act’s new assessments on its earnings (Hoffman and Cassell (2010),
pp. 55–57).50
In bailing out insured deposits at failed thrifts, Congress was forced to rec-
ognize that the perceived implicit government guarantee behind Fannie and
50New assessments were levied on the FHLBS to fund the RTC’s resolution of S&Ls and to
affordable housing programs.
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Freddie also posed a considerable potential liability for taxpayers (Hagerty
(2012), p. 77). But Congress punted such concerns a few years down the line
with FIRREA, which simply mandated that Treasury conduct two annual stud-
ies analyzing the safety and soundness of the GSEs and granted GAO auditing
authority over Fannie’s mortgage transactions. Treasury’s May 1990 report was
particularly critical of Fannie, most notably of its credit stress test model and
capital management practices, and spurred Fannie to strengthen its capital base
in anticipation of legislation imposing stricter capital requirements (see the dis-
cussion of FHEFSSA below).
Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990
(Pub. L. 101-625)
Enacted: November 28, 1990
The Act expressed the view of Congress that “every American family be able to
afford a decent home in a suitable environment,” and outlined seven objectives and
related policies to advance that goal. The Act predominantly affected the FHA,
HUD, and state-level Public Housing Agencies, as opposed to the GSEs. But
it nonetheless marked a distinct shift in the stance and objectives of US federal
housing policy with respect to mortgage finance for low- and moderate-income
households that would soon be felt by Fannie and Freddie (see below). Signing
the bill into law, President George H.W. Bush declared the Act “an exciting bipar-
tisan initiative to break down the walls separating low-income people from the American
dream of opportunity and homeownership” (Bush (1990)).
Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992
(Pub. L. 102-550)
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Enacted: October 28, 1992
Policy Change: Capital Requirements
Agency: FNMA
Impact: -$4.25 billion
News: Mar. 1990
Effective: Mar. 1990
Classification: Non-Cyclical
Policy Change: Affordable Housing Goals
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$1.0 billion
News: July 1991
Effective: Jan. 1993
Classification: Non-Cyclical
Spurred on by general concerns about taxpayer-funded financial bailouts in
the aftermath of the S&L crisis and Treasury’s reports on the GSEs mandated by
FIRREA, the capital adequacy of Fannie and Freddie became a focal point in the
early 1990s. The Treasury Secretary’s May 1990 report on the GSEs—the first
of the two annual studies mandated by FIRREA investigating the risks posed
by the GSEs—concluded that Fannie was undercapitalized, though it deliber-
ately refrained from quantifying the degree of the shortfall (Treasury (1990)).51
51The introduction of the May 1990 Treasury study was clear about the GSEs’ special status:
“GSEs are in an unusual position. While other corporations are able to diversify their operations, GSEs
are mandated to serve specific credit needs in a single business area, which makes them particularly
vulnerable to economic downturns in these areas. Furthermore, the financial risks inherent in institutions
of this size pose a greater systemic risk that cannot be completely hedged or eliminated... Some GSEs are
among the most thinly capitalized of major US financial entities. Unlike other private sector corporations,
GSEs are not subject to the usual market-imposed disciplines of increased cost or reduced access to capital
as their balance sheet leverage increases beyond normally prudent levels. This is due to the market’s
perception of a unique and special relationship to the Federal Government. Market participants believe
that, if a GSE experiences extreme financial difficulties, Congress would step in to ensure that debt holders
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In particular, the report concluded that existing capital regulations—principally
HUD’s leverage ratio—were inadequate because of the exclusion of outstand-
ing MBS, which were still held off balance sheet; in a counterfactual application
of bank and thrift capital standards, the 1990 Treasury report found that Fan-
nie did not come close to meeting capital requirements for banks and thrifts
(Treasury (1990), p. A-73). The final April 1991 Treasury report and a May 1991
GAO report both called for tougher regulatory oversight of the housing GSEs
(GAO (1991)).52 With support from the White House, Congress subsequently
began drafting legislation establishing a new regulator as an independent arm
of HUD, to be charged with developing new risk-based capital standards for
the GSEs, among other roles.
On October 28, 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed into law the Hous-
ing and Community Development Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 102-550). Title XIII of the
Act, named the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness
Act (FHEFSSA), established the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
within HUD as the new regulator of Fannie and Freddie. Lobbying efforts by
Fannie to weaken the legislation were, however, widely considered successful.
In anticipation of the Senate vote’s on the Act, the New York Times commented
that the proposed bill “satisfies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac but does not go nearly
far enough to appease their critics, who contend that the two investor-owned compa-
nies enjoy an implicit Federal guarantee on loans that could someday cost taxpayers
billions of dollars if defaults soared on mortgages... Drafted in response to fears of a
future burden on taxpayers, the bill has been so watered down that Fannie Mae and
and investors in GSE-guaranteed securities would experience no losses” (Treasury (1990), pp. 7–8).
52On the other hand, an April 1991 report by CBO, ordered by the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-508), concluded that Fannie and Freddie were “reasonably well
capitalized relative to, and pose a low level of risk of loss to the government from, their exposure to credit
risk and interest rate risk” (CBO (1991), p. xviii).
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Freddie Mac are in the slightly odd position of lobbying for a bill to impose regulations
on them” (The New York Times (6/30/1992)). Compared to the federal regu-
lators of banks and thrifts, OFHEO was structurally weak and had few legal
enforcement powers (FCIC (2011), p. 40, Hagerty (2012), pp. 91–93). The new
regulator had little flexibility to adjust capital requirements and was dependent
upon Congress for its annual budget request, rather than charging the entities it
regulated for related costs, as was the case for all other regulators. The Act also
rescinded the requirement of HUD approval for all issues of stock and securi-
ties convertible into stock, unless Fannie or Freddie failed to meet their capital
standards.
One of the main provisions of the Act affecting Fannie was the introduction
of new statutory capital requirements and the mandate that OFHEO develop
risk-based capital standards based on stress tests. Addressing Treasury’s con-
cern about the Enterprises’ unfunded off-balance sheet MBS liabilities, a statu-
tory ‘minimum capital’ requirement was set at the greater of 2.5% of aggregate
on-balance sheet assets or 0.45% of the unpaid principal balance (UPB) on out-
standing MBS and equivalent off-balance sheet instruments. OFHEO was to
determine what off-balance sheet assets had a similar credit risk as MBS and
would thus be subject to the 0.45% minimum capital requirement. The mini-
mum capital requirements were scheduled to take effect on April 28, 1994, pre-
ceded by an 18-month transition period with slightly less stringent minimum
capital requirements of 2.25% and 0.4%, respectively, assessed upon on-balance
sheet assets and off-balance sheet instruments. If capital fell below the mini-
mum level, the OFHEO Director could limit increases in obligations and growth
in assets. The Act also established a ‘critical capital’ requirement of 1.25% of ag-
gregate on-balance sheet assets and 0.25% of the UPB on outstanding MBS and
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equivalent off-balance sheet instruments; if core capital fell below these thresh-
olds, Fannie would be classified as critically undercapitalized and required to
be placed in conservatorship. Finally, the Act mandated that OFHEO devise
supplemental ‘risk-based capital’ standards that could be more stringent than
the statutory requirements. The risk-based capital requirement was to be set at
130% of the amount necessary to withstand ten years of severe credit stress, with
the extra 30% designed to protect against managerial and operational risk.53
Apart from the capital regulations, the 1992 Act also imposed new affordable
housing requirements and expanded HUD’s authority to set affordable housing
goals. As mission regulator, the HUD Secretary was required to set three classes
of housing goals for: 1) low- and moderate-income housing; 2) housing in cen-
tral cities, rural areas, and other underserved areas; and 3) special affordable
housing for low- and very low-income families.54 During a two-year transition
period following its enactment, the Act set interim targets for each of the first
two goals equal to 30% of the total number of units financed. The HUD Sec-
retary was additionally required to establish a separate annual interim goal for
the two-year transition period, and was authorized to set annual goals there-
after. The amounts under the first two goals were essentially the same as the
30/30 percentage goals that had been previously established for Fannie Mae
under HUD’s 1978 regulations (see above). Under the additional special afford-
able housing goal, Fannie was obliged to cumulatively purchase an additional
$2 billion of mortgages financing housing for low- and very-low income fam-
ilies during the two-year transition period in 1993 and 1994. Annualizing, we
assign a $1 billion portfolio increase to take effect in January 1993 as a result of
53Final regulations regarding the risk-based capital standards were not issued until Septem-
ber 2001 (see below).
54The Act defined ‘low income’ as not in excess of 80% of median income in their local area
and ‘moderate income’ as not in excess of median income.
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affordable housing goals.
The Act also revised Fannie’s statutory purpose to read as follows:
“SEC. 301. The Congress hereby declares that the purposes of this title are to estab-
lish secondary market facilities for residential mortgages, to provide that the operations
thereof shall be financed by private capital to the maximum extent feasible, and to au-
thorize such facilities to “(1) provide stability in the secondary market for residential
mortgages; “(2) respond appropriately to the private capital market; “(3) provide on-
going assistance to the secondary market for residential mortgages (including activities
relating to mortgages on housing for low- and moderate-income families involving a
reasonable economic return that may be less than the return earned on other activities)
by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the distribution of
investment capital available for residential mortgage financing; (4) promote access to
mortgage credit throughout the Nation (including central cities, rural areas, and un-
derserved areas) by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the
distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage financing; and (5)
manage and liquidate federally owned mortgage portfolios in an orderly manner, with a
minimum of adverse effect upon the residential mortgage market and minimum loss to
the Federal Government.”
Freddie’s statutory purpose saw identical amendments. Of particular note,
FHEFSSA amended the statement of purpose for Fannie and Freddie to compel
them to accept “a reasonable economic return that may be less than the return earned
on other activities” in promoting affordable housing. This clause indicated that,
in exchange for the special privileges afforded by their unique public charters,
profit maximization might have to take a back seat to meeting affordable hous-
ing goals. The revision of ‘home mortgages’ to ‘residential mortgages’ was also
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indicative of a broader push to promote affordable homeownership via multi-
family and condominium residences. The explicit emphasis added regarding
supporting “central cities, rural areas, and underserved areas” was a clear nod to
redirecting or sustaining mortgage credit toward historically underserved com-
munities.
The Act additionally mandated a number of studies on the effect of fully pri-
vatizing the Enterprises, to be drafted by the Comptroller General of the United
States, HUD, Treasury, and CBO.
It is quite clear that FIRREA and the ensuing release of Treasury’s first re-
port on the GSEs, published May 31, 1990, raised red flags with Fannie’s man-
agement about tougher pending capital regulations and triggered preemptive
action to increase its capitalization. In an effort to supersede Treasury’s first
report, Fannie hired former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker to assess
its capitalization. Volcker’s report, published March 6, 1990, stated that if Fan-
nie followed its own proposed capital adequacy standards “the Company would
be in a position to maintain its solvency in the face of difficulties in the housing mar-
kets and an interest rate environment significantly mores adverse than any experienced
in the post-World War II period” and risks of a public bailout “would be remote”
(Hagerty (2012), p. 76–77).55 To meet those standards, Fannie Mae concurrently
announced that it would increase its capital stock to roughly $6 billion by the
end of 1991, up from $3.7 billion in early 1990, a goal it repeatedly claimed was
easily feasible (Barron’s (5/21/1990)). Hagerty (2012) characterized Volcker’s
report as “an audacious maneuver—perhaps [Fannie’s] most brilliant lobbying coup
ever,” as it had the effect easing pressure from Congress to increase FNMA’s
55Fannie’s proposed capital standards were “nonrecourse credit risk at a ratio of 135-to-1, recourse
and collateralized credit risk at 250-to-1, interest-rate risk on on-balance-sheet mortgages at 50-to-1, and
credit and interest-rate risk of other on-balance-sheet assets at 50-to-1” (Barron’s (5/21/1990)).
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capitalization. Irrespectively, HUD announced in mid-March that it was ramp-
ing up oversight of Fannie and Freddie, appointing six HUD executives to a
new oversight board focusing on the Enterprises’ “credit risk, interest rate risk,
and capital adequacy” (The American Banker (3/16/1990)). HUD Deputy Sec-
retary Alfred DelliBovi said the housing agency would postpone a ruling on
capital adequacy until the first round of Treasury and GAO reports were com-
pleted. A market analyst’s report published for Bernstein Research on May 10,
1990 discussed and largely dismissed concerns about capital adequacy imped-
ing earnings per share ahead of the GAO and Treasury reports (Gray (1990)).
The research note projected that Fannie would accumulate $2.7 billion in capital
over the two years to December 1991—roughly in line with Fannie’s pledged in-
crease in capitalization accompanying the Volcker report—with $2 billion from
retained earnings net of dividends, $500 million from the expiration of warrants
in the spring of 1991, and another $250 million from net reserve additions.
Fannie consistently surpassed its regulatory requirements after the mini-
mum capital thresholds were enacted in 1992 (OFHEO (1998)). In a 1998 report,
OFHEO concluded both that Fannie did not meet the 1992 capital requirements
before mid-1990 and that Fannie began boosting capital ratios around the time
of the May 1990 Treasury report in anticipation of legislative action (OFHEO
(1998)). Assessing the impact on asset growth associated with the anticipation
of the new requirements is inherently difficult. To arrive at an estimate, we
assume perfect foresight about the eventual 1992 regulations. Using the transi-
tional minimum capital requirements under the 1992 Act, OFHEO retroactively
estimated a counterfactual capital deficiency in 1989 of 40% of the transitional
minimum requirement (OFHEO (1998)). Based on year end 1989 core capital
of $3.4 billion, the implied shortfall would have been $2.3 billion ($3.4 ×( 10.6 − 1)
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= $2.3) at the end of 1989—in line with Fannie’s recapitalization plan. FNMA
added $500 million in common stock in 1991 through the exercise of outstand-
ing warrants. Assuming 75% of the remaining shortfall was achieved through
retained earnings and reserve additions by year end 1991, the residual implied
reduction from its $107 billion in mortgage holdings would be roughly $8.5 bil-
lion ($107 ×(3.4+0.5+0.75×(2.3−0.5)3.4+2.3 − 1) = $8.5). Using the two-year rule, we assign
an annualized $4.25 billion decrease in Fannie’s retained portfolio starting in
March 1990, based on expectations of new capital regulations, dated to the Vol-
cker report and Fannie’s recapitalization plan.
Identifying the proper timing for the news of expected capital regulations
is difficult, but it is clear that Fannie was anticipating more stringent capital re-
quirements and actively increasing its capitalization by March 1990 to May 1990.
Fannie’s share price rose 2.5% on the news of the Volcker report and preemptive
capitalization plan on March 6, 1990, a gain of 1.2 percentage points above the
S&P 500 for the day. Shares fell 0.7%, for a negative excess return of 1.8 per-
centage points below the S&P 500, on March 16, the day The American Banker
reported that HUD was ramping up regulatory oversight of Fannie, particu-
larly with respect to regulatory capital. There was less stock price movement
surrounding the release of the Treasury report in late May. We identify March
1990 as the month that anticipated regulatory capital increases were priced in
and began to be acted upon.
The special affordable housing goals enacted in October 1992 and made ef-
fective in January 1993 had also long been anticipated, having been backed by
both Fannie and Freddie in July 1991 (National Mortgage News (9/23/1991)).
The original version of the House-originated Government-Sponsored Enter-
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prises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1991 (102 H.R. 2900), introduced
July 16, 1991, would have required that Fannie and Freddie develop affordable
housing programs (AHPs) funded at no less than 20% of the previous year’s
dividends payments, with no provision for a lower transitional requirement.56
Starkly opposed to efforts to amend the bill to instead divert 10% of the En-
terprises’ annual net earnings to affordable housing—similar to FIRREA’s as-
sessment on the FHLBanks—the GSEs were instructed by the House Financial
Services Committee to negotiate a mutually agreeable AHP framework with a
number of housing advocacy groups. After weekend negotiations over July 27–
28, 1991, Fannie and Freddie promised to purchase $3.5 billion in low-income
single- and multifamily housing loans over 1992–1993 (Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report (8/3/1991)). On July 30, that $3.5 billion AHP commitment was
incorporated in a leadership amendment during subcommittee markup (Dow
Jones News Service (7/30/1991)). In response to the introduction and early
evolution of the GSE oversight bill, Fannie’s common shares fell 2.0% on July
16, 1991, for a negative excess return of 1.8 percentage points below the S&P 500
for the day, a skid that extended through the next day of trading. This move-
ment reversed course around the subcommittee markup, with Fannie’s shares
rising 1.4% on July 30 and 3.8% on July 31, for excess returns of 0.4 percentage
points and 3.5 percentage points, respectively.57
The final version of H.R. 2900, referred to the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs on September 30, 1991, contained affordable
housing goals of $2 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively, for Fannie and Fred-
56According to The Washington Post, dividends paid in 1990 would have implied affordable
housing funding of $34.6 million from Fannie and $19.4 million for Freddie (The Washington
Post (7/27/1991)).
57We could not discern whether adoption of the leaders’ amendment occurred before or after
the closing bell on July 30, 1991.
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die during a two-year transition period starting January 1, 1992, followed by
a minimum of 1% of purchases in subsequent years. The bill also included the
sense of Congress that the GSEs had “an affirmative obligation to promote affordable
housing for low- and moderate-income families, consistent with the corporation’s over-
all mission” and required both to develop their own affordable housing goals.
When introduced on May 15, 1992, the Federal Housing Enterprises Regulatory
Reform Act of 1992 (110 S. 2733) also included the $2 billion and $1.5 billion
special affordable housing goals, with the transition period delayed to cover
1993–1994. The accompanying Senate committee report argued that the GSEs
were not doing enough to improve homeownership for disadvantaged popu-
lations and noted that “many parties contend that the standardizing and dominant
influence of the GSEs has actually hurt the ability of lower-income and non-suburban
borrowers to obtain mortgage loans.” (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs (1992), pp. 28–29). Roughly coinciding with the Senate bill being
reported on May 15, Fannie announced on May 13 a new ‘House America’ part-
nership with mortgage originator Countrywide Financial, promising to provide
$1.25 billion worth of mortgage financing for low- and moderate-income fami-
lies over the next 18 months (Reuters (5/14/1992)), in line with the enacted $2
billion transition period goal for 1993–1994. Using the two-year rule, we assign
an impact of $1 billion to Fannie’s affordable housing goals for 1993, but date
the news of this policy change to the July 1991 negotiations, rendering the policy
as anticipated well in advance of taking effect.
The Senate committee report accompanying FHEFFSA stated that the main
motive was to “improve the regulation of government sponsored enterprises,” and
identified FIRREA’s mandated studies as the origin of the legislation, further
underscoring that the Act was the result of a long and deliberative process (Sen-
259
ate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1992), pp. 1, 6). The
Senate report made no mention of economic stabilization or the current state of
the economy as a motivation for either policy change. In his statement upon
signing the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, President Bush
emphasized an array of policy changes entirely unrelated to the business cy-
cle, touting that the bill “establishes a sound regulatory structure for Government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), combats money laundering, provides essential regulatory
relief to financial institutions, authorizes several key Administration housing initia-
tives, and reduces the risk of lead-based paint poisoning” (Bush (1992)). The only
mention of improving economic performance was related to “reducing the regu-
latory burden” on the banking system.
The bill was enacted during the tail end of the credit crunch persisting from
1990Q1 through 1992Q4. But single-family housing starts and total residential
investment rebounded throughout 1992, spurred by a combination of low inter-
est rates, unseasonably warm weather early in the year, and tax reasons (Annual
Report of the Federal Reserve Board 1992, pp. 21, 50–51, 75). Mortgage rates had
fallen to their lowest levels since the 1970s. Multifamily housing starts contin-
ued to drop throughout the year, but the decline was largely attributed to an
excess supply of vacant units and depressed rents. Given the forward-looking
nature of the bill, its gradual development starting with FIRREA and oversight
reports in 1990, political motives related to avoiding a future taxpayer bailout of
the GSEs, and that the economy and housing markets had recovered well before
the bill’s enactment, we classify the Act as unrelated to the business or financial
cycle.
HUD Interim Notices on Housing Goals
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Issued: October 13, 1993; November 30, 1994
On July 22, 1993, HUD proposed interim affordable housing goals and pro-
vided Fannie and Freddie with an opportunity to review and comment. Fannie
stated that it would be ‘hard-pressed’ to meet the low-income lending targets,
signaling that the company would take a confrontational stance against HUD’s
tough line on the lending targets and performance monitoring (The American
Banker (8/12/1993)). On October 13, 1993, HUD issued interim housing goals
for 1993–1994 that were only slightly revised in response to comments received.
The interim goals were not mandatory, but carried a lot of weight in the polit-
ically charged environment in which the GSEs were operating (The American
Banker (10/14/1993)). For Fannie, the goals with respect to low- and moderate-
income housing remained at 30% of total purchases for 1993 and 1994. For hous-
ing located in underserved areas, the goals were set at 28% and 30% for 1993
and 1994, respectively. The special assistance goal remained $2 billion for the
1993–1994 period. For both years, only purchases exceeding the level of busi-
ness activity supporting households targeted by this goal in 1992 would count
toward meeting the $2 billion interim goal.58 On a current policy basis, HUD’s
interim notices did not necessitate any change from the $2 billion statutory in-
terim housing goal for increased mortgages purchases over 1993 and 1994, as
required by FHEFSSA (see above).
On November 30, 1994, HUD temporarily extended the modified housing
goals into 1995. The goals were to apply on a pro-rated basis until permanent
goals were established later in the year (see below). The annualized goal for
58Fannie Mae estimated that it purchased $7.2 billion of mortgages in 1992 that would have
qualified toward the special assistance goal, had it applied. Fannie’s 1993–1994 special assis-
tance goal was then established as twice the 1992 baseline ($14.4 billion) plus the $2 billion
interim goal, for a two-year goal of $16.4 billion (58 FR 53048).
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special assistance purchases for Fannie Mae was lowered to $4.6 billion in 1995,
calculated as half the 1992 baseline plus $1 billion (59 FR 61504). The special
assistance goal baseline was lowered out of recognition that the dollar volume
of conventional mortgages originated in 1995 was projected to be substantially
lower than that originated in 1992. The reduced goal for 1995 was therefore
entirely due to changes in mortgage market conditions rather than policy objec-
tives, and thus we do not consider it a significant policy event.
National Homeownership Strategy
Released: May 2, 1995
On November 5, 1994, President Clinton called for a national drive to in-
crease the homeownership rate, which had started declining in 1980 and, de-
spite increases in the preceding two years, remained well below its historical
peak. He directed HUD to form a partnership with leaders in the housing in-
dustry, non-profits, and every level of government to develop a national home-
ownership strategy. In May 1995, HUD released a report, The National Home-
ownership Strategy: Partners in the American Dream, outlining a detailed plan to
add as many as eight million new families to the homeownership rolls by 2000.
This goal translated to targeting a national homeownership rate of 67.5%, rel-
ative to 64% in 1994. The strategy recommended a series of concerted actions
to help middle- and low-income families, racial and ethnic minorities, families
with children, and young adults overcome barriers to homeownership (HUD
(1995)). Fannie and Freddie were among the national partners in developing
and implementing this strategy, and the report approvingly noted some recent
relaxations in the agencies’ underwriting standards, as well as their efforts to
develop automatic underwriting software starting in 1994. The Clinton admin-
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istration had already been increasing its emphasis on combating discrimina-
tion in home mortgage lending, and the Enterprises were coming under more
public relations pressure to increase purchases of mortgages for minorities and
lower-income families. In particular, a Boston Fed study first circulated in 1992,
later published in the American Economic Review (Munnell et al. (1996)), had
recently documented evidence of systematic discrimination in mortgage lend-
ing, based on early data collected as a result of the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) of 1975 (Pub. L. 94-200, enacted December 31, 1975); the paper
reverberated throughout the industry and with the GSEs.
HUD Final Rule on Housing Goals
Issued: December 1, 1995
In November 1994, HUD temporarily extended the 1994 housing goals for
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 1995 (see above), but also drafted more strin-
gent permanent housing goals for subsequent years, which were submitted to
OMB for review (The American Banker (12/2/1994)). It was reported that the
drafted rules would increase the required share of mortgage purchases meeting
the low- and moderate-income goal from 30% to 44% by 1998. The new goals for
1996–1999 were formally issued on December 1, 1995. The low- and moderate-
income goal was raised from 30% to 40% of the total number of dwelling units
financed by mortgage purchases for 1996, and to 42% for 1997–1999. The under-
served areas goal was lowered from 30% to 21% of the total number of units for
1996, and to 24% for 1997–1999. The special assistance goal was set at 12% of the
total number of units for 1996, and at 14% for 1997–1999. The final rule also in-
cluded additional subgoals for multifamily mortgages. HUD also announced it
would establish annual goals for 2000 and beyond, but pending their issuance,
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the annual goals for subsequent years would be the same as those for 1997–1999
(60 FR 61846).
Fannie and Freddie had increased their holdings of mortgages for low-
income borrowers and underserved areas over 1992–1995. HUD reported that
it designed the final goals for the program’s early years to be attainable under
more adverse conditions than prevailed at the time, but noted that goals would
likely become binding constraints as economic conditions changed (Treasury
(1996), p. 54). Studies by HUD (1996) and Treasury (1996) concluded that Fan-
nie’s 1995 performance already exceeded all of the new goals that became ef-
fective in 1996. A 1998 GAO report later stated that “[a]vailable evidence from
HUD’s final housing goal rule indicates that the HUD Secretary generally adopted a
conservative approach to setting the final goals in December 1995 for the period 1996
through 1999. This conservative approach placed a high priority on maintaining the
enterprises’ financial soundness. For example, in 1994 and 1995, HUD and OFHEO
conducted research which found that additional mortgage purchases required under the
goals were modest and would not materially affect the enterprises’ financial condition”
(GAO (1998), p. 8). Based on this evidence, we conclude that the higher goals
issued for 1996–1999 did not induce significant changes in Fannie’s purchase
volume or composition, and thus we do not consider the new housing goals a
binding, significant policy change.
OFHEO Ruling on Off-Balance Sheet Assets
Proposed: June 8, 1995
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 granted OFHEO
moderate discretion in determining what off-balance sheet assets had a similar
credit risk profile as MBS and would thus also be subject to the 0.45% minimum
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statutory capital ratio for off-balance sheet assets. OFHEO determined that in-
terest rate and foreign exchange contracts posed a greater risk than MBS, mer-
iting greater capital adequacy ratios. A rule proposed on June 8, 1995 would
have required higher capital ratios of 3.0% of the credit equivalent amount of
uncollateralized interest rate and foreign exchange rate contracts and 1.5% of
the credit equivalent amount of collateralized contracts (60 FR 30201). OFHEO
published a final rule setting those higher minimum capital requirements on
July 8, 1996 (61 FR 35607). An OFHEO official stated that the ruling “in no
way implies any significant increase in their capital standards” and National Mortgage
News reported that “it appears the two government-sponsored enterprises already are
in compliance” (National Mortgage News (7/15/1996)). Accordingly, we do not
consider the rule a binding, significant policy change.
New HUD Regulations on Housing Goals
Published: October 31, 2000
Policy Change: Affordable Housing Goals
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$24.4 billion
News: July 1999
Effective: Jan. 2001
Classification: Non-Cyclical
Affordable housing goals came up for renewal in 1999, and HUD had the
choice of leaving them unchanged, lowering them, or raising them. On July
29, 1999, HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo announced a policy of large increases
in the goals for 2000–2004, stating that such action would address the nation’s
housing needs, strengthen the economy, create jobs through home construction,
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and transform the lives of millions of families (HUD (1999)). The low- and
moderate-income goals for Fannie and Freddie would have been increased from
42% to 48% in 2000 and 50% for 2001–2003, requiring the two GSEs to purchase
an estimated $488.3 billion in additional affordable housing mortgages over the
next decade. A proposed rule reflecting this policy was formally issued by HUD
on March 2, 2000 (65 FR 12632).
The final rule, which largely resembled the proposed rule, was issued on
October 31, 2000, to take effect January 1, 2001 (65 FR 65044). The low- and
moderate-income goal was raised from 42% to 50%, the underserved areas goal
was increased from 24% to 31%, and the special assistance goal was raised
from 14% to 20% (all as in the proposed rule). The one-year transition period
at a lower 48% target for the low- and moderate-income goal was, however,
dropped. Absent from the proposed rule, the final rule additionally adopted
recommendations from a June 2000 report by HUD and Treasury on predatory
lending, with the rule adding more stringent rules and lending guidelines to
disallow high-cost loans with predatory mortgage lending features from count-
ing toward the AHP goals (HUD (2000)).
HUD’s final policy announcement again stated that under the higher goals,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would buy an additional $488.3 billion in mort-
gages that would provide affordable housing for 7 million more low- and
moderate-income families over the next decade. Those new mortgages and fam-
ilies were above and beyond the $1.9 trillion in mortgages for 21.1 million fami-
lies that would have been purchased if HUD’s standing goals had been retained
(HUD (1999)). Assigning half of the increased volume to Fannie and dividing
equally over ten years yields additional purchases of $24.4 billion annually, as
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announced in July 1999, and to take effect January 1, 2001.
The purchase behavior of Fannie and Freddie was somewhat influenced by
the affordable housing goals issued in 2000, although the Financial Crisis In-
quiry Commission report noted that “until HUD set new affordable housing goals
for 2005, the GSEs only supplemented their routine purchases with a small volume
of loans and non-GSE mortgage-backed securities needed to meet their requirements”
(FCIC (2011), p. 185). The elevated affordable housing goals became more dif-
ficult to meet during the refinance boom of the early 2000s, though it was later
estimated that the net cost of meeting the goals was close to negligible through
2004 for both Fannie and Freddie; while “targeted affordable” loans purchased
just to meet the AHP goals had higher expected default rates and charge offs,
they also generated greater fee income (FCIC (2011), p. 186). Profitable ex-
pansion of multifamily portfolio purchases also helped meet the goals without
hurting the GSEs’ bottom line, particularly for Freddie Mac.
Financial markets appeared to react to new information revealed with both
the proposed rule and final rule publication, gradually pricing in the higher
affordable housing goals and suggesting that they had been anticipated well
ahead of taking effect. News of the proposed rule leaked on July 28, 1999, af-
ter HUD announced a scheduled press conference with Secretary Cuomo and
Fannie Mae Chairman Franklin Raines the following day.59 Fannie’s share price
slid -1.0% on July 28, for a negative excess return of -1.2 percentage points below
the S&P 500. When the proposed rule was detailed on March 2, 2000, Fannie’s
59Dow Jones News Service reported: “HUD plans to raise the level of commitment pledged by
Fannie and Freddie to repurchasing home loans initiated by low- and moderate-income families to 48%
next year from the current 42% level, according to people familiar with the matter. In addition, the new
standards are set to jump to 50% in 2002, the sources said. The new level raises the bar significantly for
Fannie and Freddie, though analysts said the higher commitment to such loans is not expected to have a
detrimental impact on their operations” (Dow Jones News Wire (7/28/1999)).
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stock price fell 1.8%, for a negative excess return of -2.0 percentage points be-
low the S&P 500. Fannie’s share price fell 3.1% upon the announcement of the
more aggressive final rule on October 31, 2000, for a negative excess return of
5.3 percentage points below the return on the S&P 500.
Shortly after HUD had published its proposed rules, Fannie announced a
new ‘The American Dream Commitment’ on March 15, 2000, which was in-
tended to fund $2 trillion in mortgages for 18 million households over the next
decade in order to “close homeownership gaps, strengthen communities and stabilize
neighborhoods, and fight discrimination and unfair practices in the mortgage market-
place” (FNMA Annual Report 2000, p. 41). Coinciding with the final rule’s is-
suance, Fannie unveiled a new ‘My Community Mortgage’ pilot program on
October 31 for low- and moderate-income borrowers, pledging to purchase $2
billion in loans with higher LTVs and lower down payments than usual as well
as $500 million in mortgages for two- to four-family unit buildings. The roll-
out of both programs are again suggestive that the ruling had been long antic-
ipated. Given financial markets’ gradual pricing of the policy change and the
overwhelming similarities between HUD’s initial and final rules, we date the
news of this policy change to the July 1999 unveiling of the proposed rule, ren-
dering the policy anticipated well in advance of taking effect in January 2001.
While HUD Secretary Cuomo’s July 1999 remarks noted that the rule would
be good for the economy, the emphasis was clearly placed on expanding home-
ownership opportunities, particularly for minority communities: “This action
will transform the lives of millions of families across our country by giving them new
opportunities to buy homes or move into apartments with rents they can afford... It
will strengthen our economy and create jobs by stimulating more home construction,
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it will help ease the terrible shortage of affordable housing plaguing far too
many communities, and it will help reduce the huge homeownership gap dividing
whites from minorities and suburbs from cities” (HUD (1999)). HUD’s press release
noted that the policy changes would “disproportionately benefit minorities and
city residents, helping to close the homeownership gap” and “help ease the crisis-
level shortage of affordable housing documented by a HUD report issued in March”
(HUD (1999)). Moreover, President Bill Clinton’s remarks on HUD’s action un-
derscored that the increase in the goals was part of a long-standing policy initia-
tive to increase homeownership and affordable housing, making no mention of
cyclical or economic concerns.60 HUD’s final rule emphasized the GSEs’ public
responsibility for promoting homeownership for underserved populations and
combating predatory lending but made no mention of cyclical concerns, noting
instead that the “mortgage market remained strong” (65 FR 65051). Fannie Mae’s
Annual Reports for 1999 and 2000 similarly both stressed the association’s posi-
tive role in expanding access to affordable housing and closing homeownership
gaps in relation to the HUD goals, without mentioning any cyclical concerns
about housing or mortgage markets. The Annual Report of the Federal Reserve
for 1999 described a “strong housing market,” noting that “[n]early all the indica-
tors of housing activity showed upbeat results for the year,” particularly new and
existing home sales, both of which hit record highs (Annual Report of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board 1999, p. 8). The development of the rules had also been set
in motion long ago by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992
and precedent from previous HUD housing goals. Consequently, we classify
60President Clinton’s prepared remarks were as follows: “During the last six and a half years,
my Administration has put tremendous emphasis on promoting homeowners and making housing more
affordable for all Americans. Our housing programs and institutions have been a success. Today, the
homeownership rate is at an all-time high, with more than 66 percent of all American families owning
their homes. Today, we take another significant step. Raising the GSEs goals will help us generate
increased momentum in addressing the nation’s housing needs. I congratulate HUD Secretary Andrew
Cuomo and the entire HUD team on their efforts in this important area” (HUD (1999)).
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the increase in affordable housing goals as non-cyclically motivated.
OFHEO Ruling on Capital Requirements Issued: September 13, 2001
OFHEO’s development of risk-based capital standards for Fannie and Freddie,
pursuant to FHEFSSA, was a slow process. On June 10, 1996, OFHEO pub-
lished a first notice of proposed rule making outlining the risk-based capital
‘stress test’ being developed, identifying a proposed methodology for calculat-
ing the ‘benchmark loss experience’ to be used for determining the GSEs’ likely
credit losses (61 FR 29592). In September, OFHEO stated that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac would probably be required to hold more capital than they cur-
rently had on hand, in order to withstand severe economic disturbances (Na-
tional Mortgage News (9/23/1996)). In June 1997, Fannie boasted that, to the
contrary, it would have a $1.5 billion surplus over required capital if OFHEO’s
proposed risk-based capital rule had been in effect (National Mortgage News
(6/2/1997)).
But reports surfaced in March 1999 that Fannie was actively lobbying for
‘substantive changes’ in the proposed risk-based capital rule under review by
OMB (The American Banker (3/2/1999)). The Washington Post reported that
FNMA would have needed an additional $3.5 billion as of September 30, 1996
to meet the $16.55 billion cushion that would have been required under the pro-
posed rules, and an additional $3.68 billion to meet the $17.73 billion that would
have been required if the rules had been in effect on June 30, 1997 (The Wash-
ington Post (3/27/1999)). Despite these projected shortfalls, Fannie’s shares
jumped 6.5%, for a gain of 7.1 percentage points above the daily return on the
S&P 500, when they were reported in conjunction with news of the final rule
clearing OMB; markets reacted positively to OFHEO’s statement that “relatively
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inexpensive hedging strategies can dramatically reduce required capital,” while Fan-
nie spokesman John Buckley touted success in Fannie’s lobbying efforts, claim-
ing “the OMB review process was helpful in improving the rule” (Dow Jones News
Service (3/26/1999)). Following the fierce behind-the-scenes efforts by Fannie
Mae officials to substantially alter the rule, OFHEO officially issued a second
proposal fleshing out the rest of the stress test on April 13, 1999 (64 FR 18084).
On December 19, 2000, OFHEO announced that the risk-based capital rule
had been completed and was again under review by OMB (The American
Banker (12/19/2000)). The final rule was made public in July 2001 and pub-
lished in the Federal Register on September 13, 2001 (66 FR 47730), but enforce-
ment was delayed for one year, until September 13, 2002—a full decade after the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 mandated the rule’s devel-
opment. The final risk-based capital standard subjected the GSEs to a severe na-
tional economic shock that was assumed to last for ten years, required the GSEs
to maintain sufficient capital to withstand the shock, and required additional
capital for management and operations risk. An evaluation of the stress test by
Stiglitz, Orszag, and Orszag (2002) concluded that if Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac could meet the standard, their risk of insolvency was conservatively one in
500,000, though that test might fail to reflect a Great Depression-type scenario.
The risk-based capital requirements were consistently and considerably
lower than the statutory minimum capital requirements that had already been
imposed by FHEFSSA (Frame, Gerardi, and Willen (2015)), so we do not con-
sider their imposition to be a binding, significant policy change. In practice,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both maintained capital well in excess of the reg-
ulatory risk-based capital standard until mid-2008 (Frame, Gerardi, and Willen
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(2015)).
SEC Disclosure Requirements
Announced: July 12, 2002
In response to growing fears that the expansion of Fannie and Freddie posed
a systemic risk to the economy, a bill was introduced in Congress to curtail the
GSEs’ privileges and tighten their regulatory oversight. The GSEs’ private com-
petitors had been particularly displeased with Fannie’s budding expansion into
the profitable subprime mortgage market. After HUD released a study in early
2000 reporting that Fannie Mae was discriminating against African Americans,
the attack from business lobbies and Congress was joined by the Clinton ad-
ministration. In a March 2000 statement before the House Financial Services
Committee, a Treasury official stated that the Treasury Department supported
removing Fannie’s statutory lending backstop. Fannie took a confrontational
approach while ramping up its formidable lobbying efforts.61 In October 2000,
Fannie announced a number of voluntary initiatives to appease their critics (see
above), but anti-GSE sentiment continued to build, spurred on by the change in
administrations in January 2001. The George W. Bush administration’s FY2003
Budget, published in February 2002, contained an unusual amount of detail
on the risks posed by Fannie and Freddie, citing concerns about the growth of
their debt outstanding and market perceptions of a government guarantee (The
Washington Post (2/6/2002)).
The Enron accounting scandals, which broke into national headlines in Oc-
tober 2001, started tipping the tide of public sentiment against the Enterprises.
61Testifying before Congress, Fannie’s CEO combatively fired back that “there is a school of
thought that if you harass Fannie Mae, maybe they’ll pull their punches... but anybody who knows me
knows that would be a very large tactical error. Anyone who thinks that trying to intimidate us would be
productive would be making a mistake” (The American Banker (1/31/2001)).
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A bill was introduced in March 2002 that would have revoked the exemptions
for Fannie and Freddie from SEC disclosure requirements (The New York Times
(7/12/2002)). On April 1, 2002, Fannie and Freddie volunteered new and more
in-depth disclosures about their use of derivatives and other risk management
practices (The American Banker (4/2/2002)). But following charges of inade-
quate disclosures, OFHEO announced on April 9 that it was launching a com-
prehensive review of the companies’ financial statements, with assistance from
the SEC (The American Banker (4/9/2002)). In an effort to preempt legislative
action and fiercer regulatory oversight, Fannie and Freddie ‘voluntarily’ agreed
on July 12, 2002 to register their common stock with the SEC and comply with
SEC disclosure requirements, including filing audited 10-K annual reports, 10-
Q quarterly reports, and 8-Ks (Pitt (2002)). While the agreement was entered
voluntarily, it could not be revoked without SEC approval.
New HUD Regulations on Housing Goals
Issued: November 1, 2004
Policy Change: Affordable Housing Goals
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$7.6 billion
News: Apr. 2004
Effective: Jan. 2005
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The GSEs’ affordable housing goals again came up for renewal in 2004, the
first time under the Bush administration. On April 5, 2004, HUD sent Congress
proposed aggressive new rules that would have raised the low- and moderate-
income goal from 50% in 2004 to 58% by 2008, the underserved goal from 31% to
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40% in 2008, and the special assistance goal from 20% to 28% in 2008. In an effort
to boost support for first-time homeowners, HUD additionally proposed a new
quota that 45% of the single-family, owner-occupied mortgages purchased by
Fannie and Freddie in 2005 had to qualify for the low- and moderate-income
goal, to be raised to 47% by 2007. A HUD spokesperson said the proposed
housing goals would not be made public until the 15-day Congressional review
process was complete, but the targets had been reported by The American Banker
on April 7 (The American Banker (4/7/2004)).
On November 1, 2004, HUD announced the final rule for housing goals for
2005–2008, which were slightly scaled back from those proposed in April (The
Wall Street Journal (11/1/2004)). Unlike the previous goals, the new rules pro-
vided for increases in the goals for every year between 2005 and 2008.62 The
stated purpose of the elevated goals, according to HUD Secretary Jackson, was
to “help the GSEs achieve the standard that Congress intended–leading the mortgage
finance industry in helping low- and moderate-income families afford decent housing”
(HUD (2004)).
HUD projected that to meet the new housing goals, Fannie and Freddie
together would have to purchase an additional 400,000 goal-qualifying home
loans during the four-year period 2005-2008, above what they would purchase
without the increase in the housing goals (HUD (2004)). The average unpaid
principal balance on goal-qualifying mortgages acquired by Fannie in 2003 was
$152,000 (HUD (2008), Table 14a-2003). This estimate suggests a four-year cu-
mulative additional purchase volume of $60.8 billion ($152,000 × 400,000 = $61
62The low- and moderate-income goal was raised to 52% in 2005, 53% for 2006, 55% for 2007,
and 56% for 2008 (American Banker (11/2/2004)). The underserved areas goal was raised to
37% in 2005, 38% for 2006 and 2007, and 39% for 2008. The special assistance goal was raised to
22% in 2005, 23% for 2006, 25% for 2007, and 27% for 2008 (69 FR 63581).
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billion). We apportion half this amount to Fannie and divided equally over four
years, for an annualized increase in purchases of $7.6 billion resulting from the
increase in affordable housing goals for 2005–2008.
When the proposed goals were leaked in early April, Fannie’s shares fell
1.3% on April 6, 2004, closing 1.1 percentage points below the S&P 500 for the
day. Fannie’s stock price rose 0.4% on November 1 and 1.5% on November
2 on leaked news of the final rule and its publication in the Federal Register,
respectively, closing 0.4 percentage points and 1.4 percentage points above the
S&P 500 those days. The final rule’s one percentage point reduction across the
three goals, relative to the proposed rule, was received positively, although the
response to shares may have been muted by speculation about the imminent
presidential election.63 Given the similarity of the final rule to the proposed
rule, and markets’ initial pricing of the more aggressive rules, we date the news
of the housing goals being made public to the April 2004 leak of the proposed
rules.
The new affordable housing goals appeared to have noticeably affected both
Fannie’s purchase behavior and bottom line. According to the Final Report of
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, HUD’s affordable housing goals pre-
dominantly resulted in supplementing routine purchases with small purchases
prior to 2004 (see above), but the goals for 2005 onward were considerably more
difficult to meet and risked considerably greater carrying losses (FCIC (2011),
pp. 186–187). Fannie expanded several initiatives purchasing targeted loans,
including its My Community Mortgage program, and loans with lower under-
63The following day shares fell 3.7%, 4.9 percentage points below the return on the S&P 500,
with the skid was attributed to President Bush winning reelection and Republicans gaining in
the House and Senate on November 2nd—election outcomes perceived as increasing the odds
of GSE reforms and further diminishing the Enterprises’ political favor (Reuters (11/3/2004))
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writing standards. Targeted goals loan purchases totaled $18 billion in 2006, or
3.4% of FNMA’s $524 billion in single-family purchases for the year; these tar-
geted loan purchases were estimated at a holding opportunity cost of $390 mil-
lion, nearly 10% of FNMA’s annual income, and which would rise to roughly $1
billion as the market deteriorated in 2007.
HUD’s aggressive affordable housing goal increases fell under a broader
policy umbrella of the administration prioritizing expanding affordable home
ownership, particularly for minorities. President Bush had emphasized using
the GSEs to promote minority homeownership in a June 2002 speech: “Too many
American families, too many minorities do not own a home. There is a home owner-
ship gap in America. The difference between Anglo America and African American
and Hispanic home ownership is too big... Fannie May and Freddie Mac, as well as
the federal home loan banks, will increase their commitment to minority markets by
more than $440 billion... This means they will purchase more loans made by banks to
African Americans, Hispanics and other minorities, which will encourage homeown-
ership. Freddie Mac will launch 25 initiatives to eliminate homeownership barriers”
(Bush (2002)). In signing into law the tellingly titled American Dream Down-
payment Act of 2003 (Pub. L. 108-186, enacted December 16, 2003), President
Bush emphasized that “[t]his administration will constantly strive to promote an
ownership society in America. We want more people owning their own home. It is in
our national interest that more people own their own home. After all, if you own your
own home, you have a vital stake in the future of our country” (Bush (2003)).
McLean (2015) also suggested that the Bush administration pushed HUD to
increase the Enterprises’ housing goals—a politically motivated move “to make
sure Fannie and Freddie understood who was the boss in the relationship” (McLean
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(2015), p. 88)—as part of a coordinated effort to rein in the GSEs, precipitated by
investigations into Fannie’s books and ensuing accounting scandal (see below).
The 2004 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board noted that, despite the
end of the refinancing boom, “the housing market remained robust” in 2004,
with new and existing home sales reaching record highs and housing starts
accelerating from already high levels in 2003; the report noted that demand
was “supported by nominal mortgage interest rates that have remained near their
lowest levels since the late 1960s” (Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board
2004, pp. 7, 11–12). Given the lack of discernible cyclical concerns and the ex-
plicit long-term objective of promoting homeownership for low- and moderate-
income households enshrined by FHEFSSA—and reaffirmed by HUD Secre-
tary Alphonso Jackson’s announcement of the new housing goals—we classify
HUD’s increased goals for 2005–2008 as motivated by social policy and, to a
lesser extent, political concerns, and unrelated to credit cycle concerns amidst
the US housing boom.
Accounting Scandal: Capital Shortfall and Surcharge
Agreement: September 27, 2004
Policy Change: ICapital Surcharge
Agency: FNMA
Impact: -$141.4 billion
News: Sep. 2004
Effective: Sep. 2004
Classification: Non-Cyclical
Allegations of accounting irregularities at Freddie Mac surfaced in 2002, and
were subsequently confirmed in 2003 both by the company and an OFHEO
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investigation (see listing below under FHLMC, Sec. 3.4.2). On July 30, 2003,
Fannie’s chairman reassured investors at a press conference that its books were
clean. Having been embarrassed by Freddie’s accounting scandal, OFHEO Di-
rector Armando Falcon hired Deloitte to undertake an investigation of Fannie’s
books, while OFHEO started gathering its own information on Fannie’s ac-
counting policies in preparation of a special report (McLean (2015), p. 85).64 On
March 31, 2004, OFHEO announced that the special examination could prompt
a restatement of prior period earnings results. OFHEO’s preliminary report,
released on September 22, 2004, concluded that Fannie had misapplied gen-
erally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) regarding accounting of hedges
and the amortization of purchase premiums, discounts on loans, securities, and
other deferred charges. Among many irregularities, the report stated that Fan-
nie inappropriately deferred $200 million of estimated amortization expenses
incurred in 1998, allowing the company to report earnings per share at exactly
the minimum level required to trigger the largest possible executive bonuses
(OFHEO (2004a)). OFHEO’s damning report also spurred the SEC to launch its
own investigation into Fannie’s accounting practices.
On September 27, 2004, OFHEO and Fannie Mae entered into an agreement
requiring FNMA to achieve a capital surplus of 30% above its minimal capi-
tal requirement by June 30, 2005, in order to provide coverage for uncertainties
regarding Fannie’s controls and accounting practices (OFHEO (2004b)). The
agreement additionally stipulated that until Fannie reached its targeted capital
surplus it had to acquire OFHEO’s prior written approval before raising its com-
mon stock dividends, calling any preferred stock, paying preferred stock divi-
dends above stated contractual rates, or making any payment to repurchase,
64OFHEO had declared Freddie to be financially sound just months before their accounting
scandal broke.
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redeem, or retire any of its shares (OFHEO (2004b)).
The SEC announced on December 15, 2004 that it concurred with OFHEO’s
ruling on Fannie’s accounting improprieties, meaning that FNMA would have
to restate earnings, prompting Fannie’s CEO Franklin Raines and CFO Timothy
Howard to both step down. On December 21, 2004, OFHEO classified Fan-
nie as ‘severely undercapitalized’ as of the third quarter of 2004, forcing Fannie
to develop and submit a recapitalization plan to OFHEO; the regulator subse-
quently approved Fannie’s capital restoration plan on February 17, 2005. The
plan detailed how FNMA would achieve the 30% capital surplus over the mini-
mum capital requirement, coined the ‘OFHEO-directed capital requirement,’ by
a revised target date of September 30, 2005. Fannie Mae would be required to
maintain this additional capital buffer until OFHEO’s Director determined the
requirement should be modified or expire.
OFHEO’s report deliberately refrained from quantifying the degree of
FNMA’s capital shortfall, but the Wall Street Journal quickly projected that it
implied regulatory capital had likely sunk $4.6 billion below the minimum re-
quirement by the end of 2003 (The Wall Street Journal (9/27/2004)), and Fan-
nie would face a much large recapitalization if required to increase its capital
cushion by 30%, as had recently been required of Freddie in lieu of its own
agreement with OFHEO (see listing under FHLMC, Sec. 3.4.2). The Journal also
suggested that Fannie might have to reduce debt and sell some of its $989 billion
asset portfolio, likely MBS holdings (The Wall Street Journal (9/27/2004)). On
November 15, FNMA announced that being required to restate earnings in ac-
cordance with GAAP hedging rules would likely result in cumulative losses of
$9 billion—the first concrete estimate of Fannie’s balance sheet fallout from the
279
accounting scandal (American Banker (11/16/2004)).65 In determining Fan-
nie’s capital shortfall, OFHEO’s December 21 announcement that Fannie was
significantly undercapitalized similarly identified the necessary adjustment to
core capital at $9.18 billion as of September 30, 2004 (OFHEO (2004c), p. 2).66
OFHEO and FNMA estimated that Fannie’s downwardly revised core capi-
tal of $28.86 billion fell $2.98 billion under its minimum capital requirement of
$31.84 billion as of September 30, 2004 (OFHEO (2004c), p. 2). Adjusting for
the 30% required capital surplus implied a total capital shortfall of $12.5 billion
as of September 2004, to be eliminated by September 30, 2005 (1.3 × ($31.84) -
$28.86 = $12.5). Fannie Mae issued $5 billion in preferred stock at the end of De-
cember 2004, but this was not sufficient for OFHEO to change Fannie’s capital
classification at year’s end 2004 (Mortgage Markets and the Enterprises in 2004,
pp. 31–33). Even after the preferred stock issue, the New York Times reported
that Fannie was estimated to need to raise an additional $7 billion over the next
six months, some of which market analysts’ expected to come from diverting
some of its $2 billion to $3 billion in retained earnings from dividends; analysts
also noted that FNMA “could also sell part of its portfolio holdings to raise additional
funds” (The New York Times (12/30/2004)).
To ‘accelerate’ rebuilding its capital stock, FNMA announced on January 18,
2005 that it was halving its quarterly dividend from $0.52 per share to $0.26
per share in the first quarter of 2005. The dividend cut would reduce quar-
65According to The American Banker, Fannie explained that if it had to adjust hedging treat-
ment dating back to the adoption of Financial Accounting Standard 133 in 2001 “it would have
to cumulatively recognize after-tax losses of roughly $13.5 billion on cash flow hedge relationships that
have been deferred, and recognize gains of approximately $4.5 billion on fair value hedges” (American
Banker (11/16/2004)).
66In line with OFHEO’s projection, Fannie later estimated that the disallowed hedge and other
accounting practices had reduced core capital by $9.0 billion as of September 30, 2004 (FNMA
10-K Filing Report 2006, p. 19).
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terly outlays by $252 million, or $1.0 billion on an annualized basis, as was
reported at the time (The New York Times (1/19/2005)). Interim FNMA Chair-
man Stephen Ashley cast the move as “a prudent and responsible action to take
as the company moves expeditiously to increase its capital” (The New York Times
(1/19/2005)). OFHEO Director Falcon echoed that the dividend cut exemplified
Fannie’s “commitment to taking necessary measures to increase the company’s capi-
tal,” and noted that OFHEO would continue reviewing and authorizing each
quarterly dividend payment (The Washington Post (1/19/2005)). The OFHEO-
FNMA agreement required OFHEO’s approval for any dividend increase rela-
tive to the prior quarter, suggesting that FNMA’s dividend cut would not last
merely one quarter. The dividend cut—Fannie’s first since 1981—reportedly
“surprised many on Wall Street,” and was widely interpreted as being forced
upon Fannie by OFHEO (The New York Times (1/19/2005)).67 The financial
press generally seemed to suggest that the dividend cut would not be reversed
in the near-term, in part because of OFHEO’s involvement and discretion over
dividends (The Wall Street Journal (1/19/2005)). Ex post, FNMA’s dividend
would not be raised from $0.26 per share until December 2006 (FNMA 10-K
Filing Report 2005, pp. 38, 158).68
The company also cancelled plans to build new corporate offices as another
measure in Fannie’s approved recapitalization effort. Complicating such cost-
cutting efforts and the ability to recapitalize through retained earnings, how-
ever, were expenses accruing from its multiple ongoing investigations and over-
hauling its accounting and risk management practices. Fannie later estimated
that costs incurred because of the scandal—covering additional lawyers, ac-
67The Wall Street Journal had noted, however, that “[s]ome analysts had warned that the company
might have to cut its dividend” (The Wall Street Journal (1/19/2005)).
68In practice, FNMA’s dividends payments on common and preferred shares fell from $2.19
billion in 2004 to $1.38 billion in 2005 (FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2005, p. F-5).
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countants, and fines—totaled $1.6 billion in 2005 and 2006 (Hagerty (2012), p.
140).
Beyond the preferred stock issue, dividend cut, cost-cutting measures, and
increased retained earnings, the capital restoration plan also included “signifi-
cantly reducing the size of [FNMA’s] investment portfolio, through both normal mort-
gage liquidations and selected sales of mortgage assets, which reduced the amount of as-
sets in the consolidated balance sheets and thereby reduced [FNMA’s] overall minimum
capital requirements” (FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2005, p 158). Market analysts
had begun suggesting that Fannie would have to reduce its portfolio to meet the
capital surcharge almost immediately after it was announced and the gravity of
FNMA’s capital shortfall began to be realized. The Washington Post reported on
September 28 that “[s]everal analysts said Fannie Mae would probably choose to sell
assets or reduce growth, in part because selling stock would require the firm to warn
investors that its current financial statements are under review and may have to be re-
stated” (The Washington Post (9/28/2004)). National Mortgage News reported in
January that Fannie was “expected to grow more slowly” as it recapitalized, and
that its November loan purchases indeed suggested as much; Fannie’s retained
portfolio fell 1.7% from October, with purchases down 15% for the month and
30% from the previous year (National Mortgage News (1/17/2005)).
Quantifying the related implications for Fannie’s balance sheet is inherently
complicated given the sheer magnitude of Fannie’s $12.5 billion capital shortfall,
short turnaround for its closure, and varying market expectations; the extent to
which both dividend cuts and portfolio reductions would be used to rebuild
Fannie’s capital was the subject of much disagreement. We assume perfect fore-
sight as of the September 27, 2004 OFHEO-FNMA agreement of information
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revealed over the next four months, notably the magnitude of Fannie’s short-
fall, Fannie’s preferred stock issue, and dividend cut. We also assume that the
September 30, 2005 recapitalization deadline imposed by the OFHEO-directed
capital requirement would be a binding constraint. The $5 billion preferred
stock issuance reduced Fannie’s shortfall to $7.5 billion, of which another $750
million would be filled in the year from September 2004 by dividend cuts, which
we assume would be maintained until Fannie was recapitalized. Assuming
other cost cutting measures and retained earnings could not have closed more
than an additional $1 billion of the shortfall within a year would imply a resid-
ual portfolio reduction of up to 13.8% ( 28.86+5+0.75+11.3×31.84 − 1 = −13.8%) by September
30, 2005. Based on Fannie’s $1.03 trillion in assets as of September 30, 2004
(FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2004, p. F-103), this estimate would imply a portfo-
lio reduction of $141.4 billion within one year.69 We assign this impact to Fan-
nie’s retained mortgage portfolio, with its news being made public in September
2004, when OFHEO released its preliminary report and entered the recapitaliza-
tion agreement with Fannie.
Retrospectively, Fannie’s 2005 10-K report emphasized that “mortgage invest-
ment activities during 2005 were conducted within the context of our capital restoration
plan... The size of our net mortgage portfolio declined 20% during 2005 to $736.5 bil-
lion as of December 31, 2005, due to a significant increase in portfolio sales, normal
liquidations and fewer portfolio purchases” (FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2005, p. 98).
The Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board similarly noted that “Fannie
Mae reduced its mortgage portfolio about 20%,” which “occurred partly because of
regulatory concerns about the adequacy of its capitalization” (Annual Report
of the Federal Reserve Board 2005, p. 27). Fannie’s total mortgage portfolio fell
69We do not apply the two-year rule here because of the September 2005 deadline for Fannie’s
recapitalization.
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$179.3 billion, or 19.6%, from $917.2 billion at the close of 2004 to $737.9 billion
at the end of 2005 (FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2006, p 121). An OFHEO report
also noted that Fannie constrained its retained portfolio activities in 2005, both
to comply with the capital restoration plan and because addressing its account-
ing problems limited Fannie’s ability to respond to innovations in mortgage
markets: “Fannie Mae, which needed to shrink its assets in order to raise its capital
ratios, reduced its retained portfolio purchases to $147 billion in 2005, down 44 per-
cent from 2004” (Mortgage Markets and the Enterprises in 2005, p. 19). That
their lower purchase volume was primarily due to capital deficiencies was fur-
ther evidenced by the fact that Freddie Mac, during the same year, saw retained
portfolio purchases increase 42% to $320.6 billion (Mortgage Markets and the
Enterprises in 2005, pp. 19–20).70
In May 2005, OFHEO reported that Fannie was “adequately capitalized” as
of March 31, meaning that its core capital exceeded the minimum capital re-
quirement, and was on track to meet its September 30 deadline for the 30%
capital surplus (The Wall Street Journal (5/20/2005)). Fannie’s core capital had
been increased to $35.0 billion, and its minimum capital requirement had de-
creased to $30.96 billion, down $880 million since September 30, as a result of
portfolio reductions. On November 1, 2005, OFHEO announced that Fannie
had indeed succeeded in achieving a 30% surplus over their minimum capital
requirement by the September 30, 2005 deadline. Fannie’s 2005 10-K cited port-
folio reductions as instrumental: “Lowering our net mortgage portfolio enabled us
to achieve our capital objective” (FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2005, p. 98).
The revelations of September 2004 had certainly not been priced into the
70Similarly, Fannie’s total purchase volume declined 8% to $558 billion in 2005, whereas Fred-
die’s total purchase volume increased 7% to $393 billion (Mortgage Markets and the Enterprises
in 2005, pp. 19–20).
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market before that month, but that quickly changed as market analysts and the
financial press caught on to the implications for Fannie’s core capital and port-
folio. The Wall Street Journal scooped the most damning of OFHEO’s charges
against Fannie on September 20, 2004, ahead of a meeting between OFHEO
and Fannie executives, reporting “evidence of a pattern of decisions by executives
aimed at manipulating earnings to present a smoother performance” (The Wall Street
Journal (9/20/2004)). According to the American Banker, the Journal’s scoop im-
mediately started adversely affecting Fannie’s share price (American Banker
(9/21/2004)). Fannie released a summary of OFHEO’s findings the morning of
Wednesday, September 22, and OFHEO’s report was made public after markets
closed that afternoon. Fannie’s common shares fell throughout the week, for
a cumulative drop of 15.1%, with the largest declines of -6.6% and -5.0%, re-
spectively, realized on Wednesday and Thursday (negative excess stock returns
of 5.2 and 4.5 percentage points below the S&P 500, respectively). The mar-
ket reaction to Fannie’s classification as severely undercapitalized after markets
closed on December 21, 2004 was considerably more muted, suggesting that the
fallout from the capital surcharge had largely been priced in already. Shares
jumped 2.2% on December 22, 2004, rising 1.9 percentage points above the S&P
500 index, seemingly driven by the concurrent news that Raines and Howard,
Fannie’s top executives, were being forced out—which investors hoped would
staunch the regulatory crackdown.
The Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board portrayed the housing mar-
ket as quite healthy but not overheated in 2004 (see ‘New HUD Regulations
on Housing Goals’ above), and we found no evidence that concerns about an
overheating housing market contributed to OFHEO’s regulatory actions. The
backlash of capital surcharges and increased micromanagement of Fannie did,
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however, follow a trajectory of increased political opposition to the GSEs by
the Bush administration and Federal Reserve, which were advocating shrink-
ing both Fannie and Freddie by either legislative or regulatory means. As part
of that coordinated effort, “Greenspan, with support from the administration, began
to testify about the risks the GSEs, particularly their huge portfolios of mortgages, posed
to the financial system” (McLean (2015), p. 86). Greenspan stated in his autobi-
ography that an “effort that began in 2003 to curb the excesses at Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac” succeeded in convincing President Bush to back the Fed “through a
two-year struggle that resulted in crucial reforms” around the time of the accounting
scandal (Greenspan (2007), p. 242).71 McLean (2015) described the accounting
scandals and OFHEO’s investigation into Fannie as a politically exploited turn-
ing point against the Enterprises’ lobbying clout: “what had been sporadic, fairly
uncoordinated efforts to rein in the GSEs became a concerted push... The Bush admin-
istration made common ground with [OFHEO Director] Falcon and began ramping up
a push for stronger regulation of Fannie and Freddie” (McLean (2015), pp. 85–
86).72 We thus classify the regulatory changes arising from FNMA’s accounting
scandal capital shortfalls as regulatory backlash to an unforeseen event and be-
ing politically motivated to some degree, but certainly unrelated to cyclical or
financial concerns.73
71According to Greenspan: “The [George W. Bush] administration also took the Fed’s advice on
policies we thought were essential for the health of the financial markets. Most important was the effort
that began in 2003 to curb excesses at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the companies chartered by Congress
to help underwrite home mortgages. They are granted a de facto subsidy by financial markets in the form
of interest rates with very low credit-risk premiums on their debt—the markets presume Uncle Sam will
bail them out in the event of default. Fannie and Freddie had been using this subsidy to pad their profits
and grow. But their dealings had begun to distort and endanger the markets and seemed likely to become
a bigger and bigger problem. The companies employed skillful lobbyists and had powerful advocates in
Congress. President Bush had very little to gain politically by supporting a crackdown. Yet he backed the
Fed through a two-year struggle that resulted in crucial reforms” (Greenspan (2007), p. 242).
72Falcon, a Democrat, had been appointed by President Clinton and had previously been
more supportive of the GSEs than the Greenspan Fed and parts of the administration. He
quickly changed his tune, publicly deriding Fannie as “a government-sponsored Enron” (McLean
(2015), p. 90).
73Ex post, the accounting scandal and regulatory backlash appear somewhat overblown and
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OFHEO-SEC-Fannie Settlement: Portfolio Caps
Agreement: May 23, 2006
Against the backdrop of the accounting scandals and OFHEO’s continued
work on its final report investigating Fannie Mae, the Bush administration and
Federal Reserve ratcheted up pressure to limit GSE portfolio growth through
legislative or regulatory action (American Banker (2/9/2005)). Testifying be-
fore Congress in February and April 2005, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan warned that the current size of the mortgage portfolios held by Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac posed a substantial risk to the economy. Greenspan
repeatedly proposed limiting each GSE’s retained portfolios to somewhere be-
tween $100 billion and $200 billion (American Banker (2/18/2005), American
Banker (4/7/2005)). In April 2005 testimony before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Treasury Secretary John Snow echoed
the administration’s view that some type of limit should be placed on the GSEs’
retained mortgage portfolios (Department of the Treasury (2005)). In his pre-
pared testimony for Congress, CBO Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin stated that
“[t]he large mortgage portfolios held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not necessary
for the secondary mortgage market to operate efficiently; those enterprises’ issuance of
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) can accomplish that outcome” (CBO (2005)). On
May 19, the administration delivered a proposal for tighter regulation of Fannie
and Freddie that included portfolio limits (The Washington Post (5/20/2005)).
Fannie, however, countered that massive reductions in the Enterprises’ portfo-
lios could raise mortgage rates or disrupt the housing market in other ways;
perhaps politically exploited to an even greeter degree. The eventual restatement of Fannie’s
results for 2002–2004 actually resulted in an increase of shareholder’s equity of $4.1 billion,
the SEC and Justice Departments both eventually dropped their investigations into Fannie’s
accounting practices, and a civil suit against ousted Fannie CEO Raines was dismissed (McLean
(2015), pp. 90–91).
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swayed by lobbying efforts, Congress did not pass GSE regulatory reform leg-
islation. In April 2006, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke countered that
the Treasury Department should consider using its power to curb debt issuances
of Fannie and Freddie if regulatory reform of the GSEs was not enacted by
Congress (American Banker (4/28/2006)).
OFHEO’s final investigative report into FNMA’s accounting practices, re-
leased May 23, 2006, claimed that Fannie had cumulatively overstated earnings
by $10.6 billion, and had improperly smoothed earnings over 1998–2004 in or-
der to increase executive compensation.74 Concurrent with the report’s release,
Fannie announced it had agreed to pay a $400 million fine and ‘voluntarily’ cap
its retained portfolio as part of its settlement with OFHEO and the SEC. The ac-
companying OFHEO consent order retained the 30% capital surplus over Fan-
nie’s minimum capital requirement. OFHEO’s report explained that FNMA’s
portfolio should be limited due to “ongoing internal controls, risk management and
accounting deficiencies and the need for the Enterprise to provide OFHEO an accept-
able business plan for managing its market activities” (OFHEO (2006a), p. 1). The
consent order capped Fannie’s mortgage portfolio assets at their value as of De-
cember 31, 2005, calculated as $727.75 billion according to GAAP standards;
the portfolio cap was to be maintained until the OFHEO Director determined
that modification or expiration of this limitation was merited based on improve-
ments in Fannie’s internal controls, accounting practices, and risk management
(OFHEO (2006a), p. 6). The GAAP accounting calculation was not an apples-to-
apples comparison with Fannie’s typical measurement of it portfolio based on
UPB; the UPB on Fannie’s retained mortgage portfolio totaled $736.5 billion as
of December 31, 2005 (FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2005, p. 14). And the UPB on
74In December 2006, Fannie Mae released restated financial results for 2002, 2003, and 2004.
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Fannie’s retained portfolio stood at a lower $721.1 billion as of March 31, 2006,
slightly below the cap (Dow Jones Newswires (5/22/2006)). Fannie was given
a window of 60 days to propose a plan for improving its business practices and
risk management, and such a plan was allowed to propose a “moderate per an-
num increase in the ‘mortgage portfolio’ assets for reasons including liquidity, housing
goals, portfolio flexibility, and competitive considerations” (OFHEO (2006a), p. 6).
Financial markets’ reaction to the OFHEO consent order was muted, with
Fannie’s stock price jumping slightly as analysts interpreted the report as
putting an end to the OFHEO inquiry, although the SEC and Justice Department
investigations remained ongoing (The New York Times (5/24/2006)). Shares
responded positively to details of the report leaked a day in advance on May 22,
which accurately reported allegations of deliberate earnings manipulation and
recommendations of limiting Fannie’s growth and maintaining the 30% capi-
tal surcharge (Dow Jones Newswires (5/22/2006)). Fannie’s shares rose 0.8%
on May 22 and 0.9% on May 23, posting excess stock returns of 1.2 percentage
points and 1.3 percentage points, respectively, above the daily performance of
the S&P 500. But much of the fallout from Fannie’s accounting scandals had
already been priced in; the New York Times noted that Fannie’s stock was down
28% since the disgraced departure of former CEO Raines in December 2004 (The
New York Times (5/24/2006)).
This subdued response of Fannie’s share price to OFHEO’s final report and
the portfolio limit’s imposition was consistent with the recent trajectory of Fan-
nie’s retained portfolio. Fannie’s portfolio had fallen from $913.2 billion in
September 2004, when OFHEO released its preliminary report on Fannie’s ac-
counting practices and FNMA agreed to raise a surplus of 30% above its mini-
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mal capital requirement, to $717.3 billion in September 2005, Fannie’s deadline
for closing its related $12.5 billion capital capital shortfall (see above). While
Freddie’s portfolio continued to grow rapidly thereafter, Fannie’s portfolio
roughly flatlined. Reuters noted that Fannie’s retained mortgage portfolio had
grown at an annualized rate of only 0.5% to $721.1 billion in March, dwarfed by
an annualized 17.2% growth rate for Freddie’s portfolio, which reached $715.4
billion for the month (Reuters (5/23/2006)). Fannie’s (not timely) 10-Q report
filed on May 9, 2006 had explained that market conditions and credit spreads
“were not sufficient to present significant opportunities to add assets to our portfolio
that met our return requirements” (FNMA NT 10-Q Filing Report May 9, 2006, p.
11).75 Fannie’s first (not timely) 10-Q filing after entering the May 2006 consent
agreement again cited market conditions as unfavorable for portfolio growth,
but also explained that the agency had not requested an increase in its port-
folio cap when submitting a business plan to OFHEO in July because of “the
need to remediate our identified control deficiencies” (FNMA NT 10-Q Filing Report
August 9, 2006, p. 12).76 Supportive of that view, the New York Times quoted
an analyst as interpreting OFHEO’s report to mean that “Fannie’s fixing of their
problems is going to take a lot more money and a lot more time than anyone had an-
75The report elaborated that “[i]n the first quarter of 2006, competition for mortgage assets remained
strong. Nominal and intermittent improvements in spreads were not sufficient to present significant
opportunities to add assets to our portfolio that met our return requirements. Portfolio purchases during
the first quarter of 2006 were $37.8 billion, compared with $54.9 billion in the fourth quarter of 2005....
The net impact of our liquidations, purchases and sales during the first quarter of 2006 was a less than
one percent decline in our portfolio balances, to $721.5 billion at March 31, 2006 from $727.5 billion at
December 31, 2005” (FNMA NT 10-Q Filing Report May 9, 2006, p. 11).
76The report specifically explained its decision as follows: “Based on current market conditions,
including strong demand for mortgage assets by other investors, we believe that the rate of liquidations
in our mortgage portfolio will provide ample ability for us to support liquidity in the secondary market
while maintaining our net mortgage portfolio assets below the limit prescribed in the OFHEO consent
order. Given our need to remediate our identified control deficiencies, the business plan we submitted to
OFHEO in July 2006, which remains subject to OFHEO’s approval, did not request an increase in the
current limitation on our mortgage portfolio during 2006. If market conditions change significantly, the
portfolio limit could constrain our ability to capitalize fully on economically attractive opportunities to
add mortgage assets to our portfolio” (FNMA NT 10-Q Filing Report August 9, 2006, p. 12).
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ticipated,” which would continue to impede its business operations (The New
York Times (5/24/2006)). In a similar vein, shortly before the cap had been
announced Bank of American analysts noted that they “[did] not expect to see
[FNMA’s] retained portfolio continue on the growth trajectory that began in the mid-
1990s” (National Mortgage News (5/22/2006)). Regardless of whether Fan-
nie’s portfolio growth was previously being restrained by unfavorable market
conditions—perhaps hard to believe, given Freddie’s steady portfolio growth in
the same market—or preoccupation with fixing internal deficiencies and getting
out from underneath greater regulatory scrutiny, there does not appear to be a
counterfactual retained portfolio growth path that would suggest the portfolio
limit was a binding, significant constraint on balance sheet activity.77
Reactions in the financial press also generally seemed to suggest that the
May 2006 FNMA-OFHEO-SEC agreement was not a binding, significant regu-
latory constraint. The American Banker cited that “several analysts said they be-
lieve OFHEO’s cap on the portfolio would only last a few months” (American Banker
(5/24/2006)). Dow Jones Newswires quoted Thomas Stanton, a GSE expert,
claiming that the “portfolio limitation appears to be symbolic rather than an effective
approach to limiting the company’s growth” (Dow Jones Capital Markets Report
(5/23/2006)). The Financial Times, on the other hand, quoted a stock analyst
projecting the portfolio limit implying a slight reduction in Fannie’s holdings
on impact, but not beyond: “Robert Lacoursiere, Bank of America analyst, said that
based on April estimates the cap would require Fannie to trim its holdings by about
[$3 billion]. But he said the cap would probably not have a major impact on Fannie’s
performance or its competitive position” (Financial Times (5/24/2006)). Financial
77To the contrary, Freddie had projected that its portfolio would continue to grow in line with
the MBS market shortly before OFHEO unexpectedly forced it to adopt a portfolio limit in July
2006, which very much appeared to be a binding, significant constraint on its retained portfolio
purchases. See listing under FHLMC, Sec. 3.4.2.
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markets’ muted response to the regulatory action only seems to underscore that
the OFHEO agreement was not seen as an impediment to Fannie’s profitability
or desired business operations.
Because Fannie’s balance sheet had not been appreciably growing in the nine
months before the cap’s announcement, there was no indication that Fannie im-
minently planned to grow its balance sheet, Fannie’s portfolio stood below the
cap, and Fannie could request modest increases in the cap, we do not consider
its imposition to have been a binding, significant constraint when announced,
which we view as consistent with the reaction of analysts and financial markets.
OFHEO Relaxes Portfolio Caps
Announced: September 19, 2007
Policy Change: Portfolio Limit Increase
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$17.15 billion
News: Sep. 2007
Effective: Sep. 2007
Classification: Cyclical
Turmoil erupted in the subprime mortgage market in July 2007, and fore-
closure concerns spread regarding ARMs and subprime mortgages resetting at
higher rates. In early August 2007, several members of Congress called for eas-
ing the Enterprises’ portfolio restrictions as well as increasing conforming loan
limits to address problems fomenting in mortgage markets (American Banker
(8/8/2007)).78 Fannie had requested on August 1 to have its portfolio limit
78The House had passed a GSE reform bill in May that would have lifted the conforming loan
limit 50% in high-cost areas, but the bill stalled in the Senate and its future seemed uncertain
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raised by 10%, but OFHEO rejected the request on August 10, citing lingering
concerns about the safety and soundness of the housing GSEs, which had still
been unable to issue timely, audited financial statements years after accounting
scandals exposed weaknesses in their accounting practices and internal controls
(The Washington Post (8/11/2007), FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2006, p. 9). Pres-
ident Bush stated that the portfolio caps on Fannie and Freddie should not be
lifted until Congress passed a bill reforming regulation of the GSEs, and Fed
Chairman Bernanke asserted that lifting the caps was unnecessary because the
GSEs could still support the mortgage market with purchases if they sold some
of their MBS holdings to the private secondary market (The Washington Post
(8/30/2007)).
After repeatedly urging OFHEO to lift the GSEs’ portfolio caps, Senator
Chuck Schumer threatened to introduce legislation circumventing the admin-
istration to increase the GSEs’ portfolios (American Banker (8/17/2007)). In
September, a bill was introduced to expand the reach of the GSEs by allowing
their mortgage portfolios to grow by 10%, and by raising the conforming loan
limit from $417,000 to $625,500. Schumer described the bill as an “emergency
measure” and both provisions were to be temporary, sunsetting after one year
(American Banker (9/11/2007)). The bill was intended to “infuse $145 billion
into the mortgage market,” with half of that amount earmarked for mortgages
refinancing ARMs with rates resetting between June 2005 and December 2009.
On September 19, OFHEO announced changes to its methodology for cal-
culating the mortgage portfolio cap in order to provide both Fannie and Fred-
die greater flexibility in managing market-based fluctuations in an increasingly
volatile market. The regulator changed both GSEs’ retained portfolio caps from
(American Banker (8/17/2007)).
293
being measured on a marked-to-market basis, as required by GAAP, to the En-
terprises’ preferred, less volatile UPB method. OFHEO also adjusted the mea-
surement of retained portfolios from an end-of-quarter basis to a less volatile
average of monthly closing values (OFHEO (2007)); the OFHEO press release
explained that “UPB often exceeds the GAAP value for the Enterprises. Due to market
fluctuations over the first seven months of 2007, this difference has ranged from $0.1 bil-
lion to $9.4 billion” (Market News International (2007)). The new agreement also
loosened Fannie’s flat portfolio limit to allow 2% annual growth—not to exceed
0.5% per quarter—from a baseline of $735 billion in UPB at the end of 2007Q3,
revised from the previous $727.75 billion portfolio limit based on GAAP mea-
surement. The quarterly growth limit of 0.5% was doubled to 1.0% for the fourth
quarter of 2007, to provide even more near-term support for mortgage markets.
The binding 2% annual limit would have allowed Fannie a portfolio of up to
$749.7 billion in UPB by September 30, 2008. Fannie’s Monthly Volume Surveys
for August and September 2007 both suggested that their retained portfolio was
roughly $4.8 billion as higher measured on a UPB basis rather than a GAAP ba-
sis (FNMA Monthly Volume Survey August 2007, p. 2, FNMA Monthly Volume
Survey September 2007, p. 2). In scoring the policy change, we add this differ-
ence to the prior $727.75 billion portfolio limit based on GAAP as a baseline
measured in UPB. Assuming the caps were binding constraints, we assign an
annualized increase in Fannie’s potential purchases of $17.2 billion in the year
starting September 2007 ($735 × 1.02 − ($727.75+$4.8) =$17.2).
In line with this estimate, the portfolio limit modifications were intended to
encourage each of the Enterprises to purchase and/or securitize up to $20 bil-
lion each in subprime loans over the next six months, and both GSEs had made
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commitments to do so (American Banker (9/20/2007)).79 The OFHEO press
release made it explicitly clear that the policy change was motivated by the sub-
prime crisis and rising foreclosure rates: “With the ongoing concerns about the
subprime mortgage market, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have announced com-
mitments to purchase tens of billions of dollars of subprime mortgages over the next
several years... These efforts should assist lenders in helping some subprime borrow-
ers avoid foreclosure” (OFHEO (2007)). While OFHEO motivated the action by
the need to add liquidity to the subprime market, the response was viewed by
many critics as too little, too late. Fannie’s share price rose 2.3% on September
19, a gain 1.7 percentage points above that of the S&P 500 for the day. Fannie
executives had still been lobbying for a substantially larger 10% increase in their
portfolio limitation (The New York Times (9/20/2007)). Given policymakers’
near-term focus on aiding the subprime mortgage market and addressing rising
foreclosure rates, we classify the portfolio limit modifications as motivated by
financial and credit cycle concerns.
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-185)
Enacted: February 13, 2008
Policy Change: Jumbo Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$41.57 billion
News: Feb. 2008
Effective: Apr. 2008
Classification: Cyclical
As the housing crisis worsened, several legislative efforts were floated in
79Given this short-run emphasis on purchasing $20 billion in subprime MBS, we do not use
the two-year rule.
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2007 that would have increased the conforming loan limit in high-cost areas.
OFHEO warned that such an increase would divert credit from less expen-
sive housing and push the Enterprises deeper into some of the riskiest mort-
gage markets (The Washington Post (2/8/2008)). As house prices continued to
fall, OFHEO announced on November 24, 2007 that conforming loan limits for
2008 would remain at the same levels as in 2006 and 2007 (American Banker
(11/28/2007)). By early 2008, the deteriorating economic situation had rapidly
become a higher congressional priority than strengthening oversight of the En-
terprises. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (ESA), enacted on February 13,
2008, allowed a temporary increase in conforming loan limits for first lien mort-
gage loans in high-cost areas—dubbed ‘super-conforming’ loans—originated
between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008. Effective April 1, 2008, the limit
for single-family homes was increased from $417,000 to the higher of that limit
or 125% of the area median home price, but not to exceed $729,750 (175% of
the previous limit). The increase did not prove fully effective until May 2008,
in part because of issues regarding the pooling and trading of the new class of
super-conforming mortgages (Vickery and Wright (2013), Fannie Mae MBSen-
ger April 2008, p. 2).
We could not find a direct estimate of the impact of ESA’s conforming loan
limit change for 2008, so we splice together several estimated impacts. Impor-
tant to our scoring, the super-conforming loan limit was subsequently reduced
from the $729,750 maximum set by ESA to $625,500 for 2009, set in motion by the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), detailed below. Assum-
ing the super-conforming loan limit December 31, 2008 sunset would take effect,
we assume the policy to be fully operational from April 2008 through December
2008. An OFHEO document later estimated that, under the high-cost area limits
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of up to $625,500, $42.3 billion worth of mortgages would have been addition-
ally eligible for Enterprise purchase for the first half of 2007, or $84.6 billion on
an annualized basis (OFHEO Mortgage Market Note 08-1, p. 9). Pro-rating this
volume for April through December 2008, we assume the agencies could have
purchased $63.45 billion worth of super-conforming loans of between $417,000
and $625,500 in 2008. According to CRS, Fannie and Freddie had securitized
83% of eligible conforming loans in 2006 (CRS (2008), p. 4), and we extend that
share to assume that 83% of eligible super-conforming loans would have been
purchased by Fannie and Freddie. The FHFA also subsequently reported that
the Enterprises acquired approximately $30 billion in mortgages in 2010 with
loan balances between the $729,750 ESA limits and the lower $625,500 limit sub-
sequently set by HERA, or roughly 1.77% of the $1.698 trillion total origination
volume in 2010 (FHFA Mortgage Market Note 11-01, p. 4).80 Applying that
percentage to 2007 originations of about $2.3 trillion would imply additional
purchases of $40.64 billion for all of 2008, or an annualized $30.48 billion for the
portion of the year starting April 1, 2008 ($2, 300 × $30$1,698 × 912 =$30.48). Com-
bining the two scores suggests a total impact of $83.14 billion for 2008 (0.83 ×
$63.45 + $30.48 = $83.14). As these were all annualized figures applicable to a
time-limited policy, we do not invoke the two-year rule, but allocate half this
amount, or $41.57 billion, to Fannie for the year starting February 2008, while
assigning the remaining half to Freddie Mac (see below).
On January 28, the House introduced a stimulus bill negotiated with the ad-
ministration, which included the eventually enacted increase in the conforming
loan limits, and the bill was passed in the House the next day. The compan-
ion bill introduced in the Senate, however, had no provision for hiking the loan
80The FHFA was created by HERA to replace OFHEO as the housing GSEs’ regulator (see
below).
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limit. But on February 7, 2008, the Senate passed a version of the bill including
the conforming loan limit increase, and the House made it clear that it intended
to pass the Senate version. Shares of Fannie increased 3.4% on February 7, clos-
ing 2.6 percentage points above the S&P 500 for the day, whereas shares posted
a smaller 2.0 percentage point excess return over the S&P 500 on the date of en-
actment.81 We date the pertinent timing of the policy to the Senate’s February 7
passage of the House version of the bill.
The preamble of the revealingly titled Economic Stimulus Act stated that its
purpose was to “provide economic stimulus through recovery rebates to individu-
als, incentives for business investment, and an increase in conforming and FHA loan
limits.” President George W. Bush’s signing statement described the bill as “a
booster shot for our economy: a package that is robust, temporary, and puts money
back into the hands of American workers and businesses. Congress passed a really good
piece of legislation, and they did so in a very expeditious manner. The bill I’m sign-
ing today is large enough to have an impact, amounting to more than $152 billion this
year, or about 1 percent of GDP” (Bush (2008)). Given policymakers’ explicit cycli-
cal motivations and the short time horizon of both the bill’s legislative history
and policy focus, we classify the introduction of super-conforming loan limits
as cyclically motivated.
OFHEO Reduces Capital Surcharge
Announced: March 19, 2008
81Even more pointedly, Freddie’s stock price increased 6.6% on February 7, closing 5.8 per-
centage points above the S&P 500 for the day, whereas its shares were flat on the day of enact-
ment, compared with a gain of 1.4% for the S&P 500.
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Policy Change: Removal of Portfolio Limit
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$9.28 billion
News: Feb. 2008
Effective: Mar. 2008
Classification: Non-Cyclical
Policy Change: Reduced Capital Surcharge
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$53.33 billion
News: Mar. 2008
Effective: Mar. 2008
Classification: Cyclical
On February 27, 2008, OFHEO announced that the caps on the Enterprises’
portfolios were being removed effective March 1, 2008. Fannie and Freddie had
begun filing timely financial reports again, for the first time since the account-
ing scandals, which purportedly motivated the change (The New York Times
(2/28/2008)). OFHEO also noted substantial progress made by both GSEs in
reforming and improving internal systems and controls. Citing recent losses
and market conditions, however, OFHEO deliberately retained the 30% capital
surcharge above the statutory minimum capital requirement, but noted that it
would discuss phasing out the surcharge buffers as the Enterprises’ consent or-
ders approached being lifted. Regarding the decision not to remove the capital
surcharges, OFHEO Director James Lockhart stated “[w]e have to be very careful
in this market not to do too much... This capital has served them extremely well over
the last nine months” (The New York Times (2/28/2008)).
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To assess the impact of the removal of the portfolio limits, we rely on the Jan-
uary 23, 2008 Greenbook forecasts of 3.1% and 3.0% growth in mortgage debt
for 2008 and 2009, respectively. Applying this growth rate to a retained portfo-
lio of $727.75 billion at year end 2007 suggests a projected increase for 2008 and
2009 of $8 billion and $15.7 billion, respectively, in mortgage assets in excess of
the 2% growth permitted before the removal of the portfolio limits. Pro-rating
growth between the two years, we assign a potential annualized increase in Fan-
nie’s retained portfolio of $9.28 billion
(
$8.0 × 1012+$15.7 × 212 =$9.28
)
, with news
of the change being made public in February 2008. A fund manager, however,
suggested that in the deteriorating mortgage market conditions the remaining
capital surcharges were much more of an impediment to portfolio growth than
the portfolio caps: “Given the losses that the agencies are taking, the binding con-
straint to the growth of the portfolio is not the Ofheo caps but the regulatory capital”
(Financial Times (2/28/2008)).
The decision to remove the Enterprises’ portfolio caps was announced “just
hours after Fannie Mae was able to successfully file its 2007 financial statements on
time” and Freddie was expected to report its 2007 statements later that day, also
on time (The Wall Street Journal (2/28/2008)). Lifting the caps was framed by
the Financial Times as giving “a green light to expand their loan portfolios yesterday
amid mounting evidence that the US housing slump is deepening” (Financial Times
(2/28/2008)), but we could find no direct evidence that the caps were tied to
market conditions rather than the Enterprises’ timely filings. Moreover, OFHEO
was making good on a September 2007 commitment “to give the Enterprises more
flexibility to increase their portfolios, in line with the agreements, when they produced
timely financial reports” (OFHEO Annual Report 2008, p. 63). Consequently, we
classify the removal of the portfolio caps in February as principally motivated
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by a standing regulatory commitment and not cyclically motivated.
The removal of the Enterprises’ portfolio caps quickly escalated pressure
from Congress, particularly Senator Schumer, to also immediately remove their
capital surcharges. The financial crisis also escalated considerably immediately
following OFHEO’s removal of the portfolio limits. Rumors had surfaced in
early March that Bear Stearns was in trouble, precipitating a market selloff; af-
ter a first failed attempt to provide a federal lifeline to the investment bank, the
Fed arranged a fire sale takeover over by JP Morgan Chase over the weekend
of March 16-17 (Johnson and Kwak (2010), pp. 158–159).82 Along with an-
nouncing its approval of the financing arrangement for JP Morgan’s acquisition
on March 16, 2008, the Fed also announced two new policy moves to provide
increased liquidity.83
On March 19, Fannie, Freddie, and OFHEO jointly announced an “initiative
to increase mortgage market liquidity” (OFHEO (2008)). As part of the initiative,
the capital surcharge was reduced from 30% to 20% of the minimal capital re-
quirement, effective immediately. And as part of a deal, Fannie and Freddie
promised to raise additional capital and buy more mortgage securities to calm
financial markets. The plan effectively reduced Fannie’s capital requirement
from $41.5 billion to $38.3 billion, or a reduction of $3.2 billion (The Washington
Post (3/20/2008)). Made possible by the earlier removal of the portfolio caps,
OFHEO estimated that the combined reduction of required capital of about $5.9
billion would allow Fannie and Freddie to immediately add up to $200 billion
worth of MBS to their portfolios (OFHEO (2008)). OFHEO Director James Lock-
82As an investment bank, Bear Stearns was, at the time, ineligible for direct loans from the
Federal Reserve.
83These included a Primary Dealer Credit Facility to allow investment banks to borrow di-
rectly from the Fed for the first time, and a 25 basis point reduction in the primary credit rate
(Federal Reserve Press Release March 16, 2008).
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hart stressed that “both companies have prudent cushions above the OFHEO-directed
capital requirements and have increased their reserves. We believe they can play an even
more positive role in providing the stability and liquidity the markets need right
now” (OFHEO (2008)).
OFHEO’s projected $200 billion impact on the Enterprises’ holdings is con-
sistent with the release of a combined $5.9 billion in capital leveraged at the
3% minimum capital requirement. For FNMA, the release of $3.2 billion in
capital could thus expand their potential retained portfolio by up to $106.7 bil-
lion
($3.2
0.03 =$106.7
)
. Using the two-year rule, we assign an annualized impact of
$53.33 billion for FNMA’s retained portfolio in the year starting March 2008 re-
sulting from the capital surcharge reduction, its news having been made public
earlier that month.
On the announcement of the cap’s removal, shares of Fannie jumped in
mid-day trading on February 27, initially gaining up to 17%; shares closed
up 1.1% for the day, or 1.2 percentage points above the daily return on the
S&P 500, as markets priced in both OFHEO’s move and worse-than-expected
fourth quarter losses also announced later that day (Dow Jones Newswires
(2/27/2008)). Fannie’s stock soared again on March 18, 2008, a day ahead of
the announced surcharge relaxation, as OFHEO announced a press conference
for the following day and the Wall Street Journal reported that the regulator was
“close to reducing—but not eliminating—an excess-capital requirement” (The Wall
Street Journal (3/18/2008)). Later in the day Reuters reported that “a source fa-
miliar with the deal said the companies would be granted on the order of $200 billion
in new mortgage-buying power, which amounts to a one-third reduction in their ex-
cess capital” (Reuters (3/18/2008)). Shares rose 27.1% on March 18, gaining 22.8
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percentage points more than the S&P 500, and another 8.8% on March 19, rising
11.3 percentage points above the daily return on the S&P 500.
OFHEO’s press release regarding the capital surcharge reduction stressed
that the move was “expected to provide up to $200 billion of immediate liquidity
to the mortgage-backed securities market” (OFHEO (2008)). The reduction of
the capital surcharge from 30% to 20% of minimum capital requirement was
specifically attributed to a mix of “[reporting and control compliance] progress, the
public purpose of the two companies, and ongoing market conditions.” Given poli-
cymakers’ unequivocally stated cyclical motivations and the short time horizon
and narrow focus of the policy change, we classify the reduction of capital sur-
charges as cyclically motivated.
Provisional Fed Lending to Fannie and Freddie
Announced: July 13, 2008
On July 13, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors authorized pro-
visional lending to Fannie and Freddie if such lending proved necessary. The
move was intended to supplement the Treasury Department’s statutory lend-
ing authority and to “promote the availability of home mortgage credit during
a period of stews in financial markets” (Annual Report of the Federal Reserve
Board 2008, pp. 216–217). No lending was made under this authorization be-
fore the Enterprises were taken into government conservatorship on September
7, 2008 (see below).
OFHEO Reduces Capital Surcharge
Announced: May 19, 2008
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Policy Change: Reduced Capital Surcharge
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$17.75 billion
News: May 2008
Effective: May 2008
Classification: Cyclical
On May 6, 2008, Fannie announced a plan to raise $6 billion in capital, in-
cluding a common stock offer. Fannie also announced that it planned to cut its
third quarter dividend from 35 cents to 25 cents. OFHEO concurrently informed
Fannie that it had lifted its May 2006 Consent Order, effective immediately, and
would reduce the standing OFHEO-directed capital surplus requirement from
20% to 15% above Fannie’s statutory minimum capital requirement when the
capitalization plan was successful completed. OFHEO also informed Fannie
that it intended to reduce the capital surcharge by an additional 5 percentage
points by September 2008, provided Fannie could maintain excess capital well
above OFHEO’s regulatory requirement (Fannie Mae Offering Circular May 8,
2008).
Fannie CEO Daniel Mudd said the extra capital would be used to “shore up
[FNMA’s] financial strength, ‘pursue the best business opportunities we have seen’ and
help the housing market recover” (The Washington Post (5/7/2008)). Mudd
added that Fannie was “being asked to play a broader role in the future of US hous-
ing.”
On May 19, 2008, OFHEO announced that Fannie’s capital surcharge was
being reduced from 20% to 15% above the statutory minimum capital require-
ment. Based on the statutory minimum capital requirement of $31.335 billion
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as of March 31, 2008, the 5 percentage point reduction in the capital surcharge
would have freed up $1.57 billion in working capital, effective immediately.
FHFA reported that Fannie’s core capital had been $42.676 billion at the end
of March (FHFA (2008a)). The Washington Post reported that “Each dollar of ad-
ditional capital it raises would enable it to increase its mortgage holdings by about $35
or expand its mortgage guarantees by about $193, according to OFHEO” (The Wash-
ington Post (5/7/2008)). Fannie’s retained mortgage portfolio totaled $726.7
billion and its guaranteed MBS held by third parties totaled $2,201.0 billion as
of March 31, 2008 (FNMA 10-Q Filing Report, March 31, 2008, p. 3), suggesting
that these volumes were supported by roughly $20.8 billion and $11.4 billion in
capital, respectively. In keeping with this split, we assume 64.8% of the released
capital would have been allocated to retained portfolio expansion as opposed
to its MBS guarantee book, allowing an expansion of up to $35.6 billion from
the 5 percentage point capital surcharge reduction
(
$1.57× $20.8$20.8+$11.4 ×35 =$35.5
)
.
Using the two-year rule, we assign a potential annualized increase to Fannie’s
retained portfolio of $17.75 billion for the year starting May 2008.
OFHEO’s announcement that the consent order was being lifted and portfo-
lio surcharges eased appears to have been unanticipated; after falling more than
7% in morning trading on the news of a $2.2 billion first quarter loss, shares re-
bounded to gain 7.1% by the afternoon “as investors focused their attention on the
concession that Fannie won from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight”
(Financial Times (5/7/2008)).
The Financial Times framed the regulatory change as Fannie having “received
permission from its regulator to expand its activities amidst the global credit squeeze”
(Financial Times (5/7/2008)). And according to the Financial Times, “Members
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of Congress [had] called for the surplus capital requirement to be lowered or eliminated
so that Fannie and Freddie can buy more mortgages and help stabilize the market”
(Financial Times (5/7/2008)). Given policymakers’ stated objective, the similar-
ities between OFHEO’s March and May capital surcharge reductions, and the
prevailing economic context, we also classify the May reduction as cyclically
motivated.
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-289)
Enacted: July 30, 2008
Policy Change: Jumbo Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FNMA
Impact: -$13.34 billion
News: July 2008
Effective: Jan. 2009
Classification: Cyclical
The omnibus housing bill overhauled regulatory oversight of the GSEs and
the FHA mortgage insurance program, and enacted an array of other housing-
related provisions.84 With regard to the GSEs, the Act ordered the dissolution
of OFHEO, FHFB, and HUD’s GSE mission team and consolidation of their re-
sponsibilities into a new independent agency, the FHFA, tasked with regulating
Fannie, Freddie, and the FHLBanks. The FHFA was granted more power to
set capital requirements than OFHEO had been, and was newly authorized to
take the GSEs into conservatorship or receivership if classified as ‘critically un-
dercapitalized,’ with a large amount of discretion to determine whether such
84Other provisions included a first-time homebuyer credit, an expanded low-income-housing
tax credit, and a HOPE for Homeowners program enabling the FHA to insure up to $300 billion
of newly refinanced mortgages through FY2011 (CQ (2009a)).
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action was necessary. The Act also legislated that HUD’s annual housing goals
for 2008 would remain in effect for 2009 and thereafter, until the FHFA adjusted
the goals.
Of considerable near-term consequence, HERA temporarily authorized the
Treasury Department to make unlimited capital and debt investments in Fannie
and Freddie, up until a December 31, 2009 sunset. Late in the bill’s develop-
ment, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson had urged Congress to amend the bill
to include “largely unfettered authority to provide Fannie and Freddie with capital
and potentially to take them over” after the Enterprises had taken a beating in fi-
nancial markets in early July (see below), and confidence was starting to erode
regarding their ability to repay some $1.5 trillion in debt (CQ (2009b)). Congress
acquiesced to Treasury’s request of not limiting a potential capital injection into
the Enterprises, but the Act increased the statutory debt ceiling from $9.815 tril-
lion to $10.615 trillion, which Congressional Quarterly characterized as intended
to provide enough room for Treasury to potentially intervene but also to “set the
limit for Treasury’s purchase of stock” (CQ (2009a)).
The Act set a new structure for conforming loan limits for the nation as a
whole, as well as for high-cost areas, which would be annually indexed based
on a home price index chosen and maintained by the FHFA director. The FNMA
Charter Act was amended to set the national conforming loan limit at $417,000
and increase the loan limit for high-cost areas, defined as areas in which 115%
of the median home price exceed the national limit, permanently setting super-
conforming loan limits to the lesser of 115% of the area median home price or
150% of the conforming loan limit. The changes were effective December 31,
2008, when the ESA super-conforming loan limit was set to expire. The Act also
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established that the conforming loan limit would be changed, effective January
1 of each year, by the percentage change in the FHFA’s preferred home price in-
dex over a preceding 12-month period; and if the home price index was falling,
no downward adjustment would be made.
On November 7, 2008, FHFA announced that the single-family home con-
forming loan limit for most areas of the country would be kept at $417,000 for
2009, thus setting the super-conforming loan limit to 115% of the area median
home price, but not to exceed $625,500 (FHFA (2008b)).85 The lower super-
conforming loan limit authorized as a result of HERA took effect on January 1,
2009, a decrease from the $729,750 maximum temporarily set by ESA for 2008.
Adopting a current policy baseline from the ESA limits, we consider this a re-
duction in the conforming limit, further underscored by the House bill’s intent
to maintain ESA’s higher super-conforming formula, which was clawed back in
conference (see below).
As noted above, FHFA subsequently reported that the Enterprises acquired
approximately $30 billion in mortgages in 2010 with loan balances between the
$729,750 limit set by ESA and the lower limits subsequently set in accordance
with HERA, or roughly 1.8% of the $1.698 trillion total origination volume in
2010 (FHFA Mortgage Market Note 11-01, p. 4). Applying that percentage to
2008 originations of about $1.51 trillion yields roughly $26.68 billion in origina-
tions between the two conforming loan limits ($1, 510 × $30$1,698 =$26.68). We do
not invoke the two-year rule as these were all annualized figures, but we allo-
cate half this potential reduction in purchases, or $13.34 billion, to Fannie while
assigning the other half to Freddie Mac (see below).
85Because home price indices were declining, it should have been no surprise that the statu-
tory indexation floor set by HERA would bind instead of the FHFA announcing a higher con-
forming loan limit for 2009.
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We do not consider news of the reduction from the ESA to HERA conform-
ing loan limit to have been made public until the conference version of HERA
was agreed upon in July 2008. Work on the bill had begun in February 2008,
drawing in part from unmoved legislation from 2007. The Senate passed a first
version of a mortgage relief bill on April 10, focused largely on housing tax
provisions, but which would not have overhauled conforming loan limits and
high-cost area provisions (CQ (2009b)). The House passed a more expansive
version of the bill on May 10, which included, among other amendments, lan-
guage increasing the GSEs’ conforming loan limits. But the House-amended
bill was almost entirely replaced with a substitute when the Senate took the
measure up again, which was passed on July 7, and substantive differences re-
mained between the two chambers’ versions regarding conforming loan limits.
The enacted conference bill, which was not finalized until July 22, included the
Senate’s preferred formula of the lesser of 115% of the median home price or
$625,000, as opposed to House’s preferred extension of the higher ESA formula
(CQ (2009b)). According to CQ Almanac, the escalating “crisis swept away the
remaining differences over the mortgage provisions” (CQ (2009b)).
The White House had been threatening to veto the bill because of objections
to various mortgage lending and Community Development Block Grant provi-
sions, but the veto threats were dropped in late July to secure the inclusion of
the GSE bailout authority. Treasury Secretary Paulson “recommended that Bush
sign the bill because of the urgency of providing a backstop to the mortgage fi-
nance giants in order to calm the jittery financial markets” (CQ (2009b)). Paul-
son had also urged Congress to pass the bill before the looming August recess.
Senators Chris Dodd and Richard Shelby, the Chairman and Ranking Member,
respectively, of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
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issued the following statement upon the bill’s enactment: “Today marks an im-
portant change in the federal government’s response to the economic strain being felt
by millions of Americans across the country and our financial markets. This is the
most sweeping housing legislation since the Great Depression, representing a turning
point in our country’s commitment to economic growth and affordable housing, and
providing relief to homeowners and communities across the country. I congratulate
the President for signing it, and I am committed to ensuring that this law is imple-
mented effectively and expeditiously, and that it fulfills its promise to prevent foreclo-
sures, restore home values, stabilize our housing markets, and create economic
growth” (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (2008)).
Given this context and the bill’s extensive provisions aimed at increasing home
purchases, boosting refinancing activity, mitigating foreclosures, and calming
financial markets, we classify enactment of the tellingly titled Housing and Eco-
nomic Recovery Act as cyclically motivated.
FHFA Conservatorship
Announced: September 7, 2008
Policy Change: Portfolio Limit Increase
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$67.5 billion
News: Sep. 2008
Effective: Sep. 2008
Classification: Cyclical
As their losses and capital position worsened, concerns about a possible
government takeover of Fannie and Freddie increased markedly in July 2008.
The two Enterprises had posted cumulative losses exceeding $11 billion for op-
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erations spanning July 2007 through March 2008. The Wall Street Journal re-
ported on July 10 that the Bush administration had been holding increasingly
serious talks about contingency plans for the agencies faltering, prompting a
heavy market selloff; shares of Fannie and Freddie fell 13% and 24%, respec-
tively, to both close at their lowest values since 1992 (The Wall Street Jour-
nal (7/10/2008)). Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s attempts to assuage in-
vestors’ fears that common shareholders would be wiped out if either company
were taken into receivership—notably “suggesting that no government takeover of
Fannie and Freddie was imminent”—backfired, and shares of Fannie and Fred-
die closed the week down roughly 30% and 45%, respectively (The New York
Times (7/12/2008)). Concerns about a bailout and wild swings in the GSEs’
share prices spilled over into one of the most volatile days of trading since the
collapse of Bear Stearns in March. On July 14, the Federal Reserve announced
that it would grant Fannie and Freddie access to its discount window, while
the Treasury announced its intention to seek legislation expanding the GSEs’
statutory credit lines with the Treasury Department. Treasury’s request for GSE
bailout authority was quickly amended onto HERA, enacted July 30, which au-
thorized unlimited purchases of the Enterprises’ securities through 2009 (see
above).
In early September, reports started to leak that an imminent rescue deal was
expected to involve placing Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship of the FHFA
(The Wall Street Journal (9/6/2008), The New York Times (9/6/2008)). On
September 7, one week before Lehman’s failure, the Treasury and FHFA an-
nounced that Fannie and Freddie were being placed in government conser-
vatorship; the Enterprises had collectively posted losses exceeding $14 billion
in the preceding four quarters. In conjunction with the conservatorship ar-
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rangement, Treasury announced it was providing two facilities to support the
Enterprises.86 A Government Sponsored Enterprise Credit Facility was made
available to provide liquidity through short-term loans collateralized by agency
MBS, as needed, until December 31, 2009. And a Senior Preferred Stock Pur-
chase Agreement (SPSPA) was entered with each Enterprise to ensure they
would have positive net worth for a considerable time. Under its SPSPA, Trea-
sury agreed to provide Fannie with up to $100 billion in capital in exchange
for senior preferred stock and warrants representing an 79.9% ownership stake;
80% ownership would have triggered a budgetary requirement to carry the
Enterprises’ obligations on the federal government’s balance sheet, which the
administration was keen to avoid. The Treasury Department received an ini-
tial $1 billion in senior preferred stock from each Enterprise, which carried a
mandatory 10% annual dividend to be paid quarterly. If the FHFA determined
that either Enterprise’s liabilities exceeded its assets, as measured by GAAP, the
Treasury would provide capital making up the difference and an equal amount
would be added to the Treasury’s senior preferred stock holdings, again carry-
ing a 10% dividend rate. The SPSPA contracts were indefinite in duration, and
could only be amended or removed by mutual agreement (FHFA (2008c)).
As part of the SPSPA, Fannie’s retained mortgage and MBS portfolio was
capped at $850 billion as of December 31, 2009, with this limit to be subsequently
reduced by 10% each year until reaching $250 billion in 2021 (FHFA (2008c)).
Prior to being taken into conservatorship, Fannie’s total retained portfolio was
approximately $760 billion as of August 30, 2008, and the conservatorship port-
folio cap was deliberately set considerably higher. Within two weeks of enter-
ing conservatorship, “Fannie and Freddie were instructed to ramp up their mortgage
86Treasury also initiated a temporary agency MBS purchase program (see listing under US
Treasury Department, Sec. 3.4.5).
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bond purchases as the financial crisis deepened and credit activity came to near stand-
still” and the financial press began reporting in October that federal regulators
were ordering each Enterprise to purchase at least $20 billion in mortgage secu-
rities each month, of “mostly subprime, Alt-A and non-performing prime mortgage
securities” (MarketWatch (10/11/2008)). The Treasury Department’s language
also strongly suggested that the GSEs’ were being compelled to increase their
mortgage holdings before their portfolio limits began to ratchet down. In a
press statement, Treasury Secretary Paulson explained “the primary mission of
these enterprises now will be to proactively work to increase the availability of
mortgage finance,” elaborating that in order “to promote stability in the sec-
ondary mortgage market and lower the cost of funding, the GSEs will modestly
increase their MBS portfolios through the end of 2009. Then, to address systemic
risk, in 2010 their portfolios will begin to be gradually reduced at the rate of 10 percent
per year, largely through natural run off, eventually stabilizing at a lower, less risky
size” (Department of the Treasury (2008a)).87 The Washington Post cited anony-
mous government officials explaining that the GSEs would “expand their lending
programs to make mortgages available to more borrowers,” with a source elaborating
that “[t]he companies were starting to contract, and that was not very useful... They
were having trouble fulfilling this mission” (The Washington Post (9/9/2008)). We
thus considerer the FHFA conservatorship agreement to be a binding political
constraint forcing a balance sheet expansion.
In his September 7 statement announcing and detailing the move to conser-
vatorship, FHFA Director Lockhart explained that “the Enterprises will be allowed
to grow their guarantee MBS books without limits and continue to “purchase replace-
87FNMA stated an “intention to hold the majority of our mortgage assets to maturity to realize the
contractual cash flows” (FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2008, p. 43), further suggesting that post-
conservatorship purchases would expand its balance sheet.
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ment securities for their portfolios, about $20 billion per month without capital
constraints” (FHFA (2008d)). The FHFA subsequently announced on October
10 that the capital classifications of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were being sus-
pended and none of the standing regulatory capital requirements would be in
effect during conservatorship (FHFA (2008a)). Paulson had acknowledged that
“[d]uring this ongoing housing correction, the GSE portfolios have been constrained,
both by their own capital situation and by regulatory efforts to address systemic risk,”
but explained that “the GSEs are expected to moderately increase the size of
their portfolios over the next 15 months through prudent mortgage purchases”
(Department of the Treasury (2008a)). The easing of regulatory efforts to ad-
dress systemic risk were clearly intended to enable retained portfolio growth.
We do not consider the release of working capital from eliminating the remain-
ing capital surcharge to be a binding constraint, as it would have allowed a
greater balance sheet expansion than permitted by the portfolio cap, which we
view as the only constraint.88
Given the volatile mortgage market conditions and heightened political risk
surrounding agency debt and equity, we do not attempt to estimate the coun-
terfactual evolution of the Enterprises’ mortgage portfolios in the absence of
the SPSPA agreements and simply measure the impact relative to the portfolio
outstanding on August 30, 2008. On that date, Fannie’s total retained portfo-
lio was approximately $760 billion, implying a maximum increase of $90 billion
enabled by the SPSPA by the end of 2009, or an annualized $67.5 billion increase
over the next year
(
$90 × 1216 =$67.5
)
.89
88Based on the statutory minimum capital requirement of $32.63 billion as of June 30, 2008,
the elimination of the remaining 15% capital surcharge would have freed up $4.89 billion in
working capital, effective immediately (FHFA (2008a)).
89We do not invoke the two-year rule because of the political pressure to immediately ramp
up purchases by $20 billion a month and the scheduled tightening of portfolio caps after 2009.
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While speculation about the Enterprises being taken into conservatorship
had been growing since July, we found no evidence that a compelled portfo-
lio expansion and/or elimination of capital constraints had been anticipated
before September 2008, our determination of the news of the conservatorship
policy details being made public. Shares had already fallen 88.8% in the year
to September 5, 2008, but conservatorship clearly had not been fully priced into
Fannie’s shares, and the announcement wiped out nearly all remaining stock-
holder equity. When markets reopened on Monday, September 8, shares of
Fannie collapsed 89.6%, to 73 cents, from previously closing at $7.04 per share.
Hereafter we largely cease reporting information about Fannie’s share price, as
its movements became highly volatile and generally uninformative after hitting
penny stock status.
In a statement, President Bush emphasized that “[p]utting these companies on
sound financial footing and reforming their business practices is critical to the health
of our financial system and to making further progress with the housing correc-
tion that today is weighing heavily on our economy. Allowing the companies to
fail or further deteriorate would damage our home mortgage market and could weaken
other credit markets that are unrelated directly to housing. Americans should be con-
fident that the actions taken today will strengthen our ability to weather the housing
correction and are critical to returning the economy to stronger sustained growth”
(Bush (2008)). Less than one month later, the Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-343, enacted October 3, 2008) authorized a $700
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) fund to be used by the Treasury
Department to further bolster the US financial system. Given the prevailing eco-
nomic contact and the justifications of Secretary Paulson and President Bush,
we classify taking Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship as clearly cyclically
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motivated.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-5)
Enacted: February 17, 2009
Policy Change: Jumbo Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$13.34 billion
News: Feb. 2009
Effective: Feb. 2009
Classification: Cyclical
Shortly after the FHFA announced the super-conforming loan limit was be-
ing reduced for 2009 pursuant to HERA, Congress intervened to statutorily
restore ESA’s higher super-conforming loan limit. On February 17, 2009, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) re-established the
$729,750 maximum super-conforming loan limit for mortgages originated dur-
ing calendar year 2009, which had lapsed at the end of 2008 (see above). Of-
ten referred to simply as the ‘Recovery Act,’ ARRA was a package of deficit
financed tax cuts, transfers to state and local governments, increased unemploy-
ment benefits and safety net spending, and infrastructure investment; it was the
largest fiscal stimulus bill enacted to combat the Great Recession, estimated at
the time to cost $787 billion by the CBO.90
The sunset of the higher super-conforming loan limit reestablished by ARRA
was extended twice. The Department of Interior, Environment, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-88, enacted October 30, 2009)
90ARRA’s price tag was subsequently revised to $840 billion (CBO (2015)).
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extended the $729,750 maximum super-conforming loan limit for mortgages
originated through the end of calendar year 2010. The Treasury Secretary and
HUD Secretary had both been calling on Congress to renew the elevated super-
conforming loan limit as part of a broader initiative to support the housing
market, including a temporary extension of the first-time homebuyer tax credit
(American Banker (10/30/2009)). Industry trade groups had also been lobby-
ing, rather successfully, for an extension well ahead of its expiration, citing that
uncertainty about its extension was making it harder to originate loans with
balances above $625,500 (National Mortgage News (11/2/2009)). The Contin-
uing Appropriations Act of 2011 (Pub. L. 111-242, enacted September 30, 2010)
again extended the $729,750 maximum limit for mortgages originated through
the end of FY2011 (September 30, 2011), after which the temporary statutory
limits expired and the lower permanent limits under HERA would again be-
come binding.
We again estimate that the difference between the ESA and HERA super-
conforming loan limits for 2009 would have amounted to roughly $26.7 bil-
lion in annualized originations being purchased by the Enterprises (see HERA
above), and allocate half this potential increase in retained portfolio purchases
to Fannie. The bill was introduced in the House in late January, considered in
the Senate in early February, and passed and enacted within three weeks of be-
ing introduced. The enacted bill more closely resembled the Senate-passed bill,
which faced a much tougher legislative hurdle of requiring three Republican
votes to clear a filibuster, and we date the news of the conforming loan limit
increase to the Senate’s passage of the bill on February 10 (CQ (2010)). We con-
sider the two subsequent extensions to reflect a continuation of current policy
in the aftermath of the Great Recession, assigning no impact.
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The preamble of ARRA stated that its purpose was “[m]aking supplemental
appropriations for job preservation and creation, infrastructure investment, energy ef-
ficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal stabiliza-
tion.” Upon signing the bill into law, President Barack Obama offered the fol-
lowing characterization of the stimulus package and the economic context mo-
tivating it: “The Act provides a direct fiscal boost to help lift our Nation from
the greatest economic crisis in our lifetimes and lay the foundation for further
growth. This recovery plan will help to save or create as many as three to four
million jobs by the end of 2010, the vast majority of them in the private sector... The
situation we face could not be more serious. We have inherited an economic crisis
as deep and as dire as any since the Great Depression” (Obama (2009)). We
classify ARRA’s increase in the super-conforming loan limit as clearly cyclically
motivated.
Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan
Announced: February 18, 2009
Policy Change: Portfolio Limit Increase
Agency: FNMA
Impact: +$50.0 billion
News: Feb. 2009
Effective: May 2009
Classification: Cyclical
On February 18, 2009, President Obama announced the Homeowner Afford-
ability and Stability Plan, a set of new initiatives and $75 billion in funding to
support the housing and mortgage markets.91 The first two prongs of the hous-
91The Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan would also come to be known as the Mak-
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ing initiative were mortgage refinancing programs, one assisting refinancing by
non-delinquent homeowners with conforming loans owned or guaranteed by
Fannie and Freddie (the Home Affordable Refinance Program, or HARP) and
another helping homeowners with documented hardship via write-down mod-
ifications to their existing mortgages (the Home Affordable Modification Pro-
gram). The third and final prong was to “support low mortgage rates by strength-
ening confidence in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac” (Department of the Treasury
(2009a)), and the Treasury’s press release noted that purchases under their
agency MBS program would continue in conjunction with the Homeowner Af-
fordability and Stability Plan (see listing under US Treasury Department, Sec.
3.4.5). The HARP program was intended to help 4- to- 5 million homeowners
refinance mortgages guaranteed by Fannie or Freddie, in part by removing the
restriction that the Enterprises could not refinance mortgages valued at more
than 80% of a home’s worth, thus granting underwater homeowners access to
credit for refinancing (Obama (2009)). The loan modification program was to
be financed with up to $50 billion in TARP funds and $25 billion from the En-
terprises.
As part of the plan, Fannie’s mortgage portfolio cap was revised upward to
allow a maximum retained portfolio of $900 billion as of December 31, 2009,
up from the $850 billion cap set by the initial FHFA conservatorship agreement.
The new agreement, however, maintained the wind-down requirement of 10%
annual reductions to the retained portfolio cap until it reached $250 billion, just
from a higher starting point. These modifications were formally established
in an amendment of the SPSPA agreement on May 6, 2009. Based on Fannie’s
current mortgage portfolio, the revision also delayed requiring Fannie reduce its
ing Home Affordable plan.
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portfolio in 2010, increasing that limit by $45 billion relative to the first SPSPA.92
We measure the impact of the SPSPA amendment as the difference in portfolio
limits and mandated reductions before and after the amendment, assigning an
annualized increase in Fannie’s potential portfolio of $50 billion, with the news
of Fannie’s increased purchase capacity being made public in February 2009.
In conjunction with the rollout of the Homeowner Affordability and Stabil-
ity Plan, the Treasury Department also announced that it was amending the
SPSPAs to increase the Treasury’s maximum funding limit for each Enterprise
from $100 billion to $200 billion (Department of the Treasury (2009a)). Neither
Fannie nor Freddie were close to having exhausted the initial $100 billion, hav-
ing collectively drawn about $66 billion to date, but the move was intended to
bolster confidence in the Enterprises. The increased funding commitments were
intended to help the Enterprises “carry out ambitious efforts to ensure mortgage af-
fordability for responsible homeowners, and provide forward-looking confidence in the
mortgage market” (Department of the Treasury (2009b)). The May amendments
to the SPSPA also increased the Enterprises’ maximum permissible level of in-
debtedness from 110% of its debt outstanding as of June 30, 2008, as stipulated
in the first agreement, to 120% of the prevailing retained portfolio limit (FHFA
(2009a)).
Market analysts characterized the administration as exploiting control over
the Enterprises in order to address the foreclosure crisis, and in a manner that
would probably worsen their losses—hence the increased Treasury commit-
92On December 31, 2008, the total retained portfolio was approximately $792 billion, implying
a maximum increase of $108 billion by the end 2009, an increase of $18 billion by end 2010, a
decrease of $63 billion by end 2011, and a total portfolio reduction of $542 billion by the end of
2022. Before the SPSPA amendment, these corresponding portfolio changes would have been
an increase of $58 billion in 2009 followed by decreases of $27 and $103.5 billion in 2010 and
2011, respectively.
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ments and continued purchase of agency securities to assuage investors (Dow
Jones Newswires (2/18/2009)). For their part, Fannie promised to work with
the administration, the FHFA, and industry partners.
The stated purpose of the increased lines of funding and the elevated re-
tained portfolio caps was “to ensure the strength and security of the mortgage
market, to help maintain mortgage affordability, and to help keep interest rates low”
(Department of the Treasury (2009b)). President Obama’s remarks about the
program emphasized that the government was taking “major steps to keep mort-
gage rates low” and that the plan would “help us end this crisis” (Obama
(2009)). We classify the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan and the
increased retained portfolio limit as cyclically motivated.
Enterprise Transition Affordable Housing Goals for 2009
Issued: August 10, 2009
After reviewing market conditions, FHFA concluded that meeting the af-
fordable housing goals for 2009 would not be feasible unless they were adjusted.
Revised goals issued on August 10, 2009 lowered the low- and moderate-income
goal from 56% to 43% in 2009; the underserved areas goal from 39% to 32%; and
the special assistance goal from 27% to 14%. The reason given by FHFA was that
market conditions, such as stricter underwriting standards, increased standards
of private mortgage insurers, and the elevated rate of unemployment, would
result in the origination of fewer goals-qualifying loans, as would a surge in re-
financing activity. Moreover, the increased market share of mortgages insured
by the government and vastly decreased private-label MBS issuance would also
contribute to fewer goal-qualifying mortgages being available for purchase by
the Enterprises (74 FR 39873). The FHFA rule also expanded the mortgage qual-
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ification for housing goals to include any mortgages already held or guaranteed
by the Enterprises that had been modified as part of the Homeowner Afford-
ability and Stability Plan (see above). Because Fannie and Freddie were already
committed to temporarily expanding their retained portfolios to support the
mortgage market (see above) and this policy was intended to reflect a changing
landscape in mortgage originations, we do not consider this a binding, signifi-
cant policy change affecting their retained portfolios.
Second Amendment to Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
Announced: December 24, 2009
On December 24, 2009, the Treasury Department announced amendments to
both SPSPAs that would provide unlimited access to credit for Fannie and Fred-
die. The move was made just before the December 31, 2009 deadline stipulated
by HERA for the Treasury to act without Congressional approval and authoriza-
tion of additional funds. The amendments removed the cap from each agency’s
standing $200 billion funding line, effective through 2012 (FHFA (2009b)). At
the time of the amendments, Treasury had injected $60 billion into Fannie and
$51 billion into Freddie—well shy of their prevailing funding lines (Dow Jones
Business News (12/24/2009)). The Treasury Department stated that the action
“should leave no uncertainty about the Treasury’s commitment to support these firms
as they continue to play a vital role in the housing market during this current crisis”
(The New York Times (12/25/2009)). We do not classify this amendment to be a
binding, significant policy change affecting the Enterprises’ retained portfolios,
as the unlimited backstop was intended to build market confidence and, if nec-
essary, absorb losses from purchases already constrained by the SPSPA portfolio
limits.
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New Enterprise Housing Goals for 2010-2011
Announced: September 2, 2010
On September 2, 2010, FHFA released new housing goals for the remainder
of 2010 and 2011, which were made effective October 14, 2010 (75 FR 55892).
The new regulations modified the housing goal structure and established over-
hauled goals for single-family, owner-occupied home mortgage purchases for
low-income families; very low-income families; and families living in geograph-
ical areas with lower-income populations, areas with high concentrations of mi-
nority residents, and federally declared disaster areas. The newly issued goals
again included multifamily housing subgoals, and additionally set a new refi-
nancing mortgage goal for low-income families. The home purchase and refi-
nancing goals were expressed as minimum goal-qualifying mortgage shares of
mortgages acquired by the Enterprises.93 The new goals also considerably re-
stricted the pool of mortgages and mortgage securities that could count toward
affordable housing goals, notably excluding private-label MBS, second mort-
gages, and single-family government loans (FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2010, p.
45).
In line with restricting qualifying types of mortgages, FHFA stated that it
did not intend for Fannie to undertake uneconomic or high-risk activities to
meet the housing goals, but rather that support should not be withdrawn from
these market segments simply because the Enterprises were in conservatorship
(75 FR 55892). And it is not clear that the goals were intended and/or per-
93The benchmark single-family goals were set at 27% for the low-income family home pur-
chases goal, 8% for the very low-income family home purchases goal, 24% for the low-income
areas home purchases goal, and 21% for the low-income family refinance goal. The low-income
areas home purchases also included a subgoal that at least 13% of purchases were to finance
mortgages for families in low-income census tracts or moderate-income families in minority
census tracts.
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ceived to have been binding; Fannie’s 10-K stated that if they missed the new
housing goals, FHFA would start by reevaluating how feasible those goals had
been. Fannie made its multifamily subgoals and exactly hit its low-income ar-
eas home purchases goal for 2010, but missed all other single-family purchase
and refinancing goals (FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2010, p. 45). In 2011, Fannie
again made its multifamily subgoals and hit its refinancing goal, but missed all
single-family purchase goals (FNMA 10-K Filing Report 2011, p. 48). Because
this policy in part reflected changing mortgage market conditions and was not
intended to expand purchase volumes, merely to retain some support for vari-
ous market segments while maintaining “sound financial conditions of the En-
terprises,” we do not consider this a binding, significant policy change affecting
their retained portfolios.
Third Amendment to Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
Announced: August 17, 2012
Policy Change: Portfolio Limit Decrease
Agency: FNMA
Impact: -$22.16 billion
News: Aug. 2012
Effective: Aug. 2012
Classification: Non-Cyclical
Freddie Mac returned to profitability in the fourth quarter of 2011, and Fan-
nie Mae followed suit the following quarter (McLean (2015), pp. 114–115). The
second quarter of 2012 was the first time since being taken into conservator-
ship that both agencies were able to pay the required 10% dividend on Trea-
sury’s senior preferred stock (Financial Times (8/17/2012)). The positive net
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worth requirement in the SPSPAs forced Fannie and Freddie to borrow from
the Treasury whenever their earnings fell short of the required 10% dividend,
thus increasing the overall Treasury injection on which dividends would be as-
sessed. Fannie and Freddie had collectively borrowed $188.4 billion through
2012Q2, some of which had been used to finance $45.7 billion in required divi-
dend payments (Reuters (8/17/2012)). The circular practice of borrowing from
the Treasury to repay the Treasury was reportedly undermining flagging mar-
ket confidence in the Enterprises, particularly unnerving institutional investors
and Asian sovereign investors of agency debt; market analysts also expected
the ‘borrow-to-repay problem’ to worsen as the Enterprises’ requisite portfolio
wind-down decreased earnings (American Banker (8/20/2012)).
On August 17, 2012, the Treasury Department announced a third SPSPA
amendment that would cap each Enterprise’s retained portfolio at $650 billion
as of December 31, 2012, and which accelerated the required portfolio limit
wind down from an annual rate of 10% to 15% (Department of the Treasury
(2012a)). The revised agreement would reduce the Enterprises’ retained portfo-
lios to $250 billion by 2018, four years faster than previously scheduled (FHFA
(2012)). Along with accelerating their wind down, the mandatory 10% quarterly
dividend was replaced by a requirement that all quarterly net profits be paid to
the Treasury—eliminating both the possibility of the Enterprises having to bor-
row from Treasury in order to pay dividends and of the Enterprises rebuilding
positive net worth (Financial Times (8/17/2012)). This revision to the SPSPAs
was quickly and disparagingly coined the ‘net worth sweep.’ The revised port-
folio caps were made effective upon signing the agreement, while the net worth
sweep was to be made effective September 30, 2012.
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As of July 31, 2012, Fannie’s total retained portfolio was approximately $673
billion, implying a total mandated reduction by $23 billion by the end 2012, a
reduction of $120.5 billion by the end of 2013, and a total reduction of $423 bil-
lion by the end of 2018. We measure the impact of the SPSPA amendment as the
difference in mandated reductions before and after the third amendment. The
SPSPA previously would have capped Fannie’s portfolio at $656.1 billion at the
end of 2012 and $590.49 billion at the end of 2013, whereas the new amendment
capped the portfolio at $552.5 billion at the end of 2013.94 We assign an annual-
ized requisite portfolio reduction of $22.16 billion for the year starting in August
2012, being the cumulative required reduction for 2013 pro-rated through July
of that year
(
($552.5 - $590.49)× 712 = -$22.16
)
.
News of the accelerated portfolio wind down and net earnings sweep had
not leaked and was clearly made public in August 2012. While the Enterprises’
share prices and excess returns became exceedingly volatile and generally un-
informative after conservatorship sunk shares under a dollar, stock movements
nonetheless suggest that the third SPSPA amendment was genuinely unantic-
ipated; Fannie’s share price fell an unusually steep 20.0% on August 17, with
trading volumes up more than ten-fold from the previous day of trading, and
the news seemed to take the financial press and market analysts aback. The net
worth sweep certainly flabbergasted Fannie’s common shareholders—at this
point primarily consisting of hedge funds, several of which had been buying
up shares of Fannie and Freddie on the cheap—and the action precipitated nu-
merous lawsuits challenging the legality of the third SPSPA.95
94The portfolio being reduced by 10% annually from $900 billion at the end of 2009 would
have yielded $590.49 by the end of 2013 ($900 ×(0.9)4), while the new 15% rate reduction from
$650 billion at the end of 2012 would have implied a portfolio limit of $552.5 billion by the end
of 2013 ($650 ×(0.85)).
95Almost all of these challenges have been thrown out to date based on HERA’s highly re-
strictive limitations upon judicial review when the agencies are in FHFA conservatorship (see
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In a press release the Treasury stated: “We are taking the next step toward re-
sponsibly winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, while continuing to support the
necessary process of repair and recovery in the housing market. ... [We want] to make
sure that every dollar of earnings each firm generates is used to benefit tax-
payers ” (Department of the Treasury (2012b)). The Treasury statement made
clear that the overwhelming motivation for the amendment was budgetary—
protecting taxpayers—as opposed to economic.96
According to McLean (2015), Treasury officials were concerned about the
optics of hedge funds earning windfall profits from a publicly funded bailout
of the Enterprises as they returned to profitability (McLean (2015), p. 114). The
net worth sweep was, however, publicly justified as assuaging the concerns of
foreign institutional investors regarding the ‘borrow-to-repay’ practice (McLean
(2015), p. 115). FHFA Director Edward DeMarco explained that “[t]hese changes
provide certainty to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and market participants as they con-
tinue to perform their critical mission of providing liquidity and stability to the coun-
try’s housing market” (The Washington Post (8/18/2012)). DeMarco had been a
driving force behind the net worth sweep, which he reportedly believed would
strong-arm Congress into following his advice to “abolish the GSEs’ charters as
part of a broader legislative package of housing finance reform” (National Mortgage
News (12/16/2014)). The Treasury statement also signaled the intention to
SEC. 1367(a)(11)(D)).
96The five “important objectives” advanced by the amendment, in order highlighted in the
statement, were: “1) Making sure that every dollar of earnings that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
generate will be used to benefit taxpayers for their investment in those firms; 2) Ending the circular
practice of the Treasury advancing funds to the GSEs simply to pay dividends back to Treasury; 3) Acting
upon the commitment made in the Administration’s 2011 White Paper that the GSEs will be wound
down and will not be allowed to retain profits, rebuild capital, and return to the market in their prior form;
4) Supporting the continued flow of mortgage credit by providing borrowers, market participants, and
taxpayers with additional confidence in the ability of the GSEs to meet their commitments while operating
under conservatorship; and 5) Providing greater market certainty regarding the financial strength of the
GSEs” (Department of the Treasury (2012b)).
327
wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, rather than restore them to their for-
mer role. In a 2014 speech, DeMarco, recently retired, corroborated this view,
noting that “[t]here was broad consensus at that time that not only had Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac failed, but the GSE model had failed ” (National Mortgage News
(12/16/2014)).
The policy priority in Congress had also switched from promoting economic
recovery to deficit reduction, most notably signaled by the legislative history
and enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (Pub. L. 112-25, enacted Au-
gust 2, 2011). McLean (2015) noted that the third amendment came a year after
the related showdown over raising the federal statutory debt ceiling, and by re-
ducing Treasury’s borrowing, the net worth sweep “helped buy breathing room”
during subsequent fiscal showdowns (McLean (2015), p. 117). The practical
effect was a significant decrease in the federal budget deficit, with Fannie and
Freddie remitting more to the government as a result of the net worth sweep
than they had initially borrowed. CBO estimated that the Enterprises had cu-
mulatively paid the Treasury dividends and net earnings of $250 billion as of
September 2016, and were projected to pay an additional $180 billion over the
next decade under current law (CBO (2016), p. 1).97
There was bipartisan support for the third amendment on Capitol Hill, with
Republicans supportive of starving the Enterprises of capital—seen as prevent-
ing them from rebounding, and a step toward killing them off entirely—and
Democrats supportive of de facto nationalization as retaining the agencies pub-
lic mission without privatizing their upside gains. The housing market had
97Congress had set prior precedent for exploiting the conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie
for budgetary purposes; the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 (Pub. L. 112-
78, enacted December 23, 2011) required the Enterprises increase fees on new guarantees by 10
basis points, to be used as an offset for extending the expiring payroll tax cut. The Enterprises
paid $8 billion in such guarantee fees to the Treasury over 2013-2016 (CBO (2016), p. 4).
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begun to recover, enough so that the Enterprises were in a position to start
rebuilding their capital bases, and the accelerated wind down only served to
reduce support to the housing market. We thus classify the third SPSPA amend-
ment as motivated by varying political priorities and budgetary concerns, as
opposed to being cyclically motivated.
New Enterprise Housing Goals for 2012-2014
Issued: November 13, 2012
On November 13, 2012, FHFA issued final rules establishing new benchmark
levels for the single-family housing goals for 2012 through 2014, to be made ef-
fective December 13, 2012 (77 FR 67535). The benchmark single-family goals
for Fannie were decreased from 27% to 23% for the low-income home purchase
goal; from 8% to 7% for the very low-income family home purchase goal; and
from 21% to 20% for the low-income family refinance goal. In justifying the
reduced benchmarks, FHFA pointed out that Fannie and Freddie were both un-
able to meet the higher benchmarks set for 2010–2011 (77 FR 67535). Because
this policy was not intended to expand purchase volumes, merely to retain some
support for various segments of the market while maintaining “sound financial
conditions of the Enterprises,” and does not appear to have been intended or per-
ceived as a binding constraint for the Enterprises, we do not consider the revised
goals a significant policy change affecting their retained portfolios.
3.4.2 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
The Federal Home Mortgage Loan Corporation was established by the Emer-
gency Home Finance Act of 1970, following the 1969 credit crunch. The pur-
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pose of Freddie Mac was to create a secondary market for conventional mort-
gages purchased from insured financial institutions and to supplement Fannie
Mae in providing funds for housing, particularly in alleviating periodic credit
shortages among thrift banks. Ownership was placed with the FHLBanks, and
the FHLBB originally served as FHLMC’s Board of Directors. Freddie was au-
thorized to purchase and make commitments to purchase residential mortgages
from the FHLBanks and their members, the FSLIC, or other financial institutions
with government-insured deposits, including commercial banks, other insured
S&Ls, and mutual savings banks. Freddie was initially to raise funds by issuing
debt securities and by selling MBS. In 1971, Freddie started the first program
of pass-through securities backed by conventional mortgages (coined ‘partic-
ipation certificates’). In 1983, Freddie issued the first collateralized mortgage
obligation (CMO), a new type of security splitting mortgage pools into multiple
classes of bonds with varying seniority.
Like Fannie, Freddie was chartered with preferential tax and regulatory
treatment, including a statutory lending backstop with the Treasury Depart-
ment. Freddie’s debt issuance, however, was not subject to concrete leverage
restrictions. And unlike Fannie, Freddie was not chartered with an explicit
statutory purpose, although FIRREA amended FHLMC’s charter to add such
a purpose in the aftermath of the S&L crisis.
While mortgage purchases were primarily financed by debt in its first years
of operation, Freddie’s purchases were primarily being financed through MBS
issuance by 1976. Freddie Mac was initially exposed to far less interest rate risk
than Fannie Mae—and correspondingly weathered the 1980 and 1981–82 reces-
sions much better—because its MBS were largely sold to third parties. Con-
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sequently, Freddie’s retained portfolio remained fairly small relative to that of
Fannie through the 1980s, as it was used primarily to fund inventory for pool-
ing mortgages into MBS or to fund new mortgage purchase programs where
volume was not yet sufficient to support securitization.
In 1989, FIRREA turned Freddie from a corporation owned by the thrift
industry to a publicly traded shareholder-owned corporation. FIRREA also
transferred regulatory authority over Freddie to HUD, and expanded its sec-
ondary mortgage market objectives to include promoting housing for low- and
moderate-income borrowers. Freddie was also extended the same $2.25 billion
standby credit line with the Treasury as afforded Fannie, bolstering the percep-
tion of an implicit government guarantee of agency debt securities. After its
public listing, earnings pressure drove Freddie to exploit the (newly enhanced)
profitability of leveraged balance sheet expansion, and its retained portfolio be-
gan catching up with Fannie (Greenspan (2005)). Accounting scandals exposed
first at Freddie and then at Fannie in the early 2000s, however, prompted greater
regulatory oversight over Freddie Mac and the imposition of portfolio limita-
tions. In September 2008, Freddie was placed under the conservatorship of the
FHFA, and was ordered to first increase then gradually reduce its portfolio of
mortgage assets.
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-351)
Enacted: July 24, 1970
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for legislative and economic context.
On July 24, 1970, the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 chartered the
Federal Home Mortgage Loan Corporation, or Freddie Mac, in order to create a
secondary market for conventional mortgages purchased from insured financial
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institutions. Title III of the Act, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Act, established the corporation as a subsidiary of the FHLBS and a member
of each of the FHLBanks. Unlike Fannie, Freddie’s charter act did not initially
define a statutory purpose, but according to Bartke (1972), Congressional intent
was for Freddie to supplement Fannie in providing additional funds for home
building and buying, as well as to alleviate the periodic liquidity problems fac-
ing the S&L industry. Freddie Mac’s first Annual Report characterized its own
mission as “to increase the secondary market volume of sales and purchases of resi-
dential mortgages and, thus, to increase the effective supply of mortgage financing, the
flexibility of mortgage investors and the attractiveness of mortgage investments. With
the goal of improving the availability of housing to all Americans, FHLMC works to
strengthen the existing secondary markets in FHA insured and VA-guaranteed mort-
gages and, more significantly, to develop a secondary market in non-federally insured
(conventional) residential mortgages” (FHLMC Annual Report 1972, p. 2).
Freddie was authorized to purchase and make commitments to purchase
residential mortgages from the FHLBanks and their members, the FSLIC, or
any other financial institution whose deposits were insured by a federal agency.
Purchases of conventional mortgages were required to be of quality acceptable
to private investors and were restricted to those whose principal balance out-
standing was under 75% of the value of the property securing the mortgage,
unless the seller retained a participation of at least 10%, the seller agreed to
repurchase the mortgage on demand, and the portion of principal balance out-
standing exceeding 75% was insured by a qualified private insurer. Another
restriction was that conventional mortgages originated more than one year be-
fore purchase could not exceed 10% of total mortgage holdings. Finally, the Act
mandated loan limits ‘comparable’ to those for Section 203(b) FHA mortgages,
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set at $33,000 for single-family homes at the time of enactment.
Initial capital was provided through $100 million in nonvoting common
stock issued only to the FHLBanks. As the owners of the FHLBanks, the thrift
industry therefore indirectly owned Freddie Mac. Because the stock was non-
voting, however, the FHLBanks could not not directly influence corporate pol-
icy. Freddie was exempt from all federal and state taxation save property taxes,
granted all the rights and limitations of FHLBank membership, and allowed
to borrow and issue market securities. While Fannie was subject to a debt-to-
capital limitation, there was no such analogous restriction for Freddie. The Act
also permitted financing operations by issuing MBS.
Mortgage purchases were initially financed through long-term debt is-
suance. In its first year of operation, the corporation purchased $326 million
in FHA/VA mortgages. In 1971, Freddie Mac developed a continuously offered
program for buying participation interests in conventional mortgages. Later in
1971, Freddie started issuing Mortgage Participation Certificates (‘PCs’), the in-
dustry’s first conventional mortgage security.98 PCs were pools of mortgages
purchased from thrifts and packaged into pass-through securities, which were
guaranteed by the corporation as to timely payment of interest and full return
of principal. Sales of PCs rapidly increased from $67 million in 1971 to $493 mil-
lion in 1972. Development of the security was part of the corporation’s strategy
to reach investors who traditionally had not financed mortgage credit. Because
of tight credit markets in 1973–1975 and an investor base comprised mostly of
S&Ls, the PC did not become the corporation’s major source of financing until
1976 (FHLMC Annual Report 1980, p. 34). A conventional whole loan purchase
98In the early years of the program, mortgagees were required to maintain a participating
interest in the resulting security, of roughly 5% of its total principal, hence its name (Hu (2011),
p. 88).
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program was introduced in 1972. By December 31, 1972, Freddie had accu-
mulated $144 million in conventional mortgage loans in portfolio, and another
$141 million worth of participations in conventional mortgage loans (FHLMC
Annual Report 1972).
From the beginning, Freddie clearly planned to steer a very different course
than Fannie, and focused overwhelmingly on securitization rather than portfo-
lio growth. The first annual report in 1972 stated that: “FHLMC does not seek to
operate the national secondary mortgage market but, rather, to create an economic and
regulatory climate in which the private sector can take on that function” and “While
the temptation simply to buy mortgages and sell bonds is great, such activity does not
contribute to creation of the kind of privately operated liquid secondary mortgage that
FHLMC is trying to help develop ” (FHLMC Annual Report 1972, pp. 5, 8).
While the creation of Freddie Mac was unequivocally a significant policy
event, we could find no estimate or convincing manner of quantifying the im-
pact of Freddie Mac’s chartering in July 1970 for its near-term purchase activity,
likely the result of considerable uncertainty regarding the time frame for getting
the corporation up and operational.
Presidential Plan To Revitalize the Housing Market
Announced: May 10, 1974
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Policy Change: Subsidized Mortgage Purchase Program
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$1.5 billion
News: May 1974
Effective: May 1974
Classification: Cyclical
On May 10, the Nixon administration authorized Freddie Mac to make $3
billion worth of below-market forward commitments to purchase conventional
mortgages from the member institutions of the FHLBank System, with funds
provided by the Treasury, in support of the sagging housing industry (CQ
(1975b)).99 As part of the same four-point housing market plan to direct more
than $10 billion to mortgage markets, the administration also authorized the
FHLBB to provide $4 billion in loan advances to member S&Ls at interest rates
below their usual borrowing costs (CRS (2004), p. 173). And the administration
authorized an additional $3.3 billion for Ginnie Mae’s subsidized purchases of
mortgages (see GNMA, Section 3.4.3).
When Freddie launched the program on May 20, mortgagees entered a
record $581 million worth of the commitments in a single day, and the full $3
billion in commitments had been exhausted within 2 months. By the end of the
year, Freddie had taken delivery of $696 million worth of loans in fulfillment of
these commitments and was rapidly staffing up its underwriting and purchas-
ing staffs to ramp up its operations accordingly (FHLMC Annual Report 1974,
p. 3). At the time of its announcement, however, there was no indication that
99The program was financed by loans from Treasury to the FHLBS, which in turn lent the
funds to Freddie Mac as advances, rather than through Freddie’s statutory lending backstop
with the Treasury Department (FHLMC Annual Report 1977, p. 23).
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Freddie’s $3 billion commitment authority would be used up so quickly. Us-
ing the two-year rule, we assign an annualized $1.5 billion increase in Freddie’s
purchase activity for the year starting May 1974, with the news of the purchase
program being made public the same month. This program, also referred to as a
‘tandem plan,’ would pave the way for the larger Brooke-Cranston tandem pro-
gram for the subsidized purchase of conventional mortgages by GNMA, which
was authorized in October 1974 (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs (1976b), p. 83).100
In his May 10 statement about the plans and pending legislation to revi-
talize the housing market, President Nixon offered the following motivation
for these policy changes: “The higher cost of money affects all sectors of the econ-
omy, but none more directly than the housing market. The Nation’s housing indus-
try, which had been producing homes at record high rates in 1971, 1972, and 1973,
is now operating far below its potential” (Nixon (1974)). He also noted that
“The conventional mortgage market normally does not require this type of Government
support, but present circumstances warrant these unusual measures.” These pol-
icy changes occurred in the midst of the recession lasting from November 1973
through March 1975, during a particularly acute mortgage credit crunch in 1974.
The CQ Almanac explained that “[t]he housing industry served as the whipping boy
for many of the nation’s economic ills in 1974. It was caught by the “double whammy”
effects of inflation, which forced up the cost of its product, and tight monetary policy
used to fight inflation, which dried up credit for the purchase of homes” (CQ (1975b)).
We thus classify the president’s plan to revitalize the housing market as clearly
cyclically motivated.
100Broadly speaking, the tandem plans refer to programs for the subsidized purchases of mort-
gages to support certain segments of the market during times of credit scarcity. See GNMA (Sec.
3.4.3) for an overview and chronology of the various tandem programs. Unlike GNMA, FHLMC
was permitted to hold the mortgages it acquired for extended periods of time.
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Under the Treasury-FHLB program, Freddie ultimately acquired $1.575 bil-
lion in conventional mortgage loans. The outstanding principal balance of the
FHLBank advances to Freddie to fund the program was retired in 1976 and
1977, with the final payment made on February 25, 1977 (FHLMC Annual Re-
port 1977, p. 23).
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-383)
Enacted: August 22, 1974
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for legislative and economic context.
Policy Change: Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$0.46 billion
News: Aug. 1974
Effective: Aug. 1974
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The limit on the outstanding balance of a conventional mortgage eligible
for purchase by Fannie and Freddie was switched from the FHA Section 203(b)
limit to the Section 5(c) limit for mortgages originated by insured S&Ls. The Act
additionally raised the Section 5(c) limit from $45,000 to $55,000, which thus be-
came the new conforming loan limit. The net increase was $22,000, from the
standing $33,000 203(b) limit, which the Act also raised to $45,000. The reason
for the change had more to do with the Freddie than with the Fannie (HUD
(1987)). As the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs re-
port explained, it was “not realistic to permit savings and loans to originate $45,000
mortgages and to restrict Freddie to the purchase of mortgages with a maximum princi-
pal mortgage tied to a varying FHA limit” (Senate Committee on Banking (1974b),
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p. 85). The change for Fannie apparently followed in order to roughly maintain
parity between the GSEs (HUD (1987), p. 35). The Act also increased the limit
on the Enterprises’ holdings of conventional mortgages originated more than
one year prior to purchase, from 10% to 20% of aggregate portfolio holdings.
The increase in the 5(c) limit was intended to “help adjust the limit in line with
the substantial increases that have occurred in recent years in the cost and value of
single family homes, particularly in the nation’s high-cost areas” (House Committee
on Banking and Currency (1974), p. 43). The House committee report stated
that raising the Enterprises’ loan limit from $33,000 to $55,0000 “would permit
FNMA to serve much the same housing market in terms of constant dollars as it was
authorized to serve when the Emergency Home Finance Act was enacted [in July 1970]”
(House Committee on Banking and Currency (1974), p. 29). We accordingly
score the conforming loan limit as keeping Fannie’s net purchase activity in
line with interim home price inflation, potentially increasing FNMA’s retained
portfolio by $1.14 billion, up 16.8% from the net purchase volume in the year
before enactment (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1).
But as Freddie’s purchases only began in 1970Q4, the July 1970 enactment
of Emergency Home Finance Act clearly does not work as a comparable bench-
mark for Freddie’s portfolio activity, and the House, Senate, and conference
committee reports accompanying the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974 offer no indication of the effect of conforming loan limit increases
explicitly for Freddie. The increase in the loan limit for Fannie, however, was
meant to maintain parity between the two GSEs, and both were operating in
the same segment of the market. To quantify the impact of the conforming loan
limit increase for Freddie, we thus apply the same 16.8% relative increase for
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Fannie’s net purchases to Freddie’s portfolio activity. Freddie’s net purchases
were, however, far more volatile, given their prevailing business model focused
solely on securitization, so we assume the Act would have increased Freddie’s
purchasing as measured by their retained portfolio instead of net purchases.
Applying a 16.8% increase to Freddie’s $2.7 billion average retained portfolio
over 1973Q3 and 1974Q2, the year before the bill’s enactment, implies a poten-
tial increase of $456 million. In practice, Freddie’s mortgage portfolio increased
from $3.1 billion in May 1974 to $4.9 billion in May 1975.
As with Fannie, we determine the news of the conforming loan limit policy
change to have been made public in August 1974. And as with Fannie, we clas-
sify the policy change as unrelated to the business or financial cycle (see listing
under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for a discussion of legislative context and classifica-
tion).
Emergency Home Purchase Assistance Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-449)
Enacted: October 18, 1974
See listing under GNMA (Sec. 3.4.3) for an overview of the Act and Brooke-
Cranston Tandem program.
The Act established the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program, which granted
the HUD Secretary powers to instruct GNMA to make subsidized purchases of
conventional mortgages, as opposed to the FHA/VA mortgages to which its ac-
tivity was otherwise restricted, to try to slow or stop declines in housing market
activity. Eligible conventional mortgages were, however, limited to an 80% LTV
ratio and $42,000 loan limit, well below the standing conforming loan limit. As
Ginnie was statutorily required to deal in government-guaranteed mortgages,
Fannie and Freddie served as agents of GNMA for its commitments and pur-
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chases of below-market rate conventional mortgages, with each institution al-
located roughly half of the funds for Ginnie’s conventional purchases (Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1976b), p. 14). As Fred-
die and Fannie were mere conduits and did not retain related purchases, we
only consider the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program to be a significant policy
change affecting Ginnie Mae (see listing under GNMA, Sec. 3.4.3).
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 (Pub. L. 95-128)
Enacted: October 12, 1977
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for legislative and economic context.
Policy Change: Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$0.21 billion
News: Oct. 1977
Effective: Oct. 1977
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The Act raised the conforming loan limit for conventional mortgages from
$55,000 to $75,000, effective immediately. The conforming loan limit formula
was revised to 125% of the S&Ls Section 5(c) limit, which was also revised up-
wards from $55,000 to $60,000. As with FNMA, we quantify the impact of the
increase in FHLMC’s conforming loan limit by assuming the change would re-
store Freddie’s real portfolio activity back to volumes surrounding the August
1974 enactment of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, pur-
suant to the House and Senate Committee report language (see discussion in
listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). Given their prevailing business model focused
on pass-through securitization, Freddie’s net purchases were, however, far more
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volatile Fannie’s, so we again quantify the Act as having increased Freddie’s
portfolio activity relative to its retained portfolio instead of net purchases.
The $3.04 billion average retained portfolio over 1973Q4 through 1974Q3
would have translated to $4.08 billion at the end of September 1977, adjusted
for the 34.3% increase in OFHEO’s seasonally adjusted Constant-Quality House
Price Index for new homes sold over 1974Q3 and 1977Q3. Relative to Freddie’s
average $3.87 billion retained portfolio over 1976Q4 and 1977Q3, the year be-
fore enactment of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, this
would have represented an increase of roughly $210 million. To the extent that
the enacted provisions were meant to anticipate further near-term inflation, we
view this as a conservative estimate.
As with Fannie, we determine the news of the conforming loan limit policy
change to have been made public in October 1977. And as with Fannie, we clas-
sify the policy change as unrelated to the business or financial cycle (see listing
under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for a discussion of legislative context and classifica-
tion).
Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-557)
Enacted: October 31, 1978
Policy Change: Mortgagee Expansion
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$2.0 billion
News: Oct. 1978
Effective: May 1979
Classification: Non-Cyclical
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The Act amended the FHLMC Act to loosen restrictions and allow purchases
from mortgage bankers, specifically “any mortgagee approved by the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development for participation in any mortgage insurance program
under the National Housing Act” (Sec. 321(a)). In doing so, Congress also explic-
itly clarified and expanded its intent with respect to Freddie Mac’s operations,
rejecting market segmented roles for Fannie and Freddie. These amendments
were scheduled to become effective on May 29, 1979 (two hundred ten days
after enactment) unless FHLMC prescribed an earlier date, which it did not.
An accompanying House Banking Committee report made clear that the
amendment was clarifying a long-standing question of whether mortgage bro-
kers were eligible to service loans sold to Freddie, which had repeatedly sur-
faced before the committee. Confusion had been amplified by language in the
conference report for the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,
which sanctioned limited servicing. Freddie’s regulations did not explicitly rule
out loan servicing by mortgage bankers, but its regulations were designed to
be met by S&Ls, and de facto ruled out loan servicing by others (House Com-
mittee on Banking (1977a), p. 38). Freddie had submitted a report to Congress
on January 31, 1978, proposing ‘rules of the road’ for responsibly authorizing
mortgage bankers to directly sell loans to the corporation (Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1978), p. 52). The House report explained
that: “Underlying this whole issue was a basic question of whether the Congress created
FHLMC solely to assist only one segment of the mortgage lending industry, to provide
a secondary market facility, to the exclusion of all other segments. It is the position
of the committee that this facility created by the Congress was to assist the
housing markets generally and not one favored segment. It has been stated that
mortgage bankers have FNMA and savings and loans have FHLMC. The committee
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rejects that justification. These are entities created by Congress generally to assist
the mortgage credit markets and not benefit just parts of it” (House Committee
on Banking (1977a), p. 39).
After the bill cleared both the House and Senate, the Washington Post re-
ported that allowing mortgage bankers to sell to FHLMC “could result in an ad-
ditional $2 billion being recycled into the residential mortgage market by 1979” (The
Washington Post (5/13/1978)). Based on this projection, we assign an annual-
ized increase in Freddie’s purchase capacity of $2 billion for its first year of op-
eration. Earlier versions of the bill had passed the House in June and the Senate
in July, but the back-and-forth between House, Senate, and White House was
particularly contentious and threatened to kill the bill. In an effort to reassert
authority over an increasingly activist HUD, a House provision would have en-
abled a “legislative veto” over newly issued HUD regulations, which President
Carter informed Congress the administration viewed as unconstitutional, and
which the Senate rejected in its bill (CQ (1979)). It was only in conference that
this House provision was dropped and the bill’s passage seemed secured. The
Senate agreed to the conference report on October 14 and the House followed
suit a day later; correspondingly, we date the news of Freddie Mac’s expanded
mortgagee authorization as being made public in October 1978.
The Senate bill was the product of 11 hearings held between January and
April 1978, and the bill enacted in October was the product of a slow and de-
liberate legislative process. The Act was focused on routine programatic autho-
rizations and reforms aimed at longer-term housing policy objectives. The ac-
companying Senate committee report made no mention of housing starts, con-
cerns about a recession, or other cyclical motives. The accompanying House
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report characterized the economy as “in its third year of recovery from the reces-
sion of 1975,” noting that construction unemployment was unusually low and
housing starts were roughly unchanged from the previous year, although infla-
tion and higher interest rates were projected to slightly dampen home sales and
housing starts.101 The overview of projected impacts of the bill stressed creat-
ing certain types of housing units, but in no way stressed boosting employment
or overall housing starts. Moreover, the mortgagee expansion was intended to
resolve a longstanding regulatory question and better advance Congress’s orig-
inal intent with respect to the creation of Freddie Mac. We thus classify the ex-
pansion of FHLMC-eligible mortgagees as clarifying past congressional intent
and advancing longer-term policy objectives, while unrelated to the business or
financial cycle.
Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-153)
Enacted: December 21, 1979
Policy Change: Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$0.86 billion
News: Dec. 1979
Effective: Dec. 1979
Classification: Cyclical
The Act amended the FHLMC Act to open purchase of Freddie’s mortgages,
mortgage securities, and obligations to any person trust or legally chartered or-
ganization, and granted Freddie’s securities the same legal standing as US gov-
101The economic overview and discussion of inflation, housing, and the bill’s likely impacts
were included pursuant to Rule XI, Clause 2(1)(4) of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
which required the committee make a statement regarding the inflationary impact of the bill.
Hence the economic overview was not motivated by bill-specific cyclical economic concerns.
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ernment securities, up to a sunset of June 30, 1985.102 FHLMC’s charter was also
amended to make its securities and obligations legal collateral, including for
public deposits. And the Act newly allowed Freddie to purchase liens and in-
terests in housing cooperatives. The committee report accompanying the House
bill, where the amendments to Freddie’s charter originated, explained that they
were “intended to assure a broader market for the Corporation’s securities” (House
Committee on Banking (1979a), p. 26).
The Act also raised the conforming loan limit for conventional mortgages
from $75,000 to $93,750 by increasing the benchmark savings and loans Section
5(c) single-family mortgage limit from $60,000 to $75,000, effective immediately.
Regarding the 5(c) limit, the committee report accompanying the Senate bill
explained that “[b]ecause home prices have escalated 20 to 25 percent in the past 2
years, the committee believes that the $60,000 limit has become obsolete and is severely
restricting the ability of thrifts to meet the borrowing amounts requested by today’s
home buying public” and that increasing that limit to $75,000 was meant to “reflect
inflation in home prices (and increase in mortgage size) since last amended in 1977”
(Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1979), p. 20). In
explaining similar increases in the FHA 203(b) limits, the Senate report similarly
noted that median home sales prices had jumped roughly 30% since limits had
last been increased by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977
(see above), and that the FHA’s market share had dropped from roughly 15%
to 5% because loan limits had not kept up with inflation or the market (Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1979), p. 14).
102More specifically, the amendment established that: “Where State law limits the purchase, hold-
ing, or investment in obligations issued by the United States by such a person, trust, or organization,
such Corporation mortgages, obligations, and other securities shall such Corporation mortgages, obliga-
tions, and other securities shall be considered to be obligations issued by the United States for purposes of
the limitation” (Pub. L. 96-153, Sec. 316(a)).
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To quantify the impact of the increase in FHLMC’s conforming loan limit,
we assume, pursuant to the Senate Committee report language, that the change
would restore Freddie’s retained portfolio activity to that proximate to the Oc-
tober 1977 enactment of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977
(see above).103 The $3.40 billion average portfolio over 1977Q1 through 1977Q4
would have translated to $4.27 billion at the end of September 1979, adjusted
for the 25.5% increase in OFHEO’s seasonally adjusted Constant-Quality House
Price Index for new homes sold over 1977Q4 and 1979Q3; relative to an average
portfolio of $3.41 billion over 1978Q4 to 1979Q3, this would imply an annual-
ized portfolio increase of $857 million, which we assign to the year starting De-
cember 1979. In practice, Freddie’s portfolio grew from $3.9 billion in December
1979 to $5.0 billion in December 1980.
Versions of the bill were introduced in both chambers in mid-May, passed
the House in early June, and passed the Senate in mid-July, but there were sub-
stantive differences between the two bills—including over the 5(c) loan limit.
The Senate bill proposed raising the single family loan limit from $60,000 to
$75,000, whereas the House bill proposed no change (House Committee on
Banking (1979b), p. 73). The loan limit increase won out in the conference
report, which the Senate agreed to on December 18, followed by the House the
next day. Because of this legislative uncertainty over the policy change at hand,
we determine that credible news of Freddie Mac’s conforming loan limit was
made public only in December 1979, when the conference bill was agreed upon.
While the Act was signed into law shortly before the economy slipped into
the recession of January through July 1980, the accompanying House committee
103Given their prevailing business model focused on pass-through securitization, Freddie’s net
purchases remained far more volatile Fannie’s, so we again score the Act as having increased
Freddie’s portfolio activity on a retained portfolio basis instead of net purchases.
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report emphasized that the bill took “account of the specter of inflation and the need
for fiscal restraint... and the need to mitigate housing inflation” (House Committee
on Banking (1979a), pp. 3–4). The Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board
for 1979 noted that housing starts had fallen sharply during the end of the year,
as financial conditions tightened and thrifts’ deposit growth slowed (Annual
Report of the Federal Reserve Board 1979, pp. 5, 7). Unlike the longer legislative
horizon and policy scope of the Housing and Community Development Acts
of 1974 and 1977, the Amendments of 1979 were passed in shorter order, and
during the credit crunch that lasted from 1978Q2 through 1981Q4. We therefore
classify this policy change as cyclically motivated.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-399)
Enacted: October 8, 1980
The Act instituted a formulaic peg for annually adjusting the conforming
loan limit, which was tied to home prices. The formula maintained the stand-
ing benchmark loan limit of $93,750 for 1980 and was a continuation of cur-
rent policy, so we do not consider subsequent changes based on the home price
indexation formula to be significant policy changes, because they would have
been both anticipated and a continuation of current policy. The new formula
had the effect of setting the conforming loan limit at $98,500 effective January 1,
1981. See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1).
Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Program
Announced: May 28, 1981
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Policy Change: ARM Program Approval
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$0.367 billion
News: May 1981
Effective: July 1981
Classification: Cyclical
The FHLBB had approved FHLMC to launch a secondary market program
for variable-rate mortgages on July 1, 1979 (The American Banker (5/14/1980)).
In a speech in July 1979, FHLMC President Philip Brinkerhoff announced that
Freddie was gearing up to launch a secondary market for graduated payment
mortgages (GPMs) and variable rate mortgages in 1980, and stated that “during
the first 18 months of the program, [Freddie] expected to buy from $500 million to $600
million worth of the [GPM] mortgages” (The American Banker (7/16/1979)); the
timing of the ARM program’s launch, however, was rather uncertain given com-
plications in standardizing documents meeting various state requirements. In
May 1980, FHLMC announced that in addition to developing a GPM secondary
market it was also developing standardizing documents for three-to-five year
renegotiable-rate mortgages (RRMs), and intended to launch a secondary mar-
ket for RRMs by December. In November 1980, FHLMC began sending stan-
dardized ARM origination documents to mortgagees in preparation to launch a
secondary market for ARMs in 1981 (The American Banker (11/21/1980)).
As Freddie was developing documentation for an ARM program, the sup-
ply of ARM originations in the primary market was an impediment to launching
a program. Primary market deregulation only effectively authorized ARM is-
suance in early 1981, with the FHLBB authorizing Federal S&Ls to issue ARMs
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and variable-rate mortgage insurance on April 21, 1981 (46 FR 24148), which
effectively opened the door to FHLMC implementing a program; the OCC and
NCUA also approved various ARM programs and lifted impeding interest rate
restrictions imposed on federally chartered banks and thrifts around the same
time (see FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). Without established secondary market support,
however, mortgagees were initially hesitant to issue ARMs, and there was lit-
tle issuance until Fannie and Freddie unveiled their secondary purchase pro-
gram guidelines (Fannie launched an ARM program of its own a month after
Freddie).104 Because secondary market entry into ARMs was de facto set in mo-
tion immediately following deregulation of the primary mortgage market and
was necessary for mortgagees to issue ARMs, we consider entry into ARMs by
Fannie and Freddie as driven by US federal housing credit policy regulatory
changes.
FHLMC announced on May 28, 1981 that it would begin a pilot program
purchasing ARMs on July 1, 1981. At the press conference, an FHMLC official
said that the purchasing program would initially be funded through debt fi-
nancing. He added that the program would probably borrow no more than $1
billion, and then would offer participation certificates (The American Banker
(5/29/1981)). Taking the midpoint estimate of $550 million from Brinkerhoff’s
projected GPM purchase volume around the same time as a proxy for entry into
this new market, we assign an annualized increase in purchase capacity of $367
million ($500+$6002 × 1218 =$367) dated to the year stating May 1981, given the consid-
erable and long-standing uncertainty about the timing of the program’s launch
and requisite issuance approval for primary market originations.
104FHLMC’s 1981 Annual Report explained the “creation of a secondary market for adjustable rate
mortgages enabled lenders to initiate ARM programs, secure in the knowledge that the mortgages could
be sold” (FHLMC Annual Report 1981, p. 15).
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The program expansion into ARMs was made in an environment of height-
ened interest rate risk and depressed earnings resulting from monetary tighten-
ing, and the program took effect in the midst of the credit crunch persisting from
1978Q2 through 1981Q4. Moreover, the ARM program and broader deregula-
tory movement favoring ARMs was intended to help mortgage lenders better
manage interest rate risk in the prevailing economic context. Freddie’s Annual
Report for 1981 explained that the FHLBB’s approval of ARMs in the primary
market was explicitly motivated by elevated funding costs and heightened in-
terest rate risk: “Early in 1981 traditional mortgage lenders realized they could no
longer afford solely to make 30-year loans with fixed interest rates while the interest
rates they paid to borrow short term funds continued to rise. The [FHLBB] responded
by issuing regulations in April which permitted federal savings and loans to originate
mortgage loans with adjustable rates. The adjustable mortgage allows lenders the ad-
vantage of adjusting upwards the rates on loans in their portfolio to protect them when
their cost of funds goes up. The Mortgage Corporation acted by developing and intro-
ducing its own [ARM] program for lenders” (FHLMC Annual Report, pp. 14–15).
Consequently we classify the ARM program’s approval and launch as cyclically
motivated, as we classify Fannie’s program expansion into ARMs in June 1981
(see FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1).
Mortgage Purchase Amendments of 1981 (Pub. L. 97-110)
Enacted: December 26, 1981
In May 1981, FHLMC had announced that it was preparing to request autho-
rization from Congress to launch a new program guaranteeing pools of securi-
ties backed by conventional mortgages, which it planned to submit in July (The
American Banker (5/7/1981)). The program was to more closely resemble Gin-
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nie Mae’s guarantees of securities backed by FHA/VA mortgages. Because its
“current level of capital [was] not sufficient to support a large guarantor business,”
Freddie officials noted that it would also “seek authorization to issue dividend-
bearing stock that would be purchased by institutions participating in the guarantor
program” (The American Banker (5/7/1981)).
Congress opted for a more marginal deregulatory expansion into the con-
ventional market and did not address Freddie’s concerns about capital ade-
quacy for supporting expanded secondary market operations, an early exam-
ple of Freddie’s greater constraints in raising capital holding back its portfolio
relative to that of Fannie. In December, the Mortgage Purchase Amendments
of 1981 removed the portfolio limitations on FNMA and FHLMC holdings of
conventional mortgages over one year old when purchased, which were previ-
ously limited to 20% of holdings. Mortgages over one year old could only be
purchased, however, from the FDIC, FSLIC, NCUA, or other sellers currently
engaged in mortgage lending or investing activities. The Act also prohibited
FHLMC from imposing any fee or charge upon an eligible seller differing from
that imposed upon FHLBank members. Shortly after passage, FHLMC’s board
eliminated the fee charged to non-FHLBS member mortgagees (HUD (1983)).
Regardless of Congressional inaction regarding its capitalization, Freddie
launched its Guarantor Program in August 1981, under which Freddie would
purchase whole loans from thrifts and immediately sell back interests in PCs
backed by those mortgages, providing struggling thrifts with a far more liquid
asset (HUD (1983), p. 15). Freddie had made commitments to purchase more
than $5.5 billion in mortgages and exchange them for PCs by the end of the
year. The program was an “instant success” with over $25 billion in mortgages
351
exchanged under the Guarantor Program in 1982 alone, leading to a rapid ex-
pansion of Freddie’s aggregate PC issuance (Hu (2011), p 88, HUD (1983), p.
16).
Preferred Stock Authorization (Pub. L. 97-289)
Enacted: October 6, 1982
While the FHLBB imposed no statutory leverage or capital requirement on
Freddie, their regulator kept mortgage holdings and operations aligned with
what they deemed prudent capitalization. In 1981, FHLMC and FHLBB had
concluded that Freddie was adequately capitalized for current operations, but
had insufficient capital to safely expand operations, and needed to raise more
equity than the $100 million provided by the FHLBanks pursuant to the Char-
ter Act (HUD (1983), p. 15). Freddie’s capital base was $430 million as of July
1981 (The Washington Post (7/13/1981)). In late 1981, Freddie found congres-
sional sponsors to introduce legislation that would recharter and recapitalize
the organization, notably by allowing it to issue preferred stock. Freddie was
proposing to convert its nonvoting common stock to voting shares and become
a privately held, tax-paying entity while retaining a $200 million line of credit
with the FHLBB—what it considered parity with Fannie’s Treasury backstop.
But the proposal met substantial opposition in Congress and from the Reagan
administration, which thought the bill did not go far enough toward full priva-
tization.
On October 6, 1982, Pub. L. 97-289 amended the FHLMC Act to allow Fred-
die to issue preferred stock at the discretion of the Board of Directors, provided
that such stock did not change the status of the nonvoting common stock previ-
ously issued. In December 1984, the FHLBB approved a FHLMC dividend in the
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form of 15 million shares of preferred stock, pro-rated to the FHLBanks by each
district’s share of the initial $100 million common stock capitalization (National
Mortgage News (1/7/1985)). The market valuation was quoted at roughly $600
million, although FHLMC said it would only show a transfer on its balance
sheet at the book value of $150 million. Preferred shareholders would receive
the first $10 million in FHLMC’s annual dividends, and 90% of all additional
dividends. The FHLBanks subsequently transferred FHLMC’s preferred stock
dividends as a dividend to their member institution shareholders. The timing
of the dividend was motivated by the imminent repeal of Freddie’s federal tax
exemption, effective January 1, 1985 (Pub. L. 98-369, see below). Restrictions
were placed on the preferred stock so that it could only be traded among mem-
ber institutions, each subject to a 1% ownership limitation (Treasury (1990), p.
B-9).
This decision allowed thrifts to recognize a substantial portion of the value
of Freddie Mac’s stock, which they indirectly owned through the FHLBanks,
thereby shoring up their balance sheets. The transfer was estimated to inject
$600 million in previously unrecognized capital to FHLBank members; while a
‘positive’ development, analysts noted that the transfer of profits from FHLMC
to thrift institutions would ‘only marginally’ improve the industry’s belea-
guered balance sheets (The American Banker (12/11/1984)). Because Freddie’s
preferred stock issuance took the form of a dividend payment, we assign no
impact on its retained portfolio, as it did not raise any working capital.
This passthrough issue of preferred stock was quickly challenged by OMB,
however, which requested a probe by the Department of Justice on the basis
that the preferred shares were functioning as common shares, because the re-
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maining 10% of dividends above $10 million would also be transferred to the
thrifts owning preferred shares. The Justice Department, however, unequivo-
cally ruled in favor of FHLMC and the FHLBB in a letter dated January 25, 1985
(Department of Justice (1985)). Preferred shares began trading on the NYSE on
January 23, albeit with the caveat that only members of the FHLBS could pur-
chase shares. By December 1985, the FHLMC advisory committee had voted
unanimously to seek approval to repeal the restriction on trading, in large part
to improve market liquidity and boost the price of shares (National Mortgage
News (12/23/1985)). Broadening the base for ownership was also seen as a
step toward public listing and full privatization, a long-standing priority for the
Reagan administration.
Joint Resolution of Congress (Pub. L. 98-35)
Enacted: May 26, 1983
In May 1983, President Reagan signed into law a Joint Resolution of
Congress clarifying, among other things, that all securities issued or guaran-
teed Freddie Mac were exempt from SEC securities regulations, “to the same ex-
tent as securities that are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to principal
or interest by the United States” (Sec. 5), save guaranteed securities backed with
mortgages it had not purchased outright.
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-369)
Enacted June 27, 1984
Under the provisos of the Act, Freddie became subject to federal income
taxes, effective January 1, 1985. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) ex-
plained that “[t]he tax exemption for Freddie Mac was originally intended to allow the
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corporation to accumulate adequate capital so that it could compete against other enti-
ties in the secondary mortgage market, including Fannie Mae, which is a taxable entity.
The purpose of this tax exemption was not to provide Freddie Mac with a competitive
advantage. In the past 14 years, Freddie Mac has become highly profitable and has ac-
cumulated sufficient capital to compete in the secondary mortgage market. As a result,
Congress believed that the exemption from tax had fulfilled its function and had begun
to provide Freddie Mac with a competitive advantage. Accordingly, Congress believed it
appropriate to repeal the tax exemption for Freddie Mac” (JCT (1984), p. 551). Thrifts,
however, were granted a tax deduction for FHLBank dividends allocated from
previously taxed FHLMC income, thereby avoiding double corporate taxation.
Freddie was also granted a net operating loss carryback provision.
JCT estimated that the repeal of FHLMC’s tax exemption and related tax
adjustments would, on net, increase federal receipts by $67 million in FY1985,
$109 million in FY1986, and $142 million in FY1987 (JCT (1984), p. 551). These
estimates imply roughly $94.25 million in net earnings otherwise on balance
sheet that would be transferred to the Treasury in calendar year 1985.105 Freddie
Mac made $164 million in income tax provisions for 1985, reducing net income
to $208 million, down from $267 million in 1984 (FHLMC Annual Report 1985,
p. 10). We assume this new tax liability would have been too small to have
necessitated significant related portfolio reductions, particularly given the lack
of explicit leverage requirements.
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-440)
Enacted: October 3, 1984
The Act temporarily authorized FHLMC to purchase second mortgages for
105Calculations assume a 75-25 FY-CY split.
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the first time, and renewed Fannie’s prior authorization to do so; this authoriza-
tion was extended several times before being made permanent by the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1987 (Pub. L. 100-242). Enabling this
authorization, the Act amended the definition of mortgage in the FHLMC Act
to include subordinated liens. FHLMC was also prohibited from guaranteeing
MBS backed by mortgages not purchased outright by the corporation.106 And
the Act clarified that the permissible maximum for loan purchases by FHLMC
(and FNMA) applied to the full original principal, even if only a participation
were purchased—intended to keep the GSEs out of the jumbo mortgage securi-
tization market. See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for further discussion.
Second Mortgage Purchase Program
Announced: January 7, 1986
Policy Change: Second Mortgage Program Approval
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$1.0 billion
News: Jan. 1986
Effective: Jan. 1986
Classification: Non-Cyclical
On January 7, 1986, Freddie Mac announced that it would be launching a
new program to purchase second mortgages, and that a second mortgage secu-
ritization program would begin once a sufficient number of liens had been in-
ventoried on portfolio (Dow Jones News Service (1/6/1986)).107 Freddie noted
106Ginnie Mae’s securitization model involved guaranteeing the timely and full payment on
qualified issuers’ pools of FHA/VA mortgages that were never purchased outright by Ginnie;
the amendment prohibited Freddie from adopting this model.
107Fannie had started a second mortgage purchase program in 1981, under which it had pur-
chased $5 billion in second mortgages to date, but was retaining second mortgages on portfolio
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that purchases would begin in January and after accumulating an initial $500
million in loans, it would begin issuing second mortgage pass-through secu-
rities, with the first issuance expected by early 1987 (The American Banker
(1/8/1986)). Freddie Mac’s acting vice president for sales and marketing pro-
jected that the corporation would purchase roughly $1 billion worth of second
mortgages during calendar year 1986 (National Mortgage News (1/13/1986)).
As this programatic expansion was enabled by recent statutory authorization
(see above), we consider this a significant regulatory policy change, and assign
an annualized increase in purchase capacity of $1 billion for its first year of op-
eration. As the timing of such a program’s launch was entirely uncertain, and
no earlier concrete announcement or leak could be found, we determine that the
news of the second mortgage program was made public in January 1986.
In proposing second mortgage authorization for Freddie, a Senate report
accompanying the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 ex-
plained that “[t]he committee considers this amendment to be consistent with the es-
tablished mission of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to foster a nation-wide system
of home finance. Second mortgages are becoming an increasingly important source of
financing for homeownership... the Committee bill would help ensure that there is an
adequate secondary market for subordinate loans that are used for the specific purposes
of purchasing or refinancing homes” (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs (1983), p. 13).
Freddie’s 1986 Annual Report explained that its intent was “to provide billions
of dollars in housing equity for home owners and provide new opportunities for mort-
gage lenders who originate second mortgage loans” and characterized the program
(see FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). A HUD ruling had provided authority for Fannie to deal in second
mortgages in 1981, before enactment of Pub. L. 98-440 expanded statutory authority to FHLMC
(see above).
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expansion as expanding its ‘product line’ (FHLMC Annual Report 1986, pp. 3,
23). That report also described the prevailing economic and mortgage market
environment as a period of “favorable market conditions.” The economy was nei-
ther in a recession nor credit crunch, and the Federal Reserve characterized the
housing and mortgage markets as healthy: “Housing activity continued to expand
in 1986. Total housing starts edged up to 1.8 million units for the year as a whole, their
highest level since the late 1970s. Single-family homebuilding increased about 10 per-
cent, bolstered not only by a sizable decline in mortgage rates—which brought rates on
fixed-rate loans back to single digits for the first time since 1978—but also by contin-
uing favorable demographic trends” (Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board
1986, p. 9). Given Congress’s intent to modernize the structure of secondary
mortgage finance, the protracted delay between’s FHLMC’s authorization and
announced program launch, and Freddie’s business diversification motive for
the program expansion, we classify the program expansion into second mort-
gages as unrelated to the business or financial sector.108
Purchase Cap
Announced: March 3, 1987
In early March 1987, FHLBB Chairman Edwin Gray announced that the reg-
ulator would limit Freddie Mac’s mortgage purchases to $75 billion for the year,
a reduction relative to the corporation’s record $103 billion worth of conven-
tional mortgage purchases in 1986, which had been driven by record refinancing
activity as interest rates subsided (The Bond Buyer (3/9/1987)). Freddie had
previously projected in its budgetary request that it would purchase $75 billion
worth of mortgages for the year, which the Board then adopted as its purchase
108Fannie’s first authorization into second mortgages in 1981, on the other hand, was an ex-
plicit response to cyclical conditions in the mortgage market, and authority was to be rescinded
after interest rates were projected to have receded (see Sec. 3.4.1).
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limit—the first in Freddie’s history (The Bond Buyer (9/15/1987)). The Board
sent Freddie a letter dated March 3 instructing it to develop a plan detailing
how the $75 billion maximum would be attained. After news of the purchase
cap broke, Freddie’s acting president downplayed the cap as “a flexible one and
[that it] might be raised if necessary” (The American Banker (3/10/1987)).
In announcing the purchase cap, the Board cited concerns about S&Ls’ hold-
ings and hedging use of certain ‘Freddie Mac products,’ notably floating-rate
CMOs. Chairman Gray had also recently raised concerns that Freddie’s mar-
ket dominance was hurting thrifts’ ability to raise funds in capital markets
(The American Banker (3/10/1987)). But market analysts attributed the move
as largely motivated by Gray’s desire to reduce Freddie’s activity in the sec-
ondary mortgage market, and as acting on behalf of the Reagan administration
to circumvent Congress in reining in the Enterprises (The American Banker
(3/10/1987)).
On September 14, Freddie Mac President and CEO Leland Brendsel an-
nounced that the Board had lifted the cap on purchases, and projected that
Freddie’s purchases would total $85 billion for the year (The Bond Buyer
(9/15/1987)). Brendsel had hinted the week before that the Board was inter-
ested in lifting the limit, and predicted it would be lifted by year’s end. Ac-
cording to a Freddie spokesperson, altered “market conditions have convinced the
Bank Board to rescind the limit” (The Bond Buyer (9/15/1987)). Interest rates
were rising, decreasing refinancing activity and increasing demand for ARMs,
and Freddie pledged to increase support of the secondary AMR market. The
$75 billion purchase cap does not appear intended or projected to be a binding
constraint ex ante, and it certainly was not binding ex post, though its slack
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nature appears somewhat cyclically motivated by credit market conditions. We
thus do not classify the temporary purchase cap as a significant regulatory event
affecting Freddie’s mortgage holdings.
REMICs Authorization
Authorized: February 1988
In February 1988, FHLMC sought and received permission from the FHLBB
to issue REMICs. The temporary authority granted permitted the issuance of
$15 billion in REMICs and other long-term debt between February 1988 and
September 1989. Over the course of 1988, Freddie Mac sold nearly $13 billion in
Multiclass PCs as REMICs (FHLMC Annual Report 1988, p. 3). We do not con-
sider this authorization a significant regulatory affecting FHLMC’s purchases
of mortgages or MBS because the development of the REMIC market largely re-
sulted in the re-securitization of outstanding agency MBS (see discussion under
FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1).
Public Listing of Freddie Mac
Effective: January 3, 1989
Policy Change: Stock Split Capitalization
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$1.62 billion
News: Nov. 1988
Effective: Nov. 1988
Classification: Non-Cyclical
In July 1988, Senator Al D’Amato introduced a bill that would have re-
moved barriers to trading Freddie’s preferred stock and opened purchases to
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the public, which was seen as both a means to improving the balance sheets of
the thrifts holding the shares and a step toward privatization (The New York
Times (6/7/1988)). Precluding Congressional action, Freddie Mac’s Board of
Directors—still comprised of the FHLBB—-decided in July to remove the trad-
ing restrictions on the preferred stock, opening ownership to public investors
for the first time. In conjunction with the Board’s decision, Freddie Mac offered
to exchange each share of original preferred stock, along with a $7 per share
capital contribution, for four shares of new senior participating preferred stock
(Treasury (1990), p. B-9). The status of the non-voting, non-tradable common
stock held by the twelve FHLBanks would remain unchanged.
The split offer, however, would be void without at least two-thirds of exist-
ing preferred shares being tendered, and thrifts faced a November 30 deadline
to agree to exchange their shares in the split. If the deal was tendered, thrifts
would able to realize a capital gain on their undervalued stock, which at the
time of announcement, was projected to free $1 billion of new funds for the
S&L industry, which had seen its capital levels diminish considerably over the
previous few years (The New York Times (7/14/1988)). Within a week of the
November deadline, a majority of thrifts had yet to exchange their shares, as
they were delaying the $7 per share payment until the last possible minute to
preserve cash (The American Banker (11/22/1988)). But in the end, nearly all
of the thrifts’ preferred stock was exchanged in the split, the cash contributions
from which added $104 million to Freddie’s capital base (Treasury (1990), p.
B-9). Because Freddie’s increase in paid in capital was contingent upon meet-
ing the two-thirds tender threshold at the eleventh hour, we determine that the
news of the capitalization was only made public in November 1989. Preferred
shares began publicly trading on January 3, 1989.
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While the FHLBB imposed no explicit statutory leverage or capital require-
ment on Freddie, their regulator kept mortgage holdings and operations aligned
with what they deemed prudent capitalization, and portfolio expansion had
been curbed earlier in the decade until more capital was raised (see Preferred
Stock Authorization (Pub. L. 97-289) above). Assuming FHLMC’s Board was
keeping operations roughly in line with the 14.6-to-1 ratio of total liabilities on
balance sheet to the primary capital base of $1.516 billion in 1987, the addition
of $104 million in paid in capital would have enabled an increase in liabilities
and purchases of $1.62 billion ($104 million × (14.6 +1) = $1.62 billion).109 The
ratio of total liabilities to the primary capital base was a comparable 16.3-to-1
and 15.4-to-1 in 1986 and 1988, respectively (FHLMC 1988 Annual Report, p.
24). And Freddie’s primary capital base had risen to $1.976 billion by the close
of 1988, after the paid in capital increase, up 30.3% from 1987—well above ei-
ther the 23.1% increase in the prior year or average increase over the prior three
years.
The Federal Reserve’s Annual Report for 1988 noted that the “spread between
interest rates on fixed-rate mortgages, which have an average life of roughly 10 years,
and yields on 10-year Treasury notes did not change appreciably over 1988, which also
indicates that the mortgage markets continued functioning well despite the problems of
many savings and loan associations” (Annual Report of the Federal Reserve 1988,
p. 17). The report also noted that housing investment had picked up in the sec-
ond half of the year, and was up in the year to 1988Q4 (Annual Report of the
109The primary capital base was defined as reserve losses on mortgages, participating pre-
ferred stock, voting and nonvoting common stock, retained earnings, and additional paid in
capital, but excluding subordinated borrowings. Alternatively using the ratio of liabilities to
stockholder’s equity of 20.72 at the end of 1987 (Treasury (1990), p. B-8), the implied maxi-
mum growth in mortgage assets from this capital injection would be $2.26 billion ($104 million
× (20.72 +1) = $2.258 billion). A comparable ratio of liabilities to stockholder’s equity of 20.69
prevailed at the end of 1988.
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Federal Reserve Board 1988, p. 7). We classify the policy change as motivated
by political preferences for privatization as well as addressing a long-standing,
widely acknowledged constraint imposed by Freddie’s statutorily restricted ac-
cess to equity, and unrelated to the business or financial cycle.
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(Pub. L. 101-73)
Enacted: August 9, 1989.
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for a broader overview of the Act and its
context.
FIRREA rechartered Freddie and, for the first time, set its statutory purpose: “(1)
to provide stability in the secondary market for home mortgages; (2) to respond appro-
priately to the private capital markets; and (3) to provide ongoing assistance to the sec-
ondary market for home mortgages (including mortgages securing housing for low- and
moderate-income families involving a reasonable economic return to the corporation)
by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the distribution of
investment capital available for home mortgage financing” (Sec. 731a). Freddie’s mis-
sion had not previously extended to explicitly supporting housing for low- and
moderate-income families. Congress simultaneously made conforming changes
to the FNMA Charter Act, so that the Fannie and Freddie had identical statu-
tory purposes. Of particular note, Congress’s emphasis for both GSEs shifted to
‘ongoing assistance’ to the secondary market, signaling a continuous presence
in the secondary mortgage market.
The Act turned FHLMC into a fully publicly traded shareholder-owned cor-
poration. The law automatically converted Freddie Mac’s senior participating
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preferred stock into voting, freely transferable common stock, effective August
9, 1989. Common stock began trading on the NYSE the following day. The
conversion did not affect Freddie Mac’s capitalization. The old Board of Di-
rectors, which consisted of the FHLBB members, was dissolved and replaced
by a new 18-person Board of Directors, five of whom were to be appointed
by the President and the remainder of whom would be elected by the voting
common shareholders.110 In harmonizing the special privileges and statutory
treatment of Fannie and Freddie, the Act additionally amended Section 306(c)
of the FHLMC Act to allow the Treasury Secretary to purchase up to $2.25 bil-
lion worth of Freddie Mac’s obligations. As with Fannie, this statutory line of
credit was perceived as an implicit government guarantee, lowering Freddie’s
cost of funds.
FIRREA transferred regulatory oversight of FHLMC from the FHLBB, which
was also disbanded by the Act, to HUD, whose regulatory authority over Fred-
die was similar to its existing authority over Fannie. HUD could determine
the ratio of unsecured debt to total regulatory capital, which was statutorily
set to no less then 15-to-1, and could require that a reasonable portion of Fred-
die’s mortgage purchases be related to national housing goals, providing they
allowed for a ‘reasonable’ economic return to Freddie. As was the case for Fan-
nie, regulatory capital included subordinated debt. In 1989, Freddie’s debt-to-
capital ratio was only 4.25-to-1; only a small volume of Freddie’s assets were
funded by unsecured debt and the capital ratio calculation excluded PCs held
by third parties, treated as off-balance sheet securities. The Act additionally re-
quired HUD’s approval for the issuance of stock and securities convertible into
stock.
110An interim Board consisting of the President of the Corporation, outgoing FHLBB Chair-
man, and HUD Secretary were to serve until the first meeting of voting common shareholders.
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It was clear that HUD’s capital requirement did not constrain Freddie in any
way (Treasury (1990), p. B-60). We therefore do not classify the imposition of
this leverage requirement as a binding, significant policy change materially af-
fecting Freddie’s mortgage portfolio when FIRREA was enacted. The change in
ownership structure in 1989, however, created strong profit incentives to exploit
the advantages of government sponsorship and a perceived implicit guarantee
through leveraged portfolio growth (Treasury (1996), p. 39). Prior to FIRREA,
Freddie maintained a relatively small amount of mortgages in portfolio, pri-
marily held for pooling inventory purposes, and securitized almost all of its
purchases. As it was indirectly owned by the thrifts, this sufficed to accomplish
the mission of providing secondary market liquidity. On February 6, 1990, one
of the first actions taken by the new Board was to retire at par the nonvoting
common stock held by the FHLBanks, further severing Freddie’s ties with the
FHLBS (FHLMC Annual Report 1990, p. 44, Treasury (1990), p. B-9). The busi-
ness models of Fannie and Freddie subsequently converged towards expand-
ing securitization fee income coupled with highly leveraged retained portfolio
growth.
Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992
(Pub. L. 102-550)
Enacted: October 28, 1992.
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for a broader overview of the Act and its
context.
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Policy Change: Affordable Housing Goals
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$0.75 billion
News: July 1991
Effective: Jan. 1993
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The Act created OFHEO as the safety and soundness regulator of Fannie and
Freddie, imposed uniform capital requirements, and broadened the Enterprises’
statements of purpose to expand affordable housing activities. FHLMC’s char-
ter was changed from providing stability in secondary market for ‘home’ mort-
gages to ‘residential’ mortgages, thus expanding emphasis on (lower-income)
multifamily housing. One of the main provisions of FHEFSSA affecting Fannie
and Freddie was the introduction new capital requirements and requirement
that OFHEO develop of risk-based capital standards based on stress tests. As
with Fannie, Freddie anticipated the new capital requirements (see discussion
under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). For instance, Freddie’s 1990 Annual Report stated that
“Congress and certain federal agencies are considering actions that could result in the
imposition of capital standards and other regulatory requirements on Freddie Mac. Leg-
islation may be enacted or regulatory requirements may be adopted in 1991” (FHLMC
Annual Report 1990, p. 24). But regulators had deemed that Freddie’s capital
position was significantly stronger than Fannie’s, and unlike FNMA, there was
no discernible effort by FHLMC to increase its capitalization in anticipation of
pending regulations.
HUD had not previously extended national housing goals to Freddie Mac
(GAO (1996), p. 82), but the Act introduced quantitative affordable housing
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goals for Freddie. As mission regulator, HUD was required to set goals for:
(1) low- and moderate-income housing; (2) housing in central cities rural areas
and other underserved areas; and (3) special affordable housing for low- and
very low-income families. During a two-year transition period starting from
enactment, FHEFSSA set interim targets for each of the first two goals equal to
30% of the total number of units financed. Thereafter the HUD Secretary was
authorized to set annual goals. Under the additional special affordable hous-
ing goal, Freddie was obliged to purchase an additional $1.5 billion of mort-
gages financing housing for low- and very-low income families over 1993–1994,
split between single and multifamily housing loans. Given that Freddie had
completely stopped purchasing multifamily mortgages in 1989, these afford-
able housing goals clearly would have been a binding constraint.111 Splitting
the $1.5 billion goal equally between the two years, we assign an annualized
increase of $750 million to Freddie’s purchase activity from the imposition of
new affordable housing goals. As with Fannie, we classify this policy change as
non-cyclically motivated (see discussion under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1).
The special affordable housing goals enacted in October 1992 and made ef-
fective in January 1993, however, had long been anticipated, and were backed
by both Fannie and Freddie in July 1991, when the GSEs negotiated them with
housing public interest groups (see discussion under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). The
original bill that evolved into FHEFSSA, which first introduced statutory af-
fordable housing goals as a percentage of paid dividends, was introduced in
the House on July 16, 1991, and the preferred $1.5 billion transition compromise
111It had become clear by the end of 1989 that Freddie’s multifamily mortgage portfolio’s credit
performance was in bad and deteriorating shape, and these loans started to raise red flags, de-
spite accounting for just 3% of its total servicing portfolio. After first tightening underwriting
standards, multifamily mortgage purchases under its Multifamily Cash Program were com-
pletely suspended in September 1990 (FHLMC Annual Report 1990, pp. 18–19).
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for Freddie was substituted in during a subcommittee markup on July 30. In
response to the introduction and early evolution of the GSE oversight bill, Fred-
die’s common shares fell 1.7% on July 16, 1991, for a negative excess return of
1.5 percentage points below the S&P 500 for the day. This movement reversed
around the subcommittee markup, with Freddie’s shares rising 1.8% on July 30
and 3.3% on July 31, for excess returns of 0.8 percentage points and 3.0 per-
centage points, respectively. We thus date the news of the transition affordable
housing goals to July 1991, well in advance of taking effect.
HUD published slightly revised interim housing goals for FHLMC in July
1993, which were published essentially unchanged as a final rule on October 13,
1993. The special affordable housing goal was set at $1.5 billion above Freddie
Mac’s existing performance and commitments for 1993–1994, hence a change
from current policy. Freddie Mac’s goals were set lower than Fannie Mae’s,
again because it had ceased purchasing multifamily mortgages a few years ear-
lier, and was thus equipped to finance fewer of those units than Fannie Mae.112
Freddie Mac estimated that it purchased $5.214 billion of mortgages in 1992 that
would have qualified toward the special affordable housing goal, had it applied.
The 1993–1994 special affordable housing goal for Freddie Mac was then estab-
lished as twice the 1992 baseline ($10.428 billion) plus $1.5 billion, for a two-year
goal of $11.928 billion (58 FR 53072).
On November 30, 1994, HUD temporarily extended the affordable housing
goals for 1994 into 1995. The 1995 goal for special affordable housing purchases
for Freddie Mac was set at $3.357 billion for 1995, $750 million above the revised
baseline (59 FR 61504). The lower special affordable housing goal was meant to
112The goals with respect to low- and moderate-income housing were 28% for 1993 and 30%
for 1994 (The American Banker (10/14/1993)). For housing located in central cities, the goals
were 26% and 30% for 1993 and 1994, respectively.
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recognize that the dollar amount of conventional mortgages originated was ex-
pected to be substantially lower in 1995 than the volume of originations in 1992.
The goals applied on a proportional basis for that portion of 1995 before per-
manent goals were established. The lower 1995 goal was therefore entirely due
to changes in mortgage market conditions rather than policy, and we therefore
do not record any change in purchase activity as a result of the extension of the
interim goals.
The Federal Reserve’s 1995 Annual Report suggested that the new afford-
able housing goals were substantially altering the Enterprises’ purchase behav-
ior, noting they had recently “initiated a variety of affordable home loan programs
intended to benefit lower-income and minority households” and impacts of afford-
able housing goals appeared to be showing up in HMDA microdata (Annual
Report of the Federal Reserve Board 1995, p. 203).113
HUD Final Rule on Housing Goals
Issued: December 1, 1995
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for a broader overview of the revised hous-
ing goals.
113The report elaborated: “A year-to-year comparison of the HMDA data suggests that these pro-
grams may be making a difference. From 1992 to 1993 the number of conventional home purchase loans
extended to lower-income borrowers increased 38 percent compared with an 8 percent increase for higher-
income homebuyers. The trend continued into 1994. The 1994 HMDA data show that the number of
loans to lower-income borrowers increased about 27 percent while the number extended to higher income
borrowers increased about 13 percent... Among racial or ethnic groups from 1993 to 1994, the number of
loans to black applicants increased 55 percent, to Hispanic applicants 42 percent, and to Asian applicants
19 percent. The increase for white applicants was 16 percent over the same period” (Annual Report of
the Federal Reserve Board 1995, p. 203).
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Policy Change: Affordable Housing Goals: Multifamily
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$0.61 billion
News: Dec. 1995
Effective: Jan. 1996
Classification: Non-Cyclical
On December 1, 1995, HUD issued new housing goals for 1996–1999, effec-
tive January 2, 1996 (60 FR 61846). Freddie Mac had met HUD’s headline hous-
ing goals throughout 1993–1995, but by much narrower margins than Fannie
Mae. Freddie’s relative struggles with the new goals was largely attributed to
Fannie’s larger presence in the multifamily mortgage market (GAO (1998)).114
Freddie Mac missed its $750 million multifamily portion of the special afford-
able housing goal for 1993–1994, when it purchased just $495 million worth of
qualifying multifamily mortgages (FHLMC Annual Report 1995, p. 31). Fred-
die also missed another HUD goal for the fraction of purchases for mortgages in
central cities in both 1993 and 1994 (The American Banker (3/9/1995)). Fred-
die tried to compensate for these shortfalls in 1995, eclipsing that year’s $375
million special affordable goal for multifamily mortgages.
But HUD’s new special affordable goals set a considerably higher multi-
family mortgage purchase goal of $988 million—set at 0.8% of Freddie’s total
purchases in 1994—annually for 1996–1999 (60 FR 61851).115 By comparison,
HUD’s final rule noted that subgoal-qualifying multifamily mortgage purchases
114After suffering large losses in the late 1980s, Freddie completely withdrew from the multi-
family market in 1990, and only returned to the market in 1993 to satisfy the affordable housing
goals (FHLMC Annual Report 1992, p. 34).
115See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for an overview of the headline affordable housing
goals set by the final rule.
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accounted for only 0.36% of Freddie’s total purchases in 1994 (60 FR 61859).
Given Freddie’s challenges meeting the multifamily and central cities subgoals,
we deem this large increase a significant policy change that would have affected
Freddie’s purchase behavior. We assign an annualized increase in purchases of
$613 million in January 1996, scored as the difference between Freddie’s mul-
tifamily special affordable housing goals for 1995 and 1996. Ex ante, Freddie
was just barely able to meet its higher multifamily special affordable housing
subgoals, whereas Fannie hit roughly twice its higher multifamily targets (GAO
(1998), p. 18). And unlike Fannie, Freddie clearly had to change its purchase
behavior to accommodate the multifamily goals, most notably reinstating its
halted purchase program in 1993, though not all of its resumed multifamily
purchases were goal-qualifying.
HUD had published proposed rules on February 16, 1995 (60 FR 9154),
but citing credit risk, Freddie Mac pushed back vigorously against multifam-
ily mortgage provisions during the ensuing public comments period; moreover,
both GSEs pushed back against HUD’s definition and measurement of the mul-
tifamily mortgage market. The final rule explained that “[i]n response to com-
ments received and upon further consideration by the Secretary this final rule substan-
tially changes the proposed rule’s formulation of the Special Affordable Housing Goal,”
notably removing equal targets for owner-occupied versus rental housing sub-
goals and instead setting fixed minimum multifamily subgoals (60 FR 61859).
HUD also chastised Freddie Mac, citing that “[i]n 1994, Fannie Mae purchased five
times as many multifamily mortgages as Freddie Mac... the economic analysis prepared
for this rule does not support the argument that the goals will expose the GSEs to un-
acceptably high levels of credit risk.” The rule elaborated that “HUD recognizes that
Freddie Mac experienced losses on its multifamily business in the late 1980s, in part be-
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cause of flawed corporate oversight mechanisms, resulting in Freddie Mac’s withdrawal
from the multifamily market. However, half a decade has passed since that experience,
providing Freddie Mac with sufficient time to develop a multifamily business” (60 FR
61852). Given the GSE’s pushback regarding multifamily subgoals and subse-
quent, substantive revisions to HUD’s Special Affordable Housing Goals, we
date the news of the multifamily mortgage subgoals being made public to pub-
lication of the final rule on December 1, 1995.
The tightening of affordable housing goals for 1996 was ostensibly about so-
cial policy objectives promoting homeownership and housing for lower-income
households. The implementation of the new goals was also long required by
the FHEFSSA of 1992, rather than an unexpected development stemming from
housing market or financial conditions. We found no evidence that the in-
creased goals were cyclically motivated, and the housing and mortgage market
would not have justified any such cyclical motivations. The Federal Reserve’s
Annual Report for 1995 noted that, shaped by mortgage rate fluctuations, “resi-
dential investment fell in the first half of 1995 but turned up in the second half... [but]
the intra-year swings in the various housing indicators left the annual totals for these
indicators at fairly elevated levels. Sales of existing homes in 1995 were well above the
annual average for the 1980s, even after adjusting for increases in the stock of houses”
(Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board 1995, p. 9). We thus classify the
change as primarily motivated by social policy objectives, particularly increas-
ing lower-income homeownership, and unrelated to the business or financial
cycle.
New HUD Regulations on Housing Goals
Issued: October 31, 2000
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See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for a broader overview of the revised hous-
ing goals.
Policy Change: Affordable Housing Goals
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$24.4 billion
News: July 1999
Effective: Jan. 2001
Classification: Non-Cyclical
On October 31, 2000, HUD published a final rule significantly increasing af-
fordable housing goals for 2001–2003 for both Fannie and Freddie, which were
virtually identical to a new proposal outlined by the HUD Secretary on July
29, 1999. We assign the same $24.4 billion annualized increase in purchases for
Freddie as assigned to Fannie (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). Financial
markets appeared to react to new information revealed with both the proposed
rule and final rule publication. News of the proposed affordable housing pol-
icy leaked on July 28, 1999, after HUD announced a scheduled press conference
with Secretary Cuomo and Fannie Chairman Raines the following day. Fred-
die’s share price fell 0.6% that day, 0.8 percentage points below the S&P 500’s
gain for the day, despite also announcing better-than-expected second quarter
earnings results. Shares rebounded 0.7% the next day, closing 2.5 percentage
points above the S&P 500, after Freddie ‘balked’ and lodged a formal complaint
against HUD’s proposed affordable housing goals, citing concerns about the
size of the increase as well as Freddie’s disadvantaged position with respect to
its multifamily housing program, which was a quarter the size of Fannie’s (Dow
Jones News Service (7/29/1999)); Freddie announced it would submit detailed
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objections during the public comment period for the proposed rule.116 When
the proposed rule was detailed on March 2, 2000, Freddie’s stock price fell 3.3%,
for a negative excess return of -3.5 percentage points below the S&P 500. Fred-
die’s share price fell 0.8% upon the announcement of the final rule on October
31, 2000, for a negative excess return of 3.0 percentage points below the S&P
500.
As with Fannie, we determine news of the more aggressive affordable hous-
ing goals to have been made public in July 1999. The implications of the pro-
posed rules and Freddie’s unsuccessful efforts to water them down appear to
have been gradually priced into Freddie’s shares, well in advance of the even-
tual rules being made effective in January 2001. And as with Fannie, we clas-
sify the policy change as unrelated to the business cycle (see the listing under
FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1).
OFHEO Ruling on Capital Requirements
Issued: September 13, 2001
Pursuant to FIRREA, OFHEO gradually developed ‘stress-test’ risk-based
capital rules, which were issued in September 2001, to be made effective
September 13, 2002. But Fannie and Freddie both maintained capital well in
excess of the regulatory risk-based capital standard until mid-2008, so we do
not consider this to be a binding, significant policy change affecting the Enter-
prises’ portfolio behavior. See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1).
SEC Disclosure Requirements
116Contrary to Freddie’s combative stance and share price movements surrounding HUD’s
various announcements of the new affordable housing goals, its management claimed in the
1999 Annual Report that adoption of the proposed rule “would not have a material adverse effect on
Freddie Mac’s results of operations or financial condition,” though this could have been an attempt
to manage shareholder sentiment (FHLMC Annual Report 1999, p. 42).
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Agreement: July 12, 2002
On July 12, 2002, Fannie and Freddie agreed to register their common stock
with the SEC and ‘voluntarily’ comply with SEC disclosure requirements, pre-
empting legislative action requiring them to do so. We do not consider this to
be a significant policy change affecting the Enterprises’ purchase behavior. See
listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1).
Accounting Scandal: Capital Surcharge
Announced: January 29, 2004
Allegations of accounting irregularities at Freddie Mac emerged in 2002. On
January 22, 2003, Freddie announced that disallowed accounting policies re-
lated to hedging employed by its previous external auditor, Arthur Anderson,
necessitated restating financial results for 2001 and 2002, and possibly 2000. On
June 7, 2003, OFHEO launched a special examination into the accounting irreg-
ularities. On June 8, 2003, Freddie Mac President David Glenn was terminated
for due cause based on inadequate cooperation with an internal investigation
and for altering personal records, while Chairman Leland Brendsel and Chief
Financial Office Vaughn Clarke abruptly stepped down (The New York Times
(6/9/2003)). On November 21, 2003 the company restated financial results,
which led to a $5 billion increase in cumulative retained earnings and $5.2 bil-
lion increase in core capital (OFHEO (2003), p. 1). OFHEO released its special
examination report on December 10, 2003 and Freddie agreed to pay a $125
million penalty for inappropriate conduct and improper management of earn-
ings. The report concluded that Freddie Mac had disregarded accounting rules,
internal controls, and disclosure standards, and ultimately violated the public
trust in its pursuit of steady earnings growth—notably by improperly using a
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number of strategies to shift earnings among quarters, to stabilize growth in
earnings per share. The report recommended that Freddie be required to hold
a capital surplus and urged consideration of limiting retained portfolio growth
until it produced certified financial statements.
On January 29, 2004, OFHEO imposed a capital surcharge of 30% above the
minimum capital surplus in response to increased operational risk. The sur-
charge requirement was effective immediately and would remain in place until
timely, certified financial statements were produced. The order also mandated
OFHEO’s approval for any corporate action that might impair Freddie’s abil-
ity to achieve the targeted capital surplus. In the news release announcing the
surcharge, OFHEO reported a capital surplus as of November 30, 2003 of $8.1
billion, 32.2% above the standing statutory minimum requirement (OFHEO
(2004d)). The surplus for November 30, 2003 did not reflect pending 2003 fi-
nancial statement adjustments, but did reflect the increase in capital of approxi-
mately $5 billion from the 2002 restatement process. Freddie’s 2003 Annual Re-
port explained that “[w]hile OFHEO’s framework includes stringent monitoring and
imposes restrictions on share repurchases and other capital activities, we do not expect it
to adversely affect our disciplined growth strategy in most scenarios. Had the target cap-
ital surplus been in effect at December 31, 2003, our estimated surplus in excess of the
target would have been approximately $2.1 billion” (FHLMC Annual Report 2003,
p. 36). Similarly, Freddie’s 2004 Annual Report reported core capital of $35.0
billion as of December 31, 2004, $10.9 billion in excess of the minimum statu-
ary capital requirement and approximately $3.6 billion in excess of the amount
required with the 30% capital surcharge (FHLMC Annual Report 2004, pp. 22,
89).117
117While not required by OFHEO’s capital surcharge, Freddie’s capital surplus had grown by
$2.0 billion since December 2003, driven by higher retained earnings and a slight contraction in
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Because the restatement of recent earnings resulted in an increase in core
capital—unrelated to any policy change—to levels well exceeding the amounts
newly required by the capital surcharge and no portfolio adjustments appeared
to be needed, we do not classify the imposition of the capital surcharge as a
binding, significant policy change expected to impact Freddie’s retained portfo-
lio.
New HUD Regulations on Housing Goals
Issued: November 1, 2004.
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for a broader overview of the revised hous-
ing goals.
Policy Change: Affordable Housing Goals
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$7.6 billion
News: Apr. 2004
Effective: Jan. 2005
Classification: Non-Cyclical
Affordable housing goals came up for renewal in 2004. In April, HUD
proposed more aggressive rules for 2005–2008, and published a final rule in
November setting goals that were slightly scaled back but quite similar to those
initially proposed (see discussion under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). There is abundant
evidence that this round of affordable housing goal increases began to substan-
tially alter the Enterprises’ purchase and portfolio behavior (FCIC (2011), pp.
186–187). Freddie’s 2004 Annual Report stated that “[w]e believe that meeting
these goals and subgoals will be challenging and there can be no assurance that we
Freddie’s balance sheet, perhaps due to the refinancing boom’s end.
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will meet all of them in 2005 or beyond. We are making significant efforts to meet the
new goals and subgoals through adjustments to our mortgage sourcing and purchase
strategies, including changes to our underwriting guidelines and expanded and tar-
geted initiatives to reach underserved populations” (FHLMC Annual Report 2004,
p. 11). Despite warning that the goals could reduce profitability, Freddie reit-
erated its support for the affordable housing component of its public mission:
“We view the purchase of mortgage loans benefitting low- and moderate-income families
and neighborhoods as a principal part of our mission and business, and remain commit-
ted to fulfilling the needs of these borrowers and markets.” The 2006 Annual Report
similarly emphasized that: “We are making certain changes to our business to meet
HUD’s housing goals and subgoals, which may adversely affect our profitability. We are
purchasing loans and mortgage-related securities that offer lower expected returns on
our investment and increase our exposure to credit losses” (FHLMC Annual Report
2006, p. 13).
Freddie Mac retroactively estimated that there was zero cost to meeting its
affordable housing goals over 2000–2003, when goals were met through ‘prof-
itable expansion,’ but goals became harder to meet as the refinancing boom
increased the share of non-qualifying mortgage originations (FCIC (2011), p.
186). Freddie estimated that over 2005–2008, roughly 4% of loan purchases, or
roughly $31.4 billion, were made “specifically because they contribute to the goals,”
suggesting that the goals issued in 2004 forced Freddie to alter and expand its
purchases. Rather than being strictly profitable, costs associated with carry-
ing such loans were estimated to average $200 million annually over 2003–2008
(FCIC (2011), p. 186), again suggesting significant portfolio effects from the
elevated affordable housing goals. We assign the same impact to Freddie as to
Fannie, an annualized increase in purchases of $7.6 billion for the goals’ first
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year of effect (see discussion in listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1).
When the proposed goals were first leaked, Freddie’s shares fell 0.4% on
April 6, 2004, closing 0.2 percentage points below the S&P 500 for the day. The
final rule’s one percentage point reduction across the three goals, relative to
the proposed rule, was received positively, although the response to shares may
have been muted by speculation about the imminent presidential election; Fred-
die’s stock price rose 0.1% on November 1 and 0.9% on November 2 on leaked
news of the final rule and its publication in the Federal Register, respectively,
closing roughly 0.1 percentage points and 0.9 percentage points above the S&P
500 those days. Given the similarity of the final rule to the proposed rule, and
markets’ initial pricing of the more aggressive rules, we date the news of the
housing goals as being made public in April 2004, as with Fannie. And as with
Fannie, we classify the affordable housing goals as driven by social policy ob-
jectives as well as a longstanding legal requirement set by FHEFSSA, and unre-
lated to the business or credit cycle (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for an
explanation for this classification).
OFHEO-Freddie Settlement: Portfolio Growth Limit
Announced: August 1, 2006
Policy Change: Portfolio Growth Limit Imposed
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: -$42.8 billion
News: June 2006
Effective: July 2006
Classification: Non-Cyclical
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Throughout 2005 and 2006, political pressure built to rein in Fannie and
Freddie, particularly by curbing the GSEs’ retained portfolios.118 In a high-
profile May 2005 speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan was highly critical of the GSEs’ balance sheet expan-
sion and recommended portfolio limits: “The Federal Reserve Board has been un-
able to find any credible purpose for the huge balance sheets built by Fannie and Freddie
other than the creation of profit through the exploitation of the market-granted subsidy.
Fannie’s and Freddie’s purchases of their own or each other’s mortgage backed securities
with their market-subsidized debt do not contribute usefully to mortgage market liquid-
ity, to the enhancement of capital markets in the United States, or to the lowering of
mortgage rates for homeowners” (Greenspan (2005)).
Coinciding with the May 2006 release of OFHEO’s final report investigating
Fannie Mae’s accounting scandal, Fannie entered an agreement with OFHEO
and the SEC that included capping its retained portfolio at its value from the
end of 2005.119 In response to a request by OFHEO, Freddie announced on Au-
gust 1, 2006 that it would voluntarily and temporarily limit the growth of its
retained portfolio to no more than than 2.0% annually (and 0.5% each quar-
ter) from its $710.3 billion portfolio as of June 30, 2006, as measured by GAAP
accounting rules. Freddie’s 2006 Annual Report stated: “We expect to keep the
limit in place until we return to producing and publicly releasing quarterly financial
statements prepared in conformity with US generally accepted accounting principles”
(FHLMC Annual Report 2006, p. 4). Permissible portfolio growth was addi-
tionally limited to “assets that are intended to help [Freddie] meet [their] affordable
housing goals or subgoals,” particularly multifamily whole loans, private-label
118See discussion in ‘Accounting Scandal: Capital Shortfall and Surcharge’ and ‘OFHEO-SEC-
Fannie Settlement: Portfolio Caps’ listed under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1.
119See ‘OFHEO-SEC-Fannie Settlement: Portfolio Caps’ under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1.
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MBS, and commercial MBS (American Banker (8/2/2006)), further suggesting
the limits would have a substantial impact on purchase behavior. The limits
were made retroactively effective July 1, 2006.
Prior to the consent agreement, Freddie had “stated that it will grow in line
with the growth rate of the overall MBS (mortgage-backed securities) market” accord-
ing to a market analyst (Dow Jones News Wire (5/24/2006)). And unlike Fan-
nie Mae, Freddie Mac’s portfolio had been steadily growing throughout 2005
and 2006—widely interpreted as Freddie exploiting Fannie’s accounting prob-
lems and capital shortfall to gain market share—until being abruptly curtailed
by the portfolio limit. To measure the impact of the portfolio caps, we rely on
counterfactual portfolio growth based on a June 21, 2006 Greenbook forecast of
9.5%, 8.4%, and 7.1% annualized growth rates for US mortgage debt for 2006Q3,
2006Q4, and 2007, respectively. Applying these growth rates to a retained port-
folio of $710.3 billion as of June 30, 2006 suggests counterfactual mortgage port-
folio growth of $31.1 billion in the second half of 2006 and another $25.9 bil-
lion in the first half of 2007 without the cap’s imposition.120 With the annual
2% portfolio growth cap, the maximum permissible portfolio expansion would
have been $14.2 billion in the year from June 30, 2006. Annualizing, we assign
a purchase reduction of $42.8 billion for the portfolio limit’s initial imposition
($14.2 - ($31.1 + $25.9) = -$42.8).121
The introduction of portfolio caps had been publicly anticipated somewhat
before being announced by Freddie. FHLMC had reduced its mortgage portfo-
lio in both May and June 2006, slowing annualized growth for the first half of the
120For the second half of 2006 and first half of 2007 combined, $710.3 × (1.095)1/4 × (1.084)1/4 ×
(1.071)2/4−$710.3 =$57.0.
121We do not apply the two-year rule here because of the quarter-by-quarter binding nature of
the portfolio limits.
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year to 3.4%, down from 8.4% portfolio growth in 2005, though May’s decelera-
tion was only first made public in late June (American Banker (7/25/2006)). By
stark contrast, its retained portfolio had grown at annualized rates of 17.2% and
14.0% in March and April, respectively (Dow Jones News Wire (5/24/2006)).122
In a conference call with shareholders regarding 2005 net earnings, held after
markets had closed on May 30, FHLMC CEO Richard Syron announced that
the corporation expected to be in talks with OFHEO about the possibility of
portfolio limits (Dow Jones Newswires (5/30/2006)).123 On June 6, The Wall
Street Journal reported that “Freddie Mac may face limits on its holdings of mortgage
loans and related securities” (The Wall Street Journal (6/7/2006)). In testimony
earlier that day before a House Financial Services subcommittee, OFHEO Di-
rector Lockhart flagged that the “chairman of Freddie Mac mentioned that, I believe
last week, in a press conference he did mention that we have discussed the idea that
there should be some sort of freeze there as well” and that a consent agreement
was possible, but would require Freddie’s voluntary agreement. Lockhart also
claimed that Freddie was at least two years away from “having acceptable ac-
counting and internal controls and a risk management system.” Shares of Freddie
fell 3.3% for the day, for a daily negative excess stock return of 3.2 percentage
points below the S&P 500. Shares had also fallen 2.5% on May 31, for a nega-
tive excess excess return of 3.3 percentage points below the S&P 500, as markets
priced in both disappointing 2005 earnings results and Syron’s warning about
the potential for portfolio caps.
122These growth rates are based on the non-seasonally adjusted portfolio data reported at the
time. Ex post, seasonally adjusted data show a similar decline from annualized growth rates
slightly above 10% in March and April to portfolio contractions of 7.6% and 3.3%, respectively,
in May and June.
123Syron stated that: “[OFHEO Director] Lockhart has indicated that he intends to consider whether
additional remedial actions may be appropriately applied to Freddie Mac while we continue to fix our
control environment, and this could include consideration of portfolio growth limitations for some period
of time” (National Mortgage News (6/5/2006)).
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In mid-June, the Treasury Department publicly announced that it was re-
viewing its process for approving the Enterprises’ debt issuance requests,
widely interpreted as the Bush administration threatening that it would uni-
laterally limit the GSEs’ portfolios if Congress or OFHEO did not act (The Wall
Street Journal (6/14/2006)). On June 27, Freddie announced that it had reduced
its retained portfolio in May, which was characterized at the time as “a clear de-
parture from April, when the housing-finance agency grew its portfolio by an annual-
ized rate of 14.0%” (Dow Jones Newswires (6/27/2006)). Dow Jones Newswires
reported that the move was likely intended to avoid irking OFHEO, and that
since the regulator’s imposition of portfolio limits on Fannie in late May, “mar-
ket participants have speculated that similar constraints might be placed on Freddie,
or that Freddie might voluntarily impose them on itself ” (Dow Jones Newswires
(6/27/2006)). Considered in this context, particularly Treasury’s threat about
blocking agency debt issues, we consider the imposition of portfolio caps a de
facto regulatory change as opposed to strictly ‘voluntarily.’
In early July, The Wall Street Journal reported that OFHEO Director Lockhart
would like to see the Enterprises maintain a countercyclical role yet be shrunk to
a ‘smaller scale,’ and that “Mr. Lockhart appears likely to impose a similar restraint
on Freddie” as on Fannie (The Wall Street Journal (7/5/2006)). On July 7, an
interview with Lockhart published by the American Banker reported that “Fred-
die would agree soon to cap its mortgage portfolio,” and that a deal was expected
within the next three weeks (American Banker (7/7/2006)). While Lockhart’s
interview was re-reported in a number of outlets that day, shares of Freddie
fell only 0.1% and outperformed the S&P 500 by 0.6 percentage points for the
day, suggesting that the expectation of portfolio caps for Freddie had already
been priced in. Upon the portfolio caps’ announcement on August 1, Freddie’s
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share price fell 0.6%, underperforming the S&P 500 by just 0.1 percentage points
for the day. Moreover, Dow Jones Newswires reported that the announcement of
portfolio limits “was widely anticipated and had little impact on valuations of the debt
it uses to fund its purchases” (Dow Jones News Wire (8/1/2006)). Consequently,
we date the expectation of portfolio caps as being made public in June 2006,
when market participants learned that Freddie was starting to reduce its port-
folio and the news of looming caps seemed to be priced into Freddie’s shares.
The Federal Reserve’s Annual Report noted that “the housing market cooled
substantially” in 2006, and was dampening overall economic activity (Annual
Report of the Federal Reserve Board 2006, p. 3), but we find no evidence that
the imposition of portfolio caps was motivated by trying to further cool housing
market activity. The Bush administration, which, along with the Greenspan Fed,
wanted the GSEs downsized and eventually privatized, was widely perceived
as exploiting the accounting scandals to rein in first Fannie and then Freddie
as well (McLean (2015), pp. 85–86, Greenspan (2007), p. 242). Senator Chuck
Schumer, for instance, claimed that “there are a whole lot of people who want to take
advantage of the auditing problems that Fannie and Freddie have done to take the whole
thing down” (Dow Jones Capital Markets Report (5/23/2006)). We classify the
imposition of Freddie’s portfolio caps as motivated by long-standing partisan
objections to the GSEs’ portfolio growth, particularly by the current administra-
tion, and unrelated to the business cycle.
OFHEO Relaxes Portfolio Caps
Announced: September 19, 2007
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic and regulatory context.
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Policy Change: Portfolio Limit Increase
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$2.14 billion
News: Sep. 2007
Effective: Sep. 2007
Classification: Cyclical
On September 19, 2007, OFHEO announced changes to its methodology for
calculating the mortgage portfolio cap in order to provide both Fannie and Fred-
die greater flexibility in managing increasingly volatile market-based fluctua-
tions. The new agreement increased FHLMC’s baseline for the retained port-
folio cap to $735 billion measured in UPB at the end of 2007Q3, revised up-
ward from a $728.1 billion GAAP portfolio limit in place under the previous
agreement (OFHEO (2007)). The 2.0% annual growth limit and 0.5% quarterly
growth rate limit were maintained for Freddie and extended to Fannie, which
had previously faced a flat nominal limit. As with Fannie, the changes were
intended to encourage Freddie to purchase or securitize up to $20 billion in
subprime loans in the short run.
The maximum permissible 2% growth rate would allow a portfolio of up
to $749.7 billion in 2008Q3, as measured by UPB. The OFHEO press release
explained that “UPB often exceeds the GAAP value for the Enterprises. Due to
market fluctuations over the first seven months of 2007, this difference has ranged
from $0.1 billion to $9.4 billion” (Market News International (2007)). Fannie’s
Monthly Volume Surveys for August and September 2007 suggested that their
retained portfolio was roughly $4.8 billion higher when measured on a UPB
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basis rather than a GAAP basis (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1).124 In
scoring the policy change, we add this difference to the $728.1 billion port-
folio limit based on GAAP as a baseline limit measured in UPB. Assuming
the caps were binding constraints, we assign an annualized increase in Fred-
die’s potential purchases of $2.14 billion in the year starting September 2007
($749.7−1.02×($728.1+$4.8) =$2.14). Given the emphasis of purchasing a higher
$20 billion in subprime mortgage securities in the ‘short run,’ we do not invoke
the two-year rule.
Freddie’s share price rose 2.8% when the policy was announced on Septem-
ber 19, a gain 2.1 percentage points above that of the S&P 500 for the day. As
with Fannie, we determine the news of the portfolio limit relaxation to have
been made public in September. And as with Fannie, we classify the relax-
ation of portfolio caps as driven by cyclical financial concerns (see listing under
FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for a more detailed discussion of this classification).
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (Pub.L. 110-185)
Enacted: February 13, 2008
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic context and legislative back-
ground.
124No comparable comparison between UPB and GAAP valuations could be found for Fred-
die’s balance sheet during this period.
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Policy Change: Jumbo Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$41.57 billion
News: Feb. 2008
Effective: Apr. 2008
Classification: Cyclical
The Act increased the conforming loan limit in high-cost areas from $417,000
to up to $729,750, the so-called ‘super-conforming loan limit.’ We estimate that
the increase in the conforming loan limit raised the GSEs’ purchase capacity by
$83.14 billion for 2008, which we split evenly between Fannie and Freddie. As
with Fannie, we determine the news of the conforming loan limit policy change
to have been made public in February 2009. And as with Fannie, we classify
this sizable increase in conforming loan limits as driven by cyclical financial
concerns (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for an overview of this scoring
and classification).
OFHEO Reduces Capital Surcharge
Announced: March 19, 2008
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic context and regulatory back-
ground.
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Policy Change: Removal of Portfolio Limit
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$9.05 billion
News: Feb. 2008
Effective: Mar. 2008
Classification: Non-Cyclical
Policy Change: Reduced Capital Surcharge
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$43.33 billion
News: Mar. 2008
Effective: Mar. 2008
Classification: Cyclical
On February 27, 2008, OFHEO announced that the caps on the Enterprises’
portfolios were being removed effective March 1, 2008. Fannie and Freddie had
begun filing timely financial reports again, for the first time since the account-
ing scandals, which reportedly motivated the change (The New York Times
(2/28/2008)). OFHEO also noted substantial progress made by both GSEs in re-
forming and improving internal systems and controls. Citing recent losses and
market conditions, however, OFHEO initially retained the 30% capital surplus
above the statutory minimum capital requirement—much to the consternation
of some lawmakers—but noted that it would discuss phasing out the surcharges
as their consent orders approached being lifted. In a quick reversal after the col-
lapse of Bear Stearns, OFHEO, Fannie, and Freddie announced an initiative on
March 19 to increase mortgage market liquidity, including a reduction in the
capital surcharges from 30% to 20% above the minimum statutory requirement,
which was intended to pump $200 billion into the housing market (OFHEO
388
(2008)).
To assess the impact of the removal of the portfolio limits, we rely on a Jan-
uary 23, 2008 Greenbook forecast of 3.1% and 3.0% annualized growth rates for
US mortgage debt for 2008 and 2009, respectively. Applying this growth rate
to a retained portfolio of $710 billion at year’s end 2007 would suggest pro-
jected mortgage portfolio increases exceeding that under the previously per-
mitted 2% growth rates of $7.8 billion in 2008 and $15.3 billion in 2009.125 Pro-
rating growth between the two years, we assign a potential annualized increase
in Freddie’s retained portfolio of $9.05 billion in the year starting March 2008
from the portfolio cap’s removal
(
$7.8 × 1012+$15.3 × 212 =$9.05
)
.
The decrease in the capital surcharge announced the following month low-
ered Freddie’s capital requirement from $34.4 billion to $31.8 billion, or by $2.6
billion (The Washington Post (3/20/2008)). Made possible by the recent re-
moval of the portfolio caps, OFHEO estimated that the combined reduction of
about $5.9 billion would allow Fannie and Freddie to immediately add up to
$200 billion of MBS to their portfolios, consistent with a binding 3% minimum
capital requirement. For FHLMC, the release of $2.6 billion in capital would
thus expand their potential retained portfolio by $86.67 billion
($2.6
0.03 =$86.67
)
.
Using the two-year rule, we assign an annualized impact of $43.33 billion for
Freddie’s retained portfolio resulting from the capital surcharge reduction in its
first year of effect.
On the announcement of the caps’ removal, Freddie’s stock price jumped
in mid-day trading on February 27, gaining up to 4% after the announcement,
but shares closed down 0.5% for the day, 0.4 percentage points below the daily
125For 2008, $710 × (1.031 − 1.02) =$7.8. For 2009, $710 × (1.031 × 1.03 − 1.022) =$15.3.
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return on the S&P 500, as markets priced in worse-than-expected fourth quar-
ter losses posted later that day (Dow Jones Newswires (2/27/2008)). Shares
rose 26.2% on speculation and news leaking about a reduction in the capital
surcharge on March 18, gaining 22.0 percentage points more than the S&P 500,
and rising another 14.9% on March 19, 17.3 percentage points above the daily
return on the S&P 500. As with Fannie, we determine the news of the port-
folio limit’s removal to have been made public in February 2009 and news of
the capital surcharge’s termination to have been made public in March 2009.
And as with Fannie, we classify the removal of the portfolio caps as principally
motivated by a standing regulatory commitment and not cyclically motivated,
whereas we classify the subsequent reduction of capital surcharges as cyclically
motivated (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for a detailed discussion of this
classification).
Provisional Fed Lending to Fannie and Freddie
Announced: July 13, 2008
On July 13, 2008, the Federal Reserve authorized provisional lending to Fan-
nie and Freddie if it proved necessary. No such lending was made before the
Enterprises were taken into conservatorship on September 7, 2008 (see below).
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (Pub. L 110-289)
Enacted: July 30, 2008
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic context and regulatory back-
ground.
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Policy Change: Jumbo Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: -$13.34 billion
News: July 2008
Effective: Jan. 2009
Classification: Cyclical
The Act consolidated GSE oversight to the newly created FHFA. The Act also
set a structure for conforming loan limits for the nation as a whole, as well as
for high-cost areas, which would be annually indexed based on a home price
index. The Act amended the Enterprises’ charters to permanently set the na-
tional conforming loan limit at $417,000 and increase the conforming loan limit
for high-cost areas, defined as areas in which 115% of the median home price ex-
ceeded the national conforming loan limit, setting super-conforming loan limits
to the lesser of that amount or 150% of the conforming loan limit. The changes
were effective December 31, 2008, when the ESA super-conforming loan limit
expired. On November 7, 2008, FHFA announced that the single-family home
conforming loan limit for most areas of the country would be kept at $417,000
for 2009, but the new formula reduced the maximum super-conforming loan
limit from $729,750 to $625,500. Scored on a current policy basis, we estimate
that the reduction in the super-conforming loan limit would have reduced En-
terprises purchases by $26.68 billion in 2009, and allocate half this potential port-
folio decrease, or $13.34 billion, to Freddie. As with Fannie, we do not consider
the news of the reduction from the ESA to HERA conforming loan limit to have
been made public until July 2008. And as with Fannie, we classify the pol-
icy change as cyclically motivated (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for an
overview of this scoring and classification).
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FHFA Conservatorship
Announced: September 7, 2008
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic context and regulatory back-
ground.
Policy Change: Portfolio Limit Increase
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$66.75 billion
News: Sep. 2008
Effective: Sep. 2008
Classification: Cyclical
Fannie and Freddie were taken into government conservatorship by the
Treasury Department and FHFA on September 7, 2008. Freddie Mac’s Senior
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement with Treasury mirrored Fannie’s (see list-
ing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). Freddie’s retained mortgage portfolio was not
to exceed $850 billion as of December 31, 2009, with this limit to be subse-
quently reduced by 10% each year until reaching $250 billion in 2021. There
is abundant evidence that regulators were strong-arming both Enterprises to
markedly ramp up their near-term purchases to provide additional liquidity
to mortgage markets ahead of the portfolio cap reductions (see listing under
FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). We do not attempt to estimate the counterfactual evolution
of the mortgage portfolio in the absence of the SPSPA and simply measure the
impact relative to the portfolio outstanding on August 30, 2008. On that date,
the total retained portfolio was approximately $761 billion, implying a maxi-
mum increase of $89 billion by the end of 2009, or an annualized increase of
$67.5 billion
(
$89 × 1216 =$66.75
)
in the year from September 2008.
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The conservatorship announcement wiped out nearly all remaining stock-
holder equity, with shares having already fallen 91.5% in the year to September
5, 2008. When markets reopened on Monday, September 8, Freddie’s share price
fell 82.8%, to 88 cents, from previously closing at $5.1 per share. The possibility
of conservatorship clearly had not been fully priced into Freddie’s shares. Here-
after we largely cease reporting information about Freddie’s share price, as its
movements became highly volatile and generally uninformative. As with Fan-
nie, we classify Freddie’s placement into conservatorship as clearly cyclically
motivated, with its news having been made public in September 2008 (see list-
ing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for a more detailed discussion of context, scoring,
and classification).
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-5)
Enacted: February 17, 2009
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic context and regulatory back-
ground.
Policy Change: Jumbo Conforming Loan Limit
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$13.34 billion
News: Feb. 2009
Effective: Feb. 2009
Classification: Cyclical
Shortly after the FHFA announced the super-conforming loan limit for 2009
was being reduced to $625,500 pursuant to HERA, Congress intervened to statu-
torily reinstate the higher $729,750 maximum super-conforming loan limit set
by ESA (see ESA, HERA listings under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). ARRA re-established
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the higher loan limit for 2009, which was then twice extended through the end
of FY2011. We again estimate that roughly $26.68 billion in originations be-
tween the two super-conforming loan limits would have been acquired in 2009
(see HERA above), and allocate half this potential increase in retained portfo-
lio purchases to Freddie. As with Fannie, we classify the reinstatement of the
higher super-conforming loan limit as cyclically motivated, with its news hav-
ing been made public in February 2009 (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for
an overview of this scoring and classification).
Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan
Announced: February 18, 2009
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic context and regulatory back-
ground.
Policy Change: Portfolio Limit Increase
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: +$50 billion
News: Feb. 2009
Effective: May 2009
Classification: Cyclical
The Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan, a set of initiatives to prop
up the beleaguered housing market announced by the President, Treasury Sec-
retary, and HUD Secretary on February 18, 2009, increased Freddie’s portfolio
cap from $850 billion to $900 billion on December 31, 2009. The amendments to
Freddie’s SPSPA with the Treasury were identical to the amendments to Fan-
nie’s SPSPA (see FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). We measure the impact of the SPSPA
amendment as the difference in portfolio limits before and after the amendment,
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assigning an annualized increase in Freddie’s potential portfolio of $50 billion
starting in February 2009. As with Fannie, we classify the increase in Freddie’s
portfolio limit as clearly cyclically motivated, with its news having been made
public in February 2009 (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for an overview of
this scoring and classification).
Enterprise Transition Affordable Housing Goals for 2009
Issued: August 10, 2009
FHFA concluded that the affordable housing goals would not be achievable
in 2009 for a variety of economic reasons, and thus lowered all three goals in
addition to making the Enterprises’ mortgages modified under the Homeowner
Affordability and Stability Plan count toward the goals. We do not consider this
action to be a binding, significant policy change. See listing under FNMA (Sec.
3.4.1) for background and context.
Second Amendment to Senior Stock Purchase Agreement
Announced: December 24, 2009
The Treasury Department replaced Freddie’s $200 billion funding line with
an unlimited funding commitment through 2012. We assign no related portfo-
lio impact. See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic and regulatory
context.
New Enterprise Housing Goals for 2010-2011
Issued: September 14, 2010
The FHFA overhauled and revised down its affordable housing goals for
Fannie and Freddie in response to market conditions. We do not consider this
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action a binding, significant policy change. See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1).
Third Amendment to Senior Stock Purchase Agreement
Announced: August 17, 2012
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for background and context.
Policy Change: Portfolio Limit Decrease
Agency: FHLMC
Impact: -$22.16 billion
News: Aug. 2012
Effective: Aug. 2012
Classification: Non-Cyclical
On August 17, 2012, the Treasury Department announced a third amend-
ment to the Enterprises’ SPSPAs, which capped both retained portfolios at a re-
duced $650 billion by the end of 2012, accelerated the annual pace of subsequent
wind down from 10% to 15%, and replaced the standing 10% quarterly dividend
requirement with a sweep of all present and future net earnings (see FNMA,
Sec. 3.4.1). The amendments to Freddie’s SPSPA were identical to Fannie’s.
As of July 31, 2012, Freddie’s total retained portfolio was approximately $576
billion, implying no additional mandated reduction by the end 2012. Under the
newly amended SPSPA, the Enterprises’ portfolios were capped at $552.5 billion
by the end of 2013, down from $590.49 billion prior to the third amendment. We
measure the impact of the SPSPA amendment as the difference in mandated re-
ductions before and after the amendment. We assign an annualized requisite
portfolio reduction of $22.16 billion for the year starting in August 2012, being
the the required reduction for 2013 pro-rated through July
(
($552.5 - $590.49)× 712
= -$22.16
)
.
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While the Enterprises’ share prices and excess returns became exceedingly
volatile and rather uninformative after conservatorship sunk shares under a
dollar, stock movements nonetheless suggest that the third SPSPA was gen-
uinely unanticipated; Freddie’s share price fell an unusually steep 23.3% on
August 17, with trading volumes up more than 24-fold from the previous day
of trading. Moreover, the news did not seem anticipated by the financial press.
As with Fannie, we determine the news of the third SPSPA to have been made
public in August 2012. And as with Fannie, we classify the third SPSPA amend-
ment as motivated by varying political priorities and budgetary concerns, as
opposed to being cyclically motivated (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, for
an overview of classification and related context).
3.4.3 Government National Mortgage Association
The Housing and Urban Development Act (HUDA) of 1968 partitioned the Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association into two separate corporations: a publicly
retained Government National Mortgage Association and a privately chartered,
shareholder-owned FNMA granted government sponsorship and special legal
privileges. GNMA was to continue FNMA’s special assistance functions and the
management and liquidations functions, authorized under Sections 305 and 306
of the National Housing Act, respectively, and retained FNMA’s standing spe-
cial assistance authority, assets, and liabilities pursuant to those statutes. The
rechartered FNMA was to assume all secondary market operations and to re-
tain the assets and liabilities pursuant to Section 304 of the National Housing
Act (see FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1).
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Ginnie Mae’s special assistance functions were initially used to smooth mort-
gage credit during credit crunches and/or to provide support for special classes
of less attractive, policy oriented FHA/VA mortgages at below-market rates.
GNMA’s special assistance authority was split between control of the White
House and Congress. Authority under Section 305(c) could be used at the dis-
cretion of the president (‘general Presidential special assistance authority’). And
Section 305(g) authorized Congress to direct HUD to purchase mortgages for
low-cost housing for low- and moderate-income families (‘special assistance for
low- and moderate-income housing’).
In 1974, Congress authorized a new Emergency Mortgage Purchase Assis-
tance program (‘emergency special assistance’), aimed at stabilizing housing
construction and easing the effects of inflation and monetary tightening on the
housing and mortgage markets. GNMA’s special assistance and emergency spe-
cial assistance programs would often purchase loans at below-market rates and
later resell them at par, with these functions essentially serving as revolving
funds for a credit subsidy. Losses on sales were financed with borrowing from
the Treasury and/or direct appropriations. By selling off its subsidized pur-
chases, Ginnie reduced its footprint on the unified budget deficit, from gross
purchases to net-of-sales purchases. Emergency special assistance authority
was repeatedly extended until expiring in 1981, and all of GNMA’s special as-
sistance functions were fully repealed in 1983.
Prior to the split of Fannie and Ginnie, the Participation Sales Act of 1966
(Pub. L. 89-429) had authorized FNMA to issue participation certificates backed
by pools of loans made or acquired by federal credit agencies. Shortly there-
after, the HUDA of 1968 authorized GNMA to issue MBS, and Ginnie marketed
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the first ever MBS in 1970. Unlike the Enterprises, Ginnie’s MBS were exclu-
sively backed by mortgages insured or guaranteed by other government agen-
cies, primarily FHA/VA mortgages, but also those of the US Department of
Agriculture’s Office of Rural Development and HUD’s Office of Public and In-
dian Housing. In exchange for a fee, Ginnie guaranteed timely payment of inter-
est and principal repayment, covering any loan losses in excess of the amount
otherwise insured or guaranteed. Unlike the Enterprises’ debt and securities,
Ginnie’s guarantee was always explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of
the United States. And contrary to Fannie and Freddie, Ginnie always insured
pools of mortgages issued by approved mortgagees (typically banks and credit
unions) instead of purchasing and packaging securities themselves. Guarantee-
ing MBS has comprised nearly all of Ginnie’s activity in mortgage markets since
Congress wound down its special assistance programs in the early 1980s.
Ginnie Mae was created as a government corporation under HUD adminis-
tration, and thus remained on the federal budget balance, with profits or losses
passed on to the Treasury. Through the federal budget process, Ginnie Mae was
subject to more programatic oversight than Fannie or Freddie.126 Special assis-
126The federal budget process largely proceeds along three related tracks: administration bud-
get requests, authorizations, and appropriation bills. The president requests a detailed budget
from Congress, which proposes funding levels for agencies and programs. Through autho-
rizing bills, Congress can create or repeal programs, and direct how federal funds should or
should not be used. Appropriations bills set overall discretionary spending limits for agencies
or programs. The Participation Sales Act of 1966 authorized the establishment of appropriations
to cover interest payments to holders of government-backed PCs exceeding the interest pay-
ments received from the backing pool of mortgages or other obligations. Appropriations bills
for the Department of Housing and Urban Development usually include a line item appropriat-
ing funds requested by the administration to cover any insufficiencies from participation sales,
and a permanent, indefinite appropriation had been made for GNMA to cover insufficiencies
for sales authorized through 1967 (The Budget for Fiscal Year 1979 Appendix, p. 493). Starting in
1980, the federal budget process began to impose explicit restrictions on federal credit programs
and loan guarantees, including Ginnie Mae’s MBS guarantees. Annual appropriations bills sub-
sequently included a fiscal year aggregate limitation on Ginnie Mae’s authorization to enter new
commitments to issue guarantees under Section 306 of the National Housing Act. Prior to their
repeal, the special assistance functions were also governed by congressional authorizations and
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tance program funding was periodically adjusted in the appropriations process,
and appropriations bills started limiting GNMA’s commitments to guarantee
mortgage securities starting in the early 1980s.
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (Pub. L. 90-448)
Enacted: August 1, 1968
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic context and legislative back-
ground.
Policy Change: Special Assistance Increase
Agency: GNMA
Impact: +$0.25 billion
News: July 1968
Effective: July 1969
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The Act split FNMA into the Government National Mortgage Association
and a quasi-private shareholder-owned Fannie Mae. Ginnie Mae, a govern-
ment corporation under HUD administration, assumed FNMA’s special assis-
tance and management and liquidations functions. Ginnie Mae remained on
the federal budget balance, with profits or losses passed on to the Treasury. The
scope of Ginnie’s mortgage market operations was also largely governed by the
federal budget process.
The Act also authorized Ginnie to guarantee MBS issued by FNMA or other
approved issuers.127 Ginnie, however, was only allowed to guarantee the timely
payment of principal and interest on trust certificates or securities backed by
appropriations, switching to loan limits in 1980 (also set through appropriations).
127FNMA was not issuing MBS at the time (see FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1).
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pools of mortgages insured under the National Housing Act (NHA) or guar-
anteed under the GI Bill. Ginnie was also authorized to collect guarantee fees
from issuers. Unlike Fannie’s MBS authorization, “[t]he full faith and credit of the
United States is pledged to the payment of all amounts which may be required to be paid
under any guaranty” authorized by GNMA’s program. According to the 1970
Economic Report of the President, the objective of Ginnie’s MBS program was
“to authorize a mortgage investment instrument that would be marketable and attrac-
tive to a wide range of investors not now interested in mortgages directly” (Economic
Report of the President 1970, p. 114).
The Act also increased Ginnie’s special assistance authority under Section
305(c) of the NHA (general Presidential special assistance authority) by $500
million, to $3.325 billion, effective July 1, 1969. Using the two-year rule, we
assign an annualized increase in GNMA’s purchase capacity of $250 million. We
determined that the news of this policy change was made public in July 1968,
when the conference version of the bill was agreed upon, well in advance of the
increased special assistance funding taking effect.128 And we again classify the
Act as non-cyclically motivated; legislative background, economic context, and
this classification are discussed at length in the Act’s listing under FNMA (see
Sec. 3.4.1).
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969 (Pub. L. 91-152)
Enacted: December 24, 1969
128An amendment to the Senate version of the bill, accepted on May 28, had reduced that bill’s
proposed increase in GNMA’s special assistance funds from $500 million to $250 million. The
higher $500 million increase was adopted in the conference agreement, which was agreed to by
the Senate on July 25 and the House on July 26 (CQ (1969)).
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Policy Change: Special Assistance Increase
Agency: GNMA
Impact: +$0.75 billion
News: Dec. 1969
Effective: Dec. 1969
Classification: Cyclical
The Act raised Ginnie’s Section 305(g) authorization for total purchases
and commitments outstanding for its special assistance program for low- and
moderate-income housing to $2.5 billion, an increase of $1.5 billion. The revi-
sion was effective upon the bill’s enactment. Using the two-year rule, we assign
an annualized increase of $750 million in Ginnie Mae’s purchase capacity in
the year starting December 1969. The Act also increased the per-dwelling-unit
loan limits on mortgages eligible for purchase under GNMA’s special assistance
programs.
The $1.5 billion increase in GNMA’s special assistance authority and a re-
quirement that purchases be made at par was amended onto the House version
of the bill on October 22, which passed the next day (CQ (1970)); the Senate
bill, considered and passed on September 23, had included no such provision.
The Senate conferees later dropped their disagreement over GNMA’s special
assistance authorization and the conference bill, agreed upon on December 12,
adopted the House bill’s preferred increase(House Committee on Banking and
Currency (1969b)). Consequently, we date the news of the increase as being
made public in December 1969.
The Act also expanded statutory authority to use Ginnie’s special assistance
funds for subsidized purchases of mortgages. In its first years of operation,
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GNMA developed a ‘Tandem’ plan designed “to reduce cash outlays from mort-
gage purchases” while supporting the mortgage market (GNMA Annual Report
1975, p. 15). Rather than referring to a specific plan or round of purchases, ‘Tan-
dem’ referred more to a general approach of making subsidized loan purchases
and resales in tandem, to minimize the program’s appearance on the federal bud-
get balance. As CEA staff economist George von Furstenburg explained to the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development: “Tandem or
piggyback procedures were first introduced in 1968 partly to minimize the effect of fed-
erally assisted mortgage credit programs on the unified budget balance. Since the net
lending of government agencies represents an outlay above the line, GNMA’s acqui-
sition of below-market interest rate mortgages increased the budget deficit by the full
amount of the purchase price. Under tandem, these mortgages were resold to the private
market at a price sufficiently below par to afford a normal return to investors. Thus
only the discount or the present value of the interest subsidy represented an outlay and
the cycle could continue ‘in tandem’ with further purchases” (Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1976b), p. 82).129
To bolster support for certain classes of less attractive FHA mortgages, the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969 amended Section 305 of the NHA
to provide statutory authorization for GNMA to make special assistance pur-
chases “at a price equal to the unpaid principal amount thereof at the time of purchase,
with adjustments for interest and any comparable items, and to sell such mortgages at
any time at a price within the range of market prices for the particular class of mortgages
involved at the time of sale as determined by the Association” (Sec. 115), a convoluted
way of opening the door to subsidized purchases of FHA/VA mortgages. The
129GNMA’s 1975 Annual Report, however, instead framed the term as referring to cooperation
between the public and private sector: “the Government and the private sector can be said to be
working in ‘tandem’ to provide support to the mortgage market and the housing industry” (GNMA
Annual Report 1975, p. 15).
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conference report described this section of the enacted bill as the “GNMA (‘Tan-
dem’) Plan,” which “would authorize GNMA to purchase certain mortgages at par
for subsequent resale at the market price to FNMA or others” (House Committee
on Banking and Currency (1969b), p. 28). The accompanying Senate com-
mittee report had explained that “under present mortgage market conditions,
FHA-insured mortgage loans can only be made at heavy discounts. As a result, many
potential sponsors, particularly of section 236 rental and cooperative housing and sec-
tion 221(d)(8) rent supplement housing, have been discouraged from sponsoring such
housing or have done so at great financial sacrifice” (Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency (1969), p. 11).
Under the various Tandem programs, Ginnie Mae would commit to pur-
chase mortgages for new home construction at a pre-specified (typically sub-
sidized) interest rate, purchase those mortgages as the home sales were com-
pleted, and then auction off the mortgages at prevailing interest rates—doing so
relatively quickly, to keep a minimal impact on federal outlays (Nixon (1974)).
GNMA’s Tandem commitments were generally priced 100 to 200 basis points
below the market (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
(1976b), p. 79). When GNMA’s resale price was below the purchase price,
the subsidy cost would be passed along to the federal budget balance. The
Tandem programs thus allowed Ginnie Mae to effectively operate its special
assistance functions as a revolving fund for a credit subsidy. The perceived ad-
vantage of the program was locking in a favorable interest rate and reducing
uncertainty for the buyer, lender, and home builder. Tandem programs were
initially targeted toward subsidized mortgage programs for low-income home-
buyers, particularly in multifamily units (FHA’s Section 221(d)(3), 235, and 236
loan programs), but the purchase program was extended to all unsubsidized
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FHA mortgage insurance and VA mortgage guarantee programs in September
1971 (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1976b), p.
82). The only restrictions on GNMA’s Tandem loan commitments was that the
newly constructed homes qualify for FHA/VA insurance, and that the loan bal-
ance fall under a loan limit.
In addition to citing concerns about “present mortgage market conditions,” the
Senate committee report noted that the bill did “not include any new far-reaching
programs” and framed the bill as making economically motivated funding ad-
justments to the ‘comprehensive’ housing bill enacted the previous year: “The
most significant part of the committee bill involves the dollar authorizations to fund
the programs through fiscal year 1972. In general, the committee authorized funds to
continue the programs at existing levels, but raised the amount authorized to take into
account new program authority, increased costs, and increased interest charges”
(Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (1969), pp. 1–2, 9). High and
rising interest rates had also been cited as a concern during the Senate’s hear-
ings on the bill (CQ (1970)). Whereas the HUDA of 1968 evolved from a slew
of related bills dating back to 1965, the HUDA of 1969 was drafted in just a
few months and was much shorter-term in scope.130 Moreover, the bill was
fully drafted and then enacted in the midst of the credit crunch enduring from
1969Q1 through 1970Q1. Given the timing of enactment and congressional con-
cern with prevailing mortgage market conditions, we classify the policy change
as cyclically motivated.
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-351)
Enacted: July 24, 1970
130The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency held hearings in July 1969, and the bill
was first reported on September 23, 1969, less than three months before its passage.
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See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic context and legislative back-
ground.
Policy Change: Special Assistance Increase
Agency: GNMA
Impact: +$0.38 billion
News: July 1970
Effective: July 1970
Classification: Cyclical
The Act authorized Fannie Mae to expand secondary market operations
to the conventional mortgage market and charted Freddie Mac to serve as a
secondary market for the FHLBS (see listings under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1, and
FHLMC, Sec. 3.4.2). The Act also loosened the requirement that Ginnie pur-
chase mortgages at par value under its Section 305(g) special assistance pro-
gram for low- and moderate-income housing. And the Act increased Ginnie’s
Section 305(c) general Presidential special assistance authorization by $1.5 bil-
lion, by amending a prior increase of $500 million, effective July 1, 1969, up to
$2 billion. Part of this increase was offset by decreasing the authorization for
Section 305(g) special assistance functions by $750 million, to $1.75 billion, ef-
fective upon enactment. Thus the Act’s net impact across all special assistance
authorities was a $750 million increase, again effective upon enactment. Using
the two-year rule, we assign an annualized increase in Ginnie Mae’s purchase
capacity of $375 million in the year starting July 1970.
Testifying before the Senate Committee on Banking and Credit on March 3,
HUD Secretary Romney had identified the administration’s objective of deliv-
ering “$20.5 billion of net new mortgage credit needed to finance 1.4 million housing
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starts,” to be advanced by the transfer and $1.5 billion net increase of GNMA
special assistance funds, GNMA MBS issues, and a FHLBank subsidy to mem-
bers (CQ (1971)). The accompanying Senate committee report explained that
the Section 305(g) program had an unused balance of over $2 billion, which
with the reallocation of funds and loosened restrictions on the program, “could
be made immediately available upon enactment of this bill to support the badly
sagging FHA single-family construction program” (Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency (1970), p. 10), suggesting that our estimate for the impact on
GNMA purchases is likely on the conservative side.
President Nixon had proposed simply reshuffling $1.5 billion from the con-
gressional Section 305(g) allocation to the Section 305(c) general Presidential
special assistance authority allocation. The Senate version of the bill would
have reallocated $750 million in special assistance funds from the congressional
to presidential allocations, whereas the House version of the bill left the con-
gressional special assistance fund untouched, and proposed $1.5 billion in new,
additional funds for the presidential allocation (CQ (1971), House Committee
on Banking and Currency (1970)). As the net increase of $750 million in spe-
cial assistance authority resulting half from reallocated funds and half from new
authorizations was only agreed upon in conference, we date the news of the in-
crease as being made public in July, when the conference report was agreed to
in committee and both chambers.
The Act was drafted and enacted in a relatively short timeframe.131 More-
over, funds were being retargeted from the more long-term policy oriented
131The bill was considered and passed by the Senate on April 16, an amended version was
passed by the House on June 25, the Senate rejected the House amendment and requested a
conference at the end of June, and the Senate and House agreed to the conference report on July
17 and July 20, respectively.
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congressional allocation to the more cyclically oriented presidential allocation.
Given the clearly stated motivations of ‘immediately’ supporting the housing
market and the bill’s enactment in the midst of the recession lasting from De-
cember 1969 through November 1970, we classify this expansion of Ginnie’s
special assistance purchase authority as cyclically motivated. Legislative back-
ground, economic context, and this classification are discussed at more length
in the Act’s listing under FNMA (see Sec. 3.4.1).
Tandem Program for FHA/VA Loans
Announced: September 19, 1973—May 10, 1974
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Policy Change: FHA/VA Tandem Authorization
Agency: GNMA
Impact: $1.5 billion
News: Sep. 1973
Effective: Sep. 1973
Classification: Cyclical
Policy Change: FHA/VA Tandem Authorization
Agency: GNMA
Impact: $3.3 billion
News: Jan. 1974
Effective: Jan. 1974
Classification: Cyclical
Policy Change: FHA/VA Tandem Authorization
Agency: GNMA
Impact: $1.65 billion
News: May 1974
Effective: May 1974
Classification: Cyclical
On January 5, 1973, President Nixon ordered a moratorium on all federal
housing subsidy programs, including the FHA Section 235 (homeownership for
lower-income families) and Section 236 (rental and cooperative housing) pro-
grams that had been supported by Ginnie Mae’s Tandem program to date (CQ
(1974)). In his State of the Union Address on housing and community develop-
ment that March, Nixon announced the administration was undergoing a com-
prehensive overview of HUD programs and would make recommendations re-
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garding the halted programs within six months.132 The emphasis of the speech
and intended overhaul was addressing perceived inefficiencies and inequities
in HUD programs, and there was no mention of mortgage market conditions
(Nixon (1973a)).
But the administration’s focus quickly shifted, and President Nixon an-
nounced a series of legislative and administrative proposals on September 19,
1973 primarily intended to ease the prevailing tight mortgage market condi-
tions and improve low-income housing. Nixon stated that “First, we are fac-
ing certain problems in providing adequate housing credit–and we must move
promptly to resolve them. Second, too many low-income families have been left be-
hind: they still live in substandard, overcrowded and dilapidated housing–and we must
help them meet their needs” (Nixon (1973b)). It was announced that the hous-
ing program moratorium was being lifted and HUD was authorized both to
reinstate GNMA’s Tandem plan and make up to $3 billion in commitments and
purchases of mortgages for new home construction at subsidized interest rates.
This was an unprecedentedly large release of Presidential special assistance au-
thority. The FHLBanks were also authorized to make forward commitments of
up to $2.5 billion at a predetermined interest rate to member savings and loan
associations. The President also requested that Congress raise the maximum
amount of a mortgage loan insurable by the FHA and purchasable by GNMA,
and a reduction of FHA downpayment requirements, among other legislative
proposals (Nixon (1973b)).
On January 21, 1974, President Nixon authorized GNMA to purchase up
132That speech reaffirmed the administration’s commitment to the overarching goal of US
housing policy of “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family” en-
shrined by the National Housing Act of 1949, and touted that “the percentage of Americans living
in substandard housing has dropped dramatically from 46 percent in 1940 to 37 percent in 1950 to 18
percent in 1960 to 8 percent in 1970,” aided by federal programs (Nixon (1973a)).
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to $6.6 billion worth of FHA/VA home mortgages at an interest rate of 7.75%,
estimated to support roughly 200,000 housing unit purchases. A third autho-
rization made on May 10 allowed purchases of up to an additional $3.3 billion
at an interest rate of 8.0%, supporting another 100,000 units (Nixon (1974)),
but this authority was not used until October, when the prior authorization had
been fully expended. As no additional Congressional authorization was needed
for any of these three major releases of general Presidential special assistance
authority, we consider the news of each release as being made public on the
President’s first announcement. Using the two-year rule, we assign annualized
increases in GNMA’s purchase capacity of $1.5 billion in September 1973, $3.3
billion in January 1974, and an additional $1.65 billion in May 1974.
In a May 10 statement about plans to revitalize the housing market, Nixon
clearly outlined cyclical motives for the Tandem reauthorization and broader
housing stimulus agenda: “The higher cost of money affects all sectors of the econ-
omy, but none more directly than the housing market... With this shrinkage of available
housing funds, home buyers are either unable to find mortgage money, or the mort-
gages that are available are offered on terms which fewer families can meet. The home
builder finds it increasingly difficult to sell the homes he has already built, and with
the uncertainties of the availability of such mortgage funds, he is understand-
ably reluctant to produce more housing. As builders curtail operations, workers in
the construction trades face the prospect of increased unemployment” (Nixon
(1974)). Nixon also stated that “The Tandem Plan is a very useful instrument for
supporting the housing market in times of credit stringency” (Nixon (1974)).
Given the President’s explicitly cyclical concerns and the timing of the autho-
rizations just before and during the recession of November 1973 through March
1975, we classify Tandem reinstatement and all three of these releases of Presi-
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dential special assistance authority as cyclically motivated.
Emergency Home Purchase Assistance Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-449)
Enacted: October 18, 1974
Policy Change: Brooke-Cranston Tandem Program
Agency: GNMA
Impact: +$3.88 billion
News: Oct. 1974
Effective: Oct. 1974
Classification: Cyclical
The Act amended Section 313 onto the NHA to establish a statutory Tandem
program for the subsidized purchase of conventional mortgages, commonly re-
ferred to as the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program or ‘emergency special assis-
tance authority.’133 The Act authorized the HUD Secretary to instruct GNMA
to make emergency mortgage commitments and purchases “whenever the Secre-
tary finds inflationary conditions and related governmental actions are having a
severely disproportionate effect on the housing industry and the resulting reduction in
the volume of home construction or acquisition threatens seriously to affect the
economy and to delay the orderly achievement of the national housing goals...” (Sec.
3(a)). The Act authorized GNMA to make purchases and commitments of up to
$7.75 billion outstanding at any given time under the Brooke-Cranston Tandem
program, above and beyond GNMA’s authority to purchase certain FHA/VA
mortgages under its existing special assistance functions. The new $7.75 bil-
lion authorization was effective upon enactment but set to expire after one year,
133The program was coined after Senator Alan Cranston and Senator Edward Brooke, sponsors
of the Senate version of the bill.
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save purchases needed to honor prior commitments and for the provision of
liquidations.
Unlike the previous Tandem programs primarily directed toward specific
classes of FHA/VA mortgages promoting low-income housing, the Brooke-
Cranston program was primarily intended “as an emergency device for stabi-
lizing the housing market against cyclical downturns” by stimulating hous-
ing construction (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
(1976b), p. 1). On the HUD Secretary’s order, GNMA was to issue commit-
ments to purchase conventional mortgages from originators, though qualifying
mortgages were limited to an 80% LTV ratio and $42,000 loan limit, well below
the prevailing conforming loan limit. Under a HUD regulation, at least 90%
of the mortgages had to be for new home purchases, completed after October
1973, and not previously owned by a homeowner (Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs (1976b), p. 14). As a secondary objective, the
program was intended to improve home buying opportunities for households
otherwise unable to purchase a home. Interest rates were set at the average
yield on issues of 6-to-12-year Treasury bonds in the month preceding the com-
mitment date, plus administrative costs (Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs (1976b), pp. 13–14). And for legal reasons, Freddie and
Fannie served as agents for GNMA in its purchases of below-market rate con-
ventional mortgages, with each institution allocated roughly half of the funds
for conventional mortgage purchases (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs (1976b), p. 14).
On the day of enactment, the HUD Secretary authorized $3 billion worth of
commitments and purchases of conventional mortgages at an interest rate of
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8.5% (Economic Report of the President 1975, p. 72). After this authority had
been expended, an additional $3 billion was authorized for mortgages at an in-
terest rate of 7.75% on January 16, 1975, including $1 billion for the purchase
of FHA/VA mortgages. The terms were overly attractive, and the entirety of
this authorization was exhausted on January 22. A final authorization of $2
billion was made in August 1975.134 While the authorization was scheduled
to expire after one year, subsequent purchases were allowed to fulfill commit-
ments made in the program’s first year; extensions of such authorization sun-
sets also had considerable precedent and the program was indeed repeatedly
reauthorized before expiring in 1981 (see below). Accordingly we deem the
two-year rule most appropriate for GNMA commitment authorizations under
the Brooke-Cranston program, and assign a $3.875 billion annualized increase
in GNMA’s purchase capacity, measured as half of the $7.75 billion statutory
limit outstanding for the program. We classify news of Ginnie’s new conven-
tional mortgage purchases under the Brooke-Cranston program as having been
made public in October 1974, when the bill cleared both chambers and the HUD
Secretary acted immediately upon its enactment.
The bill was clearly enacted in response to depressed housing market con-
ditions, with the accompanying Senate Committee report stating that the bill
“responds to a mortgage credit crisis which has crippled the residential real estate
industry in the United States. Housing activity in the Nation is severely depressed”
(Senate Committee on Banking (1974a), p. 1). The Act also began with the three
following ‘findings’ of Congress: “(1) in many parts of the Nation, residential mort-
gage credit is or is likely soon to become prohibitively expensive or unavailable at any
price; (2) the unavailability of mortgage credit severely restricts housing produc-
134The three authorizations exceeded the $7.75 billion statutory limit outstanding in response
to cancelled prior commitments.
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tion, causes hardship for those who wish to purchase or sell new and existing housing,
and delays the achievement of the national goal of a decent home for every American
family; and (3) there is an urgent need to provide an alternate source of residen-
tial mortgage credit on an emergency basis” (Sec. 2). The bill was drafted and
passed in a remarkably short time frame, from first being introduced in Senate
committee on September 10 to passing the Senate on October 10 and the House
on October 15, and President Ford thanked “Congress for responding so quickly”
to “provide a shot in the arm for the housing industry” (Ford (1974a)). We clas-
sify the establishment of the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program as cyclically
motivated.
Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Ap-
propriation Act, 1976 (Pub. L. 94-116)
Enacted: October 17, 1975
Policy Change: Brooke-Cranston Tandem Increase
Agency: GNMA
Impact: +$2.5 billion
News: Oct. 1975
Effective: Oct. 1975
Classification: Cyclical
The Emergency Housing Act of 1975 (Pub. L. 94-50), enacted July 2, 1975,
authorized up to an additional $10 billion for emergency commitments and
conventional mortgage purchases under the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program
authorized under Section 313(g) of the NHA, subject to appropriations. The
Act also permitted GNMA to purchase conventional mortgages on multifamily
properties and individual condominium units, and expanded the pool of eligi-
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ble purchases to include all FHA-insured mortgages in addition to conventional
mortgages. And the Act rescinded authorization from any remaining uncom-
mitted funds from the prior $7.75 billion authorization, effective October 18,
1975, unless approved by an appropriations bill.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agen-
cies Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1976 (Pub. L. 94-116) authorized up to
an additional $5.0 billion for purchases and commitments to purchase mort-
gages under the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program, above and beyond prior
authorizations, which were extended beyond their October 18 sunset. GNMA
was allowed to borrow from the Treasury as needed to meet obligations under
this amended authorization. Using the two-year rule, we assign an annualized
increase of $2.5 billion in GNMA’s ability to purchase mortgages, starting Octo-
ber 1975, when the appropriations bill cleared the way for additional funds to
be released. The HUD Secretary made $3 billion available in January 1976, and
the remaining $2 billion was released in September 1976 (Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1978), p. 25).
The committee report accompanying the Senate bill explained that the
House provided for no additional Brooke-Cranston authorization, as the ad-
ministration had yet to request such funds when the House acted in June (Sen-
ate Committee on Appropriations (1975), p. 20). Pursuant to the adminis-
tration’s budget request, the Senate version of the appropriations bill, which
passed in July, would have authorized up to an additional $5 billion for the
Brooke-Cranston program (Senate Committee on Appropriations (1975), p. 21).
During conference, the House managers receded and agreed to a Senate amend-
ment authorizing only an additional $5 billion (House Committee on Appropri-
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ations (1975), p. 10). We date the news of the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program
expansion to the conference report, which both chambers agreed to on October
3, 1975.
The Senate committee report accompanying the HUD-Independent Agen-
cies Appropriations Act stated that the objective of the $10 billion increase in
the Brooke-Cranston Tandem authorization provided by the Emergency Hous-
ing Act was “to help support an increase in residential construction and thus
provide jobs, reduce unemployment and stimulate the economy” (Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations (1975), p. 20). The release of the funds by the HUD
Secretary was again conditional on a finding that a “reduction in the volume
of home construction or acquisition threatens seriously to affect the economy.”
Given both the economic stimulus motives of the increased purchase authoriza-
tion the overarching intent behind the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program (see
above), we classify the policy change as cyclically motivated.
Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Ap-
propriation Act, 1978 (Pub. L. 95-119)
Enacted: October 4, 1977
The appropriations Act limited GNMA’s Section 305 special assistance au-
thorizations to make commitments and purchases out of recaptured purchase
authority to $2 billion, without fiscal year limitation. Recaptured purchase au-
thority was that generated by GNMA’s portfolio sales, repayments, and com-
mitment cancellations, and which circumvented the need for new budget au-
thority. Prior to enactment, there was no limitation on how much recaptured
special assistance authority could be used for new purchases. The policy change
was made in the broader context of Congress trying to tighten control over fed-
417
eral credit subsidies and loan guarantees, and budget process reforms more gen-
erally.
Both the House and Senate bills would have initially barred all default use
of GNMA’s recaptured special assistance authority, clarifying that “any loan or
mortgage commitments made out of receipts of corporate funds, previously released in
appropriations acts and subsequently recaptured, may not be reused without further
appropriations action unless otherwise required by law,” further explaining that the
provision was “in agreement with the intent of the Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act that control be exercised over corporate receipts” (House Com-
mittee on Appropriations (1977), p. 58). The conference bill added an amend-
ment allowing up to $2 billion of recaptured special assistance purchase author-
ity to be used. We could not find, however, any related explanation for the
amendment in the conference agreement increasing special assistance authority
via recaptured funds. It is also unclear how much recaptured special assistance
authority was being used by Ginnie Mae ahead of this policy change. We thus
consider this policy change as setting a baseline for current policy with respect
to Ginnie’s special assistance functions, instead of classifying it as a binding,
significant policy change.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 (Pub. L. 95-128)
Enacted: October 12, 1977
See listing under FNMA (Sec. 3.4.1) for economic context and legislative back-
ground.
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Policy Change: Brooke-Cranston Tandem Expansion
Agency: GNMA
Impact: +$3.75 billion
News: Oct. 1977
Effective: Oct. 1977
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The Act extended the authorization of the Brooke-Cranston Tandem pro-
gram under Section 313 of the NHA for one year, through October 1, 1978. The
Act capped purchases and commitments to purchase under that authority at
$7.5 billion for FY1978, which was not conditional on appropriations. The Act
also expanded the purpose of the emergency special assistance program au-
thorized by Section 313 of the NHA from solely economic stabilization to also
promoting home ownership for moderate-income households, with the follow-
ing language amended onto that Section’s purpose: “To the extent feasible and
consistent with the primary purpose of this section to stabilize housing production, the
Secretary may direct the exercise of the authority conferred by this section to promote
homeownership opportunities for moderate-income families” (Sec. 407(a)). The
Act also gave the HUD Secretary more flexibility in targeting purchases towards
urban areas and housing rehabilitation.
The accompanying Senate Report explained that the $7.5 billion purchase
ceiling for FY1978 “does not constitute a new [budget authority] authorization, but
rather places a limit on the amount which GNMA may use in the next fiscal year from
funds which have previously been authorized. Since the program’s enactment in 1974,
Congress has authorized $17.750 billion, most of which has been used to purchase mort-
gages, and much of which has been recouped by the Federal Government when the loans
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were sold off... The Administration has proposed an amendment, currently pending be-
fore the Committee on Appropriations, which would prohibit GNMA from rolling over
the program funds in this manner, in order to establish greater financial control. The
Committee concurs that there is a need to establish an explicit congressional authoriza-
tion for permitting re-use of recaptured funds, and has, therefore, set a $7.5 billion dollar
ceiling in FY 1978. The Committee has taken this action as means of placing a limit on
the use of previous authorizations, rather than as authorizing new budget authority”
(Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (1977), pp. 30–31).
Since the enacted ceiling on rolling over previously authorized funds was
looser than the administration’s proposal to bar any roll over, and its de-
sign deliberately circumvented being subject to appropriating new budget
authority—counter to prior authorizations—we view this amendment as in-
creasing GNMA’s purchase capacity rather than merely continuing current pol-
icy. And because the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program had been created as
a temporary emergency power with purely cyclical motivations, the program
was considerably repurposed by the Act, substantially changing the composi-
tion of GNMA’s purchase capacity. While the authorization was scheduled to
expire after one year, subsequent purchases were authorized to fulfill commit-
ments made in the first year’s authorization, and there was precedent for such
sunsets being repeatedly extended as a matter of current policy (see above).
Consequently we apply the two-year rule, scoring the impact as increasing an-
nualized purchase capacity by $3.75 billion for the year starting October 1977.
The House version of the bill, passed in May, contained neither the permis-
sible limit of up to $7.5 billion in purchases for FY1978, nor the HUD Secretary’s
expanded authority to use the Tandem program to promote middle-income
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homeownership or support urban areas and housing rehabilitation (House
Committee on Banking (1977b), pp. 68–69). As these provisions were only
agreed upon in the conference report, we determine news of the policy to hav-
ing been made in October 1977, when both chambers agreed to that report.
The economy was experiencing neither a recession nor a credit crunch when
the Tandem program was reoriented toward housing policy objectives for low-
and moderate income households as well as urban areas. The 1977 Annual Re-
port of the Federal Reserve Board described a robust housing market: “Residen-
tial construction remained a strong expansive force in 1977. A vigorous sales pace in
housing markets stimulated a further, major increase in homebuilding activity during
the year. Private housing starts were at an annual rate of 2.1 million units in the final
quarter, and for the year as a whole they totaled nearly 2 million, the most since 1973”
(Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board 1977, p. 5). The amendment was
also made in the context of a broader housing bill focused on longer-term policy
goals, as opposed to emergency responses or depressed housing conditions. We
thus classify the policy change as unrelated to the business or financial cycle.
Economic and legislative background as well as the justification for this classi-
fication is discussed at more length in the Act’s listing under FNMA (see Sec.
3.4.1).
Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Ap-
propriation Act, 1979 (Pub. L. 95-392)
Enacted: September 30, 1978
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Policy Change: Special Assistance Increase
Agency: GNMA
Impact: +$1.0 billion
News: Sep. 1978
Effective: Oct. 1978
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The appropriations bill increased the limitation on emergency special assis-
tance purchases and commitments pursuant to Section 313 of the NHA by $1
billion, to be paid from recaptured purchase authority. The administration had
not requested an increase in the authorization for the Brooke-Cranston Tandem
program, and the House bill had not recommended it, but the Senate Appro-
priations Committee recommended granting “stand-by authority to commit these
funds in the event that a depressed housing market threatens to lower housing pro-
duction, especially in the multifamily area” (Senate Committee on Appropriations
(1978), p. 13). In the conference bill, the House and Senate compromised on
a standby increase of $1 billion for the Tandem program, but added language
instructing that “the funds not be made available in the absence of a recession in the
housing industry” (House Committee on Appropriations (1978), p. 6).135
The Act also further increased special assistance authority under Section 305
of the NHA by $2 billion, of which $1.5 billion could be made from recaptured
special assistance purchase authority and the remaining $500 million from new
borrowing authority. There was no fiscal year limitation accompanying this au-
thorization. The net $2 billion in new purchase authority had been requested
135The Senate version of the bill had proposed a $4 billion increase in the Brooke-Cranston Tan-
dem authorization. The conferees’ report language set a higher bar for releasing this authority
than the standing requirement of a finding by the HUD Secretary that inflation and the federal
government’s response was adversely affecting the housing industry (see above).
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by GNMA and the President’s budget, primarily to fund the planned purchase
of new and heavily rehabilitated housing for low- and moderate-income house-
holds. The $1.5 billion authorization from recaptured purchase authority was
above and beyond the $2 billion cap to such funds enacted by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriation Act,
1978 (see above), so we consider it a significant policy change instead of a con-
tinuation of current policy for special assistance functions.
In conjunction with the appropriations bill, the Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-557), enacted October 31, 1978,
extended authorization for the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program under NHA
Section 313 for one year, through October 1, 1979. The latter Act also increased
general special assistance authority by $500 million on October 1, 1978, subject
to approval by an appropriations bill (as had just been approved). The Hous-
ing and Community Development Amendments of 1978 also substantially in-
creased GNMA’s loan limits for purchases of FHA/VA mortgages to $55,000 for
single-family homes and up to $68,750 for four-unit homes, previously set at
$33,000 and $40,500, respectively.
According to the accompanying Senate committee report, the $1.5 billion
authorization from recaptured purchase authority was intended to “support the
production of approximately 50,000 new and substantially rehabilitated housing units
for low- and moderate-income families assisted under the section 8 program” (Senate
Committee on Appropriations (1978), p. 13). The other $500 million increase
was to be used for a ‘Targeted Tandem’ program for “mortgages on projects located
in distressed cities and neighborhoods which are undergoing or showing prospects for re-
vitalization” (Senate Committee on Appropriations (1978), p. 13). The purchases
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were to bear below-market interest rates as low as 7.5%, more than two percent-
age points below prevailing 30-year conventional fixed-rate mortgages.136
The economy was not in recession, but had just entered the credit crunch
lasting from 1978Q2 through 1982Q4 when the bill was enacted. The 1979 Eco-
nomic Report of the President, however, suggested that housing and mortgage
market conditions were holding up quite well, and construction was at capac-
ity, despite rising interest rates in the second half of the year: “Housing activity
remained on a plateau throughout last year, following nearly 3 years of steady ad-
vance. Real residential construction, on a calendar year basis, was 3.5 percent above that
in 1977, and there were 2.0 million housing starts last year... This leveling of housing
starts and residential construction in 1978 was not surprising. Three years of strongly
rising building activity had filled backlogs of demand created by the depressed level of
new construction during the 1973-74 period of credit restraint and low income. More-
over, the sharp rise in prices of a wide range of building materials suggests that the
building industry was operating at close to capacity in 1978. Indeed, the striking
feature of the housing sector last year was its continued high level of activity in the
face of sharply rising interest rates” (Economic Report of the President 1979, p.
31). The 1978 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board similarly noted the
strength of the housing market through the end of 1978, explaining that “the sus-
tained strength of residential construction activity apparently reflected both the appeal
of housing investment as a hedge against inflation and the improved ability of mortgage
markets to withstand tightening financial conditions” (Annual Report of the Federal
Reserve Board 1978, pp. 5, 8–9).
Because there was no imminent downturn in the housing market at the time,
136The report also noted that “the net outlay per $1,000,000,000 of mortgage purchase authority
exercised is only $150,000,000 or so” (Senate Committee on Appropriations (1978), p. 13).
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we do not consider the conditional standby emergency special assistance au-
thorization to be a binding increase in purchase capacity. Using the two-year
rule, we assign a $1 billion annualized increase in Ginnie’s purchasing capacity
from the Section 305 special assistance authority increase of $2 billion, as mea-
sured on a current policy basis. Because of substantive differences between the
House and Senate versions of the bill regarding the top-line increase in GNMA’s
Tandem and special assistance programs (see above), we date news of the net
increase as being dated to the agreement of the House and Senate to the confer-
ence report on September 19 and September 20, respectively.
The increase in general special assistance authority was distinctly oriented
toward specific social policy objectives related to low-income housing, notably
supporting urban revitalization and construction of multifamily housing for
HUD’s Section 8 low-income housing program. Moreover, the conditional in-
crease in the Brooke-Cranston Tandem purchase authority served as an insur-
ance policy in the event of a recession, suggesting that policymakers were not
intending the general special assistance increase to also serve a contingent coun-
tercyclical role. The GNMA special assistance authority budget request in the
FY1979 Budget emphasized supporting FHA programs with below-market in-
terest rates, and made no mention of economic conditions or cyclical motives
(The Budget for Fiscal Year 1979 Appendix, p. 493). The bill eventually just
met the administration’s request, which was made on January 20, 1978, predat-
ing the credit crunch, without any adjustment for subsequent economic trends.
We thus classify the unconditional increase in Section 305 purchase authority as
unrelated to the business or financial cycle.
Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Ap-
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propriation Act, 1980 (Pub. L. 96-103)
Enacted: November 5, 1979
Policy Change: Special Assistance Increase
Agency: GNMA
Impact: +$1.0 billion
News: July 1979
Effective: Nov. 1979
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The Act again further increased the Section 305 general special assistance
authorization by $2 billion, to be funded entirely out of recaptured special as-
sistance purchase authority. There was no fiscal year limitation accompanying
this authorization. The additional $2 billion in purchase authority had been
requested by GNMA and the President’s budget, with $1.5 billion earmarked
for the planned purchase of new and heavily rehabilitated housing for low-
and moderate-income households, particularly through Section 8 housing as-
sistance. The remaining $500 million was intended for the Targeted Tandem
program for mortgage purchases related to urban revitalization in distressed
cities (Senate Committee on Appropriations (1979), p. 15). The fiscal year had
already started October 1, 1979, so this authorization was effective upon enact-
ment. Using the two-year rule, we assign a $1 billion annualized increase in
Ginnie’s purchasing capacity from the Section 305 special assistance authority
increase of $2 billion, as measured on a current policy basis. The Senate version
of the bill, passed July 27, concurred with the GNMA special assistance autho-
rization in the House version previously passed on June 27, hence we date the
news of the increase as being made public in July 1979, as opposed to the House
and Senate agreeing to the conference report on October 24.
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The economy was not in a recession, but had entered the credit crunch last-
ing from 1978Q2 through 1982Q4 when the bill was enacted. The 1980 Economic
Report of the President offered the following overview of housing and mort-
gage market conditions: “The decline in residential construction in 1979 was about
in line with expectations at the beginning of the year, although interest rates increased
much more than had been anticipated. For the year as a whole, real residential construc-
tion was 6 percent below the high 1978 level, and new housing starts fell to about 1.74
million units from 2 million in the previous year... The rising cost of mortgage and con-
struction financing depressed housing sales and starts only moderately until late in the
year... Following Federal Reserve action in early October to tighten monetary policy,
mortgage interest rates rose sharply, reaching levels well above usury limits in many
States” (Economic Report of the President 1980, pp. 43–44).
The authorization of funds was, however, focused on longer-term policy
toward urban revitalization and affordable housing for lower- and moderate-
income households, particularly the Carter administration’s prioritization of ex-
panding Section 8 housing.137 Moreover, the appropriations committee merely
met the administration’s budget request submitted January 22, 1979, with no
adjustment for the subsequent changes in housing and mortgage market condi-
tions. We thus classify the authorization as unrelated to the business cycle.
Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-153)
Enacted: December 21, 1979
Among many other provisions, the Act waived GNMA’s Section 305 special
assistance program loan limits, to allow for the purchase of any loan insured
137In particular the Housing and Community Development Acts of 1977 and 1980 signifi-
cantly expanded Section 8 housing programs, and the Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1979 expanded GNMA’s purchase capabilities with respect to Section 8 housing
(see below).
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under a number of targeted FHA programs when at least 20% of the mortgages
fell under Section 8 of the National Housing Act. The stated purpose of the bill
in its preamble was “[t]o amend and extend certain Federal laws relating to housing,
community and neighborhood development and preservation, and related programs, and
for other purposes,” and the bill very much suggested that the stance of US federal
housing policy was focused on longer-term distributional and social insurance
motives, as opposed to cyclical concerns. We do not consider this a binding,
significant policy change affecting Ginnie’s purchase capacity, merely a modest
change in the pool of mortgages eligible.
Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Ap-
propriation Act, 1981 (Pub. L. 96-526)
Enacted: December 15, 1980
Policy Change: Special Assistance Decrease
Agency: GNMA
Impact: -$0.2 billion
News: Sep. 1980
Effective: Dec. 1980
Classification: Cyclical
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-399),
enacted October 8, 1980, extended the authorization for the Brooke-Cranston
Tandem program under Section 313 of the NHA for one year, through Octo-
ber 1, 1981. The authorization was subsequently allowed to expire. Eligible
purchases under the Brooke-Cranston Tandem program were expanded to also
include mortgage-related securities. The Act also increased GNMA’s Section
305(c) general Presidential special assistance authority by $900 million, effective
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October 1, 1980, again subject to approval in an appropriation act.138
Two months later, the corresponding Department of Housing and Urban
Development-Independent Agencies Appropriation Act for FY1981 authorized
a $1.8 billion loan limitation—as opposed to an authorization via recapture of
payments—to fund commitment contracts and purchases under the NHA Sec-
tion 305 special assistance program during FY1981, as well as additional obli-
gations as necessary to meet prior years commitments.139 The fiscal year had
already started October 1, 1980, so this authorization was effective upon enact-
ment. The budget had requested $1.8 billion in mortgage purchase authority for
FY1981, which was earmarked for the Section 8 Tandem program and, to a lesser
extent, the Targeted Tandem program for middle-income housing in distressed
urban areas. The enacted loan limit represented a decrease of $200 million in
GNMA’s authority relative to current policy (see above). The Senate version of
the bill, passed September 23, concurred with the GNMA special assistance au-
thorization in the House version previously passed on July 28, hence we date
the news of the increase as being made public in September 1980, as opposed to
the House and Senate agreeing to the conference report in December 1980.
The appropriations act also authorized GNMA to make new commitments
of up to $53 billion in FY1981 to issue MBS guarantees to carry out the pur-
poses of Section 306 of the NHA—the first statutory limitation of its kind.140
Previously, commitments to issue guarantees had been authorized in any such
138See accompanying House Committee on Banking report for complete history of Sec. 305(c)
revisions to general Presidential special assistance authority (House Committee on Banking
(1980), p. 186).
139This authorization overhaul was again the result of ongoing budget process and credit pro-
gram reforms. The President’s FY1981 Budget had proposed subjecting all federal credit pro-
grams to annual reviews and authorizations through appropriations language (Senate Commit-
tee on Appropriations (1980), p. 5).
140Ibid.
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amounts as necessary to meet the objectives of the NHA, as amended. The au-
thorization set by the Act matched the projected level of commitments and au-
thorization request in the president’s budget for FY1981 (The Budget for Fiscal
Year 1981 Appendix, p. 524).
The first emphasis of the 1981 Economic Report of the President was that
“[w]e must find ways to bring down a stubborn inflation without choking off economic
growth” (Economic Report of the President 1981, p. 3), and Congress was trying
to keep discretionary spending and program levels in check to fight inflation.
The FY1981 Budget also proposed a trial $30 million grant program to assist in
the financing of multifamily home construction as “an experimental shift from the
current mode of financing targeted tandem projects—a tandem program involving the
purchase and sale of mortgages—to an interest rate reduction approach... a grant would
be given to the lender as compensation for making a below-market interest-rate mort-
gage loan... The capital grant may accomplish the same purpose, without ever having to
purchase, hold, and subsequently sell the mortgage” (The Budget for Fiscal Year 1981
Appendix, p. 519). The appropriations committees rejected the administration’s
proposed trial interest rate subsidy program, signaling a shift in housing policy
priorities from social policy objectives to budgetary and inflationary concerns.
The accompanying Senate committee report explained that its refusal “is not in-
tended to be a condemnation of the program or its merits. Rather the Committee believes
that it is inappropriate to start a new program at a time when every effort is being
made to eliminate the budget deficit as a means of fighting inflation” (Senate
Committee on Appropriations (1980), p. 17).141 The appropriations bill also cut
all agencies of jurisdiction, save the VA, by at least 2%, with Congress deliber-
141The 1981 Economic Report of the President had similarly emphasized the imperative that
“Our monetary and fiscal policies must apply steady anti-inflationary restraint to the economy” (Eco-
nomic Report of the President 1981, p. 8).
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ately appropriating less than the administration’s top-line budget request, again
representative of cyclical budgetary and inflationary concerns (CQ (1981)).142
The request for increased GNMA special assistance authority was made on
January 28, 1980, early in the recession lasting from January through July 1980.
The appropriations bill was enacted during the briefly ensuing expansion be-
fore the more severe recession from July 1981 through November 1982. The
1981 Economic Report of the President noted that “[h]ousing and automobile sales
were the key sectors of weakness, accounting for about two-thirds of this drop in final
demand” in the first recession (Economic Report of the President 1981, p. 136).
The report noted that “Federal and related agencies provided only modest support to
the mortgage market as compared with the last cyclical downturn” (Economic Report
of the President 1981, p. 141), but also that the “chief cyclical determinant of hous-
ing activity has become interest rates rather than credit availability. As events have
demonstrated, however, [the development of secondary markets] did not insulate hous-
ing from tighter monetary conditions.” Housing starts bottomed out in May 1980,
but after a short summer rebound, weakness in the housing market remerged
in the fourth quarter. Moreover, the CQ Almanac noted that cyclical concerns
about the housing market affected the development of the appropriations bill,
with Congress adding funds during conference: “Conferees agreed to shift funds
to revitalize the Section 235 mortgage subsidy program in an effort to stimulate home-
buying and shore up the lagging home building industry” (CQ (1981)). The An-
nual Report of the Federal Reserve noted that total real residential construction
expenditures dropped 13% for the year, but HUD programs were responsible
142The ‘high-employment budget surplus,’ the prevailing structural budget deficit measure,
was estimated to have been reduced by $10 billion in CY1980, though federal expenditures
were surging because of higher net interest costs, elevated unemployment, and cost-of-living
adjustments for mandatory social insurance programs (Economic Report of the President 1981,
p. 157).
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for the resilience and increased construction of multifamily and condominium
units (Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, p. 7).143 We thus classify the
policy change as cyclically motivated by concerns about the housing and credit
markets, cyclical budget deficits, and broader inflationary dynamics.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (Pub. L. 97-35)
Enacted: August 13, 1981
The Act revised upwards the previous increase in GNMA’s Section 305(c)
general Presidential special assistance purchase authority from $900 million ef-
fective October 1, 1980 (Pub. L. 96-339) to an increase of $1.1 billion on October
1, 1981, again subject to an appropriations act, but without fiscal year limita-
tion. The Act also capped special assistance authority to enter commitments to
purchase mortgages under Section 305 of the NHA to a total aggregate princi-
pal of $1.973 billion for FY1982, with the caveat that no more than $580 million
could be commitments for projects without some units assisted under Section
8. Because the increase was subject to an appropriations bill, we do not con-
sider it a binding, significant policy change affecting Ginnie’s purchases. The
bill reflected considerable negotiation and compromise between the Republican
controlled Senate and Democratic House majority; presaging the approaching
wind-down of Ginnie’s special assistance functions, the House version of the
bill additionally contained a provision that would have required GNMA to sell
off at least $2 billion of its mortgage portfolio from the Section 305 special as-
sistance programs in FY1982, but it was dropped in conference (House Budget
Committee (1981), p. 703).144
143The Economic Report of the President suggested that federal housing policies for multi-
family construction were propping up overall housing starts following the summer rebound:
“Multifamily starts—which increased from September to November—were bolstered somewhat by Fed-
eral subsidy programs” (Economic Report of the President 1981, pp. 171–172).
144The conference report explained that: “The House bill contained a provision to increase GNMA’s
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Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Ap-
propriation Act, 1982 (Pub. L. 97-101)
Enacted: December 23, 1981
Policy Change: Special Assistance Increase
Agency: GNMA
Impact: +$0.173 billion
News: Dec. 1981
Effective: Dec. 1981
Classification: Cyclical
The Act set a special assistance loan limitation for funding commitment con-
tracts and purchases under Section 305 of the Housing Act to a total aggregate
principle of $1.973 billion for FY1982, in line with the OBRA of 1981 (see above).
The 1982 budget had requested an increased loan limit of $3.6 billion, up from
$1.8 billion, which was matched by the House bill but not by the Senate bill.
The enacted loan limit represented an increase of $173 million in GNMA’s com-
mitment authority relative to current policy for the prior fiscal year (see above).
The fiscal year had already started October 1, 1981, so this authorization was
effective upon enactment. The Senate’s preferred lower funding limitation was
mortgage purchase authority under the Special Assistance Functions by $1.1 billion on October 1, 1981.
The Senate amendment contained a similar provision, except that it increased GNMA’s authority by
$2,300,000,000 on October 1, 1981, and provided that not more than $942,800,000 of that amount shall
be available for the purchase of or commitments to purchase mortgages secured by projects which do not
contain units assisted under sec. 8 of the US Housing Act of 1937. The conference report contains the
House provision... The House bill also included a provision not contained in the Senate bill providing
that (1) during fiscal year 1982, GNMA may not enter into commitments to purchase mortgages, with
an aggregate principal amount in excess of $1,973,000,000; and (2) that such amount shall not include
any authority to enter into commitment which was authorized for use during fiscal year 1981 but was not
utilized during such year.” The conference report contained the first House provision, amended
with the enacted Section 8 limitation on commitments (House Budget Committee (1981), p.
703).
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accepted as an amendment onto the conference bill, thus we date the news of the
policy change being made public to the conference bill clearing both chambers
on December 10, 1981.
The higher unmatched request for Ginnie’s special assistance functions was
intended “to ‘buy-out’ the existing pipeline of project applications for insurance (FHA)
which are being processed on the assumption that tandem financing would be avail-
able. Commitments issued in 1982 will be in support of section 8 and targeted tandem
projects which were covered by applications for FHA mortgage insurance commitments
submitted on or before February 13, 1981” (House Committee on Appropriations
(1981), p. 8). Signaling a final wind-down of the Tandem programs, the enacted
level was intended to only cover “applications that had the status of ‘conditional in
process’ to ‘firm commitment” for insurance purposes as of February 13, 1981” (Senate
Committee on Appropriations (1981), p. 15).
The appropriations Act also increased GNMA authorizations to make new
commitments to issue guarantees to carry out the purposes of Section 306 of the
NHA by $15.25 billion, up to $68.25 billion for FY1982. The 1982 budget had
proposed credit control language limiting GNMA’s commitments to guarantee
MBS to $48 billion, which the House and Senate rejected based on the concern
that it “could have a negative effect on the already depressed housing industry”
(Senate Committee on Appropriations (1981), p. 16). The bill was enacted in
the midst of the recession lasting from July 1981 through November 1982, and
the accompanying committee report language explicitly cited concerns about
a depressed housing market. We thus classify the policy change as cyclically
motivated.
Continuing Appropriations for FY1983 (Pub. L. 97-377)
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Enacted: December 21, 1982
Policy Change: Special Assistance Decrease
Agency: GNMA
Impact: -$1.473 billion
News: Dec. 1982
Effective: Dec. 1982
Classification: Cyclical
The continuing appropriations bill set a special assistance loan limitation for
GNMA commitment contracts and purchases under Section 305 of the NHA to
a total aggregate principle of $500 million for FY1983, to be paid from collections
received. Of this, $250 million was for the targeted tandem program, and the
other $250 million was for Section 8 construction projects (House Committee on
Appropriations (1982a), p. 189). The conference bill restored the $500 million
increase initially proposed in the House bill, which had been struck in the Sen-
ate’s version of the bill (House Committee on Appropriations (1982a), p. 189).
The enacted loan limit represented a decrease of $1.473 billion in GNMA’s com-
mitment authority relative to current policy for the prior fiscal year (see above).
The fiscal year had already started October 1, 1982, so this authorization was
effective upon enactment. We determine that the news of Ginnie’s decrease
in special assistance authority was made public in December 1982, when the
House, Senate, and conference versions of the bill all cleared both chambers.145
While the loan limitation amounted to decreased support for the housing
and mortgage market relative to current policy, it nonetheless appears to have
145The FY1983 HUD-Independent Agencies bill previously reported by the House Appropria-
tions Committee and partially incorporated into the continuing appropriations act had deliber-
ately deferred action on GNMA’s special assistance programs, rendering the conference bill the
appropriate benchmark (House Committee on Appropriations (1982b), p. 4).
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been intended as stimulative in the sense of delaying the administration’s im-
minent repeal of the program (see below). The accompanying House report
framed the special assistance programs as “stimulating mortgage lending and
building activities when credit conditions so warrant” and stressed that the
funds would have a positive impact on construction employment: “these funds
will create construction jobs in as short a time as possible. The projects are ready,
for the most part, to go to construction in the next three to six months. In this con-
nection, the Committee directs the Department to allocate the $500,000,000 included
herein within 30 days of enactment of this joint resolution. It is expected that this level
of funding will generate approximately 15,000 jobs” (House Committee on Ap-
propriations (1982b), p. 8). Beyond explicitly referencing near-term concerns
about mortgage market activity and construction employment, the bill was also
drafted and moved exceptionally quickly.146 And the bill was enacted just as the
economy was bottoming out from the recession lasting from July 1981 through
November 1982. We thus classify the policy change as cyclically motivated.
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-181)
Enacted: November 30, 1983
Policy Change: Repeal of Tandem Programs
Agency: GNMA
Impact: -$2.92 billion
News: Nov. 1983
Effective: Nov. 1983
Classification: Non-Cyclical
The Act repealed Sections 305 and 313 of the National Housing Act, which
146The House version of the bill passed December 14, the Senate version of the bill passed
December 19, and both chambers agreed to the conference report on December 20.
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had authorized GNMA’s general special assistance functions and Brooke-
Cranston Tandem program, respectively. Repeal was effective upon enactment,
but previously entered commitments to purchase mortgages, as well as the ser-
vicing and disposition of related mortgage holdings, would continue to be gov-
erned by the provisions of such sections as in effect immediately before repeal.
Citing ‘large losses’ to the federal government associated with the programs,
Reagan administration’s FY1984 Budget request had proposed winding down
both subsidized special assistance programs and repealing their statutory au-
thorizations, as later implemented by the Act.147 Under existing law, the budget
projected that outlays for GNMA’s purchase activity would total $1.43 billion
in FY1984 and $212 million in FY1985, but the administration’s proposed legis-
lation would instead result in negative outlays of -$842 million in FY1984 and
-$1.038 billion for FY1985 (The Budget for Fiscal Year 1984, p. 5-57). Annu-
alizing, we estimate the elimination of the special assistance programs would
reduce federal outlays by $875 million in the year starting November 1983.148
By the design of the program, special assistance purchase volumes were consid-
erably larger than their associated net budgetary outlays, which made up the
difference between purchase and sales price. Based on the recent estimate that
$150 million in net outlays supported $1 billion in special assistance purchases
(see Pub. L. 95-392 above), we estimate that this reduction in outlays would
reduce purchases by $5.83 billion (-$875 million ×$1000$150 = -$5.83 billion). Using
the two-year rule, we assign an annualized decrease in GNMA’s purchases of
147The budget request elaborated, citing budgetary concerns about the programs: “For 1984,
the administration proposes no further activity for the GNMA tandem mortgage subsidy programs. The
statutory authority for these programs, which involves making direct loans at large losses to the Federal
Government, is proposed for repeal. Contingent upon successful enactment of this proposal, outstanding
Treasury borrowing for these programs will be forgiven, and the remaining fund balances transferred to
the GNMA management and liquidating functions fund” (The Budget for Fiscal Year 1984, p. 5-56).
148As the Act took effect after the first two months of FY1984, we assume assume a 5/6–1/6
split between projected FY1984 and FY1985 impacts
(
(−842) × 1012 + (−1038) × 212 = −875
)
.
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$2.92 billion, relative to current policy. We determine that the news of GNMA’s
special assistance programs being repealed was made public in mid-November
1983, when the conference bill passed both chambers.149
The Reagan administration’s efforts to pare back GNMA activity, particu-
larly subsidized mortgage purchases, were part of a broader, widely recognized
effort to shrink the government’s active role in housing markets, and the GSEs in
particular. The Reagan administration’s FY1983 Budget request had proposed
reducing GNMA’s guarantee commitment level by $20 billion (The Budget for
Fiscal Year 1983, p. 5-66), and requested no new authorization for the tandem
programs, though it stopped short of proposing a full repeal of their authoriza-
tion (see above). That budget had argued that reducing federal credit programs
“should relieve pressure on interest rates and lead to a sustainable and non-inflationary
recovery of the mortgage finance and construction industries” (The Budget for Fiscal
Year 1983, p. 5-70). The administration had also cited budgetary concerns about
the nature of the special assistance programs in proposing their statutory repeal.
In October 1984, the President of the Mortgage Bankers Association had railed
against the administration’s ‘ideological’ effort to shrink the government, pri-
vatize, and deregulate: “The Reagan administration’s philosophy has shifted the allo-
cation of federal government resources toward new priorities, intentionally or otherwise
diminishing the high social priority of housing in this country” (The American
Banker (10/18/1983)). Because the efforts to scale back Fannie and Freddie,
and the more successful efforts to check Ginnie, were widely viewed as driven
by political philosophy or long-term budgetary aims, we classify this policy as
149The appropriations process had badly broken down in FY1984, resulting in a slew of con-
tinuing resolutions and supplemental appropriations bills, and the enacted bill was a highly
contentious final funding measure for the year. President Reagan had, however, already signed
into law the Department of Housing and Urban Development; Independent Agencies Appropri-
ation Act, 1984 (Pub. L. 98-45), enacted July 12, 1983, which both deliberately ignored GNMA’s
special assistance authorizations and did not include repeal of Sections 305 and 313.
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unrelated to contemporaneous economic conditions.
Following the repeal of the general and emergency special assistance functions,
Ginnie’s role in mortgage markets was almost entirely confined to guaranteeing
timely payment on pools of FHA/VA mortgages. Annual appropriations bills
continued to set authorization limits for Ginnie entering commitments to guar-
antee MBS, and this statutory limitation was frequently changed in response
to economic, budgetary, and social policy objectives. But because Ginnie guar-
anteed pools issued by third parties, this guarantee activity did not result in
purchase or retained portfolio activity.
3.4.4 Federal Reserve
During the Great Recession and ensuing period of housing and financial market
fragility, the Federal Reserve Board became the principal buyer of agency debt
and a major holder of agency MBS. The Federal Reserve announced on Novem-
ber 25, 2008 that it would initiate a program to purchase obligations of Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks, as well as MBS backed
by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae (or ‘agency MBS’). As of June 28,
2017, the Federal Reserve Bank held $1.77 trillion worth of agency MBS and $8.1
billion worth of federal agency debt securities, comprising 39.4% of the Federal
Reserve System’s $4.51 trillion balance sheet (FRB H.4.1). The Fed’s holdings of
agency debt peaked at $170 billion in March 2010.
Though this was the Federal Reserve’s first foray into purchasing mortgage
securities, transacting in agency securities had been authorized since the 1960s,
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and the Fed had previously purchased agency debt instruments. The Interest
Rate Adjustment Act of 1966 (Pub. L. 89-597, enacted September 21, 1966), a bill
regulating and attempting to reduce interest rates, had expanded the authority
of the Federal Open Market Committee’s open-market operations (OMOs) to
include transacting in “any obligation which is a direct obligation of, or fully guaran-
teed as to principal and interest by, any agency of the United States.” According to an
accompanying Senate committee report, Congress’s intent behind the provision
was to “broaden the scope of Federal Reserve open-market operations in regulating the
supply of reserves available to the banking system” (Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency (1966), p. 2). The Act granted this expanded authority over OMO
purchases for only one year, but Congress extended this authority in 1967 and
permanently amended this change to Sec. 14(b)(2) of the Federal Reserve Act in
1968 (Haltom and Sharp (2014)). Pub. L. 90-505, enacted September 21, 1968,
also expanded authority regarding agency security purchases to allow direct
purchases from government agencies. Facing political pressure from Congress,
the Federal Reserve, under Chairman Arthur Burns, first engaged in purchases
of agency securities in 1971 (Haltom and Sharp (2014)). The Fed continued
to purchase FNMA debt securities and that of other federally sponsored agen-
cies through 1981, amassing as much as 10% of Fannie’s debt outstanding by
the mid-1970s, and the Fed still held FNMA debt on its balance sheet through
2000 (Haltom and Sharp (2014)). This expanded authority for OMO purchases
proved highly consequential for the conduct of unconventional monetary policy
during the Great Recession.
FOMC Announcement: QE1 Launch
Announced: November 25, 2008
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Policy Change: QE1 Launch
Agency: GNMA
Impact: +$1.39 billion
News: Nov. 2008
Effective: Dec. 2008
Classification: Cyclical
The Federal Reserve announced on November 25, 2008 that it would initi-
ate a program to purchase agency MBS and obligations of Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks, shortly after FNMA and FHLMC had
been taken into conservatorship by the FHFA and US Treasury Department (see
listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). Concurrent with the September 2008 conserva-
torship announcement, the Treasury had also initiated its own agency MBS pur-
chase program (see listing under Treasury, Sec. 3.4.5). Noting that “[s]preads of
rates on GSE debt and on GSE-guaranteed mortgages have widened appreciably of late,”
the FOMC press release offered the following motivation: “This action is being
taken to reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase
of houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved
conditions in financial markets more generally” (Federal Reserve Press Release
November 25, 2008). The Board of Governors initially authorized purchases
of $100 billion worth of GSE debt obligations and up to $500 billion worth of
agency MBS. The full schedule of purchases was not announced, but purchases
were “expected to take place over several quarters,” starting the following week, in
early December. Given the uncertain duration and pace of purchases, we use
the two-year rule and assign an annualized increase in the Federal Reserve’s
agency MBS purchases of $250 billion, with news of the policy change being
made public in November 2008. The policy announcement significantly affected
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intraday trading volumes and yields on long-term bonds (Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jørgensen (2011)).
This announcement marked the beginning of the first round of quantitative
easing, or QE1, which would run from December 2008 to March 2010. The action
was taken in the midst of the Great Recession, explicitly in response to a severe
credit crunch, housing market collapse, and declining economic activity, and is
thus classified as cyclically motivated.
FOMC Announcement: QE1 Expansion
Announced: March 18, 2009
Policy Change: QE1 Expansion
Agency: Federal Reserve
Impact: +$750.0 billion
News: Mar. 2009
Effective: Mar. 2009
Classification: Cyclical
The Federal Reserve announced on March 18, 2009 that it would expand its
purchases of agency MBS by $750 billion, and double its purchases of agency
debt from $100 billion to up to $200 billion. The FOMC noted that the expanded
MBS purchases would bring “total purchases of these securities to up to $1.25 trillion
this year” (FOMC Statement March 18, 2009). The motivation for the expansion
of the agency MBS program was “[t]o provide greater support to mortgage lend-
ing and housing markets.” The FOMC also announced it would purchase up to
$300 billion worth of long-term Treasury securities within the next six months
to “help improve conditions in private credit markets” (FOMC Statement March 18,
2009). The policy announcement again significantly affected intraday trading
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volumes and yields on long-term bonds (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen
(2011)). Given the explicit projection that the MBS purchase program would be
completed within the year, we do not invoke the two-year rule and instead as-
sign an annualized increase in the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchases of the full
$750 billion announced in March 2009.
The FOMC statement noted that the economy was still contracting, and that
“[j]ob losses, declining equity and housing wealth, and tight credit conditions have
weighed on consumer sentiment and spending.” The action was taken in the midst
of the Great Recession, explicitly in response to a severe credit crunch, hous-
ing market collapse, and declining economic activity, and is thus classified as
cyclically motivated.
FOMC Statement: Reduction of Agency MBS Program
Announced: November 4, 2009
The FOMC announced that it was slowing the pace of both its agency debt
and MBS purchases, and that the expected volume of agency debt purchased
would be $175 billion, down $25 billion from the previously announced tar-
get. The FOMC offered the following explanation: “The amount of agency debt
purchases, while somewhat less than the previously announced maximum of $200 bil-
lion, is consistent with the recent path of purchases and reflects the limited availability
of agency debt” (FOMC Statement November 4, 2009). The deceleration in pur-
chases was intended “to promote a smooth transition in markets” and purchases
were projected to be completed by the end of 2010Q1. The overall intent of
both asset purchase programs was “[t]o provide support to mortgage lending and
housing markets and to improve overall conditions in private credit markets” (FOMC
Statement November 4, 2009). Because the policy announcement did not affect
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the targeted volume of MBS purchases and only modestly extended the timing
of purchases, we do not consider this a significant policy change for the Fed’s
MBS purchase program.
FOMC Statement: Conclusion of Agency MBS Program
Announced: December 16, 2009
The FOMC again announced that it was slowing the pace of its agency debt
and MBS purchases, and expected total purchases of $175 billion and $1.25 tril-
lion respectively, and reiterated that the program was expected to be complete
by projected to be completed by the end of 2010Q1. And the statement again
reaffirmed the following motivation for the purchase program: “To provide sup-
port to mortgage lending and housing markets and to improve overall conditions in
private credit markets” (FOMC Statement December 16, 2009).
In total, the Federal Reserve purchased $432.3 billion worth of FHLMC MBS,
$703.6 billion worth of FNMA MBS, and $114.0 billion worth of GNMA MBS,
exhausting the entire $1.25 trillion MBS purchase commitment. And the Federal
Reserve purchased $67.1 billion worth of FHLMC debt, $67.4 billion worth of
FNMA debt, and $37.7 billion worth of FHLBank debt, leaving $2.9 billion of
the revised $175 billion purchase commitment unused.
FOMC Statement: Reinvestment of Agency MBS Program
Announced: August 10, 2010
The FOMC announced that it would maintain the present volume of the
Federal Reserve’s portfolio of securities held outright by reinvesting principal
payments from its holdings of agency debt and MBS into longer-term Treasury
securities, while continuing to rolling over the Federal Reserve’s holdings of
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Treasury securities as they matured. The intent behind maintaining the size of
its securities balance sheet was “[t]o help support the economic recovery in a context
of price stability” (FOMC Statement August 10, 2010).
FOMC Statement: QE2 Launch
Announced: November 3, 2010
The FOMC announced that it would purchase an additional $600 billion
worth of longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of roughly $75 billion per
month, to be concluded by the end of the second quarter of 2011. This announce-
ment marked the beginning of the second round of quantitative easing, or QE2,
which would run from November 2010 to June 2011. This round of Treasury
purchases was intended “[t]o promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to
help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate” (FOMC
Statement November 3, 2010).
FOMC Announcement: Reinvestment of Agency MBS Program
Announced: September 21, 2011
Policy Change: Agency MBS Reinvestment
Agency: Federal Reserve
Impact: +$262.0 billion
News: Sep. 2011
Effective: Sep. 2011
Classification: Cyclical
On September 21, 2011, the FOMC announced that the principal payments
from its holdings of agency debt and MBS would be reinvested into agency
MBS, instead of Treasury securities. The motivation behind the change was
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“[t]o help support conditions in mortgage markets” (FOMC Statement September
21, 2011). The FOMC maintained its policy of rolling over maturing Treasury
securities. The statement made clear that that housing market remained a far cry
from health: “Investment in nonresidential structures is still weak, and the housing
sector remains depressed.” And the FOMC cited “significant downside risks to the
economic outlook, including strains in global financial markets.” The Federal Reserve
also announced a maturity extension program in which it would purchase $400
billion worth of longer-dated Treasury securities with maturities between 6- and
30-years and sell an equal volume of Treasuries with maturities of under 3 years
(popularly coined ‘Operation Twist’).
Market analysts at Morgan Stanley estimated that paydowns on the Fed’s
standing MBS portfolio could total $262 billion over the next twelve months,
which was widely cited as an estimate of the Fed’s expected increased demand
for agency MBS as a result of the reinvestment program (Dow Jones Newswires
(9/21/2011)). Financial newswires also underscored that the Fed’s MBS rein-
vestment program had come as a surprise. Dow Jones Newswires explained that
“[t]he Fed decision to bolster the mortgage market surprised many traders and analysts
who had been expecting the central bank would keep investing cash rolling off its ex-
isting portfolio into the Treasury market” (Dow Jones News Service (9/21/2011)).
Based on Morgan Stanley’s projections, we score this policy as increasing the
Fed’s mortgage securities purchases by an annualized $262 billion starting in
September 2011. Given the FOMC’s stated concerns and objectives, we classify
the agency MBS reinvestment program as cyclically and financially motivated.
FOMC Announcement: QE3 Launch
Announced: September 13, 2012
446
Policy Change: QE3 Launch
Agency: Federal Reserve
Impact: +$480.0 billion
News: Sep. 2012
Effective: Sep. 2012
Classification: Cyclical
On September 13, 2012, the FOMC announced that the Federal Reserve
would purchase additional agency MBS at a pace of roughly $40 billion per
month. No expected duration or target total volume of purchases was an-
nounced for this round of asset purchases. The FOMC also announced that
it would continue Operation Twist, and estimated that the two purchase pro-
grams would collectively amount to increasing the Federal Reserve’s holdings
of long-dated securities by roughly $85 billion per month. The stated objective
was “[t]o support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over
time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate,” while noting that inflation
was expected to remain below target over the medium term (FOMC Statement
September 13, 2012). The statement also noted that the “housing sector has shown
some further signs of improvement, albeit from a depressed level.”
This announcement marked the beginning of the third round of quantitative
easing, or QE3, which would run from September 2012 through October 2014.
According to a Reuters poll, around 60% of financial economists and market an-
alysts had been expecting the Fed to launch a third round of quantitative easing
at this FOMC meeting, but the consensus had been that the Fed would announce
a mix of Treasury bond and agency debt purchases, as opposed to increasing
its MBS acquisitions (Business and Finance Daily News Service (9/13/2012)).
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Lending further support to having surprised markets, the policy announcement
significantly affected yields on long-term bonds in intraday trading (Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2011)). In light of the uncertain duration of QE3,
we assume purchases would continue for at least one year, and score this policy
as increasing the Fed’s mortgage purchases by an annualized $480 billion for the
year starting September 2012 ($40 × 12 = $480). Given the FOMC’s stated con-
cerns and objectives, we classify the launch of QE3 as cyclically and financially
motivated.
FOMC Statement: QE3 Expansion Announced: December 12, 2012
On December 12, 2012, the FOMC announced that the Federal Reserve would
continue to purchase additional agency MBS at a pace of roughly $40 billion per
month, and would begin net purchases of longer-dated Treasuries at a pace of
$45 billion per month when Operation Twist was concluded at the end of De-
cember 2012. The FOMC explained that “these actions should maintain downward
pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make
broader financial conditions more accommodative” (FOMC Statement December 12,
2012), and again cited concerns about downside risks from global financial mar-
kets.
FOMC Announcement: QE3 Taper
Announced: December 18, 2013
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Policy Change: QE3 Taper h
Agency: Federal Reserve
Impact: -$60.0 billion
News: Dec. 2013
Effective: Jan. 2014
Classification: Cyclical
On December 18, 2013, the FOMC announced that it would slightly reduce
the pace of its agency MBS purchases from $40 billion to $35 billion per month
and its purchases of Treasuries from $45 billion to $40 billion per month, start-
ing in January 2014. The FOMC reaffirmed its policy of reinvesting the principal
payments from its holdings of agency debt and MBS into more agency MBS and
rolling over Treasuries. The deceleration of purchases was made in “light of the
cumulative progress toward maximum employment and the improvement in the outlook
for labor market conditions” (FOMC Statement December 18, 2013). The statement
also noted that “the recovery in the housing sector slowed somewhat in recent months”
and that “[f]iscal policy is restraining economic growth” (FOMC Statement Decem-
ber 18, 2013).
While talk of whether the Fed would ‘taper’ its bond buying program was
rampant, Market Watch reported that only one out of four economists surveyed
by the Wall Street Journal the Friday before the announcement had “predicted
the Fed will scale back its bond buying at its December meeting” (MarketWatch
(12/18/2013)). We do not consider the Fed’s $5 billion monthly reduction of
MBS purchases to have been well anticipated by financial markets, and view
news of the policy change as having been made public in December. In light of
the uncertain duration of QE3, we assume the reduced pace of purchases would
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continue for at least one year, and score this policy as reducing the Fed’s mort-
gage purchases by an annualized $60 billion (($35 - $40) × 12 = -$60). Given the
FOMC’s stated concerns and objectives, we classify the tapering of QE3 as also
cyclically motivated.
FOMC Statement: QE3 Termination Announced: October 29, 2014
On October 29, 2014, the FOMC announced that it would end its current pro-
gram of purchasing agency MBS and Treasury securities at the end of October
2014, citing “a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market since the in-
ception of its current asset purchase program” (FOMC Statement October 29, 2014).
The FOMC again reaffirmed its policy of rolling over Treasuries and reinvesting
the principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and MBS into more
agency MBS. The announcement of the complete termination of QE3 had been
widely expected and largely priced in. The Financial Times reported that “The
US central bank is widely forecast to announce the end of its third round of quantitative
easing” just ahead of the FOMC announcement (Financial Times (10/29/2014)).
We thus consider the termination of the Fed’s MBS purchases under QE3 as a
significant but long-anticipated policy change.
Between October 2011 and September 2015, the Federal Reserve’s reinvest-
ment of principal payments from holdings of agency debt and MBS and ad-
ditional agency MBS purchases totaled $572.3 billion worth of FHLMC MBS,
$1.015 trillion worth of FNMA MBS, and $451.1 billion worth of GNMA MBS,
collectively totaling $2.039 trillion.
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3.4.5 US Treasury Department
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 temporarily authorized the
US Treasury Department to purchase securities issued by Fannie and Freddie
and authorized the newly created Federal Housing Finance Agency to take the
Enterprises into conservatorship, if deemed necessary. In September 2008, Fan-
nie and Freddie were placed under the conservatorship of the Treasury and
FHFA, and were ordered to first increase, then gradually reduce their mortgage
portfolios. The Treasury concurrently announced an agency MBS purchase pro-
gram that resulted in nearly $200 billion worth of purchases through the end
of 2009. During conservatorship, Treasury provided the Enterprises with funds
to ensure positive net worth in exchange for equal amounts of senior preferred
stock, in accordance with periodically amended Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreements. Treasury unexpectedly announced it would begin unwinding its
agency MBS purchase program in March 2011. Fannie and Freddie have never
made use of their $2.25 billion standby credit lines with the Treasury Depart-
ment.
Treasury Agency MBS Purchase Program
Announced: September 7, 2008
Policy Change: MBS Purchase Program Launch
Agency: Treasury
Impact: +$80.0 billion
News: Sep. 2008
Effective: Sep. 2008
Classification: Cyclical
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The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-289, enacted
July 30, 2008) amended the FNMA Charter Act, FHLMC Act, and Federal Home
Loan Bank Act to temporarily authorize the US Treasury to purchase any vol-
ume of FNMA, FHLMC, or FHLBank obligations or securities authorized un-
der their respective charters, conditional on the Secretary making an emergency
determination that such purchases were necessary to “(i) provide stability to the
financial markets; (ii) prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgage finance; and
(iii) protect the taxpayer” (Sec. 1117). The Secretary of the Treasury was autho-
rized to use the proceeds of the sale of any securities to finance such purchases.
This emergency authority was scheduled to expire on December 31, 2009.
Concurrent with the FHFA and Treasury Department taking FNMA and
FHLMC into government conservatorship on September 7, 2008, the Treasury
announced a GSE MBS Purchase Program to begin later that month. Treasury’s
stated objective behind the program was “to broaden access to mortgage funding
for current and prospective homeowners as well as to promote market stability”
(Department of the Treasury (2008b)). The announcement did not contain spe-
cific amounts of the planned purchases, but stated that the scale of the program
would be based on developments in capital markets and the housing market.
The Fed’s September 10, 2008 Greenbook stated that Treasury’s expected out-
lays for purchasing equity and MBS of Fannie and Freddie were highly uncer-
tain, but estimated outlays of $20 billion in calendar 2008 and $60 billion in 2009
(September 10, 2008 Greenbook, p. I-6). Accordingly we assign an $80 billion
expected annualized volume of agency MBS purchases under Treasury’s pro-
gram for the year starting September 2008. While perceived odds of a federal
rescue of the GSEs had been rising in the summer of 2008, the move to take the
Enterprises into conservatorship—and its accompanying agency MBS purchase
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program—clearly surprised markets and were unequivocally cyclically moti-
vated (see listing under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1). In practice, Treasury accumulated a
portfolio of agency MBS of $192 billion between September 2008 and December
2009.
Under another HERA authorization, the Treasury, in conjunction with
FHFA, HUD, Fannie, and Freddie also created an initiative in October 2009 to
provide support to state and local Housing Financing Agencies (HFAs). This
initiative was designed to support low mortgage rates and expand resources
for low- and middle-income borrowers to purchase or rent homes, making them
more affordable over the long-term. In December 2009, two Treasury supported
credit programs, the Temporary Credit and Liquidity Program and the New
Issue Bond Program, were launched as part of the countercyclical HFA initia-
tive.150
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-343)
Enacted: October 3, 2008
On September 20, 2008, the Treasury Secretary introduced a proposal to pur-
chase mortgage-related assets up to a limit of $700 billion outstanding at any
time. This proposal had the support of the President, and negotiations with
leaders in Congress commenced to draft appropriate legislation. A first vote on
the bill failed on September 28, sparking the largest stock market losses during
trading on September 29 since Back Monday in 1987.
Congress quickly reversed course, and the Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
150Treasury purchased a participation interest in the Temporary Credit and Liquidity Program,
which was a liquidity facility for outstanding HFA bonds administered by Fannie and Freddie.
Under the New Issue Bond Program program, Treasury purchased GSE securities backed by
housing bonds issued by HFAs.
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tion Act of 2008 was enacted on October 3, 2008. The Act created the Office of
Financial Stability within the Treasury Department, which was to administer a
$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The legislation’s statutory
definition of ‘troubled assets’ eligible for purchase by the Treasury included
residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other
mortgage-related instruments originated or issued before March 15, 2008. The
legislation limited the Secretary’s authority to purchase troubled assets to: (1)
$250 billion outstanding at any one time; (2) $350 billion outstanding at any one
time if, at any time, the President certified to Congress that the Secretary needed
to exercise authority for up to such an amount; and (3) $700 billion outstanding
at any one time if, at any time after such a certification, the President reported
to Congress a plan of the Secretary to exercise the authority authority for up
to such an amount, unless Congress enacted a joint resolution of disapproval
within 15 calendar days of the plan’s transmission. The total authorization of
$700 billion in October 2008 was later reduced to $475 billion by the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203, enacted July
21, 2010).
Contrary to its name, TARP funds were primarily used for a Capital Pur-
chase Program, in which Treasury injected $250 billion in capital into a wide
range of banks and recently rechartered bank holding companies (Department
of the Treasury (2008c), p. 6). The Capital Purchase Program was announced
on October 14, 2008. TARP funds were also later used for a federally incen-
tivized mortgage refinancing program (see ‘Homeowner Affordability and Sta-
bility Plan’ under FNMA, Sec. 3.4.1).
The Initial Report to Congress of the Office of the Special Inspector General
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for the TARP explained that the program authorization could have been spent
on MBS originated or issued by March 14, 2008. That report also characterized
the Capital Purchase Program as a departure from the legislation’s ‘original in-
tent’: “According to the Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability, ‘Purchas-
ing equity in healthy banks around the country would be a faster and more direct way to
inject much-needed capital into the system and restore confidence compared with asset
purchases.’ Treasury decided that healthy banks would be in the best position to increase
the flow of credit in their communities. The decision to provide a direct infusion of cap-
ital into banks was widely seen as a shift in approach from the original understanding
of purchasing troubled assets, which would have presumably involved the purchase of
troubled mortgages or mortgage-backed securities. The former Treasury Secretary ex-
plained: ‘Given the severity and magnitude of the situation, an asset purchase program
would not be effective enough, quickly enough. Therefore we exercised the authority
granted by Congress in this legislation to develop and quickly deploy a $250 billion
capital-injection program, fully anticipating we would follow that with a program for
troubled asset purchases’” (SIGTARP (2009), p. 49).151 The follow through never
materialized, and TARP funds were not used for large scale purchases of trou-
bled assets.
Wessel (2009) suggested that Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke and some
of Treasury Secretary Paulson’s staff strongly favored capital injections over
troubled asset purchases, and Paulson had reportedly concluded that funds
would have to be used for bank capitalizations the morning after the first failed
TARP vote because “buying toxic assets was going to take too long” (Wessel (2009),
pp. 227, 236). Paulson abruptly killed the idea of any troubled asset purchases
in a December 11, 2008 press conference, announcing off-the-cuff that doing so
151For an overview of the Capital Purchase Program authorization and background, see SIG-
TARP (2009), pp. 29–35.
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“was no longer ‘the most effective way’ to use the money... Instead, he said, the Treasury
Department planed to use nearly all the money to shore up the capital foundation of the
nation’s banks and to try to get consumer lending going again” (Wessel (2009), p.
243). Consequently, we do not consider TARP to be a significant policy change
affecting the Treasury Department’s holding of mortgage securities, counter to
its name and original intent. Authority to make new investments under the
TARP program expired on October 3, 2010.
Treasury Agency MBS Purchase Program Sales
Announced: March 21, 2011
Policy Change: MBS Purchase Program Sales
Agency: Treasury
Impact: -$120.0 billion
News: Mar. 2011
Effective: Mar. 2011
Classification: Cyclical
On March 21, 2011, the Treasury announced it would start selling up to $10
billion in agency MBS per month, subject to market conditions. It was also an-
nounced that sales would begin that month. Given the outstanding MBS bal-
ance of $142 billion, Treasury cited that at this pace, “the portfolio would be un-
wound in whole over approximately one year” between sales and continued pay-
downs of $2 billion to $4 billion a month (Department of the Treasury (2011a),
p. 1). Prior to March 2011, the Department’s stated intent was to hold its MBS
securities to maturity (Department of the Treasury (2011b), p. 104). A Trea-
sury official also announced that the MBS purchase program was expected to
yield a profit of $15 billion to $20 billion for taxpayers (Dow Jones Newswires
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(3/21/2011a)).
We score the policy to change to active portfolio disposal as reducing the
Treasury’s MBS net purchases by an annualized $120 billion in the year start-
ing March 2011 ($10 × 12 = $120). The Treasury Department’s announcement
appeared to take market analysts by surprise, and Treasury yields fell in in-
traday trading. The head of RBC Capital Markets’ government bond trading
desk claimed that “[t]he market was not prepared for this” (Dow Jones Newswires
(3/21/2011a)). The timing of the sale may also have been motivated by pub-
lic debt outstanding approaching statutory debt ceiling limit; a Treasury official
stated that the sale might delay hitting the debt ceiling, expected to be reached
between April 15 and May 31, by several days (Dow Jones Business News
(3/21/2011b)).152
An accompanying Treasury Press Center FAQ addressed the motivation
head-on: “Selling MBS is consistent with the general pattern of Treasury divestment of
financial assets acquired during 2008 and 2009 as part of the various financial stabiliza-
tion programs. Aided by such programs, today, the market for agency-guaranteed
MBS has notably improved along with broader financial conditions since Trea-
sury acquired the portfolio. Additionally, Treasury’s mission does not typically in-
clude managing a large mortgage portfolio” (Department of the Treasury (2011a),
p. 1). Given that the Treasury’s sale was motivated by a reversal in cyclical
economic conditions, we classify the MBS portfolio liquidation as principally
cyclically motivated, although budgetary concerns were likely also a factor.
The Treasury FAQ also emphasized that the MBS sales would have no im-
152While raising the debt ceiling was typically a politicized but pro forma matter, the Republi-
can majority in the House of Representatives was demanding spending cuts in exchange for an
increase, and after a protracted showdown the ceiling was eventually increased by the Budget
Control Act of 2011 (Pub. L. 112-25, enacted August 2, 2011), a spending reduction measure.
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pact on the scheduled wind down of the GSEs’ retained portfolios: “The Enter-
prises are currently in the process of gradually reducing the size of their retained port-
folios at a pace of no less than 10 percent per year, as they agreed to do in the preferred
stock purchase agreements between the Treasury and the Enterprises. Both Enterprises
are on track to meet or exceed the scheduled reductions, and the Administration does
not anticipate any changes to this policy” (Department of the Treasury (2011a), pp.
2–3).
The Enterprises remain in the conservatorship of the Treasury and FHFA, nearly
nine years after their federal rescue. No substantial GSE reform has been en-
acted since the conservatorship agreements were entered.
3.5 Results
Table 3.4 compiles the significant, binding policy events resulting from the nar-
rative analysis. Each intervention is characterized by a brief description of the
policy change, the agency affected, its annualized projected impact on mort-
gage purchase activity (in nominal billions of US dollars), our determination
of when its news was made public, the timing of the policy taking effect, and
our classification of the policy’s motivation as either cyclical or non-cyclical. We
document a total of 55 distinct significant policy changes over 1968–2014.153 Af-
ter aggregating to a monthly frequency, there are 48 months in which the news
of an intervention is made public; there are 22 months with policy interven-
tions classified as non-cyclically motivated and 28 months with those classified
153There are a total of 69 policy entries by each agency in Table 3.4, but one distinct policy
change often applied to both Fannie and Freddie, albeit sometimes with different portfolio im-
plications for each Enterprise.
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as cyclically motivated. News of both cyclically motivated and non-cyclically
motivated policies are attributed to December 1982 and February 2008. In the
sample that excludes the 2007/08 financial crisis by omitting policy interven-
tions after December 2006, there are 20 months with non-cyclically motivated
policy events and 15 months with those classified as cyclically motivated.
Mixing policy changes taking effect relatively quickly with those facing long
implementation delays can be difficult to handle in certain econometric appli-
cations, particularly in the context of news shocks with further lags between
mortgage commitments and purchases. For this reason, Fieldhouse, Mertens,
and Ravn (2017) further exclude all regulatory instruments from this narrative
analysis scheduled to take effect more than nine months after their news was
made public. This additional sample restriction involves dropping three dis-
tinct policy events listed in Table 3.4: the increase in GNMA’s special assistance
authority from the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, announced in
August 1968 but not taking effect until July 1969; the affordable housing goals
set for both Fannie and Freddie in 1992, agreed upon in July 1991 but not taking
effect until January 1993; and the affordable housing goals set for both Fannie
and Freddie in 2000, announced in July 1999 but not taking effect until January
2001. These exclusions reduce the number of months with non-cyclically moti-
vated interventions to 19 in the full sample, while there remain 28 months with
cyclically motivated policy interventions. Similarly, there are 17 months with
non-cyclically motivated interventions and 15 months with those cyclically mo-
tivated in the sample that excludes the 2007/08 financial crisis by omitting in-
terventions after December 2006. As a result of these exclusions to the narrative
instrument, Table 2 in Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2017) is slightly different
than Table 3.4 below.
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Table 3.4: Narrative Measures of Policy Changes
Policy Description Agency Impact News Classification
HUDA 1968: Special
Assistance GNMA
+$0.25
billion Aug. 1968 Non-Cyclical
HUDA 1968: Increased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio FNMA
+$1.39
billion Oct. 1968 Non-Cyclical
Increased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio FNMA
+$1.13
billion Dec. 1969 Cyclical
HUDA 1969: Special
Assistance GNMA
+$0.75
billion Dec. 1969 Cyclical
Treasury-Guaranteed
Capitalization FNMA
+$2.6
billion Apr. 1970 Cyclical
EHFA 1970: Special
Assistance GNMA
+$0.38
billion July 1970 Cyclical
Conforming Mortgage
Program Approval FNMA
+$0.4
billion Nov. 1971 Non-Cyclical
FHA/VA Tandem
Authorization GNMA
+$1.5
billion Sep. 1973 Cyclical
FHA/VA Tandem
Authorization GNMA
+$3.3
billion Jan. 1974 Cyclical
Subsidized Mortgage
Purchase Program FHLMC
+$1.5
billion May 1974 Cyclical
FHA/VA Tandem
Authorization GNMA
+$1.65
billion May 1974 Cyclical
HCDA 1974:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FNMA +$1.14billion Aug. 1974 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1974:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FHLMC +$0.46billion Aug. 1974 Non-Cyclical
EHPA 1974: Tandem
Program GNMA
+$3.88
billion Oct. 1974 Cyclical
FY1976 Approps:
Tandem Program GNMA
+$2.5
billion Oct. 1975 Cyclical
HCDA 1977:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FNMA +$4.82billion Oct. 1977 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1977:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FHLMC +$0.21billion Oct. 1977 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1977: Tandem
Program Expansion GNMA
+$3.75
billion Oct. 1977 Non-Cyclical
FY1979 Approps:
Special Assistance GNMA
+$1.0
billion Sep. 1978 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1978:
Mortgagee Expansion FHLMC
+$2.0
billion Oct. 1978 Non-Cyclical
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Policy Description Agency Impact News Classification
FY1980 Approps:
Special Assistance GNMA
+$1.0
billion July 1979 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1979:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FHLMC +0.86billion Dec. 1979 Cyclical
FY1981 Approps:
Special Assistance GNMA -$0.2 billion Sep. 1980 Cyclical
ARM Program
Approval FHLMC
+$0.37
billion May 1981 Cyclical
ARM Program
Approval FNMA
+$0.4
billion June 1981 Cyclical
Second Mortgage
Program Approval FNMA
+$5.0
billion Sep. 1981 Cyclical
FY1982 Approps:
Special Assistance GNMA
+$0.17
billion Dec. 1981 Cyclical
Increased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio FNMA
+$6.25
billion Dec. 1982 Non-Cyclical
FY1983 Approps:
Special Assistance GNMA
-$1.47
billion Dec. 1982 Cyclical
FY1984 Supp.
Approps: Tandem
Repeal
GNMA -$2.92billion Nov. 1983 Non-Cyclical
Second Mortgage
Program Approval FHLMC
+$1.0
billion Jan. 1986 Non-Cyclical
Decreased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio FNMA -$2.7 billion Apr. 1987 Non-Cyclical
Public Listing: Stock
Split Capitalization FHLMC
+$1.62
billion Nov. 1988 Non-Cyclical
FHEFSSA 1992:
Capital Requirements FNMA
-$4.25
billion Mar. 1990 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 1992 FNMA
+$1.0
billion July 1991 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 1992 FHLMC
+$0.75
billion July 1991 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 1995 FHLMC
+$0.61
billion Dec. 1995 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 2000 FNMA
+$24.4
billion July 1999 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 2000 FHLMC
+$24.4
billion July 1999 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 2004 FNMA
+$7.6
billion Apr. 2004 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 2004 FHLMC
+$7.6
billion Apr. 2004 Non-Cyclical
Accounting Scandal:
Capital Surcharge FNMA
-$141.4
billion Sep. 2004 Non-Cyclical
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Policy Description Agency Impact News Classification
Portfolio Growth Limit
Imposed FHLMC
-$42.8
billion June 2006 Non-Cyclical
Portfolio Limit Increase FNMA +$17.15billion Sep. 2007 Cyclical
Portfolio Limit Increase FHLMC +$2.14billion Sep. 2007 Cyclical
ESA 2008: Jumbo Loan
Limit FNMA
+$41.57
billion Feb. 2008 Cyclical
ESA 2008: Jumbo Loan
Limit FHLMC
+$41.57
billion Feb. 2008 Cyclical
Removal of Portfolio
Limit FNMA
+$9.28
billion Feb. 2008 Non-Cyclical
Removal of Portfolio
Limit FHLMC
+$9.05
billion Feb. 2008 Non-Cyclical
Reduced Capital
Surcharge FNMA
+$53.33
billion Mar. 2008 Cyclical
Reduced Capital
Surcharge FHLMC
+$43.33
billion Mar. 2008 Cyclical
Reduced Capital
Surcharge FNMA
+$17.75
billion May 2008 Cyclical
HERA 2008: Jumbo
Loan Limit FNMA
-$13.34
billion July 2008 Cyclical
HERA 2008: Jumbo
Loan Limit FHLMC
-$13.34
billion July 2008 Cyclical
Conservatorship:
Portfolio Limit Increase FNMA
+$67.5
billion Sep. 2008 Cyclical
Conservatorship:
Portfolio Limit Increase FHLMC
+$66.75
billion Sep. 2008 Cyclical
MBS Purchase
Program Launch Treasury
+$80.0
billion Sep. 2008 Cyclical
QE1 Launch Fed +$250.0billion Nov. 2008 Cyclical
ARRA 2009: Jumbo
Loan Limit FNMA
+$13.34
billion Feb. 2009 Cyclical
ARRA 2009: Jumbo
Loan Limit FHLMC
+$13.34
billion Feb. 2009 Cyclical
HASP: Portfolio Limit
Increase FNMA
+$50.0
billion Feb. 2009 Cyclical
HASP: Portfolio Limit
Increase FHLMC
+$50.0
billion Feb. 2009 Cyclical
QE1 Expansion Fed +$750.0billion Mar. 2009 Cyclical
MBS Purchase
Program Sales Treasury
-$120.0
billion Mar. 2011 Cyclical
Agency MBS
Reinvestment Fed
+$262.0
billion Sep. 2011 Cyclical
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Policy Description Agency Impact News Classification
Third SPSPA
Amendment FNMA
-$22.16
billion Aug. 2012 Non-Cyclical
Third SPSPA
Amendment FHLMC
-$22.16
billion Aug. 2012 Non-Cyclical
QE3 Launch Fed +$480.0billion Sep. 2012 Cyclical
QE3 Taper Fed -$60.0billion Dec. 2013 Cyclical
Notes: Acronyms (in chronological appearance): Housing and Urban Development Act
(HUDA); Emergency Home Finance Act (EHFA); Housing and Community Development
Act (HCDA); Emergency Home Purchase Act (EHPA); fiscal year (FY); adjustable-rate mort-
gage (ARM); Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act (FHEFSSA);
Economic Stimulus Act (ESA); Mortgage-backed securities (MBS); Housing and Economic
Recovery Act (HERA); quantitative easing (QE); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA); Home Affordability and Stability Plan (HASP); and Senior Preferred Stock Pur-
chase Agreements (SPSPA).
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APPENDIX A
APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 1
Appendix A1: Historical Background
This appendix provides some more historical background to the evolution of
agency market shares depicted in Figure 1.1.1 During the Depression, the Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation took ownership of nearly 15 percent of mortgage
debt. Housing and homeownership reemerged as a priority at the end of WWII,
which is reflected in the strong growth of Fannie holdings in the late 1940s until
the Korean War again shifted priority away from housing. A struggling Fan-
nie was rechartered as a mixed private-public ownership corporation in 1954.
In 1968, Fannie Mae was split into a publicly listed private corporation and a
government-owned Ginnie Mae. In the 1970s, Fannie expanded almost without
interruption and the agencies mortgage holdings reached close to 10 percent of
total mortgage debt. However, Fannie’s large debt-financed balance sheet in-
curred heavy losses after interest rates rose sharply in 1979. Profitability was
only restored through a strategy of aggressive portfolio expansion and by en-
tering the securitization business. At its creation in 1970, ownership of Freddie
Mac was restricted to the savings and loans, which had no interest in creating
a competitor. As a result, Freddie focused on the securitization of conventional
loans, maintaining only a relatively modest mortgage portfolio for warehousing
until the late 1980s. In the second half of the 1980s, rising delinquencies and a
more hostile attitude of the Reagan administration towards the GSEs led to a
reduction in the agencies’ market share.
1Table 1.1 contains references to various books an articles that contain more comprehensive
overviews.
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Various reforms in the aftermath of the 1980s S&L crisis set the stage for
a prolonged rise in agency activity in the 1990s and early 2000s, and by 2002,
the agencies held close to one quarter of the total outstanding mortgage debt
on their portfolios. In 1989, Freddie was turned into a publicly traded com-
pany with therefore the same profit incentives for balance sheet growth as Fan-
nie, while the Federal Home Loan Banks were granted permission to invest in
MBS. Prudential regulations were tightened for private banks, but remained
light for the GSEs despite a 1992 reform. The agencies increasingly retained
their own and acquired each other’s MBS, as opposed to selling them to pri-
vate investors. As part of an ambitious homeownership strategy, the Clinton
administration was supportive of the efforts by Fannie and Freddie to develop
automated underwriting systems and ramped up affordable housing goals for
their purchases.
The rapid rise in agency ownership of mortgage debt increasingly became
a cause of concern with public officials, and in the wake of the Enron scandal
Fannie and Freddie were required to start filing reports with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Allegations of accounting fraud in 2003 prompted an
investigation by regulators, leading to capital surcharges in the fall of 2004 and
settlements that included portfolio caps in 2006. This contributed to a sharp fall
in the agencies’ market share, which declined 10 percentage points from 2003 to
2007. During the turmoil in mortgage markets in 2007, the portfolio caps and
capital surcharges were relaxed, allowing the agencies to step up purchasing
activity. In early September 2008, Fannie and Freddie were taken into conserva-
torship by the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Treasury Department.
The 2008 conservatorship agreement allowed for continued GSE balance
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sheet growth in the short run, but also mandated a long-run wind-down of their
portfolios at an annual rate of 10 percent, increased to 15 percent in 2012, un-
til they reaching $250 billion each. The day after the agreement, the Treasury
announced its own MBS purchase program, while the Federal Reserve’s MBS
program was launched a few weeks later. As a result of the Fed and Treasury
programs, the combined agency ownership share regained levels similar to the
early 2000s despite a gradual decline in holdership by the traditional housing
agencies. In contrast, Fannie and Freddie have been allowed to grow their MBS
guarantee book essentially without limits. Since the financial crisis, the vast ma-
jority of conforming loans originated have been acquired, guaranteed, and sold
off in MBS by the agencies.
Appendix A2: An Alternative Identification Strategy Using GSE
Excess Returns
Although our narrative instrument is a good predictor of agency purchasing
activity, it is based on relatively few policy events. To gain confidence that our
results are not driven by the small sample size, as well as to address other po-
tential concerns with the narrative identification method, in this appendix we
present results based on a complementary identification approach. Under this
alternative approach, we instrument measures of agency purchasing activity
with innovations in Fannie and Freddie excess stock returns. This strategy is in-
spired by Fisher and Peters (2010), who use excess return innovations in major
US defense stocks as a measure of news shocks to military spending.
The special advantages granted by federal housing credit policy are likely
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to account for much of Fannie and Freddie’s market value and portfolio size.
This is supported by Passmore (2005), who estimates that 44 percent to 89 per-
cent of Fannie’s and Freddie’s stock market value is derived from their special
GSE status, and that the GSEs would hold far fewer mortgages in portfolio, and
have higher capital ratios, if they were purely private. Based on this, we can ex-
pect that idiosyncratic movements in Fannie’s and Freddie’s stock prices reflect
unanticipated changes in the value of the GSE status and expected purchasing
activity. More specifically, any news about changes in the policies guiding the
GSEs’ portfolios business and leverage will affect their market value relative to
the private sector. Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) provide narrative evidence
that announcements of housing credit policy changes are generally associated
with adjustments in GSE stock prices. Below, we use our narrative indicator of
federal housing credit policy changes to confirm that news about policy inter-
ventions affecting GSE balance sheets indeed affect Fannie’s and Freddie’s stock
market valuation. After accounting for the usual covariance with real estate and
banking sectors and the market as a whole, and after controlling for credit aggre-
gates, interest rates, and other macro variables, we find that residual variation
in Fannie and Freddie stock returns predicts agency mortgage purchases. This
motivates us to use shocks to GSE excess returns as an alternative instrumental
variable for agency mortgage purchasing activity.
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Empirical Specification using the GSE Excess Returns Instru-
ment
GSE excess returns shocks erGSEt are defined as the residual in the following
regression:
ERGSEt = α˜ + ζ˜Wt + ϕ˜(L)Zt−1 + er
GSE
t (A.1)
where ERGSEt is the log ratio of the GSE stock price index over the market index.2
The vector Wt contains a number of contemporaneous controls, including sev-
eral excess return measures from the Fama-French data library. In our bench-
mark specification, we include excess returns for the market index and a real
estate portfolio. In appendix IV, we also look at specifications adding excess re-
turns on banking or finance sector portfolios or the Fama and French (1993) size
and value factors, with little impact on the results. Besides the return variables,
Wt also includes contemporaneous values of the control variables used for the
narrative specifications, i.e. the interest rate variables (3-month T-bill, 10-year
Treasury, the conventional rate, BAA spread), the log of real originations, the
log changes in mortgage debt, real house prices, the core PCE price index and
personal income, the log of housing starts, and the unemployment rate. For the
results below, when we rotate in another variable, we also include it in Wt. Fi-
nally, the vector Zt with lagged controls is the same as in (1.3), but we also add
lags of ERGSEt as well as (cumulative) Fama-French excess market returns.3 All
results involving GSE stock returns are based on monthly data from September
2The GSE stock price index from 1970 through 1988 is based on Fannie stock. Post 1988
it is the geometric average of Fannie and Freddie stock (from Bloomberg). The market and
sector return variables are based on value-weighted portfolios and exclude dividends, and were
downloaded from the data library on the homepage of Kenneth French at http://mba.tuck.
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french.
3Further adding real estate sector excess returns to Zt had no material impact on the results.
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1970 to December 2006. The start of the effective sample is September 1971, re-
flecting the twelve lags and the fact that Fannie stock was traded for the first
time on the NYSE on August 31, 1970.
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Figure A.1. GSE Excess Returns Shocks êrGSEt and Response to Anticipated
Agency Purchases Shock
Notes: The left panel shows the estimated residuals in the GSE excess returns regression in (A.1),
as well as the indicator for non-cyclical policy changes. Shaded areas are credit crunch periods,
see the data appendix for the chronology. The right panel shows the cumulative response of
êrGSEt to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market share measured by agency
commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from local projections-IV regressions
instrumented with the non-cyclical narrative policy indicator, see equation (1.3). Shaded areas
are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample: Sep 1970 to Dec 2006.
The left panel in Figure A.1 plots the (standardized) estimated innovations
êrGSEt , together with the non-cyclical narrative indicator for reference. To pro-
vide evidence that GSE stock prices reflect policy-induced changes in agency
purchasing activity, the right panel in Figure A.1 plots the cumulative response
of GSE excess returns measures to a one pp. increase in the expected future
agency market share, measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend orig-
inations. The response, which is estimated by (1.3) using the narrative policy
indicator as the instrument, reveals a clear and significant rise in the GSE stock
prices after accounting for the comovement with the overall market and real
estate sector as well as for all other macro and financial factors included as con-
trols.
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To obtain the effect of a shock to anticipated agency purchases, we estimate
the following regressions:
yt+h − yt−1 = αh + δh
128 ×
∑7
j=0 pt+ j
X˜t
 + ζhWt + ϕh(L)Zt−1 + ut+h (A.2)
where the right hand side variable of interest measures annualized agency com-
mitments made over an 8 month period, expressed as a ratio of X˜t, a long-run
trend in annualized originations. The response coefficient δh in (A.2) is esti-
mated using 2SLS using ERGSEt as the instrumental variable. Because (A.2) in-
cludes the same regressors Wt and (lags of) Zt as in (A.1), this is equivalent to
using the estimated values of erGSEt as the instrumental variable. However, in-
cluding the same controls as in (A.1) and instrumenting with ERGSEt makes it
straightforward to obtain the correct standard errors. For simplicity, we keep
the horizon for cumulating commitments in equation (A.2) at 8 months, the
same as in equation (1.3). The value of the first-stage robust F-statistic for this
horizon is 7.09. The GSE excess returns shocks are therefore followed by statis-
tically significant increases in agency purchasing activity. Figure A.2 shows the
F-statistics associated with both commitments and effective purchases for hori-
zons up to 60 months. The F-statistic for the GSE excess returns instrument is
the highest for agency commitments at a horizon of 10 months, and equals 7.96.
Changing the horizon for cumulating commitments in specification (A.2) to 10
months does not lead to any meaningful change in the results.
The excess returns identification approach is analogous to Fisher and Pe-
ters (2010), who interpret innovations in excess stock returns of major defense
contractors as news shocks about future military spending. They obtain these
innovations by ordering the excess returns last in a recursively identified struc-
tural vector autoregressive system (SVAR). The recursive scheme assumes that
none of the endogenous macro aggregates included in the analysis are affected
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Figure A.2. First-Stage Diagnostics for GSE Excess Returns Instrument
Notes: The figure shows Newey and West (1987) robust F-statistics of the first-stage regressions
of cumulative agency commitments and purchases, respectively, for the GSE excess returns vari-
able ERGSEt with the controls Wt and (lags of) Zt. Sample: Sep 1970 to Dec 2006.
on impact by the news shock, while excess stock returns react contemporane-
ously to all macroeconomic shocks. Because the monthly innovation erGSEt is or-
thogonalized to the innovations to all of the variables included in Wt, the 2SLS
regression in (A.2) similarly imposes that shocks to expected agency purchases
have no contemporaneous impact on the variables in Wt. By assumption, this
step eliminates other endogenous influences by allowing the GSE excess returns
to respond contemporaneously to market or real estate sector returns, in addi-
tion to the innovations in mortgage credit, interest rates, prices, and the cyclical
indicators. While the assumption of a zero contemporaneous effect on these
variables seems ex ante restrictive, it is not rejected by the narrative instrument,
see Figures 1.7, 1.8, and 1.10. In appendix IV, we implement the same strategy
in a recursive SVAR as in Fisher and Peters (2010), which yields estimates that
are very similar those of Figure A.3. In the SVAR, the contribution to the short-
run variability of mortgage credit and housing starts is substantial and similar
to that of monetary policy shocks.
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Because the GSE excess returns instrument has monthly observations, it con-
tains potentially more information about variation in agency purchases than
the narrative policy indicator.4 Our narrative indicator contains, for instance,
little information for the 1990s because of the scarcity of quantifiable and bind-
ing regulatory changes. However, this period witnessed a rapid expansion of
GSE balance sheets and may be particularly important for learning the effects
of agency purchases. As is well known, however, equity prices are volatile,
and the GSE excess return shocks are, on the other hand, also relatively noisy.
While the GSE excess returns shocks clearly have predictive power for agency
commitment activity, the first-stage F-statistics are somewhat lower than for the
narrative instrument. Another caveat is that the GSE excess returns shocks may
also pick up unanticipated variation in the scale of the GSEs’ securitization busi-
ness. Nevertheless, we view this identification strategy as a useful alternative
to the narrative approach.
Results using GSE Excess Returns Shocks as an Alternative In-
strument
Figure A.3 summarizes the responses of mortgage credit, interest rates, and
other macro variables to news about higher future purchases identified using
the GSE excess returns shocks instrument. The impulse responses are directly
comparable to those reported in Figures 1.7 and 1.10 for the narrative instru-
ment. The GSE excess returns shocks generally yield responses that are less
delayed and more transitory for some variables. The main finding, however, is
4Assuming the GSE excess returns shocks contain all of the information about agency pur-
chase shocks, it becomes possible to estimate the variance contribution of these shocks to any
endogenous variables of interest. In appendix IV, we do this in the context of an SVAR model.
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that they are overall remarkably similar in size and direction across both identi-
fication strategies.
Figure A.3. Shock to Anticipated Agency Purchases: Responses Using GSE
Excess Returns Instrument
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from
local projections-IV regressions instrumented with the GSE excess stock returns innovations,
see equation (A.2). Shaded areas are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands.
Sample: Sep 1970 to Dec 2006.
The first row in Figure A.3 shows statistically significant increases in mort-
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gage originations following a shock to agency purchases. The rise in total orig-
inations occurs slightly more rapidly, and is more transitory than with the nar-
rative instrument. The peak increase in originations is, on the other hand, very
similar in size to that in Figure 1.7, and occurs between 10 and 14 months at
around 4 percent. As with the narrative instrument, both home purchase and
refinancing originations rise, but the rise in refinancing activity is particularly
pronounced. The leftmost panel in the second row shows that the rise in the
stock of mortgage debt is also very similar to that in Figure 1.7. As in our bench-
mark results, agency purchases lead to a statistically significant rise in housing
starts, which are around 2 percent higher between 4 and 12 months after the
shock. There is also a significant and persistent rise in homeownership. The
third row in Figure A.3 shows that the conventional mortgage rate is lower by
10 to 15 basis points after 6 to 18 months. The declines in the 10-year and 3-
month Treasury rates are also similar to our benchmark results.
The bottom row in Figure A.3 reveals some differences with our benchmark
narrative instrument. The left panel shows a more pronounced increase in con-
sumer spending following the GSE excess returns shock, as well as a clear de-
cline in the unemployment rate. The responses of consumption, unemploy-
ment, and personal income (not displayed) are even marginally statistically sig-
nificant. In contrast to Figure 1.10, there is, on the other hand, no indication that
house price are affected significantly by agency purchases.
The results produced by this alternative identification strategy are also sim-
ilar for other variables not shown in Figure A.3. The GSE excess returns in-
strument, for instance, also yields a temporary decline in the federal funds rate,
although it is smaller in size and not statistically significant. We note, on the
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other hand, that the GSE excess returns instrument does not yield a similar sig-
nificant decline in the Romer and Romer (2004) residual, and also leads to dif-
ferent conclusions regarding the role of traditional interest rate policies. Figure
A.4 compares the estimated responses to those under the counterfactual with
constant short-term interest rates, as in Figure 1.13. In contrast to the findings
based on the narrative instrument, the drop in long-term interest rates remains
clearly present after holding short-term interest rates fixed when we use GSE
excess returns shocks for identification. The same is true for the positive effect
on housing starts and, to a lesser extent, for the rise in mortgage debt. As in Fig-
ure 1.13, purchases of mortgage assets continue to have statistically significant
effects on mortgage lending, and short-term interest rates appear irrelevant for
the effect on homeownership.
Figure A.4. Counterfactual with Constant Short-Term Rate Using GSE Excess
Returns Instrument
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share and a sequence of monetary shocks such that the 3-month T-bill rate remains constant.
Estimates are from local projections-IV regressions instrumenting agency commitments with
the GSE excess stock returns shocks and the 3-month T-bill rate with the Romer and Romer
(2004) monetary policy shock measure. Finer lines and shaded areas are 95% Newey and West
(1987) confidence bands. Sample: Sep 1970 to Dec 2006.
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Appendix A3: Data Sources and Construction
Data underlying Figure 1.1: Residential Mortgage Debt post-1945 is the sum
of home mortgages and multifamily residential mortgages from the Federal
Reserve’s Financial Accounts of the United States. Pre-1945 data is spliced
using Series N-151 (Nonfarm Residential Mortgage Debt) from the Histori-
cal Statistics of the United States (1960 edition). Nominal GDP post-1929 is
from the National Income and Product Accounts, spliced using series Ca-10
from the Historical Statistics of the United States (Table Ca9-19, Millennial
Edition). The data for Housing Wealth post-1930 is from Davis and Heath-
coate (2007) available at and updated by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy,
http://www.lincolninst.edu/research-data/data. Pre-1930 data is
spliced using Series N-129 (Total Nonfarm Residential Wealth) from the Histor-
ical Statistics of the United States (1960 edition).
Agency Mortgage Holdings is the sum of the retained mortgage portfolios of Fan-
nie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, the FHLBanks, the Treasury Department,
the Federal Reserve, and a number of other government agencies. Both hold-
ings of whole loans and mortgage pools are included.
Fannie Mae: Monthly data on Fannie’s retained mortgage portfolio from
1950 to 2003 is from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, which
stopped reporting GSE portfolio statistics in 2003. From then onwards,
the data is from Fannie’s monthly volume summary cross-checked with
the annual reports from OFHEO/FHFA for consistency. Prior to 1950, the
data is based on fiscal year data from a Fannie publication titled “FNMA
Background and History” (1969 and 1973 editions), as well as Series N-159
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from the Historical Statistics of the United States (1960 edition).
Freddie Mac: Monthly data on Freddie’s retained mortgage portfolio from
1970 to 2003 is from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, and
after 2003 from Freddie’s monthly volume summary cross-checked with
the annual reports from OFHEO/FHFA for consistency.
Ginnie Mae: Quarterly data on Ginnie’s home and multifamily mortgage
from the Financial Accounts of the United States. Monthly data is avail-
able from 1968 to 1974 from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
FHLBanks: Data on FHLB mortgage holdings is from various issues of
FHFA annual reports (annual from 1992 to 2007 and quarterly since 2008).
Pre-1992 annual data is from a 1993 CBO study titled “The Federal Home
Loan Banks in the Housing Finance System” (p. 15).
Treasury: Data from the Treasury Department https://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Pages/mbs-purcha
se-program.aspx
Federal Reserve: Data from the Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts of
the United States.
Other Agencies: The home and multifamily holdings of the Veterans Ad-
ministration, the Federal Housing Administration, the Federal Farmers
Home Administration, the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, and Public Housing Administration are all
obtained from the Financial Accounts of the United States. Data from the
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (which in the Financial Accounts is in-
cluded with Fannie Mae) is series N-158 from the Historical Statistics of
the United States (1960 edition).
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The upper left panel of Figure 1.1 shows annual data up to 1952 and quarterly
data afterwards. Missing quarterly data on FHLB holdings is obtained by linear
interpolation of annual data.
Residential mortgage originations shown in the lower left panel of Figure 1.1 is the
quarterly aggregate of the monthly series described below.
Agency Net Portfolio Purchases and Pool Issues is the sum of net portfolios pur-
chases of both whole loans as well as mortgage pools, and of issues of mortgage
pools respectively, by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, the FHLBanks, the
Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, and a number of other government
agencies:
Fannie Mae: Monthly data on Fannie’s net portfolio purchases from 1953
to 1998 is from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin (portfolio
purchases less sales). More recent data is from Fannie’s monthly volume
summary cross-checked with the annual reports from OFHEO/FHFA for
consistency. While data on purchases is available over the entire sample,
data on portfolio sales is missing for 1986 and 1988-1997. We impute the
missing observations using data on Fannie’s commitments to purchase
and sell, actual purchases, and the net change in the retained portfolio.
The imputation is done by Kalman smoothing in a state space model es-
timated by maximum likelihood as in Shumway and Stoffer (1982) using
monthly data from 1980 to 2014. The model used is a vector autoregressive
process for the net portfolio purchase rate, retained mortgage portfolio
growth, and the ratio of purchases and net commitments to the retained
portfolio. Data on Fannie pool issues from 1993 is from Lehnert, Pass-
more, and Sherlund (2008), extended to 2014 using Fannie’s monthly vol-
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ume summaries. Pre-1993 monthly data is obtained by subtracting Fred-
die and Ginnie pool issues from total net purchases by agency mortgage
pools from monthly releases by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development from the Survey of Mortgage Lending Activity (obtained
through the National Archives and Records Administration).
Freddie Mac: Monthly data on Freddie’s net portfolio purchases from 1993
onwards is from Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherlund (2008) and Freddie’s
monthly volume summaries. Data before 1984 is obtained by subtracting
Freddie pool issues from total wholesale loan purchases available from
the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Data between 1984 and 1993 is imputed us-
ing data on Freddie holdings and repayment rates in Fannie’s portfolio.
The imputation is done by Kalman smoothing in a state space model es-
timated by maximum likelihood as in Shumway and Stoffer (1982) using
monthly data from 1980 to 2014. The model used is a vector autoregressive
process for Freddie’s net portfolio purchase rate, retained mortgage port-
folio growth, and repayment rates in Fannie’s retained portfolio. Monthly
data on Freddie pool issuance is from the journal of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (various issues, 1971-1980), the Federal Reserve Bulletin
(1980-1998), and the monthly volume summaries (1998 onwards).
Ginnie Mae: Monthly data on Ginnie’s net portfolio purchases from 1968
to 1971 is from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Subsequent
data is imputed by assuming that repayment rates for mortgages pack-
aged in pools backed by Ginnie are the same as for mortgages held in
portfolio. Monthly data on Ginnie pool issues since 1968 was provided to
us directly by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
FHLBanks: Data on net purchases by the FHLBanks is imputed using
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net changes in holdings and assuming that the combined repayment rate
on mortgage debt in Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie pools is identical to the
repayment rate on mortgages in mortgage-backed securities held by the
FHLBanks.
Treasury: Data on MBS purchases is from the Treasury Department
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/Pages/mbs-purchase-program.aspx.
Federal Reserve: Data on MBS purchases using the date of set-
tlement is available from the Board of Governors https://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_mbs.htm and the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York https://www.newyorkfed.org/
markets/ambs/ambs_schedule.html.
Other Agencies: Data on combined net purchases by the other agencies
is imputed using net changes in holdings and by assuming that the com-
bined repayment rate on mortgages debt in Ginnie pools is identical to
the repayment rate on mortgages in mortgage-backed securities held in
portfolio.
The lower right panel of Figure 1.1 shows quarterly data from 1952 onwards.
Data underlying Figure 1.2: Agency mortgage holdings is the quarterly series
from Figure 1.1. Private mortgage holdings is total residential mortgage debt
from Figure 1.1 less agency holdings. Both series are deflated by the price in-
dex for personal consumption expenditures excluding food and energy from
NIPA (series PCEPILFE from the FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis). The chronology for pre-1986 credit crunches is from Eckstein and
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Sinai (1986). The dating of post-1986 crunches is based on Owens and Schreft
(1993) for the 1990 commercial real estate crunch, Lehnert, Passmore, and Sher-
lund (2008) for the 1998 Russian default/LTCM crisis, and Bordo and Haubrich
(2010) for the 2007 financial crisis.
Monthly agency data: The monthly series for consolidated agency mortgage hold-
ings and net portfolio purchases sums the monthly series for Fannie, Freddie, Gin-
nie, the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury described above (see data underlying
Figure 1.1). All series are seasonally adjusted using the X-13 program from the
Census Bureau.
Agency purchase commitments are the sum of the following series:
Fannie Mae: Monthly data on the stock of total outstanding unfulfilled
commitments from 1953 to 1990 is available from various issues of the
Federal Reserve Bulletin. To obtain net purchase commitments made dur-
ing the month, we add net purchases to the net change in commitments
outstanding. From 1990 onwards we use net commitments (issued less to
sell) from the Federal Reserve Bulletin (up to 2003) and Fannie’s monthly
volume summaries (2003 onwards).
Freddie Mac: Monthly data on Freddie’s net portfolio commitments (is-
sued less to sell) is from Freddie’s monthly volume summaries from 1998
onwards. For observations before 1998, we use Freddie net portfolio pur-
chases.
Federal Reserve: Data on MBS purchases using the trade date is available
from the Board of Governors https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/reform_mbs.html and the Federal Reserve Bank of New
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York.
No data for net commitments is available for Ginnie Mae and the Treasury, and
we simply use the series for net portfolio purchases.
Monthly mortgage market data: The conventional mortgage rate is the 30-year
fixed-rate conventional conforming mortgage rate. From 1971 onwards, the
conventional rate is the monthly average commitment rate from the Freddie
Mac primary mortgage market survey. Pre-1971 data is from the Federal Hous-
ing Administration (FHA)/Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) series for the primary conventional market rate, available from the Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin (various issues). The FHA mortgage rate is the 30-year
fixed-rate FHA-guaranteed mortgage rate. Rate data for FHA-mortgages of-
fered in the secondary market from 1963 is provided by FHA/HUD and is
available from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Earlier data is
from the NBER’s macrohistory database (series m13045). The series has a hand-
ful of missing observations and was discontinued in 2000. We impute data by
Kalman smoothing in a VAR/state space model estimated by maximum like-
lihood as in Shumway and Stoffer (1982) using several closely related interest
rate series over the 1976-2014 period: the conventional 30-year rate (FHA/HUD
as well as the Freddie Mac series), the 3-month and 10-year Treasury rates, and
yields on Ginnie Mae securities (from the Federal Reserve Bulletin as well as the
MTGEGNSF Index from Bloomberg). A couple of missing observations prior to
1976 were imputed in a similar fashion using data on the 3-month and 10-year
Treasury rates, on interest rate data provided by Saul B. Klaman’s 1961 NBER
publication “The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market”, and on interest rate
ceilings on FHA loans applicable at the time. The 10-year and 3-month Trea-
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sury rates are from the FRED database (GS10 and TB3MS).
The primary source of monthly data on residential mortgage originations are
monthly news releases from the Survey of Mortgage Lending Activity (SMLA)
conducted by HUD from 1970 to 1997, accessed through the National Archives
and Records Administration (Tables 2 and 3: total originations of long-term
mortgage loans for 1-to-4 nonfarm homes and multifamily residential proper-
ties). The monthly series is interpolated after 1997 using quarterly data on origi-
nations (series USMORTORA in Datastream) and weekly data on mortgage ap-
plications (series MBAVBASC on Bloomberg), both from the Mortgage Bankers’
Association (MBA). The interpolation is done through Kalman smoothing of an
estimated VAR/state space model as in Shumway and Stoffer (1982). Observa-
tions before 1965 are based on data of total new non-farm mortgages of $20,000
or less recorded from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and available from
the NBER’s macrohistory database (series m02173). To obtain an estimate of to-
tal originations, we assume that the share of originations of $20,000 or less in all
originations is the same as the share in originations by Savings & Loans asso-
ciations. Data on S&L originations (total and $20,000 or less) is available from
various issues of the Savings and Home Financing Sourcebooks, a publication
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board up prior to 1990. Data between 1965 and
1970 is imputed using total originations by S&L associations based on Kalman
smoothing in a VAR/state space model estimated as in Shumway and Stoffer
(1982) using monthly data from 1954 to 1985. The series is seasonally adjusted
using the X-13 program from the Census Bureau.
Unfortunately, the monthly SMLA releases do not contain information on the
purpose of the mortgage loans. However, the Savings and Home Financing
Sourcebooks published prior to 1990 contain monthly data on refinancing origi-
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nations by S&L banks (although observations from May 1985 to December 1986
are missing). After 1990, quarterly totals of refinancing originations are avail-
able from the MBA (series USMORRVLA in Datastream). As an estimate of the
share of refinancing loans, we use the monthly shares at S&L banks before 1990,
and the quarterly shares from the MBA afterwards. Our monthly series on refi-
nance and purchase originations are obtained by applying the estimated share of
refinancing to our series for total residential mortgage originations.
The monthly series for mortgage debt is based on interpolation of the quar-
terly mortgage debt series from the Financial Accounts of the United States (see
Figure 1.1) using the series on monthly originations. The series is constructed
by linear interpolation of the implied quarterly repayment rates. The final series
is seasonally adjusted using the X-13 program from the Census Bureau.
Other monthly variables The series on (seasonally adjusted) housing starts is
from the Census Bureau and obtained through the FRED database at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (series HOUST). House prices post-1975 are measured
by the Freddie Mac house price index (FMHPI) available at http://www.
freddiemac.com/finance/house_price_index.html. The data are ex-
tended before 1975 by splicing with the home purchase component of the BLS
Consumer Price Index (PHCPI from FRED), obtained from Shiller (2015), and
seasonally adjusted using the X-13 program from the Census Bureau. The series
is deflated by the nominal price level, measured by the core PCE price index to
obtain a real house price index (series PCEPILFE from FRED). To the best of our
knowledge, no monthly data on the homeownership rate is available. We therefore
simply use quarterly values of series RHORUSQ156N from FRED. Monthly per-
sonal consumption expenditures is from NIPA (series PCE from FRED). Monthly
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personal income is from NIPA (series PI from FRED). The unemployment rate is
series UNR from FRED. The short- and long-term nominal interest rates 3-month
and 10-year Treasury rates are series TB3MS and GS10 from FRED. The BAA and
AAA corporate bond rates are the Moody’s seasoned BAA and AAA yields (series
BAA and AAA from FRED).
Appendix IV: Additional Results and Robustness Checks
Cumulative Credit Multipliers
This section discusses a number of robustness checks of the results presented in
Section 1.5 regarding the cumulative effects of agency purchases.
1. Scaling by Trend Originations. The baseline specification in (1.2) uses a
trend in personal income as the scaling variable. Figure A.5 reports the results
when we instead use a long-run trend in annualized mortgage originations. The
latter is obtained by fitting a third degree polynomial of time to the log of real
mortgage originations obtained using the core PCE price index as the deflator.
This is potentially consequential for the results because of trend growth of the
mortgage market relative to the economy. However, the figure shows that the
results remain generally similar to the baseline in Figure 1.5. Cumulative origi-
nations do not increase in the short run, but are higher by 4 dollars after 3 to 4
years, while mortgage debt rises in the long run by almost one dollar. The bulk
of the new originations are for refinance purposes, while originations for home
purchases are higher by 1 to 1.5 dollars after 3 to 4 years.
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Figure A.5. Cumulative Estimates Using Trend Originations as the Scaling
Variable
Notes: The figure shows dollar changes per dollar increase in agency net portfolio purchases or
commitments to purchase cumulated over the reported horizon in months. Estimates are from
local projections-IV regressions, see equation (1.2). Finer lines are 95% Newey and West (1987)
confidence bands. Sample: Jan 1967 to Dec 2006. In the bottom row panels, the sample excludes
May 1985 to Dec 1986 because of missing data on refinance shares.
2. Agency Pool Issuance. Figure A.6 reports the cumulative dollar change in
agency issuance of mortgage pools, i.e. MBS. In contrast to originations or total
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mortgage debt, the choice of scaling variable is important for the cumulative
impact on agency MBS issuance. Scaling by trend income implicitly assigns a
larger relative weight to policy changes that occur later in the sample. The left
panel of Figure A.6 shows that at relatively short horizons, agency MBS issuance
rises by roughly the same dollar amount as the increase in agency mortgage
holdings, see Figure 1.5. The fact that private mortgage holdings also decrease
by roughly the same amount implies that the agency portfolio purchases are
predominantly of MBS, while there are no additional MBS sales to private in-
vestors. As the horizon increases, cumulative MBS issuance rises to close to 2
dollars after three to four years. The increase in MBS issuance coincides closely
with the rise in originations. Cumulative MBS issuance converges to around
40% to 50% of the cumulative rise in originations, which is about the typical
agency securitization share since the mid-1980s. The right panel of Figure A.6
shows in contrast no short-run impact on MBS issuance when the scaling vari-
able is a trend in originations, implying that the agency portfolio purchases are
instead of whole loans. MBS issuance gradually rises, but the total cumulative
increase is a smaller share of the total increase in originations. This pattern is
more similar to agency behavior before the growth of mortgage securitization
in the mid-1980s.
3. Other Robustness Checks. Table A.1 clarifies how the results depend on
instrumentation and the choice of controls. Estimates from the benchmark spec-
ifications of Section 1.5 using net commitments and purchases are reported in
columns [6] and [7], respectively. Given the similarity of the results, the other
columns all report multipliers associated with commitments only. To assess the
role of instrumentation, column [5] reports the OLS estimates for the benchmark
specification. Columns [3] to [4] display the OLS and IV estimates when the
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Figure A.6. Total Mortgage Pool Issuance Associated with Agency Mortgage
Purchases
Notes: The figure shows dollar changes per dollar increase in agency net portfolio purchases
or commitments to purchase cumulated over the reported horizon in months. Estimates are
from local projections-IV regressions, see equation (1.2), using non-cyclical policy events as the
instrument. Finer lines are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample: Jan 1967 to
Dec 2006.
cyclical indicators (unemployment and income growth) are omitted. Columns
[1] and [2] further omit the interest rate controls. Finally, column [8] shows
the IV estimates when we use all policy events, both cyclical and non-cyclical,
to construct the instrument. To better visualize the role of instrumentation by
the narrative instrument, Figure A.7 displays the cumulative effects on agency
holdings and mortgage originations estimated by OLS and 2SLS for all horizons.
We highlight the following patterns from the results in Table A.1. First, the
point estimates across the IV regressions are all quite similar. Controlling for in-
terest rates is the most consequential. When leaving out interest rates in [2], we
find somewhat smaller increases in mortgage originations and debt. The results
are essentially unchanged by including the cyclical controls (unemployment
and income growth). Interestingly, and conditional on including the richest
control set as in our benchmark specification, the results remain similar when
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Table A.1: OLS and IV Estimates of Balance Sheet Adjustments and Mortgage
Credit Multipliers
Notes: Numbers are dollar amounts. Estimates are from local projections-IV regressions, see
equation (1.2). OLS: no instrument used; 2SLS-NC, instrument based on non-cyclical policy
events; 2SLS-ALL: instrument based on all policy events. 95% Newey and West (1987) confi-
dence bands in parentheses. Asterisks denote 10%, 5%, or 1% significance. Sample: Jan 1967 to
Dec 2006.
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Figure A.7. Comparing OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Mortgage Credit Multi-
pliers
Notes: The figure shows dollar changes per dollar increase in agency net portfolio purchases
or commitments to purchase cumulated over the reported horizon in months. The specification
with baseline controls excludes the interest rate and cyclical controls.
we also include the cyclically motivated policy events in the instrument, see col-
umn [8]. This suggest that any bias arising because the cyclical policy events are
correlated with other economic shocks is probably relatively small compared to
the other sources of endogeneity bias discussed in Section 1.4.1. Another factor
that may mitigate the impact of the cyclical policy events are the lagged controls.
Based on our reading of the various historical policy actions, see Fieldhouse and
Mertens (2017), recognition and decision lags likely exceed one month in prac-
tice. With a sufficiently rich set of lagged controls, including the cyclical actions
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may therefore not lead to any meaningful violation of the requirement that the
policy events are contemporaneously uncorrelated with economic shocks.
Instrumentation with policy events, however, is important for the results.
The OLS estimates in columns [1], [3], and [5] differ substantially in size and
display very different time patterns from the IV counterparts in columns [2],
[4], and [6]: Agency holdings rise immediately and more or less independently
of the horizon, private holdings do not fall significantly over shorter horizons,
and originations are higher by an amount that is much less dependent on the
horizon. The OLS estimates are likely contaminated by reverse causality, as this
pattern is more consistent with private lenders simply passing on newly orig-
inated loans to the agencies rather than selling existing loans off their balance
sheets. Figure A.7 further illustrates this by depicting the full set of OLS and
2SLS estimates for agency holdings and mortgage originations. Regardless of
whether the baseline or full set of controls are included, the bulk of the increase
in mortgage originations per dollar change in commitments occurs within the
first 12 months (panel A), and within even a much shorter window when the re-
gressor is agency purchases (panel B). Such a pattern indicates a much stronger
contemporaneous relation between originations and agency purchases. Given
decision lags as well as the time delays associated with the making of new mort-
gage loans, the delayed and gradual rise in originations that appears after in-
strumentation is more consistent with a causal interpretation. Figure A.7 also re-
veals that the total agency mortgage holdings increase by a substantially smaller
amount than the dollar purchased or committed, even at relative short horizons.
This indicates that agency purchases tend to coincide with higher sales of mort-
gage assets to private investors and/or with higher repayment rates, both of
which are likely to reflect other influences on the private demand for mortgage
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credit in the primary or secondary market.
Table A.2 verifies the robustness of the results to variations in the sample
and to the inclusion of additional indicators of agency activity. For compari-
son, column [1] repeats the benchmark estimates based on net commitments.
For brevity, all other columns are based on using commitments as the measure
of agency purchasing activity. Column [2] extends the end point of the sample
from December 2006 to December 2014. Note that in this case the h-th regres-
sion in (1.2) drops the last h observations. Column [3] restricts the sample by
setting September 1982 as the starting point, marking the end of the period of
non-borrowed reserves targeting by the Federal Reserve. This shorter sample
selects a period of more stable monetary policy. Because of the smaller sam-
ple, we omit in this case the cyclical controls to reduce the number parameters
to be estimated. Columns [4], [5], and [6] show results when we omit in turn
each of the three largest policy interventions from the non-cyclical narrative in-
strument: the October 1977 conforming loan limit increase and expansion of the
Brooke-Cranston Tandem program, the December 1982 increase in Fannie Mae’s
debt-to-capital limit, and the September 2004 tightening of capital requirements.
In each case we add the omitted event as a separate dummy variable, including
both the contemporaneous value and twelve lags to the control variables. The
final two columns include lagged values of two indicators of agency activity
as additional controls: the volume of mortgage pool issues (in ratio of Xt) and
log ratio of GSE stock prices to the S&P 500 index. In the latter case, the sam-
ple starts in September 1971 instead of December 1967, reflecting the fact that
Fannie Mae stock started trading on August 31, 1970.
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Table A.2: Credit Multipliers, Sample and Robustness Checks
Notes: Numbers are dollar amounts. Estimates are from local projections-IV regressions, see
equation (1.2), using non-cyclical policy events as the instrument. 95% Newey and West (1987)
confidence bands in parentheses. Asterisks denote 10%, 5%, or 1% significance.
All variations of the baseline specification reported in Table A.2 yield cumu-
lative origination multipliers in the range of 2.5 to 4.5 after 3 to 4 years. More-
over, the impact on originations is consistently highly statistically significant.
The estimated cumulative change in mortgage debt also remains in the range
of the benchmark specification. The credit multipliers are the lowest when we
extend the sample to include the recent financial crisis (column [2]) and when
we add the GSE to S&P 500 stock price ratio to the control set (column [8]). In
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these cases, the impact on mortgage debt is no longer significant at conventional
levels. We also highlight that the inclusion of the September 2004 policy event is
important for the precision of the estimates. The instrument that omits the 2004
event is generally weaker and produces wider confidence bands. On the other
hand, omitting the 1977 and 1982 events (columns [5] and [6]) does not have a
large influence on the results.
Impulse Responses of Mortgage Originations by Type
This section discusses additional results regarding the effects of news shocks to
agency purchases on mortgage originations by type. The available data allows
us to distinguish between refinancing and purchase originations (see data ap-
pendix). The average share of refinancing originations in the 1967-2006 sample
is 25% (and 28% in the 1967-2014 sample). The refinancing share is volatile and
ranges from values of 10% during the high nominal interest rates of the late
1970s and early 1980s, to up to 75% during refinancing booms.
Figure A.8 shows point estimates for the first 24 months after an increase
in anticipated purchases by one percentage point of trend originations, together
with 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. For reference, the left panel
repeats the responses of total mortgage originations shown in Figure 1.7. The
middle panel shows the estimated response of refinancing originations, while
the right panel shows the estimated response of originations financing the pur-
chase of a home. We note that for the estimates in these two panels, the sam-
ple excludes May 1985 to December 1986 because of missing data on refinance
shares, see data appendix.
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The results in Figure A.8 are consistent with those for the dollar credit mul-
tipliers reported in Section 1.5. Refinancing originations show a gradual in-
crease following the agency purchase shock. Purchase originations also rise,
but with a longer delay relative to refinance originations. Purchase originations
are initially lower for the first six months or so, before rising between 12 and
24 months. Using the average share of refinancing originations of 25% over the
benchmark sample, the estimates in Figure A.8 imply that refinancing origina-
tions account for the larger share of the increase in total originations.
Figure A.8. Impulse Responses to a Shock to Anticipated Agency Purchases
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from
local projections-IV regressions instrumented with the narrative policy indicator, see equation
(1.3). Shaded areas are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample: Jan
1967 to Dec 2006. In the middle and right panels, the sample excludes May 1985 to Dec 1986
because of missing data on refinance shares, see data appendix.
Figure A.9 compares the response of originations to a traditional monetary
policy shock (in red) with the response to the agency purchase shock identified
using the narrative instrument (in blue). Responses to monetary shocks are
identified using the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shock measure
as an instrument, as explained in Section 1.7. As in Figure 1.12, the impact of the
interest rate shock is scaled such that the maximum decline in the 3-month T-bill
rate is identical as for the agency purchase shock identified with the narrative
instrument. The left panel repeats the responses of total mortgage originations
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shown in Figure 1.12 and shows that the agency purchase shock generates a
larger increase in total originations. The middle panel shows the responses of
refinancing originations, while the right panel shows the estimated responses of
originations financing the purchase of a home. The results in Figure A.9 indicate
that the differential impact on total originations is due to the different impact
on refinancing activity. The response of purchase originations (right panel) is
very similar in timing and size across both shocks. The response of refinancing
originations to monetary policy shock, on the other hand, is much more muted
than the response to the agency purchase shocks.
Figure A.9. Responses to a Shock to Anticipated Agency Purchases Versus a
Monetary Policy Shock
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share as well as the response to a monetary policy shock. Estimates are from local projections-IV
regressions instrumenting agency commitments with the narrative policy indicator, see equa-
tion (1.3), and instrumenting the 3 month T-Bill rate with the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary
policy shock measure. Finer lines and shaded areas are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence
bands. Sample: Jan 1967 to Dec 2006. In the middle and right panels, the sample excludes May
1985 to Dec 1986 because of missing data on refinance shares, see data appendix.
Impulse Response Analysis: Sensitivity Checks
1. Omitting the 1977-1982 and NBR-targeting Periods. Figure A.10 shows the
response to a shock to anticipated agency purchases by one percentage point of
trend originations, together with 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands.
Each figure shows results based on the narrative instrument for two different
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subsamples. The first subsample omits the period of non-borrowed reserves
targeting under the Volcker chairmanship of the Federal Reserve from October
1979 to August 1982. The second subsample omits the 6 years between 1977
and 1982, which are more broadly characterized by relatively high interest rate
volatility. Each of the excluded periods contain several sizable credit policy
changes as well as a greater incidence of large monetary policy shocks in the
Romer and Romer (2004) measure. Their exclusion allow us to verify the role of
these parts of the sample for our results regarding the interactions between the
two types of policies. The results in Figure A.10 are qualitatively very similar
to those of the full sample, and in both cases include both a significant rise in
originations as well as declines in short- and long-term interest rates. Compared
to the full sample, the rise in the stock of mortgage debt is, however, no longer
evident when we omit the 6 years between 1977 and 1982.
2. Post-1982 Sample. Figure A.11 shows the response to a shock to antici-
pated agency purchases based on a shorter sample that starts in October 1982
instead of December 1967. The Figure reports results for agency purchases in-
strumented with the narrative instrument, as in Figure 1.7. The October 1982
starting period marks the end of the period of non-borrowed reserves targeting
by the Federal Reserve and selects a period of more stable and inflation averse
monetary policy. Because of the smaller sample, we omit in this case the cyclical
controls (personal income and unemployment) to reduce the number param-
eters to be estimated. The results remain qualitatively very similar to those
of the full sample, indicating a rise in originations and declines in short- and
long-term interest rates. Compared to the full sample, the rise in the of stock
mortgage debt is slightly smaller.
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Figure A.10. Impulse Responses Excluding 1977-1982 and NBR Targeting Pe-
riods
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from
local projections-IV regressions instrumented with the narrative policy indicator, see equation
(1.3). Finer lines and shaded areas are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample:
Jan 1967 to Dec 2006, excluding the period indicated.
3. Including Romer and Romer (2004) Shocks as Controls. Figure A.12 compares
the benchmark narrative impulse response estimates of Figure 1.7 with those
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Figure A.11. Impulses Responses in the Post-1982 Sample
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from
local projections-IV regressions instrumented with the narrative policy indicator, see equation
(1.3). Shaded areas are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample: Oct
1982 to Dec 2006.
from a specification that includes both the contemporaneous value as well as
12 lags of the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary shock measure as additional
controls. Figure A.12 shows that controlling for the Romer and Romer (2004)
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shocks has little effect on the estimation results.
Figure A.12. Controlling for Romer and Romer (2004) Shocks
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Benchmark estimates
are from local projections-IV regressions instrumented with the narrative policy indicator, see
equation (1.3). The new specification includes additionally the contemporaneous value and 12
lags of the Romer and Romer (2004) shocks as controls. Finer lines and shaded areas are 95%
Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample: Jan 1967 to Dec 2006.
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Alternative Versions of the GSE Excess Returns Instrument
As described in appendix II, the GSE excess returns shocks are defined as the
residual in the regression given in (A.1). Our benchmark specification controls
for returns on the market portfolio, as well as on a real estate sector portfolio.
This section presents results based on several alternative versions of the excess
returns instrument that are obtained by adding additional contemporaneous
regressors in the vector Wt relative the benchmark results in the paper. Each of
the additional variables are obtained from the data library on the homepage of
Kenneth French at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/
ken.french
Figure A.13 shows the results after adding the excess return on a value-
weighted banking sector portfolio, and Figure A.14 after adding the excess re-
turn on a value-weighted finance sector portfolio. The return variables exclude
dividends and are expressed relative to the overall market return. Figure A.15
shows the results after adding the Fama-French value and size factors. All the
additional results are very close to those reported in Figure A.3.
Forecast Error Contributions from an SVAR Model
The local projections-IV specifications do not allow an assessment of the his-
torical role of structural shocks to housing credit policy, which requires knowl-
edge of the variance contribution of these shocks to the cumulative purchase
measures in equations (1.2) or (1.3). In order to gain some insight into the im-
portance of GSE activity for the dynamics of credit aggregates and interest rates,
this section estimates the variance contribution of the GSE excess returns shocks
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Figure A.13. Controlling for Banking Sector Excess Returns
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from
local projections-IV regressions instrumented with the GSE excess stock returns innovations,
see equation (A.2). Shaded areas are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands.
Sample: Sep 1970 to Dec 2006.
in a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model. The main finding is that the
contribution of GSE excess returns shocks to the short-run variability of mort-
gage credit and housing starts is roughly as important as that of monetary policy
shocks. In addition, shocks to monetary policy are substantially more important
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Figure A.14. Controlling for Finance Sector Excess Returns
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from lo-
cal projections-IV regressions instrumented with the GSE excess stock returns shocks, see equa-
tion (A.2). Shaded areas are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample:
Sep 1970 to Dec 2006.
for the forecast error variance of interest rates in the short run. The role of GSE
excess returns shocks for long-term interest rates exceeds the one of monetary
policy shocks at horizons beyond 18 months.
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Figure A.15. Controlling for Fama and French (1993) Size and Value Factors
Notes: The figure shows responses to a one pp. increase in the expected future agency market
share measured by agency commitments as a ratio of trend originations. Estimates are from lo-
cal projections-IV regressions instrumented with the GSE excess stock returns shocks, see equa-
tion (A.2). Shaded areas are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Sample:
Sep 1970 to Dec 2006.
In order to estimate forecast error variance contribution of shocks to GSE
activity, we adopt a VAR model for the joint dynamics of the ratio of agency
purchases and commitments to trend originations, as well as all of the vari-
ables included as controls in the LPIV regressions: the log levels of core PCE
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and house price indices, the log difference of total mortgage debt, the log lev-
els of real mortgage originations and housing starts, the 3-month T-bill rate, the
10-year Treasury rate, the conventional mortgage interest rate, the BAA-AAA
corporate bond spread, the unemployment rate, and the log of real personal in-
come. In addition, the VAR system also includes the cumulative difference in
returns between (1) the Fama-French market portfolio and a risk free portfolio,
(2) GSE stock and the market portfolio, and (3) the Fama-French real estate and
market portfolios. We estimate the VAR by OLS using 12 lags of all the endoge-
nous variables and using monthly data from September 1970 to December 2006.
The impact of a shock to orthogonalized GSE excess returns is the response
to an innovation to the GSE stock index variable, which is obtained by tak-
ing the lower triangular Choleski decomposition of the estimated covariance
matrix of the VAR residuals, ordering all of the variables except agency pur-
chases/commitments above the GSE stock index variable. This approach im-
poses the same exclusion restrictions as the LPIV model in (1.3) within the SVAR
context, which amounts to assuming that none of the variables ordered before
the GSE stock index variable responds within the same month to orthogonal-
ized GSE excess returns innovations.
Figure A.16 shows the resulting impulse responses, which for ease of com-
parison are scaled to imply a similar 6-month impact on originations as the LPIV
estimates in Figure 1.7. The GSE excess returns shocks lead to statistically sig-
nificant increases in agency net commitments and net purchases (not shown).
Consistent with our main findings, Figure A.16 shows that originations, mort-
gage debt, and housing starts all rise significantly following a positive innova-
tions in GSE excess returns, while interest rates decline in the short run. The
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SVAR estimates are generally very similar to those obtained using LPIV regres-
sions using the GSE excess returns shocks as an instrument for agency mortgage
purchases.
Figure A.16. SVAR Impulse Responses to a GSE Excess Returns Shock
Notes: The figure shows SVAR impulse responses to an innovation in orthogonalized GSE ex-
cess returns.Shaded areas are 68% and 95% confidence bands obtained from a residual wild
bootstrap using 10,000 replications. Sample: Sep 1970 to Dec 2006.
An advantage of the SVAR model is that it is straightforward to evaluate the
relative importance of shocks in driving fluctuations in the endogenous vari-
ables. Figure A.17 depicts the share of the forecast error variance at various
horizons that is due to the identified GSE excess returns shocks. For com-
parison, Figure A.17 also shows the variance contribution of monetary policy
shocks identified using the Romer and Romer (2004) measure as a proxy us-
ing the methodology in Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013).
We find that the GSE excess returns shocks explain up to 8% of the agency net
purchases and commitments forecast variance (not shown). The contribution of
monetary policy shocks remains below 2% at all horizons considered.
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Figure A.17. Forecast Error Variance Contributions of Monetary and GSE Ex-
cess Returns Shocks
Notes: The figure shows contributions to the forecast error in the SVAR model. Monetary policy
shocks are identified using the Romer and Romer (2004) measure as external instrument. GSE
excess returns shocks are identified as described in appendix II. Sample: Sep 1970 to Dec 2006.
Figure A.17 reveals that both shocks account for a substantial fraction of
the forecast variance of originations and housing starts at horizons beyond 6
months. GSE excess returns shocks explain up to 12% of the forecast variance
of originations at horizons between 12 and 18 months, and around 7% to 8%
of housing starts between 8 and 14 months. In comparison, monetary shocks
explain between 6% to 8% of originations, and around 11% of housing starts
at similar horizons. Neither of the shocks accounts for much of the forecast
variance of the stock of mortgage debt at horizons up to 36 months. Monetary
shocks account for a substantial share of the short-run forecast variance of the
3-month T-bill rates, and up to 14% and 7%, respectively, of the variance in
mortgage and 10-year Treasury rates at horizons shorter then 6 months. GSE
excess returns shocks are relatively less important for the variability in interest
rates at shorter horizons, but become relatively more important than monetary
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policy shocks in accounting for the uncertainty in long-term interest rates at
horizons exceeding 18 months.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2
Appendix B1: Institutional Background and Overview of Narra-
tive Instruments
Uncle Sam as Mortgage Lender: A Brief History of U.S. Housing
Credit Policy
Distress in housing and mortgage markets during the Great Depression
prompted the first large-scale federal housing credit policy interventions. Prior
to the Depression, U.S. mortgage contracts were typically structured as non-
amortizing balloon loans with maturities of no more than six years and high
downpayment requirements (loan-to-value ratios not exceeding 60%). This
mortgage financing system collapsed during the Depression due to widespread
bank failures and the effects of deflation increasing real mortgage liabilities and
depressing home values; the U.S. experienced an unprecedented foreclosure cri-
sis as households and banks could no longer roll over maturing mortgages.1
Residential investment also collapsed ahead of and during the Depression, with
housing starts falling 90% between 1925 and 1933; see Leamer (2007).
Against this backdrop, Congress and the Hoover Administration created the
Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) to bolster mortgage lending in 1932.
Modeled after the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Home Loan Bank Sys-
1Single-family home prices fell roughly 24% between 1929 and 1933; see Rose (2011) for a
broader overview of housing market distress during the Depression.
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tem was designed as a network of 12 regional FHLBanks that would provide
a liquidity backstop for mortgage lenders in their respective districts. The
FHLBanks were chartered to provide member institutions with wholesale loans,
termed “advances,” that were secured by members’ mortgages.
To ameliorate the foreclosure crisis, Congress created and championed a
new class of long-term, fixed-rate, self-amortizing mortgages, initially through
the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) mortgage refinancing program
and new Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured mortgages. In 1933,
Congress created the HOLC, a public utility that purchased distressed mort-
gages and refinanced them as longer-maturity, self-amortizing loans; see Rose
(2011). A year later, the National Housing Act of 1934 established the FHA,
which began insuring default risk on mortgages for qualifying borrowers; the
FHA-backed mortgages were long-term, fixed-rate, self-amortizing mortgages
with a modest loan limit. Depository institutions were initially reluctant to hold
long-term, government-insured mortgages, prompting Congress to charter sec-
ondary markets to increase liquidity for mortgage originations. The Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation (RFC) and its subsidiary RFC Mortgage Company ini-
tially supported a limited secondary market for FHA-insured mortgages. In
1938, Congress chartered the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, or
Fannie Mae) to support a permanent, liquid secondary market for FHA-insured
mortgages.
Shortly before the end of World War II, the Veterans Administration (VA)
established a mortgage guarantee program, enabling veterans to obtain subsi-
dized loans on favorable terms. The VA loan-guarantee program was intended
in part as a cheap alternative to cash bonuses. Congress additionally intended
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to simulate housing construction, both to ameliorate a national housing short-
age as millions of soldiers returned and to keep the nation from slipping back
into depression as military spending receded. Residential investment had re-
mained depressed throughout the 1930s and ensuing war effort. Eligibility for
the VA loan-guarantee program was expanded following the Korean War and
every subsequent major military intervention. FNMA was rechartered in 1948
to support a secondary market for both VA-guaranteed and FHA-insured mort-
gages.
The focus of U.S. housing policy began to shift toward clearing Depression-
era slums and “urban renewal,” particularly with passage of the Housing Act
of 1954; the use of secondary mortgage markets was expanded to support new
types of FHA mortgages for urban redevelopment. In light of a highly regu-
lated, regionally fragmented banking sector, the secondary mortgage market
was additionally intended to reallocate mortgage credit from regions with ex-
cess savings to regions with high demand for mortgage loans, smoothing mort-
gage availability across both the country and the credit cycle. The United States
experienced numerous credit crunches and bouts of disintermediation during
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when the Fed actively regulated interest rate ceil-
ings on demand deposits and savings accounts; see Eckstein and Sinai (1986)
and Mertens (2008).2 Congress began more actively using secondary markets to
increase liquidity for mortgage lending, particularly during credit crunches and
downturns in construction activity.
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 split off the secondary
mortgage market functions of FNMA into a quasi-private, shareholder-owned
2Every recession between the mid-1950s and the early 1980s was preceded by a credit crunch;
see Eckstein and Sinai (1986).
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Fannie Mae; regulation of Fannie was principally overseen by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The remaining FNMA functions
were transferred to a newly created Government National Mortgage Associa-
tion (GNMA) owned and operated by HUD. Ginnie Mae’s initial role largely
entailed supporting demand for difficult-to-market classes of FHA mortgages
and, at policymakers’ behest, increasing mortgage purchases and subsidies dur-
ing recessions.
Following a credit crunch the previous year, Congress chartered the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC, or Freddie Mac) in 1970 to sup-
port a secondary market for conventional mortgages originated by the thrift
industry. Ownership of Freddie Mac was initially placed with the FHLBanks
and their members, while the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was granted reg-
ulatory authority. Fannie, meanwhile, was authorized to expand its operations
from purchasing smaller FHA/VA-backed loans to also purchasing larger con-
ventional mortgages, enabling it to provide liquidity for a broader swathe of the
mortgage market.
Congress authorized Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie to issue securities in which
the payments from a pool of mortgages are ‘passed through’ to the holder;
mortgage-backed securities were intended to diversify credit risk, increase liq-
uidity for standardized mortgages, and attract new sources of funds for residen-
tial mortgage lending. Ginnie issued the first modern mortgage pass-through
security in 1970, backed with interests in FHA/VA mortgages. One year later,
Freddie issued the first pass-through security for conventional mortgages. The
agency MBS issued and guaranteed by Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie are highly
liquid securities that attract funding from institutional investors barred from
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holding whole mortgages, such as pension funds.
The perception of an implicit government guarantee on agency securities in-
creased investors’ appetite for agency-guaranteed MBS. Only Ginnie MBS are
explicitly backed by the U.S. Treasury Department. Investors assumed the Trea-
sury would, if needed, backstop the agency securities issued by Fannie and
Freddie. The perception of an implicit government guarantee stems from the
GSE charters; Fannie was granted a limited statutory lending backstop with the
U.S. Treasury when first authorized to issue bonds during a 1954 reform, and
Congress later granted Freddie the same statutory lending backstop. The GSEs
earn guarantee fees on their off-balance sheet MBS held by third parties, which
were historically subject to negligible capital requirements. The share of U.S.
residential mortgage debt pooled as agency MBS has—with the brief exception
of the private-label securitization boom of the 2000s—steadily risen since mort-
gage securitization was popularized by Ginnie and Freddie in the early 1970s,
as depicted in the left panel of Figure B.1. Since the early 1990s, between 30%
and 55% of residential mortgage debt has been pooled as agency MBS.
The perception of an implicit government guarantee additionally lowered
borrowing costs for Fannie and Freddie to nearly that of the U.S. Treasury De-
partment, and well below wholesale funding costs of commercial banks. Com-
bined with loose leverage and capital requirements, the safe asset premium on
agency bonds afforded the GSEs a profitable business opportunity in highly
leveraged holdings of mortgage investments. In the aftermath of the S&L cri-
sis, Freddie was split from FHLBank ownership and rechartered as a publicly
traded company in 1989, under the (loose) oversight of HUD.3 After being pri-
3Ownership of the GSEs has been repeatedly restructured, oscillating between public and
quasi-private. Fannie was rechartered as a publicly listed company in 1968 and Freddie in 1989,
while the Treasury took a majority stake in both GSEs in 2008.
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vatized, Freddie began to mimic Fannie’s business model of leveraged balance
sheet growth; profit motives and newfound competition propelled a rapid ex-
pansion of the GSEs’ mortgage holdings, as depicted in the right panel of Figure
B.1.
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Figure B.1. Mortgage Securitization and Mortgage Holdings of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac
Notes: Data have been seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program. Gray bars
correspond with NBER recession dates. The vertical dashed line marks the Treasury Depart-
ment and Federal Housing Finance Agency taking Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship in
September 2008. Sources: See the data appendix for details.
Political backlash to the S&L crisis stoked concerns on Capitol Hill that Fan-
nie and Freddie might someday necessitate an unpalatable taxpayer bailout.
A 1992 reform created the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO), an agency within HUD tasked with new regulatory authority over
the safety and soundness of Fannie and Freddie. OFHEO, however, was politi-
cally hamstrung and only imposed non-binding capital constraints. During the
Clinton Administration and then the early Bush Administration, policymakers
again repurposed Fannie and Freddie to promote homeownership and afford-
able housing, particularly for lower-income households and neighborhoods as
well as minority groups. Fannie and Freddie were assigned affordable hous-
ing goals and subgoals for their mortgage purchases, and their charters were
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amended to place more emphasis on supporting multifamily mortgage lend-
ing.
Fannie and Freddie were effectively left balance sheet unconstrained in the
1990s and early 2000s, the result of their formidable lobbying clout, structurally
weak regulatory oversight, and an emphasis on promoting the American Dream
of homeownership supported by the GSEs, advocate groups, homebuilders, and
much of Congress. The enterprises cornered the market for automated mort-
gage underwriting software and capitalized on the refinancing booms of the
1990s and early 2000s, which they used to gain market share. The GSEs began
aggressively courting foreign institutional investors and marketing agency se-
curities issues abroad, effectively intermediating the global savings glut toward
U.S. mortgage lending. By the early 2000s, Fannie and Freddie held over $2
trillion in residential mortgage debt, or roughly 20% of that outstanding.
Accounting scandals surfaced first at Freddie and then at Fannie in the early
2000s, and the ensuing regulatory backlash arrested the GSEs’ rapid portfolio
growth. Disallowed hedging practices abruptly prompted a downward restate-
ment of Fannie’s capital by $9 billion in September 2004. OFHEO imposed cap-
ital surcharges and required Fannie to close a capital shortfall of $12.5 billion in
one year, prompting Fannie to rapidly deleverage and reduce its mortgage hold-
ings, as seen in the right panel of Figure B.1. The considerable lobbying clout
of Fannie and Freddie ebbed and regulatory oversight of the GSEs increased;
outright portfolio growth limits were imposed first on Fannie and then, rather
unexpectedly, on Freddie in 2006.
The subprime lending and private-label mortgage securitization booms con-
tributed to the GSEs losing market share ahead of the Great Recession. Af-
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ter a refinancing boom ended in mid-2003, mortgage banks maintained orig-
ination volumes by originating more jumbo, subprime, and Alt-A mortgages.
Private-label securitization of mortgages with lax underwriting standards ex-
acerbated moral hazard and predatory lending, and credit quality rapidly de-
teriorated after mid-2003; conditioning on borrower characteristics, mortgage
spreads abruptly contracted roughly 100 basis points (Justiniano et al., 2017).
The GSEs were prohibited from securitizing these non-conforming loans and
could only purchase them if accompanied with private mortgage insurance. The
private-label securitization market share surged from roughly 20% in the early
2000s to 55% in 2005–2006 before the market all but evaporated in 2008–2009.
But when turmoil started to foment in the subprime market in August 2007,
Congress pushed Fannie and Freddie to start purchasing increased volumes of
subprime loans, and the enterprises’ portfolio caps were relaxed in September
2007.
In July 2008, regulatory authority over Fannie and Freddie was transferred
from OFHEO to the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), a new indepen-
dent federal agency. The FHFA was granted sweeping authority to take Fan-
nie and Freddie into conservatorship if the GSEs were determined to be “criti-
cally undercapitalized,” and the U.S. Treasury Department was temporarily au-
thorized to make unlimited investments in the enterprises’ securities. Facing
mounting losses and collapsing share prices, Fannie and Freddie were taken
into government conservatorship on September 7, 2008. In exchange for a guar-
antee of positive net worth and up to $100 billion in capital for each agency, the
Treasury received warrants for a 79.9% ownership stake in each enterprise, as
well as dividend-bearing senior preferred stock claims.4
4Federal budgetary rules require that the liabilities of any entity be placed on the federal
budget ledger if the government owns an equity stake exceeding 80%, which the Bush and
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After initially expanding their mortgage holdings during the Great Reces-
sion at the behest of their regulators, Fannie and Freddie were required to
rapidly shrink their mortgage holdings in accord with a series of new portfolio
caps, as depicted in the right panel of Figure B.1. The conservatorship agree-
ments initially capped each enterprise’s mortgage holdings at $850 billion as
of December 31, 2009, to be reduced 10% annually until reaching $250 billion
in 2021.5 The initial caps were soon increased by $50 billion in February 2009,
to support GSE mortgage refinancing under the Home Affordable Refinance
Program.6 In August 2012, a revision to the conservatorship agreements accel-
erated the wind-down of the GSEs’ mortgage holdings to reach $250 billion in
2018. Fannie and Freddie have reduced their mortgage holdings to under $250
billion.
As federal regulators ordered Fannie and Freddie to wind down their mort-
gage holdings, the Fed launched and quickly ramped up a novel agency MBS
purchase program.7 Shortly after the agencies were taken into conservatorship,
the Fed announced in November 2008 that it would purchase $500 billion worth
of agency MBS and $100 billion in agency debt, the beginning of the Fed’s first
round of quantitative easing (QE1). In March 2009 the Fed announced that it
would increase its purchases of agency MBS by $750 billion, and expand its
purchases of agency debt up to $200 billion. In September 2011 the FOMC an-
Obama Administrations were eager to avoid.
5The caps were deliberately set well above the agencies’ standing retained portfolio volumes,
as regulators were pushing each to expand their mortgage holdings in support of the collapsing
market; see Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017).
6The Treasury simultaneously increased its funding line for each enterprise from $100 billion
to $200 billion, which was subsequently revised to an unlimited line of funding in December
2009.
7The Treasury Department also announced a smaller scale agency MBS purchase program
when it took Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship, and purchased $220 billion in mortgage
debt over September 2008–December 2009. The Treasury announced that it was unwinding its
agency MBS portfolio in March 2011, and the last securities were sold off in March 2012.
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nounced that it would redirect reinvestment of principal payments from agency
debt and MBS holdings back into agency MBS, a departure from its stand-
ing policy of reinvesting payments into Treasuries. In September 2012 the Fed
launched a third round of quantitative easing (QE3), announcing that it would
purchase $40 billion in agency MBS each month, with no target volume or ter-
minal date stipulated. The FOMC subsequently announced that it was tapering
its monthly MBS purchases to $35 billion in December 2013, and announced the
termination of all QE3 purchases in October 2014. The Fed, however, reaffirmed
its policy of reinvesting principal payments from agency securities back into
agency MBS. Consequently the Fed’s mortgage holdings hovered around $1.75
trillion for the next three years, as depicted in the left panel of Figure B.2.
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Figure B.2. Agency MBS Holdings and Purchases of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem
Notes: Gray bars correspond with NBER recession dates. Vertical dashed lines correspond
to the following related Federal Open Market Committee policy announcements: QE1 launch
(11/25/2008), QE1 expansion (3/18/08), principal reinvestment (9/21/2011), QE3 launch
(9/13/2012), QE3 taper (12/18/2013), QE3 termination (10/29/2014), and balance sheet nor-
malization (9/20/2017). Purchases are aggregated monthly by transaction date. Sources: Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
In September 2017 the FOMC announced that it would initiate a program
of balance sheet normalization, meaning that it would reduce its asset hold-
ings. At the time, the Fed was financing upwards of one-sixth of U.S. residen-
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tial mortgage debt and holding roughly 30% of U.S. MBS outstanding. As part
of the Fed’s balance sheet reduction, the monthly volume of principal repay-
ments reinvested into agency MBS was scheduled to be gradually lowered by
a series of capped reductions starting in October 2017.8 The schedule would
reduce the Fed’s purchases of agency MBS by up to $120 billion over October
2017–September 2018. The New York Fed stopped reinvestment purchase oper-
ations in mid-October 2018. Barring further policy adjustments, the last of the
Fed’s MBS holdings might run off by the end 2025 if holdings fall in line with
the capped reductions, as projected in the upper panel of Figure B.2.9
Due to the falling mortgage holdings of Fannie, Freddie, and the Fed, the
share of U.S. residential mortgage debt being financed by government agencies
is projected to fall considerably based on current policy, as depicted in Figure
2.10. Congress is currently trying to write the next chapter of the history of Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac; government-sponsored secondary mortgage markets
will surely persist in some form, but the balance between federal mortgage guar-
antees versus mortgage holdings may shift considerably.
8The New York Fed will reinvest only those repayments exceeding $4 billion in October–
December 2017; $8 billion in January–March 2018; $12 billion in April–June 2018; $16 billion in
July–September 2018; and $20 billion in October 2018 and beyond. Between terminating QE3
and beginning balance sheet “normalization” in October 2017, the Fed’s policy of reinvesting
agency securities repayments resulted in an average of $28.5 billion in net agency MBS pur-
chases each month, as depicted in the lower panel of Figure B.2.
9If repayment rates exceed the $20 billion cap in any given month the capped reduction is
an upper bound for the pace of balance sheet run off. Lower repayment rates below the cap
would slow the pace of balance sheet run off, and the FOMC may decide to resume agency MBS
reinvestment and maintain some holdings.
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Policy Objectives and Public Mission: Statutory Charters of Fan-
nie and Freddie
The GSEs have repeatedly been repurposed by Congress and used as public
utilities to address new policy priorities, as loosely chronicled in Section B.
Policy objectives have broadly included increasing the liquidity of mortgages,
boosting construction to ameliorate housing shortages or support aggregate in-
vestment, attracting new sources of funding for mortgage lending, reallocating
credit across regions of the country, harmonizing mortgage contracts to facilitate
securitization, promoting homeownership and housing affordability for vari-
ous constituencies, and expanding mortgage lending during credit crunches.
To more concretely shed light on Congress’s objectives behind chartering Fan-
nie and Freddie and amending their public missions, this section reproduces
Fannie Mae’s statutory charter from Title III of the National Housing Act, as
amended:
“SEC. 301. DECLARATION OF PURPOSES OF TITLE
The Congress declares that the purposes of this title are to establish secondary mar-
ket facilities for residential mortgages, to provide that the operations thereof shall be
financed by private capital to the maximum extent feasible, and to authorize such facil-
ities to
1. provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages;
2. respond appropriately to the private capital market;
3. provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market for residential mortgages (in-
cluding activities relating to mortgages on housing for low- and moderate-income
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families involving a reasonable economic return that may be less than the return
earned on other activities) by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and
improving the distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage
financing;
4. promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation (including central cities,
rural areas, and underserved areas) by increasing the liquidity of mortgage invest-
ments and improving the distribution of investment capital available for residen-
tial mortgage financing; and
5. manage and liquidate federally owned mortgage portfolios in an orderly manner,
with a minimum of adverse effect upon the residential mortgage market and min-
imum loss to the Federal Government.”
See Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) for the legislative history of revisions to
the GSEs’ statutory charters.
Overview of GSE Narrative Instruments
Shifting long-term priorities for federal housing policy, independent (often
weak) regulatory oversight of the GSEs, and ad hoc policymaking gave rise to a
considerable degree of regulatory policy variation affecting the mortgage hold-
ings of Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie. The Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) nar-
rative analysis parses primary and secondary sources to document the history
of Fannie, Freddie, Ginnie, the Federal Reserve, and the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment as pertains to housing credit policy, emphasizing legislative, regulatory,
or macro stabilization policies affecting the mortgage holdings of government
agencies. The narrative analysis is intended to develop a time series of exoge-
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nous regulatory shocks as valid instrumental variables for agency purchases of
mortgage debt, proceeding in the following five steps:
1. Identifying significant policy changes expected to affect agency portfolios;
2. Quantifying a projected effect of each policy on agency retained portfolios;
3. Pinpointing the timing of each policy’s news first being made public;
4. Classifying each policy as either cyclically or not cyclically motivated; and
5. Restricting the sample, starting January 1967.
Unlike Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018), I entirely abstract from the re-
tained portfolio activity of Ginnie Mae, as Ginnie’s past activity is less relevant
to the Fed’s balance sheet normalization program and GSE reform. Ginnie’s
purchase programs were concentrated in a different segment of the mortgage
market and largely driven by countercyclical objectives. Before Congress termi-
nated its purchase programs in the early 1980s, Ginnie was actively employed to
direct credit toward FHA loans during periods of distress in the 1970s; almost
all policy changes affecting its purchases are classified as cyclically motivated
by Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017). I also focus exclusively on the pre-crisis Jan-
uary 1967–December 2006 sample, ignoring more recent policy interventions by
the Federal Reserve and Treasury, which were cyclically motivated.
Table B.1: Narrative Measures of Policy Changes
Policy Description Agency Impact News Classification
HUDA 1968:
Increased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio
FNMA +$1.39 billion Oct. 1968 Non-Cyclical
Conforming
Mortgage Program
Approval
FNMA +$0.4 billion Nov. 1971 Non-Cyclical
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Policy Description Agency Impact News Classification
HCDA 1974:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FNMA +$1.14 billion Aug. 1974 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1974:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FHLMC +$0.46 billion Aug. 1974 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1977:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FNMA +$4.82 billion Oct. 1977 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1977:
Conforming Loan
Limit
FHLMC +$0.21 billion Oct. 1977 Non-Cyclical
HCDA 1978:
Mortgagee Expansion FHLMC +$2.0 billion Oct. 1978 Non-Cyclical
Increased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio FNMA +$6.25 billion Dec. 1982 Non-Cyclical
Second Mortgage
Program Approval FHLMC +$1.0 billion Jan. 1986 Non-Cyclical
Decreased
Debt-to-Capital Ratio FNMA -$2.7 billion Apr. 1987 Non-Cyclical
Public Listing: Stock
Split Capitalization FHLMC +$1.62 billion Nov. 1988 Non-Cyclical
FHEFSSA 1992:
Capital Requirements FNMA -$4.25 billion Mar. 1990 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 1995 FHLMC +$0.61 billion Dec. 1995 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 2004 FNMA +$7.6 billion Apr. 2004 Non-Cyclical
Affordable Housing
Goals of 2004 FHLMC +$7.6 billion Apr. 2004 Non-Cyclical
Accounting Scandal:
Capital Surcharge FNMA -$141.4 billion Sep. 2004 Non-Cyclical
Portfolio Growth
Limit Imposed FHLMC -$42.8 billion June 2006 Non-Cyclical
Notes on acronyms: Housing and Urban Development Act (HUDA); Housing and Com-
munity Development Act (HCDA); and Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and
Soundness Act (FHEFSSA). Source: Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017).
Table B.1 details the regulatory policy events for Fannie and Freddie that I
use as identifying variation: the projected dollar effect of each policy change
for agency mortgage holdings (in nominal dollars), the timing of each pol-
icy’s news being made public, and the date each policy took effect for all reg-
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ulatory policy events classified as not cyclically motivated in the Fieldhouse
and Mertens (2017) narrative analysis. After monthly aggregation, there are 14
months with not cyclically motivated regulatory policy events affecting the re-
tained portfolios of Fannie and Freddie over the January 1967–December 2006
sample. Section B provides a brief, chronological overview of each of these pol-
icy changes that I use as instrumental variables, while more detailed explana-
tions of the quantification, timing, and classification of each policy, along with
related sources and documentation, can be found in Fieldhouse and Mertens
(2017).
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Figure B.3. Non-Cyclically Motivated GSE Policy Events
Notes: Gray bars correspond with NBER recession dates. The not cyclically motivated GSE
policy events (black, left axis) are the sum of the quantified policy changes (in current dol-
lars) affecting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from the Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) narrative,
scaled to annualized GSE mortgage holdings over the previous year (left panel) and annual-
ized mortgage originations over the previous year (right panel). The cyclical growth in GSE
mortgage holdings (blue, right axis) measures the combined mortgage holdings of Fannie and
Freddie, deflated using the core PCE prince index, log transformed, and detrended using the
linear two-year forecasting error method proposed by Hamilton (forthcoming). Sources: see
the data appendix.
Figure B.3 depicts the not cyclically motivated GSE policy events that I use
for identification (black), scaled to GSE mortgage holdings over the prior year
(left panel) and scaled to annualized mortgage originations over the prior year
(right panel). For a sense of scale, GSE purchases averaged just under 10% of
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residential mortgage originations over 1967–2006. Figure B.3 also depicts the de-
trended growth in GSE mortgage holdings (blue), estimating the cyclical com-
ponent of log real GSE mortgage holdings using the linear forecasting method
proposed by Hamilton (forthcoming). The expansionary (contractionary) nar-
rative regulatory events overwhelming line up with periods of relative balance
sheet growth (contractions).
Chronological Overview of GSE Policy Events Used for Identifi-
cation
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968: The HUD Secretary in-
creased Fannie’s debt-to-capital limitation on secondary market borrow-
ing from 15 to 20 times its regulatory capital in October 1968. The Trea-
sury Secretary additionally put in writing that the Treasury would make
any loans necessary to guarantee timely payment of interest and princi-
pal on Fannie’s new debt issues. Collectively, these actions helped Fannie
expand faster than had been envisioned by the Housing and Urban De-
velopment Act of 1968, which had set a statutory debt-to-capital ratio of
15 times regulatory capital.
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970: In addition to chartering Fred-
die Mac to support a secondary market for conventional mortgages origi-
nated by thrift banks, the Act expanded Fannie Mae’s purchase authority
to include conventional mortgages, conditional on the HUD Secretary’s
approval. Approval was granted shortly after the bill’s enactment. Fan-
nie had previously been restricted to purchasing FHA/VA-backed mort-
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gages, and the policy change significantly expanded the pool of mortgages
it could purchase. The policy change was forward-looking, intended to
spur the harmonized development of standardized contracts for conform-
ing mortgages qualifying for sale to the secondary market.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974: Before indexing the
conforming loan limit to a national home price index in 1980, Congress
would erratically revise the conforming loan limit in periodic housing au-
thorization bills, which were typically subject to much debate back and
forth between the House and Senate. The Act increased the conforming
loan limit for conventional mortgages from $33,000 to $55,000, effective
upon enactment. The policy change considerably expanded the pool of
mortgage debt eligible for purchase by the GSEs in both nominal and real
terms, as the previous limit had been fixed nominally since 1969; the CPI
rose by 34% between 1969 and 1974, whereas the loan limit was increased
67% by the Act. The bill’s objectives were forward-looking, largely re-
lated to urban redevelopment, consolidation of housing programs, and
resolving a multi-year impasse over all housing legislation; the Nixon Ad-
ministration was trying to roll back parts of the Great Society legislation,
particularly related to housing, to which the Senate objected.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977: The Act increased
the conforming loan limit for conventional mortgages from $55,000 to
$75,000, effective upon enactment. The policy change again considerably
expanded the pool of mortgage debt eligible for purchase by the GSEs, as
the previous limit had been fixed nominally since 1974; the CPI rose by
23% between 1974 and 1977, whereas the loan limit was increased 36% by
the Act. The bill was largely intended to reduce discrimination in mort-
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gage lending and federal housing policy, and had no discernible counter-
cyclical motive. Shortly thereafter, Congress indexed the conforming loan
limit to a national home price index, and it thus ceased to be a source of
significant, unanticipated policy variation until the Great Recession.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1978: The Act amended
Freddie’s charter act to allow it to purchase mortgages from mortgage
banks in addition to thrift banks and clarified that Congress did not in-
tend for Fannie and Freddie to be operating in different segments of the
housing market, but for both to broadly support the housing market.
The amendment significantly expanded the scope for Freddie’s secondary
market activity and, ahead of passage, was projected to spur an increase in
Freddie’s near-term purchases. The policy change was intended to clarify
prior legislative intent, and had no discernible countercyclical motive.
Increased Debt-to-Capital Ratio: The HUD Secretary increased Fannie’s
debt-to-capital limit on secondary market borrowing from 25 to 30 times
its regulatory capital in December 1982, easing a binding balance sheet
constraint and allowing further leveraged portfolio growth. The regula-
tory loosening was part of a broader pattern of deregulatory efforts to help
Fannie and mortgage lenders grow their way back to health without us-
ing public funds for bailouts, which presaged the S&L crisis later in the
decade. Enhancing profitability and strengthening Fannie’s balance sheet
was perceived by the Reagan Administration as a necessary prerequisite
to privatizing both Fannie and Freddie.
Second Mortgage Program Approval: Congress increasingly came to
view second mortgages as an important source of funding for down pay-
ments for home purchases in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Fannie had
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begun purchasing second mortgages, in part to help rebuild its balance
sheet, after HUD authorized Fannie to start dealing in junior lien mort-
gages in 1981, but Freddie remained prohibited from transacting in junior
liens. The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 rede-
fined “mortgage” to encompass second liens and temporarily authorized
Freddie to purchase second mortgages, intended to equalize regulatory
treatment of the GSEs. Authorizing Freddie to purchase second mortgages
considerably expanded the pool of mortgage debt it was allowed to pur-
chase, and Freddie soon announced that it was launching a program of
purchasing and securitizing second mortgages.
Decreased Debt-to-Capital Ratio: In April 1987, HUD issued a rule grant-
ing Fannie Mae limited approval to enter the new real estate mortgage
investment conduit (REMIC) market with issues backed by conventional
mortgages. The rule also unexpectedly lowered Fannie Mae’s debt-to-
capital-ratio from 30-to-1 to 25-to-1, effective immediately, with another
pending reduction to 20-to-1 announced for December 31, 1988. Mort-
gage lenders were concerned about Fannie monopolizing the conventional
REMIC market and had been lobbying regulators to bar Fannie from ex-
panding into the market; the Reagan Administration was perceived as tak-
ing an alternative tack to rein in Fannie that would move the enterprise
more in the direction of privatization.
Public Listing: Stock Split Capitalization: As chartered, Freddie Mac had
no means of raising additional capital and had been lobbying regulators
for a means to expand its capitalization for nearly a decade. Legislation
was in the works to remove trading barriers on Freddie’s original pre-
ferred stock, a move toward privatizing Freddie and enabling the belea-
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guered thrift industry to realize gains on their holdings of FHLMC shares.
Ahead of its public listing, Freddie was allowed to tender an exchange
and split of original preferred shares for new preferred stock, which came
with a mandatory capital contribution per share. The effect of the stock
split was a long-sought and sizable injection of working capital for Fred-
die shortly before being publicly listed. No countercyclical motive was
discernible.
Capital Requirements: In the early 1990s the Treasury Department con-
cluded, in a series of high-profile reports, that Fannie Mae was under-
capitalized, and the Government Accountability Office reached the same
conclusion. As legislation was being drafted that would eventually im-
pose new statutory capital requirements and initiate the development of
risk-based capital standards for the GSEs, Fannie raced to preempt regu-
lators and embarked on a politically motivated recapitalization campaign
in March 1990, temporarily restraining its balance sheet growth. The sub-
sequently enacted capital requirements imposed by the Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (FHEFSSA) would
have been a retroactively binding constraint and Fannie’s abrupt recapi-
talization was clearly prompted by the anticipation of pending capital re-
quirements. The imposition of capital requirements was driven by safety
and soundness concerns, intended to avoid the fiscal cost or political back-
lash from potentially bailing out Fannie Mae.
Affordable Housing Goals of 1995: Freddie Mac had shrunk and then
entirely terminated its multifamily mortgage purchase program in 1990
after suffering considerable losses on its multifamily portfolio in the late
1980s. FHEFSSA imposed a variety of quantitative affordable housing
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goals for the GSEs’ purchases, much of which were designed to be easily
achievable in the early years. Freddie, however, widely missed its mul-
tifamily mortgage affordable housing subgoals for 1993–1994 after being
forced to reinstate its multifamily operations in 1993. In December 1995,
HUD announced a sizable increase in multifamily purchase requirements
for 1996–1999, which materially affected Freddie’s purchase volumes. The
multifamily affordable housing subgoals were motivated by long-term so-
cial policy objectives related to housing affordability.
Affordable Housing Goals of 2004: The GSEs’ affordable housing goals
came up for renewal in 2004 and were considerably increased for 2005–
2008 as part of a broader effort by the Bush Administration to promote
homeownership, particularly for minorities. The new qualifying mort-
gage purchase requirements were much harder to meet than earlier goals,
which were not classified as binding constraints for retained portfolio ac-
tivity, and appeared to have affected the GSEs’ purchase volumes. The
changes were motivated by long-term social policy objectives related to
housing affordability.
Accounting Scandal: Capital Surcharge: Accounting scandals surfaced
at Freddie Mac in 2003, prompting increased oversight of both GSEs.
Graver accounting irregularities were subsequently found at Fannie,
which abruptly prompted a $9 billion downward revision in Fannie’s reg-
ulatory capital in September 2004; the shortfall was the result of disal-
lowed accounting practices regarding hedging and amortization of de-
ferred charges, and Fannie was found to have been deferring amortiza-
tion expenses to inflate earnings per share and maximize related execu-
tive bonuses. Fannie’s regulator imposed capital surcharges that required
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a $12.5 billion capital shortfall to be closed within one year, prompting
both recapitalization efforts and a sizable reduction in Fannie’s retained
portfolio. The accounting scandals broke the considerable lobbying clout
of Fannie and Freddie, and OFHEO, in an effort at reputation manage-
ment, increased its regulatory oversight of the GSEs. The Treasury De-
partment and Greenspan Fed had been pushing regulators to reduce the
GSEs’ mortgage holdings, and the accounting scandals provided pretext
to do just that. No countercyclical motive was discernible.
Portfolio Growth Limit Imposed: Coinciding with the release of the fi-
nal report into Fannie’s accounting scandal in May 2006, federal regula-
tors capped the size of Fannie’s retained portfolio at its level as of Decem-
ber, 31 2005; Fannie’s portfolio did not, however, appear counterfactually
poised for considerable growth in the absence of the limits, the imposition
of which did not faze investors. Regulatory pressure then unexpectedly
bore down on Freddie Mac, which entered an agreement in August 2006
to cap the growth of its portfolio to 2% annually. Freddie, however, had
been rapidly growing and exploiting Fannie’s accounting scandal woes to
gain market share, so the unanticipated portfolio limit significantly con-
strained Freddie’s retained portfolio activity.
See Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) for sources and discussion regarding classifi-
cation of policy motives, the determination of policies’ news being made public,
and quantification.
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Additional Results on Instrument Relevance and Validity
Figure B.4 depicts the response of GSE mortgage holdings to a one-dollar in-
crease in GSE net portfolio purchases, estimated as in equation (2.2) using the
not cyclical GSE policy events. GSE retained mortgage holdings see a significant
rise shortly following news shocks about pending regulatory changes, increas-
ing roughly 80 cents per dollar of cumulated purchases after six months. The
expansion gradually declines thereafter, but remains statistically significant at
conventional levels. The significant response of GSE mortgage holdings to the
regulatory policy shocks is further evidence of instrument relevance. The grad-
ual decline in the GSEs’ mortgage holdings is likely driven by a combination
of accelerated repayment of existing holdings, pooling mortgage holdings and
selling off MBS to third parties, or reaching new balance sheet constraints.
To test the lag exogeneity requirement, I estimate equation (2.2) as a single-
stage LP-OLS regression to obtain fitted values of the error terms, û⊥t , that have
been orthogonalized to the set of lagged controls. Figure B.5 plots the corre-
lation of the narrative instrument (scaled to trend real personal income) with
lagged error terms û⊥t− j for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 12}, along with 95% confidence intervals.
Correlations with lagged error terms are calculated for regressions measuring
the response of GSE mortgage holdings (left panel) and total residential mort-
gage debt (right panel) to actual GSE purchases. In both cases, I fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the narrative instrument is uncorrelated with lagged struc-
tural shocks after conditioning on the lagged controls. The results are broadly
robust to estimating the correlation of the GSE regulatory events and lagged re-
gression residuals calculated using various left-hand-side variables of interest.
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Figure B.4. Instrument Relevance: GSE Retained Mortgage Holdings
Notes: GSE retained portfolio mortgage holdings measure the balance sheet holdings of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, excluding off-balance-sheet guaranteed MBS held by third parties, while
non-GSE mortgage holdings measure all other residential mortgage debt. Data have been sea-
sonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program. Finer lines are 68% and 95% Newey
and West (1987) confidence intervals. Sources: see the data appendix.
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Figure B.5. Lag Exogeneity Diagnostics
Notes: The GSE regulatory events are scaled to trend real personal income. Lagged regression
residuals are fitted by estimating equation (2.2) as a single-stage LP-OLS regression measuring
the response of GSE mortgage holdings (left panel) and total residential mortgage debt (right
panel) to actual GSE purchases. Dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. Sample: January
1967–December 2006. Sources: see the data appendix.
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Appendix B2: Additional Results, Robustness Checks, and Ex-
tensions
Private Lending Reallocations by Sector
Section 2.4.1 estimates the aggregate responses of private mortgage lending
by borrower-type to GSE purchase shocks. I document that GSE purchases
crowd in private mortgage lending for single-family homes while simultane-
ously crowding out private lending for multifamily and commercial mortgages.
The transmission of GSE purchase shocks appears to induce such a reallocation
of credit in part through a mortgage origination channel, as suggested by the
analysis of mortgage transaction flows in Section 2.4.2. To the extent that finan-
cial institutions originating loans retain loans on balance sheet, crowd-out ef-
fects for lending volumes likely vary across financial sectors, depending on the
degree of origination activity and exposure to GSE demand for mortgage origi-
nations. There is considerable heterogeneity across the origination and lending
activity of the major sectors of the primary mortgage market, often due to regu-
latory limits on asset holdings.10 Crowd out of nonresidential lending might be
expected to be particularly discernible on the balance sheets of financial insti-
tutions with a large market share of residential mortgage originations that also
10Thrift banks (savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions) were
legally required to dedicate at least 65% of their assets to mortgage lending to be eligible for
FHLBank membership. While savings and loan associations have largely been confined to
making residential mortgage loans and investing in government securities, reforms in the early
1980s granted increasing (albeit limited) scope to make consumer, commercial mortgage, and
other commercial loans. Commercial banks have a broader loan portfolio spanning residen-
tial and commercial mortgage lending, C&I loans, consumer loans, and an array of securities.
On the far end of the spectrum, mortgage companies (mortgage banks or brokers) are non-
depository institutions that are reliant on wholesale funding and only originate and service
mortgage loans.
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originate nonresidential loans—notably commercial banks, thrift banks, mort-
gage companies, and credit unions.
Figure B.6 depicts the response of private holdings of whole mortgages by
sector to a one-dollar increase in GSE purchases, estimated by 2SLS as in equa-
tion (2.2) using the not cyclically motivated policy events. The top panel doc-
uments the mortgage lending responses of all depository institutions (commer-
cial banks and thrifts) to GSE purchase shocks. The top-left panel of Figure B.6
shows that depository institutions’ holdings of whole home mortgages respond
quite similarly to that of the private sector at large; holdings jump roughly 40
cents at horizons of roughly six months and later see a sustained increase of up
to 25 cents on the dollar at horizons above two years, which is broadly signif-
icant at the 68% or 90% confidence level. In the top-middle panel, depository
institutions’ holdings of multifamily mortgages see a significant and persistent
decline at horizons above 10 months following GSE purchase shocks, with point
estimates around five cents on the dollar. In the top-right panel, depository in-
stitutions’ commercial mortgage holdings also exhibit a rather persistent decline
of 10 to 15 cents per dollar of GSE purchases at horizons above one year, albeit
only broadly significant at the 68% confidence level. Much of the aggregate
crowd-in and crowd-out effects of GSE purchase shocks for private mortgage
lending appears to be driven by the lending behavior of depository institutions,
including the near-term home mortgage warehousing behavior depicted in Fig-
ure 2.3.
The middle panel of Figure B.6 depicts the mortgage lending response of life
insurance companies to GSE purchase shocks. Life insurance companies hold a
broadly diversified asset portfolio, including significant holdings of multifamily
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Figure B.6. Private Direct Mortgage Holdings by Sector
Notes: Depository institutions include commercial banks, savings banks, and savings and loan
associations. Other private entities include mortgage companies, credit unions, real estate in-
vestment trusts, state and local credit agencies, state and local retirement funds, noninsured
pension funds, finance companies, and individuals. Direct mortgage holdings exclude holdings
of mortgage pools. Finer lines are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence intervals.
Data is seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program. Sources: See the data
appendix.
and commercial mortgage debt, but play a marginal role in originating mort-
gages. The response of life insurers’ home mortgage holdings is quite muted
and only marginally significant, as depicted in the middle-left panel of Figure
B.6. The point estimates for holdings of multifamily mortgages in the middle
panel are negligible and not statistically different than zero. The response of life
insurance companies’ commercial mortgage holdings is again small and only
marginally significant for most of the horizon, as seen in the middle-right panel.
The muted response of life insurers’ mortgage holdings juxtaposed with that of
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depository institutions supports the transmission of GSE purchases through a
mortgage origination channel: portfolio rebalancing effects are concentrated in
sectors originating mortgages.
The bottom row of Figure B.6 depicts the mortgage lending response of other
non-depository private entities, which include mortgage companies, credit
unions, real estate investment trusts, state and local retirement funds, pension
funds, finance companies, and individuals.11 As depicted in the bottom-left
panel, the home mortgage holdings of these other private entities see a steady,
significant response to GSE purchase shocks only after two years. Unlike depos-
itory institutions, there is no early spike in home mortgage loans being ware-
housed for an extended period before being sold off to the secondary market.
The medium-term increase in home mortgage lending by sectors originating
and holding home mortgages is again consistent with GSE purchases induc-
ing lagged expansions in new housing investment and new home purchases, as
documented in Section 2.5 and Appendix Section B, respectively. The bottom-
middle and bottom-right panels depict declines in other private entities’ mul-
tifamily and commercial mortgage holdings, respectively; the declines in lend-
ing are smaller but qualitatively similar to those of depository institutions, and
significant for much of the impulse response horizon. As with the lending re-
sponses of depository institutions, the lending responses of other private enti-
ties provides evidence of GSE purchase shocks crowding out multifamily and
commercial lending and crowding in home mortgage lending, particularly at
horizons exceeding two years.
The disparate responses of mortgage lending to GSE purchase shocks across
11Mortgage companies originate both residential mortgages and commercial real estate loans,
which are passed on to the secondary mortgage market shortly after origination. Credit unions
play a significant role in originating home mortgages that are not sold to the secondary market.
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sectors of the primary mortgage market provides further evidence of the trans-
mission of purchases operating through a mortgage origination channel: crowd-
out effects are concentrated in industries that originate mortgages, particularly
depository institutions with the option of retaining new mortgage originations
or selling them to the secondary market.
Domestic vs. International Funding of Agency Debt and U.S.
Mortgage Lending
The transmission of GSE purchase shocks through a safe asset supply channel
might be dampened if foreign institutional investors absorb a significant share
of the accompanying new agency securities issues, as depicted in Figure 2.5.
Fannie and Freddie began aggressively marketing agency bond and MBS issues
to foreign institutional investors in the 1990s, and foreign holdings have ac-
counted for roughly 10–15% of agency securities outstanding in recent years.12
If government agency securities and loans to U.S. banks are imperfect substi-
tutes for foreign investors, international demand for agency securities would
dampen the effect of GSE issues competing with domestic banks for wholesale
funding and related portfolio rebalancing effects. More broadly, foreign funding
of the subsidized expansion in U.S. mortgage lending would reduce the scope
for credit spillovers among domestic lenders, to the extent bank lending is con-
strained by domestic savings.
Figure B.7 depicts the response of net foreign purchases of long-term agency
12The underlying Treasury International Capital System data series on net foreign purchases
of agency securities include agency bonds and MBS; separate series for asset-backed securities
(ABS) and non-ABS are not available before 2011.
577
6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
Horizon (Months)
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
D
ol
la
rs
Foriegn Private Net Purchases of Agency Securities
6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
Horizon (Months)
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
D
ol
la
rs
Total Foriegn Net Purchases of Agency Securities
Figure B.7. Foreign Net Purchases of Agency Securities Associated with GSE
Purchase Shocks
Notes: Agency bonds and securities include mortgage-backed securities. Foreign official hold-
ings include those of central banks, sovereign wealth funds, and multinational organizations.
Net purchases exclude principal payments distributed to holders prior to redemption. Foreign
net purchases data are not seasonally adjusted. Finer lines are 68% and 95% Newey and West
(1987) confidence intervals. Sources: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury International
Capital System. Sample: May 1978–December 2006.
bonds and MBS to a one-dollar regulatory shock to GSE purchases, estimated by
2SLS as in regression (2.2).13 The left panel shows that cumulated purchases of
agency securities by foreign private entities quickly rise by nearly 25 cents per
dollar of GSE purchases and persistently rise 10 to 20 cents for horizons above
one year; this increase in foreign purchases of agency debt is broadly statistically
significant at conventional levels for the entire impulse response horizon. Cu-
mulated agency securities purchases of foreign official institutions see a small
decline of roughly 5 cents per dollar in GSE purchases, which is only marginally
significant (not depicted).14 On net, a one-dollar shock to GSE mortgage pur-
chases induces a decline in total foreign net purchases of agency securities of
roughly 10 to 20 cents, as depicted in the right panel of Figure B.7. The un-
13Flows of foreign purchase of agency securities, ft, are cumulated such that yt+h − yt−1 =∑h
j=0 ft+ j. The sample is limited to May 1978–December 2006 based on data availability, and
the controls for unemployment and personal income growth are dropped to conserve on the
number of parameters estimated.
14Foreign official holdings include those of central banks, sovereign wealth funds, and multi-
national organizations.
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derlying Treasury International Capital System data on net purchases exclude
principal repayments prior to securities’ redemption, so the impulse response
for cumulated net purchases are an upper bound for the response of foreign
holdings of agency securities in levels. The evidence on international capital
flows suggests that most of the subsidized expansion in U.S. mortgage lending
driven by GSE regulatory shocks is being financed by domestic savings, with
foreign purchases of agency securities accounting for at most 15-20% of the rise
in residential mortgage debt outstanding. Foreign purchases of agency securi-
ties do not appear to be significantly dampening a safe asset supply channel of
U.S. housing credit policy for domestic lending.
Additional Robustness Checks: Credit and Construction Multi-
pliers
Tables B.2 and B.3 analyze the role of instrumentation and the set of lagged con-
trols for the headline lending and construction results, respectively. Columns
[1] and [2] present the 2SLS and OLS estimates of the credit and construction
multipliers with the benchmark set of lagged controls, as reported in Sections
2.4 and 2.5. Asterisks denote significance at the 68%, 90%, or 95% confidence
interval. The near-term increase in private-sector home mortgage lending and
decrease in C&I lending documented in the 2SLS estimates does not register
in the OLS estimates, but the OLS point estimates otherwise generally follow a
similar pattern to the 2SLS estimates.15 The short-run LP-OLS estimates would
15Another notable divergence between 2SLS and OLS estimates arises in the response of
agency debt outstanding to GSE purchases; the near-term spike in agency debt outstanding
and gradual reversion, as depicted in Figure 2.5, does not register in the OLS estimates, which
are persistently flat (not reported).
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Table B.2: Credit Multipliers: Relevance of Instrumentation and Controls
Notes: Point estimates measure the cumulative dollar response of lending volumes per dollar
of cumulated GSE purchases. 2SLS specifications are estimated as in equation (2.2), using the
not cyclically motivated regulatory policies as an instrument for actual GSE purchases. OLS re-
gressions are estimated without instrumentation, using actual GSE purchases on the right-hand
side. Reported in parentheses are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Asterisks de-
note significance at the 68%, 90%, or 95% confidence interval. Sample: January 1967–December
2006.
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Table B.3: Cumulative Construction Multipliers: Relevance of Instrumenta-
tion and Controls
Notes: Point estimates measure the cumulative dollar response of construction expenditures per
dollar of cumulated GSE purchases. 2SLS specifications are estimated as in equation (2.2), us-
ing the not cyclically motivated regulatory policies as an instrument for actual GSE purchases.
OLS regressions are estimated without instrumentation, using actual GSE purchases on the
right-hand side. Reported in parentheses are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands.
Asterisks denote significance at the 68%, 90%, or 95% confidence interval. Sample: January
1967–December 2006.
be biased downward if the GSEs’ counter-cyclical public mission or profit mo-
tives induced an expansion of portfolio purchases in response to decreased pri-
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vate home mortgage lending. Reverse causality bias running from home mort-
gage lending to GSE purchases appears to be a significant cause for concern in
the short run, but less so for horizons above one year. Moreover, the results
suggest that reverse causality bias is more of a concern when estimating the
response of variables endogenously related to GSE profit motives. Instrumenta-
tion appears to make relatively little difference for the construction multipliers.
Similarities between 2SLS estimates and OLS estimates, however, hinge on
using the identical set of lagged controls; as the set of lagged controls is pared
back, the OLS estimates begin diverging from the 2SLS estimates for certain de-
pendent variables. Columns [3] and [4] report the 2SLS and OLS point estimates
when the lagged interest rate controls are dropped. The 2SLS point estimates are
largely unaffected, but the precision of the lending responses decreases without
the interest controls, as would be expected. Crowd-out effects are not driven
by conditioning lending or construction on borrowing rates and lending risk
spreads. Columns [5] and [6] report the 2SLS and OLS point estimates when
the lagged housing market and price controls are instead dropped. Dropping
controls for housing activity kills the response of multifamily mortgage lend-
ing and, relatedly, construction spending excluding single-family homes, while
significantly increasing the estimated expansion in home mortgage lending
and related construction. Significant differences emerge across 2SLS and OLS
estimates of home and multifamily mortgage lending responses to GSE pur-
chases when the lagged housing and price controls are removed. Conversely,
the response of commercial mortgage lending and C&I lending to GSE pur-
chase shocks is largely unaffected by the addition of housing market controls.
Columns [7] and [8] report the 2SLS and OLS point estimates when the lagged
cyclical controls are instead dropped. Reassuringly, adding the cyclical con-
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trols leaves the 2SLS point estimates largely unchanged and merely increases
precision in the benchmark specification; concerns about policy endogeneity
and misclassification might arise if adding controls for the unemployment rate
markedly changed the results.
Tables B.4 and B.5 document that the credit and construction multipliers are
robust to additionally controlling for possible interaction effects with other ar-
eas of policy affecting banking lending, mortgage borrowing, and construction
activity.16 As a baseline for comparison, column [1] replicates the point esti-
mates from the benchmark impulse responses reported in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
The benchmark sample witnessed considerable deregulation of the commercial
bank and thrift industry, the timing of which was largely governed at the state
level. Columns [2] and [3] show that the results are robust to controlling for dif-
fusion indices of interstate and interstate bank branching deregulation, respec-
tively; I construct the indices from the deregulation dates documented by Mian,
Sufi and Verner (2017), see the data appendix for details. The effect of federal
housing credit policies may also depend on interactions with federal tax pol-
icy, particularly as relates to the deductibility of home mortgage debt. Column
[4] shows that the results are robust to controlling for the dollar value of home
mortgage interest deducted from federal personal income taxes as a share of
real disposable income.17 The value of federal tax subsidies for home mortgage
borrowing depends on marginal tax rates. Columns [5], [6], and [7] document
that the headline results are robust to controlling for average marginal tax rates
for the top 1%, top 10%, and bottom 90%, respectively, as calculated by
16Lagged controls for personal income growth are dropped when rotating in 12 lags of any
additional control variables.
17The data are constructed from the Office of Management and Budget’s estimates of revenue
losses from tax expenditures in various issues of the President’s Budget; see the data appendix
for details.
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Table B.4: Cumulative Credit Multipliers: Policy Interaction Robustness
Checks
Notes: Point estimates measure the cumulative dollar response of lending volumes per dollar
of cumulated GSE purchases. 2SLS specifications are estimated as in equation (2.2), using the
not cyclically motivated regulatory policies as an instrument for actual GSE purchases. OLS re-
gressions are estimated without instrumentation, using actual GSE purchases on the right-hand
side. Reported in parentheses are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Asterisks de-
note significance at the 68%, 90%, or 95% confidence interval. Sample: January 1967–December
2006.
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Table B.5: Cumulative Construction Multipliers: Policy Interaction Robust-
ness Checks
Notes: Point estimates measure the cumulative dollar response of construction expenditures per
dollar of cumulated GSE purchases. 2SLS specifications are estimated as in equation (2.2), us-
ing the not cyclically motivated regulatory policies as an instrument for actual GSE purchases.
OLS regressions are estimated without instrumentation, using actual GSE purchases on the
right-hand side. Reported in parentheses are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands.
Asterisks denote significance at the 68%, 90%, or 95% confidence interval. Sample: January
1967–December 2006.
Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018). There may also be important interactions with
conventional monetary policy not fully encapsulated by controlling for 3-month
Treasury yields. Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018) document significant
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interactions between housing credit policies and conventional monetary policy.
Column [8] documents that credit and construction multipliers are robust to
additionally controlling for surprise innovations to the federal funds rate, as
constructed by Romer and Romer (2004).18
Tables B.6 and B.7 document that the credit and construction multipliers are
robust to details affecting the GSEs. Column [1] again reports the point esti-
mates from the benchmark impulse responses reported in Sections 2.4 and 2.5
as a baseline for comparison. Columns [2], [3], [4], and [5] demonstrate that the
results are broadly robust to iteratively dropping the following larger narrative
policy events from the first-stage regression (2.1): the October 1968 increase in
Fannie Mae’s permissible debt-to-capital ratio; October 1977 increase in the con-
forming loan limit; the December 1982 increase in Fannie Mae’s debt-to-capital
ratio; and the September 2004 capital surcharges imposed on Fannie Mae in
response to accounting scandals. While the patterns of divergent lending and
construction responses are broadly robust, dropping Fannie Mae’s forced re-
capitalization (the largest policy intervention) from the first stage yields less
precisely estimated impulse responses and the crowd-in of private mortgage
lending is more front-loaded. The GSEs’ footprint in secondary market support
for mortgage lending is influenced by the conforming loan limit, which was in-
dexed to home prices in 1989 and was previously revised statutorily. Column
[6] documents that the main results are robust to controlling for lagged growth
of the real conforming loan limit, deflated by home prices. The effect of GSE
purchases may additionally depend on their market share. Columns [7]
18The Romer and Romer (2004) measure of monetary shocks are constructed as intended
changes of the federal funds rate around FOMC meetings that are orthogonalized to Green-
book forecasts of real GDP growth, GDP deflator growth, and the unemployment rate. The
Gertler and Karadi (2015) measure of monetary shocks is not available for the full benchmark
sample.
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Table B.6: Cumulative Credit Multipliers: GSE Policy Robustness Checks
Notes: Point estimates measure the cumulative dollar response of lending volumes per dollar
of cumulated GSE purchases. 2SLS specifications are estimated as in equation (2.2), using the
not cyclically motivated regulatory policies as an instrument for actual GSE purchases. OLS re-
gressions are estimated without instrumentation, using actual GSE purchases on the right-hand
side. Reported in parentheses are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Asterisks de-
note significance at the 68%, 90%, or 95% confidence interval. Sample: January 1967–December
2006, except for column [8], which is truncated to January 1973–December 2006 to reflect the
period of agency securitization activity.
587
Table B.7: Cumulative Construction Multipliers: GSE Policy Robustness
Checks
Notes: Point estimates measure the cumulative dollar response of construction expenditures per
dollar of cumulated GSE purchases. 2SLS specifications are estimated as in equation (2.2), using
the not cyclically motivated regulatory policies as an instrument for actual GSE purchases. OLS
regressions are estimated without instrumentation, using actual GSE purchases on the right-
hand side. Reported in parentheses are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence bands. Aster-
isks denote significance at the 68%, 90%, or 95% confidence interval. Sample: January 1967–
December 2006, except for column [8], which is truncated to January 1973–December 2006 to
reflect the period of agency securitization activity.
documents that the credit and construction multipliers are robust to control-
ling for lagged growth rates of the GSEs’ mortgage holdings, measured as the
log first difference of their combined real retained portfolios. Column [8] doc-
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uments that the credit and construction multipliers are broadly robust to con-
trolling for lagged growth rates of the real volume of GSE MBS outstanding
(securitization market share is non-stationary).
Additional Robustness Checks: Housing Construction and
Home Sales
The pattern of GSE purchases expanding single-family housing activity while
crowding out commercial real estate activity, as documented for construction
flows in Section 2.5.1, is robust to analyzing the response of related measures of
single-family housing and commercial activity. Figure B.8 depicts the response
of housing activity following news shocks about GSE balance sheet expansions,
estimated as in equation (2.8).19 The left panel depicts a significant rise in build-
ing permits between 4 and 16 months following news about pending GSE bal-
ance sheet expansions. The middle panel sees a significant rise in housing starts
for single-family homes that lags slightly behind and is more persistent than
the response of building permits. The right panel depicts a significant but more
delayed rise in the number of new single-family homes sold, which rise 1% to
1.5% at horizons of 12 to 24 months following news about pending expansions
of GSE purchases. Reassuringly, the staggered responses of building permits,
housing starts, and lagged home sales follow the actual cycle of new housing
development, and are of roughly the same magnitude.
19Twelves lags of any left-hand-side variables not included in the benchmark controls are
additionally rotated into the control set, expressed in log first differences.
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Figure B.8. Housing Market Responses to GSE Purchase Shocks
Notes: Finer lines are 68% and 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence intervals. Sources: see
the data appendix.
The significant rise in new home purchases at horizons above one year, after
new construction is completed, is consistent with the more gradual, persistent
rise in private home mortgage holdings depicted in Figure 2.3. The response
of multifamily housing starts sees a short-lived decline at horizons of under
6 months and never sees a significant expansion at longer horizons (not de-
picted). As with the construction multipliers depicted in Figure 2.7, the housing
market responses in Figure B.8 provide evidence that GSE purchase shocks, in
addition to stimulating home mortgage lending, induce an expansion in real
single-family housing investment because of significant real-financial linkages.
The impulse responses would, however, misleadingly suggest that U.S. housing
credit policies can be used as an effective form of stabilization policy to boost
investment.
Lending Responses to Broader Credit Market Shocks
The Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) narrative record can be interpreted as de-
veloping a series of housing-specific shocks to the supply of mortgage credit
resulting from regulatory policy changes affecting government agencies. In this
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sense, my analysis complements a larger empirical literature on the effects of
broad-based credit supply shocks.20 Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present evidence of
disparate lending and related real responses to the not cyclically motivated sec-
ondary market purchase shocks. Such disparate lending responses might ensue
from credit shocks more generally if driven by bank balance sheet or origina-
tion capacity constraints. I compare the impulse responses to housing-specific
credit shocks with responses to the Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012) excess bond
premium—a broader measure of credit shocks. The SVAR impulse response
analysis provides complementary evidence of divergent lending dynamics for
credit shocks more generally. Results additionally underscore the endogenous
expansion of GSE activity during periods of credit market distress, a source of
reverse causality bias that my narrative identification strategy is intended to
circumvent.
The excess bond premium is an aggregated measure of residual variation
in corporate bonds spreads, with spreads orthogonalized to bond-specific char-
acteristics and firm-specific measures of expected default.21 Gilchrist and Za-
krajs˘ek (2012) find that the residual variation in credit spreads has considerable
forecasting power: a spike in spreads induces significant, persistent declines
in investment, consumption, and output. The authors interpret the excess bond
premium as a credit supply shock unrelated to underlying default risk, or a shift
in the risk-bearing capacity of the U.S. financial sector.
20See, for example, Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (2003); Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajs˘ek
(2009); Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012); Bassett, Chosak, Driscoll, and Zakrajsek (2014); Mian,
Sufi and Verner (2017); and Di Maggio and Kermani (2017).
21The Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012) credit spread is constructed from microdata by measur-
ing each corporate bond’s yield-to-maturity relative to the yield of a synthetic Treasury security
matching that bond’s cash flow, purging duration and maturity mismatch. The credit spread
for each bond is then regressed on an expected measure of default, a vector of bond-specific
characteristics, and fixed effects for industry and S&P credit rating. The excess bond premium
is constructed as the average credit spread less the average spread predicted by firm and bond
characteristics, capturing aggregated residual variation in credit spreads.
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I estimate impulse responses of economic activity in a recursively identified
SVAR, a modified version of the Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012) VAR system that
incorporates credit flows and housing activity and is estimated on monthly as
opposed to quarterly data. The core identifying assumption behind the recur-
sive SVAR is that slow-moving macroeconomic aggregates cannot contempo-
raneously respond to changes in credit conditions because of stickiness in in-
vestment and consumption decisions, which seems plausible for a VAR system
estimated on monthly data. I first estimate a reduced-form VAR
Yt = A1Yt−1 + ... + ApYt−p+νt (B.1)
with the following variables in Yt: the log first differences of industrial produc-
tion, the consumer price index, housing starts, real mortgage originations, and
real GSE net purchases; the excess bond premium; cumulated Fama and French
market excess returns index; federal funds rate; 10-year Treasury yield; and con-
ventional mortgage spread over 10-year Treasuries. I estimate the reduced-form
VAR on monthly data from January 1974–December 2006 and, in keeping with
Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012), setting lag length L = 12.22 Block-recursive iden-
tification of impulse responses from the structural shocks, t, of the SVAR model
B0Yt = B1Yt−1 + ...BpYt−p + t (B.2)
⇔ Yt = B−10 B1︸︷︷︸
A1
Yt−1 + ... + B−10 Bp︸︷︷︸
Ap
Yt−p + B−10 t︸︷︷︸
νt
(B.3)
from the reduced-form VAR innovations, νt, is achieved by assuming only fast-
moving financial market variables can respond to the excess bond premium on
impact, while non-financial variables respond with a lag of at least one month.
Imposing these contemporaneous zero restrictions on B−10 enables the identifi-
22The excess bond premium is available January 1973 onwards, and 12 observations are
needed before the start of the sample.
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cation of its remaining elements from the reduced-form error covariance matrix
E(νtν′t) = Σν = B
−1
0 B
−1
0
′.23
The following variables are iteratively rotated into the benchmark specifica-
tion for Yt: single-family and multifamily housing starts (dropping total hous-
ing starts), real GSE mortgage holdings (dropping real GSE net purchases), real
home mortgage debt outstanding, real multifamily mortgage debt outstanding,
real commercial mortgage debt outstanding, real agency MBS outstanding, a
measure of cumulated GSE excess stock returns, real personal consumption ex-
penditure, a real home price index, and the unemployment rate. All additional
variables save the unemployment rate are expressed in log first differences.
Figures B.9 and B.10 depict the structural impulse response functions to a
one standard deviation increase in the excess bond premium—roughly a 45
basis point increase in corporate credit spreads over this sample. All impulse
responses are cumulated for variables expressed in log first differences. Finer
dashed lines are 68% confidence intervals based on 2,000 bootstrap replications.
Similar to the impulse responses in the Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012) SVAR
specification, Figure B.9 sees a spike in the excess bond premium gradually
fading over two years (top-left panel), and the shock is broadly contractionary.
The credit shock induces significant but transitory declines in consumption and
output (measured here as industrial production rather than GDP) as well as a
persistent decline in excess stock market returns. The credit shock additionally
induces a significant rise in the unemployment rate for two years and policy
accommodation by the Fed, with the funds rate declining as much as 50 basis
points after one year. The 10-year Treasury yield persistently falls by 15 to 20
23Because of its symmetry, Σν contains n(n − 1)/2 unique elements, hence B−10 can be solved
from a Cholesky decomposition of Σν by imposing at least n(n − 1)/2 exclusion restrictions on
B−10 .
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basis points but is less precisely estimated, which, as with the response of the
funds rate, is in line with the estimates of Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012).
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Figure B.9. Macro and Housing Recursive SVAR Responses to Excess Bond
Premium Shocks
Notes: Impulse responses are scaled to a one standard deviation innovation to the Gilchrist and
Zakrajs˘ek (2012) excess bond premium. Finer dashed lines are 68% delta method confidence in-
tervals based on 2,000 bootstrap replication standard error estimates, as in Kilian and Lu¨tkepohl
(2017). Sample: January 1974–December 2006.
Unlike Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012), my SVAR system is extended to en-
compass the housing, mortgage lending, and commercial lending activity.24 As
24The SVAR specification of Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012) includes quarterly time series for
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depicted in the lower panels of Figure B.9, the excess bond premium shock in-
duces a significant jump in real residential mortgage originations of around 8–
10% over the first year, which is not followed by any mean reversion. Conven-
tional mortgage spreads see a significant increase of 5–10 basis points over the
first year, followed by a decrease of around 5 basis points at horizons approach-
ing two years. Driven by the decline in Treasury yields, conventional mortgage
rates persistently fall by 10 to 20 basis points for horizons above six months in
response to the shock (not depicted).
GSE activity also jumps in response to the excess bond premium credit
shock. The lower right panel of Figure B.9 shows GSE retained portfolio pur-
chases persistently rising 1.5% to 2% over two years following excess bond pre-
mium shocks. As seen in the lower-left panel of Figure B.10, there is no sig-
nificant response of GSE retained portfolio holdings, indicating that the rise in
originations and net purchases coincides with elevated repayment and refinanc-
ing activity. The lower-middle panel of Figure B.10 depicts a significant rise in
the volume of agency MBS outstanding, which increases by 2–2.5%. A weighted
average of the GSE stock prices significantly outperforms the market index for
two years following the excess bond premium shock, as depicted in the lower-
right panel of Figure B.10. The rise in GSE purchase and securitization activity
appears a profitable expansion of business in the midst of deteriorating credit
conditions.
As with the impulse responses to the narrative GSE regulatory shocks pre-
sented in Section 2.4, the excess bond premium shock induce divergent lend-
the log differences of real personal consumption expenditures, real business fixed investment,
real GDP, and the GDP price deflator; the quarterly average of the EBP; the quarterly (value-
weighted) excess stock market return from CRSP; the 10-year Treasury yield; and the effective
federal funds rate, and it is estimated over January 1973–September 2010.
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Figure B.10. Additional Housing and Agency Recursive SVAR Responses to
EBP Shocks
Notes: Impulse responses are scaled to a one standard deviation innovation to the Gilchrist and
Zakrajs˘ek (2012) excess bond premium. Finer dashed lines are 68% delta method confidence in-
tervals based on 2,000 bootstrap replication standard error estimates, as in Kilian and Lu¨tkepohl
(2017). Sample: January 1974–December 2006.
ing responses across markets. The volume of home mortgage debt outstanding
gradually increases, seeing a persistent and significant increase of 1.5% after
four years, as depicted in the top-left panel of Figure B.10. The faster and larger
increase of mortgage originations relative to mortgage debt outstanding again
suggests a spike in refinancing activity, followed by a more gradual rise in new
purchase originations. As depicted in the middle-left panel of Figure B.10, a
persistent increase in housing starts for single-family homes lags behind the
rise in originations and roughly coincides with the expansion of home mort-
gage debt. Single-family housing starts see a significant increase at horizons
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above 18 months and are persistently 5% higher four years after an excess bond
premium shock. Multifamily mortgage lending, however, sees no statistically
significant response and the point estimates are quite small, as depicted in the
top-middle panel. There is some evidence of a temporary reduction in housing
starts for multifamily dwellings in the first eight months following an excess
bond premium shock, and no significant response at longer horizons.
Contrary to residential mortgage lending, commercial mortgage debt out-
standing falls steadily following the excess bond premium shock, as depicted
in the top-right panel of Figure B.10. While the point estimates are insignificant
at shorter horizons, there is a significant 1.5% reduction in the volume of lend-
ing roughly four years following the credit shock. As depicted in the middle-
right panel of Figure B.9, the volume of C&I loans outstanding gradually falls
over three years, persistently decreasing by more than 4% after four years. The
persistent reduction in C&I loan volumes stands in contrast to the rebound in
industrial production and the unemployment rate; the reduction in C&I lend-
ing ensuring from GSE purchase shocks, as depicted in Figure 2.6, is similarly
persistent.
Housing-specific credit supply shocks from the secondary mortgage market
induce an increase in home mortgage lending and a decrease in commercial
lending; similarly divergent lending patterns emerge in response to contrac-
tionary, broad-based credit supply shocks—which also spur an increase in sec-
ondary market activity. The SVAR impulse response analysis provides comple-
mentary evidence of significant, persistent portfolio rebalancing effects arising
from credit supply shocks. The SVAR impulse responses similarly suggest a
significant degree of substitutability between originating home mortgages and
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commercial loans at the level of primary market lenders. Activity in mortgage
and construction markets for one- to four-family dwellings expand consider-
ably in response to adverse credit shocks, perhaps spurred on to a degree by
the expansion in GSE purchases and securitization activity, as intended by pol-
icymakers. The mortgage and construction markets for multifamily dwellings,
however, merely seem effectively insulated from excess bond premium shocks.
Impulse responses to broader credit shocks, measured by the Gilchrist and Za-
krajs˘ek (2012) excess bond premium, thus find similarly divergent, market-
segmented responses of lending and construction activity in a recursive SVAR
framework as documented in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
The recursive SVAR impulse responses are also broadly robust to estimating
an alternative SVAR-instrumental variable (SVAR-IV) framework identified us-
ing a measure of residual variation in the excess bond premium, having been
orthogonalized to contemporaneous macroeconomic controls, as an instrument
for the Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012) credit spread measure (not depicted). The
identifying assumption behind the SVAR-IV specification is that the residual
variation in the excess bond premium affects credit spreads on impact, but only
affects other financial variables and macro aggregates through its impact on
credit spreads.
Aggregate C&I Crowd-out from the Fed’s MBS Purchases
I document evidence of pre-crisis housing credit policies crowding out aggre-
gate C&I lending volumes, complementing work by Chakraborty, Goldstein,
and MacKinlay (2017), who find that the Fed’s MBS purchases spurred a relative
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increase in mortgage originations and decrease in C&I loan growth for treated
banks. To benchmark aggregate effects of the Fed’s recent conduct of housing
credit policies to the results in Section 2.4, I estimate LP-OLS forecasts of lend-
ing responses to the Fed’s MBS purchases. Lending responses to the Fed’s MBS
purchases are contrasted with those to the Fed’s purchases of Treasuries, which
should reflect a similar policy endogeneity bias without operating through a
mortgage originations channel.
LP-OLS estimates do not share the causal interpretation of LP-IV estimates
and are more suggestive, as the Fed’s purchases during the crisis were clearly
endogenously motivated; see Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017). But while LP-IV
and LP-OLS estimates of lending responses to GSE purchases vary considerably
for home mortgage lending and GSE securities outstanding, differences in LP-
IV and LP-OLS estimates are relatively small for commercial lending responses.
Much of the bias arising in the LP-OLS estimates appears to be driven by the
GSEs’ endogenous response to the flow of home mortgage originations and res-
idential housing market conditions, not by conditions in other credit markets
outside of their statutory charters. If anything, the LP-OLS estimates underes-
timate crowd-out effects relative to the LP-IV estimates by picking up the spu-
rious negative correlation between countercyclical purchases and deteriorating
commercial credit conditions. Moreover, lagged controls reduce the scope for
reverse causality bias in both regression frameworks.
The local projection regression specification for forecasting cumulative
changes in commercial lending, yt, in response to the Fed’s purchases is simi-
lar to regression (2.2), but estimated by OLS rather than 2SLS:
yt+h − yt−1
Xt
= ah + bh
∑h
j=0 ot+ j
Xt
+ ϕh(L)Wt−1 + ut+h, (B.4)
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where ot are the Federal Reserve System’s monthly open market operation pur-
chases of either agency MBS or Treasury securities (by date of settlement), and
scale factor Xt is again a trend of real personal income.25 Lagged controls, Wt,
include growth in total housing starts, industrial production, and the consumer
price index (all measured quarter-over-quarter); GSE retained mortgage hold-
ings and agency MBS held by third parties (both scaled by Xt); the federal funds
rate; 10-year Treasury yield; BAA-AAA corporate bond spread; and conven-
tional mortgage spread over 10-year Treasury yields.26 The Fed’s monthly pur-
chases of agency MBS and Treasury securities, GSE retained portfolio mortgage
holdings, and agency MBS held by third parties are deflated using the CPI-U.
Lagged values of the left-hand-side variable of interest, yt/Xt, are rotated in for
each regression. Wt additionally includes a QE event indicator series to con-
trol for announcement effects regarding LSAPs, although the results are robust
to its omission.27 Projecting commercial lending of interest on lagged controls
for GSE mortgage holdings and securitization activity, housing market activ-
ity, industrial output, and credit spreads amounts to estimating the effect of the
Fed’s purchases on forecast errors of commercial lending, reducing the scope
for reverse causality bias. Equation (B.4) is estimated on a monthly sample over
January 2008–March 2018, with control lag length reduced to L = 6 and the
impulse horizon truncated to H = 24 in light of the shorter sample size.
The upper panel of Figure B.11 depicts the LP-OLS forecasts of C&I loan
volumes in response to one dollar in Fed purchases of agency MBS (solid blue)
25The Fed’s purchases are aggregated from transactions level microdata available from the
New York Fed; see the data appendix.
26Agency MBS held by third parties are agency pools net of agency MBS held by Fannie and
Freddie; see the data appendix.
27The QE event indicator series are an expanded set of those used in Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jørgensen (2011) with updates from Greenlaw et al. (2018), as detailed in the data ap-
pendix.
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and Treasury securities (dotted gray) cumulated over each forecast horizon h.
Dashed blue lines are 95% Newey and West (1987) confidence intervals for lend-
ing responses to the Fed’s MBS purchases. The top-left panel of Figure B.11 sees
a persistent, significant decline in total C&I lending of 10 to 25 cents in response
to one dollar of the Fed’s MBS purchases. C&I lending sees a smaller 5- to 10-
cent decline for each dollar of the Fed’s purchases of Treasuries over the same
period. The decline in aggregate C&I lending appears to be largely driven by
lending activity of large domestically chartered commercial banks, which see
a loan reduction of up to 15 cents per dollar of MBS purchases (middle panel).
There is a significant, persistent decline in foreign banks’ C&I lending of roughly
5 cents per dollar of MBS purchases (right panel).28 Small domestically char-
tered commercial banks see a significant, albeit smaller and more transitory,
decline in C&I lending for horizons of up to 16 months (not pictured).
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Figure B.11. Local Projections Impulse Responses to Fed QE Purchases
Notes: Local projections impulse responses to cumulated Federal Reserve MBS purchases (solid
blue) and Treasury purchases (dotted gray). Finer dashed blue lines are 95% Newey and West
(1987) confidence intervals. Sample: January 2008–March 2018.
28Credit Suisse, UBS, Deutsche Bank, RBC, BNP Paribas, Nomura Securities, and Mizuho
Securities were among the Federal Reserve’s largest counterparties for its MBS purchases.
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To shed light on portfolio rebalancing dynamics potentially related to de-
creased C&I lending, the lower panel of Figure B.11 reports other balance sheet
responses of large domestically chartered commercial banks. The lower-left
panel depicts a statistically significant increase in large commercial banks’ hold-
ings of residential mortgages, which rise by 30 to 40 cents per dollar in pur-
chases over horizons of up to six months, roughly coincident with the decrease
in their C&I lending volumes; the response is comparable in both timing and
magnitude to the short-term warehousing response of private sector mortgage
holdings to GSE purchase shocks, as depicted in Figure 2.3 and Appendix Fig-
ure B.6. Reassuringly, no significant response of commercial bank mortgage
holdings is forecasted by the Fed’s purchases of Treasuries, which would not
operate through mortgage origination channel. The lower-middle panel depicts
a persistent, significant reduction in large commercial banks’ holdings of agency
MBS, which could be driven either by banks selling assets to the Fed or by the
Fed decreasing the available supply of newly pooled agency MBS. The lower-
right panel sees a significant expansion in large commercial banks’ cash hold-
ings (including reserves), which rise by as much as one dollar in per dollar of the
Fed’s MBS purchases over the same horizon; reassuringly, the Fed’s purchases
of Treasuries predict a similar increase in cash holdings for much of the forecast
horizon.
Collectively, the LP-OLS forecasting analysis suggests that the Fed’s MBS
purchases induce large commercial banks—the Fed’s main counterparties in
the TBA forward market for agency MBS—to temporarily divert resources to-
ward originating residential mortgages and away from originating C&I loans,
and then swap pooled mortgages for reserves without any mean reversion of
C&I lending volumes. This dynamic is strikingly similar to the response of pri-
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vate mortgage holdings and commercial lending in response to GSE purchase
shocks, as depicted in Section 2.4. My results suggest that the mortgage pur-
chases of the GSEs and the Federal Reserve operate in part through a similar
mortgage originations channel, both inducing persistent crowd-out of commer-
cial lending in the process of spurring increased originations of residential mort-
gages.
Appendix B3: Data Sources and Construction
Figure 2.2: GSE retained portfolio holdings measure the balance sheet holdings
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, excluding off-balance sheet guaranteed MBS
held by third parties, while non-GSE mortgage holdings measure all other res-
idential mortgage debt outstanding (for one-to- four-family homes and multi-
family homes). Fannie Mae’s monthly retained portfolio holdings is constructed
from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin (prior to 2003) and Fannie’s
Monthly Summary Highlights reports. Freddie Mac’s monthly retained port-
folio holdings is constructed from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin
(prior to 2003) and Freddie’s Monthly Volume Survey reports. The monthly
frequency series for seasonally adjusted residential mortgage debt outstanding
is from Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018) and is constructed from quar-
terly data from the Financial Accounts of the United States and interpolated to
a monthly frequency using monthly mortgage originations and a linear smooth-
ing of implied repayment rates. Seasonally adjusted monthly data for net port-
folio purchases of Fannie and Freddie are also from Fieldhouse, Mertens, and
Ravn (2018), and were compiled from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bul-
letin, Fannie’s Monthly Summary Highlights reports, and Lehnert, Passmore,
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and Sherlund (2008). Data have been seasonally adjusted using the Census Bu-
reau’s X-13 program.
Data sources for the benchmark controls in regressions (2.1) and (2.2) are
as follows: Interest rate controls for the 3-month T-bill rate and 10-year Trea-
sury rate are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database (se-
ries GS10 and TB3MS). The BAA-AAA bond spread is constructed as Moody’s
seasoned Baa corporate bond yield less Moody’s seasoned Aaa corporate bond
yield (series BAA and AAA from FRED). The conventional mortgage rate is
from Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018), which is constructed as the aver-
age monthly commitment rate from Freddie Mac’s primary mortgage market
survey (1971 onwards) spliced with the FHA series for conventional mortgage
rates in the primary market (from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin).
The series for residential mortgage originations is from Fieldhouse, Mertens,
and Ravn (2018), and is primarily constructed from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development’s discontinued Survey of Mortgage Lending Activity
(for 1970–1997), obtained from the National Archives and Records Administra-
tion; more recent data are interpolated from the Mortgage Bankers’ Associa-
tion’s quarterly originations data and weekly mortgage applications data. The
real home price index is from Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018) and is pri-
marily constructed from the (repeat-transactions) Freddie Mac Home Price In-
dex (post-1975) and the home purchase price component of the Consumer Price
Index; this series is seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program
and deflated using the core PCE price index. Monthly seasonally adjusted series
for housing starts, the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price in-
dex (excluding food and energy), personal income, and the civilian unemploy-
ment rate are from FRED (series HOUST, PCEPILFE, PI, and U6, respectively).
604
All real series are deflated using the core PCE price index.
Figure 2.3: The series for total private direct holdings of mortgage debt are
constructed from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ historical series on
Mortgage Debt Outstanding (Table 1.54), with all underlying series seasonally
adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program. Private direct holdings of
one- to four-family home mortgages are summed across depository institutions
(line 8), life insurance companies (line 13), and individuals and others (line 76).
Private direct holdings of multifamily mortgages are summed across deposi-
tory institutions (line 9), life insurance companies (line 14), and individuals and
others (line 77). Private direct holdings of commercial mortgages are nonfarm,
nonresidential holdings summed across depository institutions (line 10), life in-
surance companies (line 15), and individuals and others (line 78). Total holdings
are the sum of these series as well as farm mortgage holdings of depository insti-
tutions (line 11), life insurance companies (line 16), and individuals and others
(line 79). Quarterly shares of these seasonally adjusted series relative to resi-
dential mortgage debt outstanding are then applied to the monthly frequency
series for seasonally adjusted residential mortgage debt outstanding from Field-
house, Mertens, and Ravn (2018). Note that holdings of individuals and others
include that of mortgage companies, real estate investment trusts, state and lo-
cal credit agencies, state and local retirement funds, noninsured pension funds,
credit unions, and finance companies. Direct mortgage debt holdings exclude
holdings of agency mortgage pools.
Figure 2.4: Monthly data on residential mortgage originations by sector for
January 1970–December 1997 are from the U.S. Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development’s SMLA. Residential mortgage originations are the sum of
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originations for one- to four-family homes (Table 1: Originations of 1-4 Fam-
ily Homes) and multifamily homes (Table 2: Originations of Loans for Mul-
tifamily Properties). Net residential mortgage acquisitions are the sum of to-
tal mortgage originations, home mortgage purchases (Table 6A: Purchases of
Loans for 1-4 Family Nonfarm Homes), and multifamily purchases (Table 7A:
Purchases of Loans for Multifamily Residential Properties) net of total home
mortgage sales (Table 6B: Sales of Loans for 1-4 Family Nonfarm Homes) and
multifamily mortgage sales (Table 7B: Sales of Loans for Multifamily Residential
Properties). Each series is seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13
program. Nonesidential mortgage originations are the total of long-term non-
farm nonresidential loan originations, including farm and nonfarm nonresiden-
tial mortgages but excluding construction and land loans (Table 3: Originations
of Nonfarm Nonresidential Loans). Construction loans are the total of origina-
tions for construction loans for all properties except land (Table 5B: Originations
of Mortgage Loans for All Properties (Except Land)). Each series is seasonally
adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program.
Figure 2.5: Monthly data on agency medium- and long-term notes and
bonds outstanding are compiled from several sources. Debt of Fannie Mae and
the Federal Home Loan Bank System prior to October 1962 is from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1941–1970, series “Debt
of Federally Owned and Government-Sponsored Corporations (in millions of
dollars), Secondary Market Operations.” Outstanding debt of all three agencies
is from various issues of the Federal Reserve Annual Statistical Digest and Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin, series “Federal and Federally Sponsored Credit Agencies,
Debt Outstanding,” “Debt of Federal and Federally Sponsored Credit Agen-
cies,” or “Major Balance Sheet Items of Selected Federally Sponsored Credit
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Agencies.” Partially incomplete time series for 2003–2005 are from the Statis-
tical Supplement to the Federal Reserve Bulletin, series “Federal and Federally
Sponsored Credit Agencies, Debt Outstanding.” Data for Fannie Mae since Jan-
uary 2006 are from the Fannie Mae Monthly Report, “Table 7. Debt Activity.”
Data for Freddie Mac since December 2007 are from the Freddie Mac Monthly
Volume Summary, series “Table 5. Debt Activities.” Data for the FHLBanks
since January 2008 are from the FHLBS Office of Finance, Monthly Issuance
Data Archive, available at http://www.fhlb-of.com/ofweb_userWeb/
resources/fhlbanalystdata_archive.xlsx. Missing data for 2002–
2007 are interpolated by Kalman smoothing in a VAR/state space model es-
timated by maximum likelihood as in Shumway and Stoffer (1982). End of
quarter debt outstanding for Freddie Mac and the FHLBS for 2006 and 2007
are from the Annual Report of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Missing
observations for Fannie Mae’s debt for various months of 2005 are first imputed
from a VAR system with the following variables: monthly growth of Fannie
Mae’s debt, net mortgage purchases, gross mortgage holdings, and MBS pool
issues; monthly growth of mortgage debt outstanding; the 10-year Treasury
yield; and housing starts. The VAR system is estimated over a monthly sam-
ple over January 1972–December 2014 with a lag length of six months. Miss-
ing observations for Freddie Mac’s debt for various months over 2002–2007 are
estimated with an analogous VAR system that instead uses monthly growth
of Freddie Mac’s debt, net mortgage purchases, gross mortgage holdings, and
MBS pool issues. Missing observations for the FHLBS’s debt for various months
over 2005–2007 are imputed from a VAR system with the following variables:
monthly growth of FHLBS debt, quarter-on-quarter growth of FHLBS advances
outstanding, monthly growth of mortgage debt outstanding, the 10-year Trea-
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sury yield, and monthly growth in FHLMC’s debt outstanding and mortgage
holdings. The VAR system is again estimated over a monthly sample from
January 1972 through December 2014 with a lag length of six months. Each
smoothed series for agency debt is then seasonally adjusted using the Census
Bureau’s X-13 program, and “Housing GSE debt” is the monthly sum of the
three seasonally adjusted series for Fannie, Freddie, and the FHLBS.
Monthly data for Fannie Mae’s MBS outstanding for 1998–2000 and 2006–
2017 are from Fannie Mae’s Monthly Summary Highlights reports. Missing
end-of-quarter observations for 1992–2002 are from Fannie Mae’s annual In-
formation Statements and quarterly updates, while missing end-of-quarter ob-
servations for 2003–2006 are from Fannie Mae’s 10-K and 10-Q forms, cross-
referenced with the Financial Statistics of the United States. Remaining end-
of-quarter observations are from the Financial Statistics of the United States.
Monthly data for Freddie Mac’s MBS outstanding 1998-2018 are from Freddie
Mac’s Monthly Volume Summary reports. End-of-quarter observations prior to
1998 are from the Financial Statistics of the United States. End-of-quarter obser-
vations for Ginnie Mae’s MBS outstanding are from the Financial Statistics of
the United States. All missing monthly observations are constructed by linear
interpolation of monthly MBS pool issues for each agency and implied quar-
terly repayment rates. The final monthly data series for each agency has been
seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program. Monthly data for
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae net pool issues are from Fieldhouse,
Mertens, and Ravn (2018). GSE MBS outstanding and GSE pool issues are the
sum of MBS outstanding and net pool issues, respectively, for both Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.
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Figure 2.6: The following seasonally adjusted balance sheet items for all do-
mestic commercial banks are from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ his-
torical series on Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States
(Table H.8): bank credit (line 1); total securities in bank credit (line 2); Trea-
sury and agency securities (line 3); other securities (line 6); loans and leases in
bank credit (line 9); commercial and industrial loans (line 10); real estate loans
(line 11); and consumer loans (line 20). Real estate loans include home mort-
gages, revolving home equity loans, and commercial real estate loans. Con-
sumer loans include credit cards, auto loans, student loans, personal loans, and
other forms of revolving credit. Treasury and agency securities include all lia-
bilities of the U.S. Treasury Department, other U.S. government agencies, and
U.S. government-sponsored enterprises. Bank credit is the sum of all securities,
loans, and leases, less allowances for loan and lease losses.
Figure 2.7: Monthly data series on construction spending are from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s Value of Construction Put in Place Survey. Seasonally adjusted
data for 1993 and onward are from the Census, available at https://www.
census.gov/construction/c30/historical_data.html. Older series
are constructed from digitized PDFs of historical monthly Value of Construc-
tion Put in Place Survey reports, obtained through the Hathi Trust Digital Li-
brary, using Abbyy Finereader optical character recognition software; the hand
constructed data series are seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13
program.
Figure 2.8: Construction sector employment, total nonfarm employment,
and financial activities employment are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis’s FRED database (series USCONS, PAYEMS, and USFIRE). All series are
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seasonally adjusted.
Figure 2.9: The conventional mortgage rate and FHA mortgage rate are from
Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018), and both spreads are calculated relative
to the 10-year Treasury yield. The conventional mortgage rate is largely based
on the average commitment rate on 30-year fixed-rate conventional conform-
ing mortgage from Freddie Mac’s primary mortgage market survey. The FHA
mortgage rate reflects 30-year fixed-rate FHA-guaranteed mortgages based on
data publicly available from the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment. William English provided data on business loan rates. The bank prime
loan rate is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database (series
MPRIME). Both business loan rate spreads are calculated relative to the effec-
tive federal funds rate. The benchmark rates are from the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis’s FRED database (series GS10 and FEDFUNDS).
Figure 2.10: The retained portfolios of FNMA and FHLMC include both
whole loans and MBS held on balance sheet, but exclude the guarantee book
of off-balance-sheet MBS. Data for FNMA and FHLMC for 1968Q1–2014Q4 is
from Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018), with subsequent updates from Fan-
nie Mae’s Monthly Summary Highlights reports and Freddie Mac’s Monthly
Volume Summary reports. Total agency holdings is the sum of holding by
FNMA, FHLMC, GNMA, U.S. Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, Federal
Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS), Federal Housing Administration (FHA),
Veterans Administration (VA), Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), Fed-
eral Land Banks, Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC). Data for the FHLBS for 1968Q1–2014Q4 are from Fieldhouse, Mertens,
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and Ravn (2018), with subsequent updates from the FHFA’s Annual Report to
Congress for FHLBS holdings. Data for GNMA for 1968Q1–2014Q4 is from
Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018), with subsequent updates from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board of Governors’ historical series on Mortgage Debt Outstand-
ing (Table 1.54). All quarterly data for other government agency holdings are
also from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ historical series on Mortgage
Debt Outstanding.
Residential mortgage debt growth is forecast by estimating a VAR system
largely based on variables forecast at a quarterly frequency in the Congressional
Budget Office’s (CBO) Economic Outlook. The VAR system includes the log
differences of real residential mortgage debt, GDP, residential fixed investment,
personal income, and a trend of mortgage debt held in private-label MBS, the
federal funds rate, 10-year Treasury yield, log differences of the CPI and a home
price index, and the unemployment rate. Personal income is deflated using CPI-
U. The home price index is constructed from the FHFA Purchase Only House
Price Index for 1990 onward, spliced together with quarterly average growth in
the Freddie Mac House Price Index (FMHPI) for repeat transactions post-1975
and the home purchase component of the BLS Consumer Price Index (series
PHCPI from FRED) pre-1975, as in Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018). The
trend in private-label MBS is calculated by fitting a fourth degree polynomial to
the Private mortgage conduits component of the Federal Reserve Board of Gov-
ernors’ historical series on Mortgage Debt Outstanding; the inclusion of this
series is meant to explain (or absorb) some of the anomalous subprime mort-
gage lending boom and home price bubble of the aughts. The VAR system is
estimated over a quarterly sample for 1957Q1–2017Q3 with a lag length of eight
quarters, as selected by the Akaike Information Criterion. Growth in residen-
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tial mortgage debt outstanding is then iteratively forecast for 2017Q4–2027Q4
using the fitted values and the CBO’s economic forecast, which includes quar-
terly forecasts for all other variables in the VAR system save trend growth in
private-label MBS, which is simply zeroed out.
FNMA and FHLMC holdings are projected in line with current policy for
their portfolio caps, each indefinitely fixed at $250 billion (in nominal dollars).
The Federal Reserve’s MBS holdings are projected as described for Figure B.2.
Holdings of the RTC, FDIC, and FSLIC are fixed at zero, as these mortgage hold-
ings of public resolution utilities only bulge historically in response to waves of
bank failures. Holdings of GNMA, FHLBS, and all other government agencies
are held fixed at their stable, 2.2% average share of mortgage debt outstanding
over 2011Q1–2016Q4.29
Figure B.1: Agency MBS outstanding are constructed as detailed for Fig-
ure 2.5. The retained portfolios of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac include both
whole loans and MBS held on balance sheet, but exclude the guarantee book of
off-balance-sheet MBS. Data for 1968Q1–2014Q4 is from Fieldhouse, Mertens,
and Ravn (2018), with subsequent updates from Fannie Mae’s Monthly Sum-
mary Highlights reports and Freddie Mac’s Monthly Volume Summary reports.
The sequence of conservatorship portfolio caps are calculated from the orig-
inal Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (dated 9/26/2008) and the
third amendment to the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (dated
8/17/2012), both of which are available from the Federal Housing Finance
Agency: https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/.
29Combined holding of these agencies have ranged from 2.13% to 2.21% of total residential
mortgage debt outstanding over this period. Projecting forward, fixing holdings at this share is
meant to reflect a continuation of current policy for these agencies.
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Figure B.2: In the left panel, the Fed’s monthly holdings of agency MBS
are based on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Release: H.4.1 Fac-
tors Affecting Reserve Balances, retrieved at an end-of-month basis from the
FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (series MBST). Projec-
tions for agency MBS holdings during balance sheet normalization apply the
maximum monthly reductions from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s
Monthly Caps on SOMA Securities Reductions for Agency Securities, avail-
able at https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_
policy_170920. The first reductions were announced on October 13, and the
settlement date has lagged by one month, so the first reductions in portfolio
holdings are assumed to take effect in November 2017, measured from end-of-
October holdings.
In the right panel, the Fed’s monthly net purchases of agency MBS are
separately aggregated from microdata on all purchase and sale transactions,
by either trade date or settlement date. Purchases for QE1 are available
from the Federal Reserve Board of Governor’s Agency Mortgage-Backed Se-
curities (MBS) Purchase Program: https://www.federalreserve.gov/
regreform/reform-mbs.htm. Subsequent purchases for the reinvest-
ment of principal and QE3 are available from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York’s Agency MBS Historical Operational Results and Planned Pur-
chase Amounts: https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/ambs/ambs_
schedule.html. The original portfolio caps for each GSE were set at $850
billion as of December 31, 2009, to be reduced 10% each subsequent December
31 until reaching $250 billion. The original portfolio caps for each GSE were
set at $850 billion as of December 31, 2009, to be reduced 10% each subsequent
December 31 until reaching $250 billion. The current caps reflect the upwardly
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revised cap of $900 billion for December 31, 2009, as well as the downwardly
revised $650 billion cap for December 31, 2012, and a subsequent reduction at
an accelerated rate of 15% annually.
Figure B.3: The not cyclically motivated GSE policy events are the pol-
icy changes affecting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from the Fieldhouse and
Mertens (2017) narrative, as listed in Table B.1, with the quantified dollar ef-
fect on retained portfolio activity aggregated to a monthly frequency. In the left
panel, the not cyclically motivated GSE policy events are scaled to the average
combined retained portfolios of Fannie and Freddie over the previous year, as
described for Figure B.1. In the right panel, the not cyclically motivated GSE
policy events are scaled to annualized mortgage originations over the previous
year, using the same series for seasonally adjusted residential mortgage origi-
nations as described for Figure 2.2. The detrended growth in the GSEs’ retained
portfolios measures the log transformed combined retained portfolio of Fannie
and Freddie using the same series as described for Figure 2.2, deflated using
the core PCE price index, and detrended using the linear forecasting method
proposed by Hamilton (forthcoming).
Figure B.4: Data sources are as detailed for the first-stage regressions for
Figure 2.2.
Figure B.5: Data sources are as detailed for Figure 2.2.
Figure B.6: The series for depository institutions’ direct holdings of mort-
gage debt are constructed from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ histor-
ical series on Mortgage Debt Outstanding (Table 1.54). The quarterly series for
depository institutions’ holdings of one- to four-family home mortgages (“One-
614
to four- family residences,” line 8), multifamily mortgages (“Multifamily resi-
dences,” line 9), commercial mortgages (“Nonfarm, nonresidential,” line 9), and
farm mortgages (“Farm,” line 11) are seasonally adjusting using the Census Bu-
reau’s X-13 program. The series for life insurance companies’ direct holdings
of mortgage debt are constructed from the Federal Reserve Board of Gover-
nors’ historical series on Mortgage Debt Outstanding (Table 1.54). The quar-
terly series for life insurance companies’ holdings of one- to four-family home
mortgages (“One- to four- family residences,” line 13), multifamily mortgages
(“Multifamily residences,” line 14), commercial mortgages (“Nonfarm, nonresi-
dential,” line 15), and farm mortgages (“Farm,” line 16) are seasonally adjusting
using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program. The series for mortgage holdings of
individuals and others are constructed from the Federal Reserve Board of Gov-
ernors’ historical series on Mortgage Debt Outstanding (Table 1.54). The quar-
terly series for individuals’ and others’ holdings of one- to four-family home
mortgages (“One- to four- family residences,” line 76), multifamily mortgages
(“Multifamily residences,” line 77), commercial mortgages (“Nonfarm, nonresi-
dential,” line 78), and farm mortgages (“Farm,” line 79) are seasonally adjusting
using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program.
Quarterly shares of these seasonally adjusted series relative to residential
mortgage debt outstanding are then applied to the monthly frequency series
for seasonally adjusted residential mortgage debt outstanding from Fieldhouse,
Mertens, and Ravn (2018). Holdings of depository institutions include commer-
cial banks, savings banks, and savings and loan associations. Holdings of indi-
viduals and others include that of mortgage companies, real estate investment
trusts, state and local credit agencies, state and local retirement funds, nonin-
sured pension funds, credit unions, and finance companies. Direct mortgage
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debt holdings exclude holdings of agency mortgage pools.
Figure B.7: Historical data on foreign net purchases of agency
bonds and securities are from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Treasury
International Capital Monthly Reports on Cross-Border Portfolio Finan-
cial Flows, available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticsec.aspx. These flow series are not
seasonally adjusted, as they proved overly problematic for the Census Bureau’s
X-13 program, either in raw flows and cumulated levels. Note that agency
bonds and securities include mortgage-backed securities, and net purchases ex-
clude principal payments distributed to holders prior to redemption. Foreign
official holdings include those of central banks, sovereign wealth funds, and
multinational organizations.
Figure B.8: Building permits for new private housing units, housing starts
for privately owned single-unit homes, and new sales of single-unit homes are
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database (series PERMIT,
HOUST1F, and HSN1F). All series are expressed in seasonally adjusted annual
rates.
Tables B.2 and B.3: Data are constructed as detailed for Figures 2.3 and 2.7.
Tables B.4 and B.5: Indices for interstate and intrastate bank regulation
are constructed as the annual population-weighted share of states having en-
acted deregulation, based on the deregulation dates provided by Mian, Sufi and
Verner (2017). Average marginal tax rate series are from Mertens and Montiel
Olea (2018). The conventional monetary policy shock series is the Romer and
Romer (2004) measure of intended changes to the federal funds rate orthogo-
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nalized to Greenbook forecasts of inflation, unemployment, and GDP growth.
Tables B.6 and B.7: Annual data for the conforming loan limit data is con-
structed from various acts of Congress (before the loan limit was indexed to
home prices) and Federal Housing Finance Agency Data, available at https:
//www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/Conforming-Loan-Limits.
aspx. GSE portfolio growth is measured from data constructed as described for
Figure 2.2. GSE agency MBS growth is measured from data constructed as de-
scribed for Figure 2.5.
Figure B.9: Data sources for variables in the benchmark SVAR specification
are as follows: the Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012) updated option-adjusted EBP
is from Simon Gilchrist’s webpage, available at http://people.bu.edu/
sgilchri/Data/data.htm. Monthly seasonally adjusted series for indus-
trial production, privately owned housing starts, the consumer price index for
all urban consumers (CPI-U), federal funds rate, and 10-year Treasury yield are
from FRED (series INDPRO, HOUST, CPIAUCSL, FFR, and GS10, respectively).
Data on real mortgage originations and real GSE net purchases are as described
for Figure 2.2. The conventional mortgage spread is constructed as the conven-
tional mortgage rate series, as described for Figure 2.2, less the 10-year Treasury
yield. The cumulated Fama and French market excess returns index is based on
the Rm-Rf series of the Historical Fama/French Benchmark Factors, retrieved
from Ken French’s data library, available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.
edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html; their index is
calculated as the value-weighted return on all stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ less one-month Treasury yields.
Data sources for additional variables rotated into the SVAR framework, as
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discussed in Section B, are as follows: monthly seasonally adjusted series for
privately owned housing starts for single-unit structures, housing starts for
structures with five unites or more, personal consumption expenditure, and the
civilian unemployment rate are from FRED (series HOUST1F, HOUST5F, PCE,
and U6, respectively). Data series for real GSE mortgage holdings are as de-
scribed for Figure 2.2, for real agency MBS outstanding as described for Figure
B.1, and for the real home price index as described for Figure 2.2. Data se-
ries for real home mortgage debt outstanding, real multifamily mortgage debt
outstanding, and real commercial mortgage debt outstanding are constructed
from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ historical series on Mortgage
Debt Outstanding (Table 1.54). The quarterly series for total mortgage debt out-
standing (“All holders,” line 1), one- to four-family home mortgages (“One-
to four- family residences,” line 2), multifamily mortgages (“Multifamily res-
idences,” line 3), and commercial mortgages (“Nonfarm, nonresidential,” line
4) are seasonally adjusting using the Census Bureau’s X-13 program. Quar-
terly shares of these seasonally adjusted series relative to residential mortgage
debt outstanding (for one- to four-family homes and multifamily homes) are
then applied to the monthly frequency series for seasonally adjusted residen-
tial mortgage debt outstanding. All mortgage lending series have been de-
flated using the core PCE price index. The measure of cumulated GSE ex-
cess stock returns is from Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn (2018) and is con-
structed as a geometrically weighted average of stock returns for Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac less the Fama and French market returns series, Rm, of the
Historical Fama/French Benchmark Factors, retrieved from Ken French’s data
library, which is available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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Figure B.10: Data are constructed as detailed for Figure B.9.
Figure B.11: The Fed’s purchases of agency MBS are as described for Fig-
ure B.2. Monthly time series for the Fed’s purchases of Treasury securities
are constructed from the New York Fed’s Open Market Operations Trans-
action Data, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo_
transaction_data.html. The monthly data series for agency MBS held by
third parties is constructed as total agency MBS outstanding, as described for
Figure B.1, less Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s holdings of their own and other
agency MBS, compiled from Fannie’s Monthly Summary Highlights reports and
Freddie’s Monthly Volume Survey reports, respectively. The federal funds rate
is the effective federal funds rate from FRED (series FEDFUNDS). Data sources
for all other lagged controls are as described for Figure 2.2 or Figure B.9.
The QE event indicator series include the following dates: September 2008
for GSE conservatorship and launch of the U.S. Treasury Department’s agency
MBS purchase program; November 2008 for the November 25 FOMC statement
and launch of QE1; December 2008 for Chairman Bernanke’s December 1 speech
and the December 16 FOMC statement; January 2009 for the January 28 FOMC
statement; March 2009 for the March 18 FOMC statement and expansion of QE1;
August 2010 for the August 10 FOMC statement announcing reinvestment of
principal payments in long-term Treasuries; September 2010 for the September
21 FOMC statement; November 2010 for the November 3 FOMC statement and
launch of QE2; September 2011 for the September 21 FOMC statement announc-
ing reinvestment of principal payments from agency MBS and debt into agency
MBS; September 2012 for the September 13 FOMC statement and launch of QE3;
December 2012 for the December 12 FOMC statement and expansion of QE3;
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December 2013 for the December 18 FOMC statement and tapering of QE3; Oc-
tober 2014 for the October 29 FOMC statement and the termination of QE3; and
September 2017 for the September 20 FOMC statement and launch of balance
sheet normalization policies.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Federal National Mortgage Association, 1934–1967
This appendix provides an overview of major legislative and regulatory
changes affecting Fannie Mae prior to enactment of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968.
National Housing Act of 1934 (Pub. L. 73-479)
Enacted: June 27, 1934
The Act established the legal basis for privileged national mortgage associa-
tions, and in doing so, for the subsequent chartering of FNMA in 1938. Act also
created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), to be run by the Federal
Housing Administrator, as an independent agency, in order to stimulate the
construction sector and employment and to improve housing standards. Sec-
tion 203 of the Act established a system of FHA insurance for qualifying home
mortgages deemed socially or economically desirable, and Section 207 autho-
rized a more flexible program for insuring mortgages for low-income housing.
Before the Great Depression, most mortgages were short-term loans of only
up to five years, required large down payments, with LTVs not exceeding 60%,
and were not self-amortizing (Elliot (2013), pp. 9-10); borrowers would take
out a new mortgage to make their final ballon principal repayment, but this fi-
nancing system imploded when panicked or failing banks stopped making new
loans. The new FHA-insured loans initially imposed maximum LTVs, loan ma-
turities, interest rates, and loan values of 80%, 20 years, 5%, and $16,000, respec-
621
tively, a considerable deviation from the prevailing industry norm. Congress
again loosened these FHA loan requirements in 1938 in order to “support the
housing market during ongoing weakness” (Elliot (2013), p. 10).
Title III of the Act authorized and empowered the the Administrator “to pro-
vide for the establishment of national mortgage associations” which would be autho-
rized “(1) to purchase and sell first mortgages and such other first liens as are commonly
given to secure advances on real estate...” provided the liens had a loan-to-value-
ratio of no more than 80% upon their purchase date, and “(2) to borrow money
for such purposes through the issuance of notes, bonds, debentures, or other such obli-
gations as hereinafter provided” with obligations not to exceed ten times its capital
stock or the current value of assets. Investments were to be restricted to mort-
gage assets, cash and deposits on hand, and Treasury securities. The minimum
capital stock subscription for incorporation of a national mortgage association
was set at $5 million.
The Administration and Congress had intended the National Housing Act
of 1934 to induce the incorporation of legally privileged private national mort-
gage associations, subject to federal supervision but distinct from government
agencies (Haar (1960), p. 78). The associations were to be granted special privi-
leges to induce their incorporation, including exemption from state taxes (save
property taxes) as well as unique regulatory oversight limited to the Adminis-
trator. According to Haar (1960), the intended purpose of the associations was
to accustom “the financial and banking communities to what then appeared a radical
new financing device–the FHA mortgage, which the act also created.” (Haar (1960),
p. 76).
Amendments to Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act (Pub. L. 74-1)
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Enacted: January 31, 1935
With the objective of reestablishing a normal mortgage market, the Act
amended the Reconstruction Finance Corporation’s (RFC) charter to authorize
stock subscriptions and loans for the stock subscriptions of national mortgage
associations, or any other similar financial institutions primarily in the business
of making residential mortgage loans. RFC lending and stock subscriptions un-
der this authorization was capped at $100 million.
Under this new authority, the RFC Mortgage Company was incorporated
by the RFC on March 14, 1935, intended to support a secondary market for
FHA-insured mortgages. The RFC provided an initial capital stock purchase
of $10 million, and purchased an additional $5 million worth of capital stock
in 1936Q3. Between 1935 and 1947, the RFC authorized $373.4 million worth
of loans to the RFC mortgage company, and disbursed $334.9 million of loans.
Loans outstanding to the RFC peaked at $118.8 million in 1944Q2 (Department
of the Treasury (1959), Table MS-2, p. 261).
Amendments to the National Housing Act (Pub. L. 74-76)
Enacted: May 28, 1935
In a further effort to induce the private incorporation of national mortgage
associations, the Act reduced the minimum capital stock required for such asso-
ciations from $5 million to $2 million and increased their permissible leverage
ratios from ten to twelve times their capital stock.
National Housing Act Amendments of 1938 (Pub. L. 75-424)
Enacted: February 3, 1938
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The 1938 amendments to the National Housing Act of 1934 expanded the
struggling FHA mortgage insurance programs to cover certain low principal
loans with maturities of up to 25 years and LTVs of up to 90 percent. In do-
ing so, the Act set in motion the creation of a federal mortgage association,
as it was understood that assistance would be needed to launch such foreign
mortgage contracts (Haar (1960), p. 80). The Act also amended Title III of the
National Housing Act to increase federal national mortgage associations’ per-
missible leverage ratios from twelve to twenty times their capital and surplus,
and reduced the $2 million stock subscription requirement from being fully paid
in to only 25% paid in upfront. And in a last attempt to encourage private in-
corporation, the Act exempted national mortgage associations from all federal
taxation in addition to state taxes (again save property tax). After enactment, a
last effort by the FHA again proved unsuccessfully in luring private capital into
a secondary market for FHA mortgages.
The RFC had been trying to incentivize the incorporation of private mort-
gage associations, and had been authorized to subscribe to common stock, but
“RFC policy had been to offer to buy preferred, leaving to the private investor both
profit and risk. This same stock purchase plan had proved successful in the commer-
cial banking area, but no one appeared willing to accept the risks and profits entailed in
mortgage banking.” (Haar (1960), p. 80). At the president’s request, the National
Mortgage Association of Washington was chartered by the RFC on February 10,
1938, as a wholly owned RFC subsidiary. The Association was re-designated
the Federal National Mortgage Association in April 1938. According to Haar
(1960), the original purpose of FNMA was twofold: “First, it rendered the new
FHA mortgages more desirable by offering an assured market to institutions concerned
with liquidity. The psychological factor was important here: that FNMA was available
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was sufficient to lure into the mortgage market many institutions that actually made
little or no use of FNMA. Second, as anticipated, FNMA facilitated the geographical
spreading of mortgage capital” (Haar (1960), p. 83).
Pursuant to the amendments, the RFC provided $10 million in paid-in cap-
ital and $1 million in surplus; Fannie was authorized to borrow up to twenty
times that cumulative amount, so RFC’s capitalization of Fannie could support
a mortgage portfolio of $231 million (Haar (1960), p. 82 and Klaman (1961), p.
218). Purchases were limited to FHA mortgages and were first made on May 5,
1938. The mortgage portfolio grew rapidly, rising to $80 million by the end of
1938 and $144 million by the end of 1939, before subsequently slowing due to
war restrictions on building activity (Klaman (1961), p. 220, Bartke (1971)).
FNMA was chartered and initially capitalized by the US government in the
midst of the recession that lasted from May 1937 through June 1938. The ac-
companying Senate Committee on Banking and Currency report characterized
the Act’s objective as “to encourage the private construction and financing of housing
on a large scale... in wrestling with the inseparable problems of unemployment relief,
economic recovery, and Budget balancing” and “to utilize the best available means for
achieving a sustained long-term residential construction program with a minimum ex-
penditure of Federal funds and a maximum reliance upon private business enterprise”
(Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (1937), pp. 1, 4). Similarly, Kla-
man (1961) noted that FNMA was originally charted “against a background of
federal efforts to stimulate housing construction, building materials production, and
mortgage investments following the unprecedented decline during the Great Depres-
sion,” (Klaman (1961), p. 217).
National Housing Act Amendments of 1941 (Pub. L. 77-24)
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Enacted: March 28, 1941
The amendments to the National Housing Act added Title VI–Defense Hous-
ing Insurance, which authorized FHA insurance on more generous terms in crit-
ical defense areas. The amendments also authorized Fannie to purchase FHA
mortgages insured under Title VI. Fannie’s overall purchase authorization did
not change.
1948 Amendments to the National Housing Act and Servicemen’s Readjust-
ment Act (Pub. L. 80-864)
Enacted: July 1, 1948
Shortly after the GI Bill of 1944 authorized a VA mortgage guarantee pro-
gram, the RFC Mortgage Company was tasked with supporting a secondary
market for those loans (Pub. L. 696-79, enacted August 7, 1946). Congress, how-
ever, disbanded the RFC Mortgage Company the following year, and, along
with it, all secondary mortgage market support for VA-guaranteed loans (Pub.
L. 132-80, enacted June 30, 1947). The need for a secondary market was quickly
made apparent, and strongly influenced the drafting of the housing amend-
ments of 1948 (Haar (1960), pp. 88-90). VA loans had been declining, aggra-
vated by a widening spread between their fixed 4% rate and market interest
rates, so Congress amended Fannie’s charter in a manner intended to stimulate
their flows (Klaman (1961), p. 54).
The Act reorganized Fannie Mae under a new charter and prohibited the
formation of private mortgage associations envisioned in the National Hous-
ing Act of 1934. It authorized secondary market purchases of VA-guaranteed
mortgages with restrictions, although none were purchased until fiscal year (FY)
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1950 (Bartke (1971), p. 21). The principle balance for an eligible mortgage was
restricted to $10,000, which was lower than the FHA insurance limit of $16,000
(FNMA (1969), p. A38). The amended charter, however, only permitted FNMA
to purchase up to one-quarter of the FHA or VA loan value originated by the
lender.
In anticipation of Fannie’s expansion into the VA market, the Act also in-
creased FNMA’s capitalization by $10 million to $21 million (again provided by
the RFC) and raised its borrowing capacity from 20 to 40 times its capital and
earned surplus.
The accompanying committee report emphasized the need for a permanent
secondary market for VA mortgages, the principal reason for the passage of the
1948 Amendments (Haar (1960), p. 90). Between FNMA’s first reorganization
by the Act and a second reorganization under the National Housing Act of 1954
(Pub. L. 83-560), FNMA principally served as “special support for government
sponsored housing and mortgage programs, which were not acceptable in private finan-
cial markets,” and VA mortgages accounted for the bulk of purchases (Klaman
(1961), p. 220).
Housing Act of 1948 (Pub. L. 80-901)
Enacted: August 10, 1948
The Act loosened a restrictive provision in FNMA’s recently amended char-
ter to allow Fannie to purchase up to half of the FHA or VA loan value origi-
nated by the lender, which had been capped at one-quarter of the loan by the
July 1948 housing amendments (Pub. L. 80-864). According to Klaman (1961),
“the intended stimulus [to VA loans] was largely nullified” by the purchase limitation
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of only up to one-fourth of VA and FHA loans, hence the subsequent loosening
shortly after enactment of the 1948 amendments (Klaman (1961) p. 54). The
restriction would be fully repealed just over a year later.
Public Law 81-176
Enacted July 19, 1949
On July 6, 1949, FNMA approached so close to reaching its borrowing limit
that it was forced to suspend further commitments to purchase mortgages. This
was a blow to the VA-guaranteed mortgage market, and Congress promptly
increased FNMA’s authorization (Haar (1960), p. 92). The bill replaced Fannie’s
standing leverage restrictions with a flat limit of $1.5 billion on the total volume
of assets and commitments outstanding (FNMA (1969), p. C2), to the effect of
increasing Fannie’s purchase capacity by roughy $500 million.
Private mortgage finance was particularly weak in 1949, and VA loans bore
the brunt of reduced lending (Klaman (1961), p. 113). The increase in FNMA’s
portfolio limit was made midst of the recession that lasted from November 1948
through October 1949. The January 1950 Economic Report of the President ar-
gued that further stimulus was needed to stabilize housing production, view-
ing the “maintenance of a high and growing level of private investment in housing as
perhaps the most important issue in connection with the maintenance of a total level
of investment high enough to support maximum employment and production over the
next few years” (Economic Report of the President (1950), p. 93). The bill was in-
tended as a stopgap measure, as the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
stated that it intended to consider more permanent legislation (Haar (1960), p.
93).
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National Housing Act Amendments of 1949 (Pub. L. 81-211)
Enacted: August 8, 1949
The amendments to the National Housing Act added Title VIII–Military
Housing Insurance, meant to encourage construction of rental housing for mil-
itary and defense areas. The FHA’s Title VI program for critical defense areas
had been repealed one year earlier. The Act also authorized Fannie to purchase
FHA mortgages insured under Title VIII, while Fannie’s overall purchase au-
thorization was unchanged.
Public Law 81-387
Enacted: October 25, 1949
By September 30, 1949, the remaining capacity from July’s increased pur-
chase authorization of $500 million had dwindled to $149 million (Haar (1960),
p. 93). Market interest rates were rising, and the 4% interest rate ceiling on
VA loans was preventing the attraction of adequate private capital. Congress’s
answer was to continue to pump money into Fannie. Public Law 81-387 in-
creased FNMA’s authorization by $1 billion to a total of up to $2.5 billion, and
removed some restrictions on the purchase of VA loans, including the 50% limi-
tation on purchases of mortgagees’ holdings. RFC funding was correspondingly
increased by $1 billion. In practice, Fannie fast again neared its statutory limits
and stopped issuing commitments in March 1950.
The increase in FNMA’s portfolio limit was made at the tail end of the re-
cession that lasted from November 1948 through October 1949. The January
1950 Economic Report of the President framed housing policy and the desire to
increase residential investment as important stimulus for supporting full em-
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ployment (see above).
Housing Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-475)
Enacted: April 20, 1950
Lending through Fannie and the RFC could not continue to expand indef-
initely. In the 1951 Budget, President Truman stated: “The continuing need for
a stand-by secondary market does not mean that Government purchases should be re-
garded as a permanent substitute for private financing. Accordingly, the administration
of this program will be directed toward encouraging private lenders to hold a larger por-
tion of these mortgages as well as to repurchase the mortgages previously sold to the
Federal Government” (Budget for Fiscal Year 1951, p. M-51). But it was projected
that Fannie’s standing $2.5 billion authorization would be exhausted by July
1950, and the President recommended an additional $500 million in public debt
authorizations for FY1950 and $250 million for FY1951, to carry through on the
large volume of commitments already outstanding.
The Housing Act of 1950 eventually increased FNMA’s portfolio authoriza-
tion by $250 million to $2.75 billion, short of the increase proposed by the Pres-
ident. The Act also expanded eligibility for Fannie’s purchases to include FHA
mortgages insured under Section 8 (low cost housing) and Section 213 (cooper-
ative housing) of the National Housing Act. Lastly, FNMA was authorized to
charge mortgagees a fee of 1% of the amount of a mortgage purchased.
In order to stop Fannie’s uncontrolled growth, the Act simultaneously lim-
ited purchases to mortgages guaranteed or insured at the time of the contract,
with the effect of revoking authority to issue advance commitments to pur-
chase mortgages. This ban on advanced commitments, however, was short
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lived. Public Law 81-243, enacted October 30, 1950, allowed $30 million of ad-
vance commitments outstanding at any time for the specific relief of veterans
who had obtained FHA commitments but could not get mortgages following
the ban (Haar (1960), p. 67). The Defense Housing and Community Facili-
ties and Services Act (Public Law 82-139), enacted September 1, 1951, restored
advance commitments authorization to $200 million outstanding for purchase
of mortgages backed by “emergency” housing in critical defense areas, disas-
ter areas, and for military use housing under Title VIII of the National Housing
Act. Public Law 82-309, enacted April 9, 1952, increased advance commitments
authorization by $52 million to $252 million outstanding at any given time.
Reorganization Plan No. 22 of 1950.
Approved: June 20, 1950
This presidential reorganization plan moved authority over Fannie Mae
from the RFC to the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the overseer of the
FHA at the time, effective September 7, 1950 (Bartke (1971), p. 21). The objec-
tive was to improve coordination of federal housing programs (Hagerty (2012),
p. 29). There was no change in Fannie’s purchase authorization.
Suspension of Non-Emergency Mortgage Purchases
Announced: April 1952
Having exhausted its funding authorization for non-defense mortgage pur-
chases, FNMA announced in April 1952 that it was suspending all purchases of
mortgages unrelated to emergency types of housing (Haar (1960), p. 99).
Housing Act of 1952 (Pub. L. 82-531)
Enacted: July 14, 1952
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The Act was designed to aid military housing and increased FNMA’s pur-
chase authorization by $900 million to $3.65 billion. The increased authority
could only be used to purchases related to critical defense, disaster, and mil-
itary housing. Purchases of other types of mortgages, in practice mostly VA
mortgages, remained limited to $2.75 billion, and were thus notionally restricted
to funds available from sales, repayments, foreclosure sales, and funds held for
purchases under previously issued commitment contracts. In practice, how-
ever, $600 million of former authority had been set aside for defense purposes,
such that the effect was to free this amount for non-defense mortgages (Haar
(1960), p. 99). According to Klaman (1961), the Act had the effect of freeing
$362 million previously reserved for defense, military, and disaster housing for
the purchase of other mortgages (Klaman (1961), p. 65). The Act also further
expanded Fannie’s advance commitment authority from $252 million to $1.152
billion. Purchases of non-emergency mortgages were resumed in September
1952.
The January 1952 Economic Report of the President indicated that govern-
ment policy for 1952 would aim to decrease housing starts to 850,000 or less,
down from 1.1 million in 1951 and 1.4 million in 1950, in order to prioritize
resources for the defense industry and the escalation of the Korean conflict (Jan-
uary Economic Report of the President (1952), pp. 8-11). The administration
was fully supportive of selective credit controls being administered by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, pursuant to the Defense Production Act, to limit credit for
housing and consumer durables. But the report also noted that “A serious need
has already appeared for additional housing and community facilities and services in de-
fense areas,” recommending additional aid to critical defense areas beyond those
recently provided (January Economic Report of the President (1952), p. 17).
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The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency report accompanying the
Act stated that the bill was principally intended to carry out the objectives of
the Defense Housing and Community Facilities and Services Act of 1951, which
was designed to assist the provision of housing for military personal and de-
fense workers in critical areas for the war effort. It was also reported that pri-
vate mortgage lenders perceived elevated marketability risk with these defense-
related mortgages, and private loans would not be originated without FNMA
advance commitments.
Housing Amendments of 1953 (Pub. L. 83-94)
Enacted: June 30, 1953
After effectively exhausting the increase in purchase authority from the
Housing Act of 1952, FNMA again announced on April 10, 1953 that it was
suspending purchases of non-emergency FHA/VA mortgages (Haar (1960), p.
100). The Act extended FNMA’s advance commitment authorization for defense
and disaster mortgages through July 1, 1954, but left overall purchase authority
unchanged. But the bill repealed the restriction that no more than $2.75 bil-
lion of purchase authority be used related to mortgages other than for defense,
disaster, and military housing, in effect freeing the remaining $900 million in
additional authorization for purchases of non-emergency mortgages. The ac-
companying Senate Committee on Banking and Currency report estimated that
$200 million of the $900 million authorization would probably not be needed
for such purchases, and would thus be freed for over-the-counter purchases of
FHA/VA mortgages when FNMA resumed such purchases (Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency (1953), p. 10). FNMA quickly resumed over-the-
counter purchases of non-emergency FHA/VA mortgages.
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The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency Report accompanying the
Act stated that the bill was principally concerned with “amendments to the hous-
ing acts which are urgently needed and which will aid and facilitate in the maintenance
of a high level of residential construction.” (Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency (1953), p. 1). But the urgency of the legislative action derived from prior
legislative sunsets, not economic conditions: Federal authority to make mort-
gage purchases and enter new commitments would have expired on June 30,
the day of enactment, if the bill had not been signed into law (CQ (1954)). The
report also emphasized the objective of improving housing as “a basic factor in
our ability to maintain a healthy and expanding economy.” The August 1953 Federal
Reserve Bulletin’s report on residential real estate developments noted strong
housing demand, record construction activity, and record real estate credit flows
in the first half of the year (FRB August 1953, pp. 810–812).
Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act (Pub. L. 83-560)
Enacted: August 2, 1954
Title II of the National Housing Act of 1954, designated the Federal National
Mortgage Association Charter Act, rechartered a nearly bankrupted Fannie Mae
into a three-part corporation, separating a special assistance function, man-
agement and liquidations of Fannie’s existing portfolio, and secondary mar-
ket operations. Fannie was separately accountable for each of these. The spe-
cial assistance function was to be entirely supported by loans from the Trea-
sury, and amounted to a direct government lending program—at the Presi-
dent’s discretion—for certain FHA loans that were not generally acceptable
to investors, primarily because of their low interest rates. Management and
liquidations operations were set up to dispose of Fannie Mae’s previously
634
amassed mortgage portfolio in an orderly fashion, although related mortgage
purchases continued for many months because of prior outstanding commit-
ments. Lastly, secondary market operations were to continue supporting the
market for FHA/VA guaranteed mortgages and also serve to stabilize the mort-
gage market. The 1956 Budget stated that the purpose of the secondary market
activities was to ensure that mortgage funds were available at market interest
rates to meet normal needs in all parts of the country (Budget for Fiscal Year
1956, p. M-75). Purchases and sales were to be made only at such prices as
would prevent excessive use of Fannie’s secondary market facilities and permit
Fannie to operate on a fully self-supporting basis.
The Act turned Fannie Mae into a mixed-ownership corporation by requir-
ing authorized mortgagees to purchase Association common stock, while the
federal government retained its preferred stock, with ownership transferred
from the RFC to Treasury. Prior to this rechartering, funding for Fannie’s ac-
tivities came almost exclusively from the Treasury or RFC.1 The Act also autho-
rized Fannie to issue debt in capital markets in order to fund secondary market
and management and liquidity operations. The secondary market function was
granted standby powers to borrow up to $500 million from the Treasury plus
the sum of repayments of principal and cancelation of commitments from the
management and liquidation functions, but not to collectively exceed $1 billion.
The new financing provisions envisaged an eventual full privatization of Fannie
Mae, but provided neither a deadline nor mechanism for the transition (Hagerty
(2012), p. 32; Haar (1960), pp. 101–125; Bartke (1971), pp. 22–29).
The Act left the total authorization for outstanding assets and commitments
1Between 1938 and 1950, only two relatively small series of obligations were issued to the
public (FNMA (1969) p. A-13).
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under previously authorized programs unchanged at $3.65 billion, but appor-
tioned this authority across the newly separated functions. The Act limited total
authorized investments, loans, purchases, and commitments under the special
assistance program at $300 million.2 Management and liquidations function
were authorized up to the remaining $3.35 billion. Fannie’s outstanding $3.0
billion mortgage portfolio was to be gradually liquidated and replaced with the
new secondary market operations (Haar (1960), p. 110), although prior com-
mitments forced continued purchases instead of an immediate net drawdown.
The dollar limitation on the amount of the mortgage that could be purchased
under the special assistance and secondary market functions was set at $15,000
(FNMA (1969), p. A38), up from the previous $10,000 limit. Purchases were
also limited to a maximum of one-half of mortgagees’ VA originations and one-
fourth of their FHA originations (Klaman (1961), p. 221).
To fund the new secondary market facility, $93 million in preferred stock
was issued to the Treasury—equal to the sum of the initial $21 million cap-
italization plus accumulated earned surpluses. Authorized mortgagees were
required to purchase common stock of at least 3% of the unpaid principal of
mortgages sold (Klaman (1961), p. 221). The secondary market facility was au-
thorized to issue unguaranteed debt in private capital markets up to ten times
the sum of Fannie’s capital, surpluses, reserves, and undistributed earnings. As
purchases under the secondary market function were not subject to the prior
portfolio limitations apportioned between special assistance and management
and liquidations functions, obligations for secondary mortgage market could
support a mortgage portfolio of up to $1.02 billion ($93 million × (10+1) = $1.02
2Eligible mortgages for purchase under special assistance programs included those financing
housing in Alaska and Guam, housing in defense or military programs, and for victims of major
disasters, cooperative housing projects, or urban renewal program housing.
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billion). However, activity was not expected to approach this level very quickly,
as only mortgages insured or guaranteed on or after August 2, 1954 were ini-
tially eligible for purchase.
Following this rechartering, FNMA took to issuing one-year standby com-
mitments to purchase mortgages. Mortgagees would pay a fee for such a com-
mitment, and mortgages would be purchased at a slight haircut relative to the
going market rate. But mortgagees had the option not to call in standby com-
mitments.
The Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act completely over-
hauled Title III of the National Housing Act, and in doing so, newly established
a statutory purpose for Fannie. Three subsequent landmark reforms of US fed-
eral housing credit policy would later revise Fannie’s statutory purposes, and
all four offer considerable insight to congressional intent and the evolution of
policy priorities.3 The FNMA Charter Act of 1954 set the following statutory
purpose for Fannie (emphasis added):
“SEC. 301. The Congress hereby declares that the purposes of this title are to establish in
the Federal Government a secondary market facility for home mortgages, to provide that
the operations of such facility shall be financed by private capital to the maximum extent
feasible, and to authorize such facility to “(a) provide supplementary assistance to
the secondary market for home mortgages by providing a degree of liquidity for
mortgage investments, thereby improving the distribution of investment capi-
tal available for home mortgage financing; “(b) provide special assistance (when,
and to the extent that, the President has determined that it is in the public interest)
3The subsequent three acts were the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (Pub. L.
90-448), Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (Pub. L. 101-73),
and Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 102-550).
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for the financing of (1) selected types of home mortgages (pending the establishment
of their marketability) originated under special housing programs designed to provide
housing of acceptable standards at full economic costs for segments of the na-
tional population which are unable to obtain adequate housing under estab-
lished home financing programs, and (2) home mortgages generally as a means of
retarding or stopping a decline in mortgage lending and home building activi-
ties which threatens materially the stability of a high level national economy;
and “(c) manage and liquidate the existing mortgage portfolio of the Federal National
Mortgage Association in an orderly manner, with a minimum of adverse effect upon the
home mortgage market and minimum loss to the Federal Government.”
Of note, the secondary market was intended as a policy mechanism to improve
liquidity and redirect housing credit flows without any caveat about business or
financial cycle conditions, whereas the special assistance functions were statu-
torily intended, at the President’s discretion, to either play a countercyclical role
or advance various social and/or defense housing policy objectives supporting
underserved mortgage markets.
President Eisenhower’s remarks upon signing the Act emphasized social
policy objectives and longer-term policy goals: “It will raise the housing standards
of our people, help our communities get rid of slums and improve their older neighbor-
hoods, and strengthen our mortgage credit system. In coming years it will also strongly
stimulate the nation’s construction industry and our country’s entire economy... by
this new law we have made a major advance toward meeting America’s housing needs”
(Eisenhower (1954)).
Housing Amendments of 1955 (Pub. L. 84-345)
Enacted: August 11, 1955
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The Act created two new special assistance functions, to be managed by
Congress rather than executive order, for Fannie to enter commitments to pur-
chase FHA mortgages insured under Section 213 (cooperative housing) and Sec-
tion 803 (armed services housing). This new special assistance authority was
limited to $50 million for cooperative housing and $200 million for armed ser-
vices housing. The increased funding levels did not appear to be cyclically mo-
tivated.
Housing Act of 1956 (Pub. L. 84-1020)
Enacted: August 7, 1956
The Act repealed the limitation on total authorizations for the management
and liquidations and special assistance functions set by the 1954 Charter Act,
although the special assistance authority limitation was not repealed. This ef-
fectively removed the portfolio limitations for just the management and liqui-
dations function, as secondary market functions remained limited by restric-
tion on obligations imposed by the National Housing Act of 1954. FNMA was
additionally authorized to issue one-year “standby” commitments to purchase
mortgages (Klaman (1961), p. 72). The Act also authorized FNMA to lower the
stock purchase requirement for mortgagee counter parties from 3 to 2%, and to
1% under limited circumstances (Klaman (1961), p. 72). Permissible secondary
market purchases were loosened from mortgages at par to those ‘within the
range of market prices.’
Limitation on Purchases of Older Mortgages
Announced: November 1956
As part of a coordinated effort to encourage new home production, FNMA
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announced in November 1956 that it would limit and reduce purchases of mort-
gages that had been guaranteed or insured more than four months ago (Klaman
(1961), p. 72).
Pub. L. 85-10
Enacted: March 27, 1957
The Act authorized and directed Fannie to issue an additional $50 million
in preferred stock, to be delivered to the Treasury, which was directed to ac-
cept said stock. The effect was to increase Treasury’s preferred stock holdings
of FNMA up to $142.8 million. Based on the existing cap on debt obligations of
ten times capital, the injection effectively increased secondary mortgage market
purchase capacity by $550 million ($50 million × (10 + 1) = $550 million). The
Act additionally increased the supplemental special assistance function autho-
rization for commitments for and purchases of Section 213 FHA-insured mort-
gages (cooperative housing) by an additional $50 million. The total increase in
Fannie’s purchase capacity was therefore $600 million. The Act also increased
the limitation on Treasury’s purchases of Fannie obligations to $1.35 billion.
The accompanying Senate Committee on Banking and Currency report em-
phasized the urgent, stopgap nature of the bill: “[t]he purpose of the resolution
is to provide immediate assistance on an interim basis to the secondary market opera-
tion of [FNMA]” (Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (1957a), p. 1).
The Committee estimated that without the “immediate relief ” provided by the
Act, FNMA’s purchase program would come to an abrupt halt in early March—
precisely what the bill was trying to prevent (Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency (1957a), p. 2). It was noted that FNMA’s secondary market facilities
had come under severe strain as “pressure upon available investment capital tight-
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ened steadily during 1956” (Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (1957a),
p. 1). Lastly, the report noted that the “the resolution is a stopgap measure” and
that the $50 million capitalization increase fell short of the administration’s re-
quested $100 million increase, intended by the administration to be a “long-
term solution,” but viewed as inadequate by the committee (Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency (1957a), p. 3).
Housing Act of 1957 (Pub. L. 85-104)
Enacted: July 12, 1957
The Act directed Fannie to issue an additional $65 million in preferred shares
to the Treasury Department, effective immediately, thereby increasing Trea-
sury’s preferred stock holdings to $207.8 million. Based on the existing cap
on debt obligations of ten times capital, the authorization effectively increased
secondary mortgage market purchase capacity by $715 million ($65 million ×
(10 + 1) = $715 million). In addition, the President’s general special assistance
authority was increased by $150 million to $450 million. The Act also increased
the supplemental special assistance function authorization for commitments for
and purchases of Section 213 FHA-insured mortgages (cooperative housing)
from $100 million to $200 million and mortgages insured under Title VIII of
the National Housing Act (armed services housing) from $200 million to $450
million. The total increase in Fannie’s purchase authority was therefore $1.215
billion. The Act additionally increased the limitation on the Treasury’s pur-
chases of Fannie obligations by $900 million, from $1.35 billion to $2.25 billion,
where it would remain until Fannie was taken into conservatorship during the
Great Recession.
The accompanying committee report made clear that the increase in FNMA’s
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borrowing authority was motivated by temporary stabilization concerns, “an at-
tempt to stabilize the market for federally underwritten mortgages and to prevent the
continuing decline in housing starts and applications” (Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency (1957b), p. 8). The increase in the Treasury Department’s au-
thority to lend to FNMA was viewed as complementary to increasing Fannie’s
borrowing capacity, and report language noted that the line of credit “provides
assurance to private investors that FNMA has available a source of liquid funds which
may be used to purchase maturing debentures” (Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency (1957a), p. 8). The conference committee report explained that the
“Treasury ‘backstop’” was increased to match FNMA’s total purchase authority,
which was expanded to $2.25 billion by the Act (House Committee on Banking
and Currency (1957), p. 16).
Emergency Housing Act of 1958 (Pub. L. 85-364)
Enacted: April 1, 1958
The Act, of stated purpose “to stimulate residential construction,” increased
the President’s general special assistance authority by $500 million to $950 mil-
lion. The Act also increased the supplemental special assistance function au-
thorization for purchases of mortgages insured under Title VIII of the National
Housing Act by $50 million to $500 million.4 The act additionally created a new
special assistance authority function for purchases of mortgages for low- and
moderately priced housing insured under Title II of the National Housing Act
or guaranteed under the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, with $1 billion
authorized to be outstanding at any given time. The total increase in Fannie’s
purchase authority was therefore $1.55 billion.
4An additional program had been recently established under Title VIII: Section 809 mortgage
insurance for civilian owner-occupied housing for employees of military R&D instillations (Pub.
L. 84-574, enacted June 13, 1956).
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The increase in FNMA’s portfolio limit was enacted at the tail end of the
recession that lasted from August 1957 through April 1958. The Act, and partic-
ularly the additional special assistance purchase authorizations, were seen as “a
way to spur housing during a recession” (Hagerty (2012), p. 34). This near-term,
countercyclical emphasis was underscored by the accompanying Senate com-
mittee report, which explained the bill was “designed to encourage and expedite
the construction and financing of a substantial number of new housing units” (Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency (1958), p. 1).
Housing Act of 1959 (Pub. L. 86-372)
Enacted: September 23, 1959
The Act increased the supplemental special assistance function authoriza-
tion for purchases of Section 213 FHA-insured mortgages (cooperative housing)
by $25 million to $225 million. The statutory limitation on the amount of the
mortgage purchased under the special assistance functions was also increased
from $15,000 to $17,500, while the loan purchase limit for secondary market
functions was increased from $15,000 to $20,000 (FNMA (1969), pp. A38–A39).
The accompanying Senate Committee on Banking and Currency report char-
acterized the Act as primarily motivated to address “urban renewal and low-rent
public housing,” and made clear that the bill was the result of a multi-year de-
liberative process, as opposed to an emergency response (Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency (1959), p. 1). In testimony before the Housing Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Federal Reserve Chair-
man William Martin expressed concerns that the inflationary impact of strong
post-war housing activity growth was intensifying, and that mortgage credit
was dominating capital markets (FRB August 1959, p. 882). He also cautioned
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against certain proposed provisions of the Act, notably discretionary decreases
in down payments for FHA loans, “at this time when mortgage lending and housing
starts are at or near record levels and when growing pressures in the capital markets are
being reflected in high and rising interest rates.”
Housing Act of 1961 (Pub. L. 87-70)
Enacted: June 30, 1961
The Act increased the special assistance authority under the direction of the
President from $950 million to $2.05 billion outstanding at any time, through
several channels: a general increase of $750 million to $1.7 billion; a further in-
crease of $207 million resulting from the transfer of remaining commitment and
purchase authority for low- and moderately priced housing granted by Public
Law 85-364 (the Act terminated this special assistance function); and an increase
of $139.4 million, equal to the net decrease in mortgage positions under manage-
ment and liquidation functions for FY1961 (FNMA (1969), p. C8). The Act also
provided for further increases in each of the fiscal years 1962-1964 by the net de-
crease in mortgage positions under the management and liquidation functions.
Ignoring the reshuffling of the preexisting low-income assistance authorization,
the total immediate increase in purchase capacity would have been $889 million.
In his remarks upon signing the Act, President Kennedy hailed the bill as
“the most important and far-reaching Federal legislation in the field of housing since
the enactment of the Housing Act of 1949,” enabling communities and developers
to “build the cities of tomorrow where families can live in dignity, free from both the
squalor of the slums and the unbroken monotony of suburban sprawl” with emphasis
on “long-term development of this country” (Kennedy (1961)). Neither his remarks
nor the bill’s accompanying committee reports made mention of countercyclical
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motivations or other short-term policy objectives. The Federal Reserve Bulletin
also underscored that many of the Act’s provisions “are necessarily long-term in
character” (FRB December 1961, pp. 1383–84).
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 (Pub. L. 89-117)
Enacted: August 10, 1965
The Act legislated four staggered increases in the President’s special assis-
tance authority: an increase of $100 million upon enactment; an additional in-
crease of $450 million on July 1, 1966; an additional $550 million on July 1, 1967;
and an additional $525 million on July 1, 1968. The Act further increased general
special assistance authority by an amount equivalent to what would otherwise
be available for new commitments and purchases of mortgages under Title VIII
of the National Housing Act, with $107.5 million transferred effective upon en-
actment.5
The accompanying conference committee report characterized the Act as pri-
marily motivated to “to assist in the provision of housing for moderate- and low-
income families, to promote orderly urban development, to improve living environment
in urban areas, and to extend and amend laws relating to housing, urban renewal, and
community facilities” (House Committee on Banking and Currency (1965), p. 1).
In his remarks upon signing the Act, President Johnson emphasized new ap-
proaches to serving disadvantaged populations: “The importance of the bill is not
only that it retains and improves the best of good and traditional programs; it is a land-
mark bill because of its new ideas. Foremost and uppermost of these is the program
of assistance for the construction and the rehabilitation of housing for the elderly and
5An additional program had been recently established under Title VIII: Section Section 810
mortgage insurance for off-base housing of military and essential civilian armed services per-
sonal (Pub. L. 86-372, enacted September 23, 1959).
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for families of low income—the people who live in the most wretched conditions in our
slums and our blighted neighborhoods” (Johnson (1965)). His remarks made no
mention of countercyclical motivation or other short-term policy objectives.
Loan Limit Decrease of 1966
Ordered: April 2, 1966
Public Law 88-560, enacted on September, 2 1964, had eliminated the statu-
tory maximum limitation on the mortgage amount under the secondary market
function. On April 2, 1966, the loan limit under the secondary market was ad-
ministratively reduced from $20,000 to $15,000 “to reduce the volume of mortgages
then being offered for purchase and to conserve Corporation funds” (FNMA (1969),
p. A39). The Federal Reserve Bulletin noted that secondary market offerings of
FHA/VA mortgages and Fannie’s aggregate mortgage holdings had hit record
highs, as mortgage credit was becoming tight, and FNMA was trying to pre-
serve cash (FRB May 1966, pp. 644–645).
Participation Sales Act of 1966 (Pub. L. 89-429)
Enacted: May 24, 1966
The Act authorized Fannie Mae to package and sell participation certificates
(PCs) backed by pools of loans and obligations made or acquired by other Fed-
eral credit agencies. Funds raised by PC issues on agencies’ behalf would be
available to those agencies to meet loan demands, thus reducing their reliance
on borrowing or advances from the Treasury. Agencies’ PC issues would re-
quire approval by an appropriation bill, and such approval would direct the
Treasury to provide payment to FNMA for any PC insufficiencies (e.g., if PC
interest payments exceeded the interest borne by the agencies’ underlying obli-
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gations). The Act would soon serve as the statutory basis for Ginnie Mae’s MBS
program after the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 split GNMA
off from FNMA (see GNMA, Section 4.3). The Act also repealed the pending
$450 million increase in the President’s special assistance authority, authorized
by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, scheduled to take effect
on July 1, 1966.
The Act’s stated objective was to “to promote private financing of credit needs
and to provide for an efficient and orderly method of liquidating financial assets held
by Federal credit agencies,” and the bill was intended as “a major step in a shift
from public to private financing of governmentally sponsored credit programs (Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency (1966), pp. 1–2). But in the short-run, the
bill was also clearly motivated by trying to reduce Treasury’s debt issues. The
accompanying committee report explained that “borrowing needs of the Govern-
ment are expected to be large in the year ahead” and in the prevailing interest rate
environment, the Treasury would not be able to issue additional long-term debt
except at rates above a prevailing 4.25% statutory cap.
That report also shed light on the privileged status of agency PCs, threading
the needle between an explicit Treasury guaranteed versus de facto backing,
while moving agencies’ financing off the federal balance sheet and out from
under the federal debt ceiling: “The underlying obligations will be guaranteed by
the agency establishing the trust, and timely payments of principal and interest on the
certificates will be guaranteed by FNMA. FNMA’s guarantee in turn is supported by
borrowing authority from the US Treasury. Although the participation certificates will
not be full faith and credit obligations of the United States, as a practical matter the
moral obligation of the Government to back up these participation certificates is entirely
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clear. Because they are not Government obligations, they will be subject to State tax-
ation, including State income taxes. They will be eligible securities to support Federal
Government deposits. Since they are not Government obligations, they will not be sub-
ject to the Federal debt ceiling and they will not be subject to the 4.25-percent interest
ceiling on Government bonds of 5 years or more” (Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency (1966), p. 3).
Public Law 89-566
Enacted: September 10, 1966
The Act increased the cap on FNMA’s secondary market facility leverage
from 10 to 15 times its capital, surpluses, reserves, and undistributed earnings.
The Act also increased the authorization for preferred stock issued to the Trea-
sury by an additional $110 million. Using 1965 year end capital of approxi-
mately $415 million (FNMA Semi-Annual Report December 1965), the capital
injection and leverage increase supported an expansion in the secondary mar-
ket portfolio of up to $3.84 billion ($415 million × (15-10) + $110 million × (15+1)
= $3.84 billion). The Act also increased special assistance authority for purchases
of mortgages for low- and moderately priced housing insured under Title II of
the National Housing Act or guaranteed under the Servicemen’s Readjustment
Act of 1944 by $1 billion, with half this sum deriving from $500 in new purchase
and commitment authorization and the other $500 million transferred from a
reduction in the President’s general special assistance authority. Thus special
assistance function purchase authority was increased on net by $500 million.
The use of these special assistance funds were restricted to the purchase of mort-
gages for homes constructed after the date of enactment.
The 1967 Economic Report of the President explained that monetary tighten-
648
ing in 1966, intended to slow an overheated economy, had driven interest rates
to 40-year highs, inducing a particularly sharp decline in residential construc-
tion activity (Economic Report of the President (1967), p. 6). By mid-1966, a
steep drop in net savings flows to thrifts and a general credit crunch were drag-
ging at housing starts and construction activity (FRB September 1967, p. 1481).
The accompanying conference report stated that the Act’s purpose was to “stim-
ulate the flow of mortgage credit for Federal Housing Administration and Veterans’ Ad-
ministration assisted residential construction” (House Committee on Banking and
Currency (1966), p. 1). In the same vein, the CQ Almanac characterized the bill
as intended to ameliorate the effect of tight monetary conditions on the housing
market: “A pronounced slump in the housing industry was one of the most serious
imbalances in the economy during 1966. S 3688 was intended to somewhat relieve this
condition” (CQ (1967)).
Loan Limit Increase in 1966, Elimination in 1967
Announced: October 4, 1966; February 3, 1967
With the increase in FNMA’s purchase authorization pursuant to Public Law
89-566, Fannie was able to reverse course from conserving cash back to expand-
ing purchases in support of the distressed mortgage market. The loan limit was
increased on October 4, 1966 to $25,000 for new construction and to $17,500 for
existing homes. On November 2, 1966, the ceiling on existing homes was in-
creased back to $20,000.
On February 3, 1967, Fannie removed its standing loan limits for eligible
secondary market mortgage purchases, which had been reduced from $20,000
to $15,000 in April 1966, and established that it would instead purchase FHA-
insured mortgages up to FHA’s loan limit. The loan limit for Section 203(b)
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mortgages had most recently been increased from $25,000 to $30,000 by the
Housing Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-560, enacted September 2, 1964). Unlike FHA
mortgages, VA-guaranteed mortgages were not limited by a statutory ceiling,
but various administrative purchase limitations were periodically imposed on
loan size or the non-guaranteed portion of VA mortgages (see FNMA (1969), p.
A40).
The Federal Reserve Bulletin noted that FNMA’s net mortgage purchases
had declined in late 1966 and early 1967, and that private mortgage market
conditions had improved. FNMA also raised its purchase price in February
and March 1967 “in an effort to stimulate housing activity further” (FRB September
1967, p. 1481). Offerings to FNMA started to pick up in May 1967, when private
market mortgage rates started to decline in line with other market rates.
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